MURILLO-CASTILLO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WASHINGTON MURILLO- Civil Action No. 25-16728 (MCA)

CASTILLO,

Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

v.

JONATHAN FLORENTINO, et al.,

Respondents.

This matter comes before the Court on a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241, in which Petitioner Washington Murillo-Castillo challenges his mandatory

detention without bond by immigration authorities. At issue in this habeas proceeding is whether

Petitioner may be lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) after he was arrested in the

interior of the United States following a period of parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). For the

reasons explained below, the Court finds that Petitioner is unlawfully detained under § 1225(b)(1),

GRANTS the Petition on that basis, and orders Respondents to release Petitioner from detention

within 24 hours. The Court dismisses the Amended Petition and motions for temporary injunctive

relief as moot in light of the relief provided.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a 38-year-old citizen and national of Ecuador. (ECF No. 1, Petition at ¶ 1.)

“On or about October 13, 2022, [Petitioner] was encountered by Customs and Border Protection

(“CBP”) in Laredo, Texas. After stating that he would be harmed if returned to Ecuador, he was

processed and traveled to New Jersey.” (Petition at ¶ 4.) Department of Homeland Security

records submitted by Respondent indicate that Petitioner

entered the United States on or about October 13, 2022, at or near,

the Rio Grande City, Texas border without inspection. On this same

date, the U.S. Border Patrol at The Eagle Pass, Texas Sector,

encountered MURILLO-CASTILLO and served an I-860 and

issued him an Expedited Removal with a Credible Fear Claim. On

October 27, 2022, MURILLO-CASTILLO had a Credible Fear

package submitted to USCIS. The Credible Fear Package was

pending with USCIS.

(ECF No. 1-8, Form I-213 at 2.) DHS records also indicate that Petitioner has no known criminal

history, gang affiliation, or links to terrorist organizations. (Id.)

DHS records show that Petitioner was released on parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1182(d)(5)(A) and that parole was authorized for a year, beginning on December 14, 2022. (ECF

No. 6-7, Form 1-286 at 1.) It appears undisputed that Petitioner was not provided with a credible

fear interview prior to being paroled.

In 2023, Petitioner applied for asylum with USCIS. (ECF No. 1, Petition at ¶ 9). On June

12, 2025, USCIS dismissed Petitioner’s application pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 because

Petitioner remained subject to the credible fear screening process. (ECF No. 6-8, Form I-589

Dismissal Notice). On August 1, 2025, USCIS determined that Petitioner has a credible fear of

persecution or torture if returned to Ecuador, and ICE issued a warrant for his arrest on that same

date. (ECF No. 6-1, Form I-213 at 2); ECF No. 6-3, Form I-200); ECF No. 1, Petition at ¶¶ 2, 8,

9.)

On that same day, USCIS filed a Notice to Appear with the immigration court, thereby

commencing “removal proceedings under section 240 of the [INA].” (ECF No. 6-4, Notice to

Appear; see also ECF No. 1, Petition at ¶ 2.) The Notice to Appear charged Petitioner with

removability under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for being present in the

United States without admission or parole, and INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for being an immigrant without valid documents. (ECF No. 6-4, NTA at 1

(“You are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.”).) The

records contain no documents revoking Petitioner’s parole, which appears to have expired by the

time he was taken into custody on or about August 1, 2025.

Petitioner is currently detained at the Delaney Hall Detention Facility in Newark, New

Jersey. (ECF No. 1, Petition at ¶¶ 2, 4. On October 7, 2025, an immigration judge denied

Petitioner requested custody redetermination (i.e., bond hearing) pursuant to Matter of Yajure

Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (ECF No. 6-5, IJ Order; ECF No. 1, Petition at ¶¶ 3,

9.) On December 3, 2025, an immigration judge pretermitted Petitioner’s asylum application and

ordered Petitioner removed from the United States. (ECF No. 14, Dec. 3, 2025 Orders of the IJ;

see also ECF No. 12, Amended Petition at ¶ 14, ECF No. 13-1, TRO Motion at at 4.) Petitioner

appealed the immigration judge’s orders to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on

December 27, 2025, and that appeal remains pending (ECF No. 14, Jan. 8, 2026 BIA Filing

Receipt; see also ECF No. 12, Amended Petition at ¶ 15.)

