The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4/22/2 026
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
X EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ALBA COREAS, LONG ISLAND OFFICE
Plaintiff, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
25-CV-00604 (GRB) (JMW)
-against-
ANGELES BEAUTY SALON INC.,
ANGELICA HERNANDEZ, an
individual, CARMEN HERNANDEZ
AYALA, an individual,
Defendants.
X
A P P E A R A N C E S:
Raymond Nardo, Esq.
Raymond Nardo, P.C.
129 Third St.
Mineola, NY 115011
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Angeles Beauty Salon Inc.
90 S Main Street
Freeport, NY 11520
Defendant Appearing Pro se
Angelica Hernandez
90 S Main Street
Freeport, NY 11520
Defendant Appearing Pro se
1 Counsel’s address appears as indicated in this Report & Recommendation in the signature block of the
Complaint. However, the docket indicates a different address. Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to ensure
the correct address is provided on ECF.
WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Alba Coreas (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against Angeles Beauty Salon
Inc. (“Salon”), Angelica Hernandez (“A. Hernandez”) and Carmen Hernandez (“C. Hernandez”2
and collectively, the “Defendants”), alleging inter alia that Defendants failed to pay her
minimum and overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq. and various sections of the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). (See generally, ECF
No. 1.) Before the Court on referral from the Hon. Gary R. Brown is Plaintiff’s Motion for
Default Judgment (ECF No. 27). (See Electronic Order dated 11/24/2025.) For the reasons stated
herein, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment
(ECF No. 27) be GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following allegations are drawn from the Complaint and are assumed true for
purposes of this motion. (ECF No. 1.) The Defendants own and operate Angeles Beauty Salon,
located at 90 S. Main Street, Freeport, New York. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff was employed by the
Defendants as a colorist from November 25, 2024 through December 19, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff was not exempt from the FLSA. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff worked approximately eighty four
(84) hours per week, and was paid $300 daily. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff was an employee as
defined by the FLSA, did not receive overtime wages and was not allowed to take the required
uninterrupted thirty-minute breaks. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.) Defendant Salon is an enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce and has an annual gross volume of sales
in excess of $500,000. (Id. at ¶ 16.)
2 Defendant C. Hernandez is now voluntarily dismissed from the case as of September 18, 2025. (See
ECF No. 23.)
A. Hernandez is an owner or officer of Salon and exercised operational control over the
company, including the control, maintenance, and oversight of the employees. (Id. at ¶¶ 18–21.)
A. Hernandez hired Plaintiff and set her pay rate. (Id. at ¶ 19.) C. Hernandez maintained the
same control as she terminated Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff further alleges that she was paid a flat rate of $300 per day rather than an hourly
wage. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff minimum wage and overtime compensation
at one and one-half times her regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty per week.
(Id. at ¶¶ 2, 11.) Likewise, Defendants failed to pay spread-of-hours compensation for days in
which her workday exceeded ten hours. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 28–29.) Additionally, Defendants failed to
provide required wage notices at the time of hiring and failed to furnish accurate wage
statements with each payment of wages, in violation of the NYLL. (Id. at ¶¶ 24–27.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts seven claims arising from her employment: (i) failure to
pay minimum wages in violation of the FLSA; (ii) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of
the FLSA; (iii) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of the NYLL; (iv) failure to pay
overtime wages in violation of the NYLL; (v) failure to provide wage notices in violation of
NYLL; (vi) failure to provide wage statements in violation of NYLL; and (vii) failure to pay
spread of hours compensation in violation of the NYLL. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’
conduct was willful, intentional, and not in good faith. (Id. at ¶¶ 34–35, 40–41.)
Therefore Plaintiff seeks: (i) damages for unpaid minimum, overtime wages and spread
of hours; (ii) liquidated damages under the FLSA and/or NYLL; (iii) $5,000 statutory damages
under the NYLL, (iv) attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA and NYLL, (v) prejudgment and
post-judgment interest; (vi) attorneys’ fees and costs; (vii) injunctive and declaratory relief; and
(viii) such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. (Id. at pp. 13–14.)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint (ECF No. 1.) On February 4,
2025, summonses were issued (ECF No. 4) and returned executed on February 17, 2025. (ECF
Nos. 5–7.) Defendants Salon and A. Hernandez through counsel appeared on March 5, 2025.