After the initial Petition was briefed, Petitioner filed a motion for a temporary restraining

order (“TRO”) (ECF No. 8), an amended petition (ECF No. 12), and a second TRO Motion (ECF

No. 13). The Government provided a letter with updated authority (ECF No. 10) and a status

update. (ECF No. 14.) The Court will decide the matter based on the parties’ current submissions

and without additional briefing or argument.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is available to every individual

detained within the United States. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.

Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). District courts have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(a). A district court’s authority includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to

immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). The burden is on

petitioner to show that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(c)(3); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court first addresses the threshold issue of whether immigration authorities paroled

Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).1 The Petition contends that he was released on

recognizance and that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2),

a provision of the INA that has been the subject of much litigation in this District.2

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s allegations are premised incorrectly

on the view that ICE is detaining him under § 1225(b)(2) rather than under § 1225(b)(1).

Respondents argue that Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) and is

subject to mandatory detention until his removal proceedings conclude. According to

Respondents, that section applies to aliens such as Petitioner that are “encountered within 14 days

1 Courts in this District have generally agreed that where a petitioner was inspected at or near the

border and “outright released from detention by the Government pursuant to its authority under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a),” he is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) if later arrested in the

interior of the United States. See Salas v. Soto, No. 25-17339 (MAS), 2026 WL 485712, at *3

(D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2026); Flores v. Rokosky, No. 25-18998, 2026 WL 84434, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Jan.

12, 2026) (rejecting Government’s argument that petitioner was mandatorily detained under §

1225b(b)(1), when Government did not show petitioner was paroled); Salvatierra v. Bondi, No.

25-18608, 2026 WL 45171, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2026) (same); see also Matter of Olty Cabrera-

Fernandez, 28 I. & N. Dec. 747, 749 (Sept. 11, 2023) (“Release on such conditional parole under

section 236(a)(2)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B), is legally distinct from release on

humanitarian parole under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).”).

2 See, e.g., Zumba v. Bondi, 25-cv-14626 (KSH), 2025 WL 2753496, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025)

(analyzing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)). To fall within the mandatory detention section of §

1225(b)(2)(A), a noncitizen must be “seeking admission” at or near the border or port of entry, and

an “examining immigration officer” must determine that the noncitizen is “not clearly and beyond

a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” Id. at *7.

of entry without inspection and within 100 air miles of any U.S. international land border.” 3 (ECF

No. 6, Answer at 6 (citing Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 425 (3d Cir.

2016) (citations omitted); Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 511 (A.G. 2019).) In his reply

brief, Petitioner appears to concede that he was paroled under § 1182(d)(5)(A). He argues at

length, however, that § 1225(b)(1) does not apply to him because he was paroled.4 (ECF No. 7 at

20 (“Respondents would have this Court treat Petitioner, who was paroled and has been living in

the country for over 3 years, as a noncitizen who is actually physically present at the border and

. . . was not paroled into the United States.”)

The Court finds that Petitioner was paroled under § 1182(d)(5)(A) and next addresses

which detention statute applies to him. As summarized in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281

(2018), “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking

admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§

1226(a) and (c).” Id. at 289 (emphasis added). Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of

noncitizens prior to a final order of removal. See id. at 287-89. Specifically,

§ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United

States (“applicants for admission” in the language of the statute).

Section 1225(b) divides these applicants into two categories. First,

certain aliens claiming a credible fear of persecution under §

3 Although both the Castro petitioners and Petitioner were apprehended by CBP near the border,

in Castro the “[p]etitioners’ fear of persecution was found to be not credible, such that their

expedited removal orders became administratively final. Each family then filed a habeas petition

challenging various issues relating to their removal orders.” 835 F.3d at 425. Petitioner in contrast,

was paroled into the United States, found to have a credible fear of persecution if returned to

Ecuador after his parole expired, and placed in full removal proceedings. And although he was

ordered removed, his removal order is not final because his appeal to the BIA is still pending.

4 Petitioner also argues that his expedited removal order is legally deficient and that the

Immigration Court unlawfully dismissed his asylum proceedings, but these arguments relate to his

underlying removal proceedings and must be made to the BIA and, if necessary, to the Court of

Appeals in a Petition for Review.

1225(b)(1) “shall be detained for further consideration of the

application for asylum.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Second, aliens falling

within the scope of § 1225(b)(2) “shall be detained for a [removal]

proceeding.” § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Id. at 287. The Jennings Court held that “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of aliens

throughout the completion of applicable proceedings[.]”5 Id. at 302. In contrast, 8 U.S.C. §

1226(a) governs the detention of noncitizens (without qualifying criminal convictions or charges)

already present within the United States who may be detained pursuant to a warrant based on flight

risk or dangerousness and are entitled to receive a bond hearing before an immigration judge. See

id. at 288.

Although the parties dispute whether Petitioner can be detained under § 1225(b)(1)

following the decision to parole him, it appears that Petitioner was initially subject to § 1225(b)(1)

when he was apprehended in 2022. A noncitizen who enters the United States and is detained

shortly after making an unlawful crossing of the border may be subject to expedited removal under

§ 1225(b)(1). See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139-40 (2020). Section

1225(b)(1) is “a separate track for expedited removal proceedings,” which “‘substantially shorten

and speed up the removal process.’” Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 811 F.Supp.3d 274, 291

(E.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing Make the Rd. New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 618–19 (D.C. Cir. 2020)).

Applicants covered by § 1225(b)(1) may be removed “without further hearing or review” pursuant

to an expedited removal process unless he “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or

a fear of persecution[,]” in which case he is referred for an asylum interview. 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).

5 In 2019, following Jennings, the BIA overruled In Re X-k-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 731 (2005), and

held that noncitizens who are “transferred from expedited removal proceedings to full removal

proceedings after establishing a credible fear of persecution or torture” are “ineligible for release

on bond” and must “be detained until his removal proceedings conclude, unless he is granted

parole.” Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 509 (2019).

To fall within § 1225(b)(1), a noncitizen must be “inadmissible” to the United States either

because he lacks proper entry documents or because he engaged in fraud or willfully

misrepresented a material fact on his application for admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).

Under the current version of that provision, he must also either be “arriving in the United States,”

under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), or be a noncitizen “who has not been admitted or paroled into

the United States, and has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer,

that [he] has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period

immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility[.]” Id., §

1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). The latter provision is known as the “Designation Provision,” and when

Petitioner was apprehended in 2022, it applied to a noncitizen who has not been admitted or

paroled and was encountered within 14 days of entry and 100 miles of the border. See Castro, 835

F.3d at 425 (explaining that Section 1225(b)(1) applies to “arriving aliens” and those aliens

“encountered within 14 days of entry without inspection and within 100 air miles of any U.S.

international land border”).

Noncitizens subject to § 1225(b)(1) will generally be subject to expedited removal

procedures unless they indicate to immigration officers that they have a credible fear of

persecution, in which case they may be referred for further proceedings regarding that fear. Castro,

835 F.3d at 425. As noted above, such noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention throughout

removal or credible fear proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). But

the government may, in its discretion, temporarily parole such aliens “for urgent humanitarian

reasons or significant public benefit.” See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287-88. The parole statute states

in relevant part that

such parole of an alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the

alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of

the Secretary of Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall

forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was

paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the

same manner as that of any other applicant for admission.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).

It is axiomatic that statutory construction begins with the text of the statute. See Sebelius

v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376, (2013). Respondents argue that once parole ends, Petitioner reverts

back to his original mandatory detention status under § 1225(b)(1), but they do not analyze the

parole statute and cite to a single District Court decision for that proposition, see Pipa-Aquise v.

Bondi, No. 25-cv-1094, 2025 WL 2490657, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2025); see also ECF No. 10

(citing supplemental authority for this proposition). They fail to address whether “return or be

returned to the custody from which he was paroled” plainly means that the Petitioner returns to the

same custody status, i.e., mandatory detention, that he held when he entered the United States in

2022. See Guevara v. Tsoukaris, 2026 WL 969261, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2026) (JXN).

(“Respondents fail to discuss the plain text of § 1225(b)(1)” or “analyze the statutory language of

the parole statute, § 1182(d)(5)(A), and how it provides for Petitioner’s return to mandatory

detention under § 1225(b)(1).”)