(ECF No. 8). Plaintiff subsequently filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, without prejudice as
to Defendant C. Hernandez. (ECF No. 23.)3 Multiple extensions of time were granted for the
Defendants to file an answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint as representations were set
forth that settlement discussions were ongoing. (See Electronic Orders dated 3/6/2025, 4/4/2025,
5/9/2025, and 6/7/2025.) However, on June 19, 2025, counsel for Defendants filed a motion to
withdraw (ECF No. 13), stating that the attorney-client relationship had become irreconcilable
and that Defendants had closed their salon and could no longer afford to pay a substantial
settlement or attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 13-2 at 7.) The motion was granted, and the case was
stayed for thirty days, until August 6, 2025, to allow Defendants an opportunity to retain new
counsel (ECF No. 16.) The Court also scheduled an in-person conference for August 18, 2025, at
which time Defendants could appear pro se or with new counsel. (Id.) After adjournments, the
in-person conference was ultimately held on September 17, 2025, at which Defendants failed to
appear. (ECF No. 21.) The Court then directed Plaintiff to file a request for a Certificate of
Default on or before October 10, 2025. (Id.) Plaintiff complied and filed the request on
September 18, 2025 (ECF No. 24), and the Clerk of Court entered a Certificate of Default on
September 19, 2025 (ECF No. 25.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed Default Judgment motion (ECF No. 26) but failed to comply
with Judge Brown’s Individual Practice Rules and the motion was denied. (Electronic Order
3 In light of Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of C. Hernandez, all subsequent references to ‘Defendants’
herein refer only to the remaining Defendants.
dated 10/21/2025.) On November 20, 2025, plaintiff renewed the motion for default judgment.
(ECF No. 27.) On November 24, 2025, the motion was referred from Judge Brown for a Report
and Recommendation. (Electronic Order dated 11/24/2025.) The Court requested supplemental
filings, and service on Defendants, all of which was complied with. (ECF Nos. 28-29.) To date,
Defendants have not filed opposition nor retained new counsel or otherwise further appeared.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
There is a two-step process for the granting of default judgments under Fed. R. Civ. P.
55. First, as here, the Clerk of the Court enters default when a party fails to plead or otherwise
defend the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); see also E.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 55.1(b) and 55.2.
After the clerk’s certificate of default is issued and posted on the docket, a party may apply for
entry of a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); see also E.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 55.2. The
decision to grant a motion for default is left to the sound discretion of the district court. No Limit
Auto Enterprises, Inc. v. No Limit Auto Body, Inc., No. 21-CV-4755 (AMD)(JMW), 2022 WL
18399477, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL
348271 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2023). As the Clerk has already entered default against Defendants
(ECF No. 25), the Court is primarily concerned with Plaintiff’s compliance with E.D.N.Y. Loc.
Civ. R. 55.2.
A default constitutes an admission of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint, except those relating to damages. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L.
Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. El
Norteno Rest. Corp., No. 06-CV-1878 (RJD)(JMA), 2007 WL 2891016, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
28, 2007) (finding that a default constitutes an admission of all well-pleaded factual allegations
in the complaint and the allegations as they pertain to liability are deemed true). “Where
damages are susceptible to simple mathematical calculation and the plaintiff provides a
‘sufficient basis from which to evaluate the fairness’ of the requested damages, no evidentiary
hearing is necessary.” Euro Pac. Capital Inc. v. Bohai Pharm. Grp., Inc., No. 15-CV-4410
(VM), 2018 WL 1596192, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018) (quoting Am. Jewish Comm., 2016
WL 3365313, at *4).
However, a plaintiff must still demonstrate that the allegations set forth in the Complaint
state valid claims. See City of N.Y. v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir.
2011) (“[A] district court is ‘required to determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish
the defendant’s liability as a matter of law’” prior to entering default judgment) (quoting Finkel
v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009)) (alterations omitted). The Court, thus, must
ensure: (i) Plaintiff satisfied all required procedural steps in moving for default judgment, see
Loc. Civ. R. 55.2; and (ii) Plaintiff’s allegations, when accepted as true, establish liability as a
matter of law, see Finkel, 577 F.3d at 84; and (iii) Plaintiff’s request for damages is adequately
supported.
With this legal framework in mind, the Court analyzes the instant application.
DISCUSSION
I. Procedural Compliance
Local Civil Rule 7.1 requires motions to include a notice of motion, a memorandum of
law, and supporting affidavits or exhibits containing any necessary factual information for the
decision of the motion. E.D.N.Y. Local R. 7.1(a)(1) - (3). Local Civil Rule 55.2 requires that a
party moving for default judgment append to its application an affidavit or declaration
demonstrating that (A) the Clerk has entered default against the Defendants, (B) the movant has
complied with the SCRA, and (C) that the individual defaulting defendant is not a minor or
incompetent person, as well as all papers required by E.D.N.Y. Local Rule 7.1 (supra), and a
proposed judgment and certificate of service that all documents in connection with the motion
for default judgment has been personally served on or mailed to the defaulting defendants’
residence or business address. E.D.N.Y. Local R. 55.2(a)(1)-(3).