In Olimov v. Jamison, 2026 WL 596155, at *4, the District Court analyzed the return to

custody language of § 1182(d)(5)(A) and found that it did not necessarily mean return to physical

detention. The District Court noted that the government’s argument “assumes that ‘return . . . to

custody’ means a return to detention at the moment before parole, but it provides no analysis to

support that interpretation.” Because this phrase is not defined in the INA, the District Court in

Olimov “turn[ed] to the phrase’s plain meaning at the time of enactment.” See Tanzin v. Tanvir,

592 U.S. 43, 48 (2020) (citing FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011)); Niz-Chavez v.

Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 160 (2021) (the Court “normally seeks to afford the law’s terms their

ordinary meaning at the time Congress adopted them”).

The District Court observed that

[w]hen Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of

1952, it included identical language about a return to custody

following parole. See Pub.L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 188, § 212(d)(5)

(June 27, 1952). [FN omitted.] Then, as now, the statute did not

define “custody.” However, at the time Congress enacted the INA,

“custody” could refer to charge, control, or possession, as well as

detention. See Custody, Black's Law Dictionary, 460 (4th ed. 1951).

Indeed, the term was “very elastic and [could] mean actual

imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal or

physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual possession.” Id.

Id. at *5. The District Court also analyzed other uses of the words “custody” and “detain” in §

1182 found that “Congress’s use of the various forms of the word ‘detain’ demonstrates that, in

1952, when Congress wanted to specify physical custody, it knew the words to use.” Id. (citing

Bittner v. United States, 598 U.S. 85, 94 (2023); Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). It found

that “‘custody’ is an elastic term that could have various meanings” and that “it was more prudent

to assume that Congress meant custody to refer to control over the alien, as opposed to physical

detention.” Id. at *6 (citing United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 488 (3d

Cir. 2017) (“The use of different words or terms within a statute demonstrates that Congress

intended to convey a different meaning for those words.”); see also Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-

CV-10029 (LJL), 2025 WL 3654098, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (finding that return to the

custody from which he was paroled does not mean a return to physical detention). The court finds

this analysis persuasive particularly in light of Respondents’ failure to analyze the relevant

language.

Nor do Respondents sufficiently analyze what it means for the noncitizen to be “dealt with

in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). In

recent months, Courts have held that it simply “mandates that [the petitioner] be treated just as the

INA would treat any noncitizen previously granted parole and living in the United States[,]” and

that “any determination as to [petitioner’s] detention must be conducted under the discretionary

framework of Section 1226(a).” Qasemi, 2025 WL 3654098, at *12.

Respondents also fail to address how Petitioner still fits within the Designation Provision

of Section 1225(b)(1) when plain language of that provision applies to a noncitizen “who has not

been admitted or paroled into the United States[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). The record

shows that CBP encountered Petitioner on October 13, 2022, near the border and he was initially

processed for expedited removal but referred for a credible fear hearing after expressing a fear of

returning to Ecuador. On December 14, 2022, he was released on parole under § 1182(d)(5)(A)

for a period of a year, until December 14, 2023. Although Petitioner was subject to the Designation

Provision when he was encountered by ICE in October 2022, that provision does not apply to

Petitioner years later because it plainly exempts those noncitizens who have been have been

admitted or paroled into the United States. The Court holds that the phrase “has not been admitted

or paroled” in the Designation Provision “does not refer to a legal status but rather to the event of

entry into the United States via admission or parole, which either did or did not occur.”6

Rodriguez-Acurio, 811 F. Supp.3d at 300. Thus, even if Section 1182(d)(5)(A) could be read to

return Petitioner to the physical detention or the custody status he held at the time he entered the

United States, the plain language of the Designation Provision, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), does not

apply to Petitioner because he was “paroled” into the United States; see also Rivas Rodriguez,

2025 WL 3485628, at *2 (finding “because § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) applies only to individuals

6 In addition, Petitioner has lived freely in the United States since 2022 and is not an “arriving

alien” who is “in the process of reaching the United States.” Rodriguez-Acurio, 811 F. Supp.3d at

306.

‘who have not been . . . paroled,’ the plain language of the statute clearly and unambiguously

shows that § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) cannot serve as the basis for” detention of a noncitizen who was

previously paroled under § 1182(d)(5)(A)); Vasquez-Rosario v. Noem, Civ. A. No. 25-7427, 2026

WL 196505, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026) (same); Suazo Rivera v. Blanche, No. 2:26-cv-03892

(BRM), 2026 WL 1153665, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2026) (same).

Moreover, it appears that Petitioner’s parole expired on its own terms, and he lived freely

in the interior of the United States after his parole ended. Petitioner was clearly known to

immigration authorities, as he applied for asylum and obtained work authorization. ICE arrested

Petitioner long after his one-year period of parole expired in December 2023 and pursuant to a

warrant used to detain noncitizens under § 1226(a). In similar circumstances, other District Courts

have concluded that noncitizens who are not taken into custody when their period of parole expires

may only be detained under § 1226(a). See Cabrera Martinez v. Marich, 816 F. Supp.3d 356, 373

(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (“[T]his Court joins those courts that have found that an individual who has been

living in the United States outside parole and is later apprehended is detained under section 1226.).

Several District Courts have interpreted § 1182(d)(5)(A) to require the mandatory detention

under § 1225(b)(1) of parolees who are later arrested in the interior of the United States, see, e.g.,

Faqirzada v. Rokosky, No. 25-16639 (MAS), 2026 WL 63614, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2026);

Geincharles v. Rokosky, 26-cv-150 (ESK), 2026 WL 266093, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2026);

Tasigchana v. Soto, No. 25-cv-18252 (ZNQ), 2026 WL 266170, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2026)

(same); and the Third Circuit has not squarely addressed the detention status of parolees.7

7 There is some support for this interpretation in the regulations and decisions by BIA, but this

Court “must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions.”

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024), (overruling Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). And although Respondents do

not explicitly rely on the entry fiction, the Court agrees with the District Court in Rodriguez-

Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1182(d)(5)(A), however, raises serious due

process concerns because it requires the mandatory detention of noncitizens who have lived in the

United States for years and formed significant ties here. As other Courts have persuasively found,

interpreting §§ 1225(b)(1)(B) and 1182(d)(5)(A) to require mandatory detention of all noncitizens

paroled into the United States “would also raise significant constitutional issues.” Qasemi, 2025

WL 3654098, at *12; Olimov, 2026 WL 596155, at *6. Therefore, to the extent this Court were to

find that 1182(d)(5)(A) and/or § 1225 are ambiguous, it would resort to constitutional avoidance,

a doctrine which permits a court to choose “‘between competing plausible interpretations of a

statutory text.’” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 298 (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 381)); Gonzalez v. United

States, 553 U.S. 242, 251 (2008) (cleaned up) (“When a statute is susceptible of two constructions,

by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such

questions are avoided, [the Court’s] duty is to adopt the latter.”).

For all these reasons, the Court rejects Respondents’ arguments that Petitioner is subject to

mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1). Although Petitioner may be lawfully subject to detention

under § 1226(a), “the Government did not attempt to follow the requirements of that statute in

taking him into custody, nor have they used that statute as a basis for his detention.” Fajardo-

Nugra v. Soto, No. 26-975, 2026 WL 579192, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2026). The Court will not

convert Petitioner’s detention to “potentially lawful alternate form under a different statute with

different procedural requirements and rules.” Id. at *2 (granting Petitioner’s habeas petition and

ordering Petitioner’s release based on the Government's flawed application of § 1225(b)(2)). As

Acurio, 811 F. Supp.3d at 306, which found that “Thuraissigiam stands for the limited principle

that those ‘at the threshold of initial entry’ stand on a different footing for due process purposes

than noncitizens ‘who have established connections in this country.’” Id. at 313-14 (citing 591

U.S. at 107).

in cases involving Petitioners who have been improperly detained under § 1225(b)(2), the Court

will order Respondents to release Petitioner within 24 hours. The Court denies as moot the pending

motions TRO motions (ECF Nos. 8, 13) and declines to reach the remaining arguments in light of

the relief provided. An appropriate Order follows.

5/18/26

s/ Madeline Cox Arleo

MADELINE COX ARLEO

United States District Judge