The Local Rules provide that the moving party “must file a statement of damages, sworn
or affirmed to by one or more people with personal knowledge, in support of the request,
showing the proposed damages and the basis for each element of damages, including interest,
attorney’s fees, and costs.” E.D.N.Y. Local R. 55.2(c).
With respect to the non-military affidavit, before a default judgment can be entered for
the plaintiff, the SCRA commands that the Court “require the plaintiff to file with the court an
affidavit . . . stating whether or not the defendant is in military service and showing necessary
facts to support the affidavit.” 50 U.S.C. App. § 521; ADI Glob. Distribution v. Green, No. 20-
CV-03869 (AMD) (JMW), 2023 WL 3355049, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3346499 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2023). The SCRA requirement
is inapplicable where, as here as to Defendant Salon which is a corporate entity rather than an
individual. (See ECF No. 12-3 at ¶ 4); see also Guanglei Jiao v. Shang Shang Qian Inc., No. 18-
CV-5624 (ARR) (VMS), 2020 WL 6370148, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5105063 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2020) (only applying service
members civil relief act to the individual defendants). Conversely, with respect to A. Hernandez,
Plaintiff submits an exhibit of the SCRA Department of Defense Manpower Data Center stating
that she was not an active military member, and an affidavit stating the same. (See ECF No. 29-
2; see also ECF No. 27-3, Nardo Decl. at ¶ 1.)
Additionally, Plaintiff’s motion against the defaulting Defendant complies with Local
Rule 7.1 and Local Rule 55.2(a)(2) because it includes (1) a notice of motion (ECF No. 27); (2) a
memorandum of law (ECF No. 29-1 ); (3) affidavits and exhibits to support Plaintiff’s
contentions (see ECF Nos. 27-1-5); and (4) a proposed order detailing the proposed judgment
(ECF No. 27-6). The motion further complies with Local Rule 55, as Plaintiff properly attached
and submitted a declaration affirming that the Certificate of Default was entered by the Court on
September 19, 2025 (ECF No. 27-5) and a declaration that Defendants are not an infant, in the
military, or an incompetent person. (ECF No. 27-3 at 2.) The parties have also filed an affidavit
of service of the requisite documents as to Defendants via first class mail. (ECF Nos. 27-7; 29-
3.)
Finally, Plaintiff complied in all respects with Local Rule 55.2(c) by filing a statement of
damages demonstrating the proposed damages and basis for the element of damages. E.D.N.Y.
Local R. 55.2(c). As to Plaintiff’s damages, Plaintiff submits a breakdown of her individual
FLSA/NYLL overtime damages, liquidated damages, statutory damages, and interest. (ECF No
27-2.) Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Motion for Default Judgment is procedurally
proper and now turns to the merits.
II. Jurisdiction
a. Personal Jurisdiction
“[B]efore a court grants a motion for default judgment, it may first assure itself that it has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading
Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2010). Since a judgment rendered against a defendant over
whom the Court does not have personal jurisdiction can be vacated pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), it
“preserves judicial economy for the court to assess personal jurisdiction from the outset and
thereby avoid rendering a void judgment.” Foshan Shunde Xinrunlian Textile Co. v. Asia 153
Ltd., No. 14-cv-4697 (DLI) (SMG), 2017 WL 696025, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2017). Here, “a
sua sponte assessment of personal jurisdiction is appropriate” because while Defendants were
initially represented by counsel, no objections to personal jurisdiction were raised nor were any
raised while Defendants are pro se. Id. Additionally, as Defendant Salon is a corporate entity, it
may not represent itself pro se. See Grace v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co. of NY, 443 F.3d 180, 192 (2d
Cir. 2006) (collecting cases on pro se corporate defendants and the ability to enter default
judgment against such unrepresented entities); see also DMKA LLC v. Chandler W T LLC, No.
23-CV-3296 (BMC), 2024 WL 406549, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2024) (granting default
judgment against a pro se corporate defendant).
For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction: (i) a plaintiff must complete proper service
of process, (ii) there must be a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that renders such service
of process effective, and (iii) the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with
constitutional due process principles. See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL,
673. F.3d 50, 60–61 (2d Cir. 2012).
Service of process was procedurally proper here. Rule 4(c) requires that a summons must
be served with a copy of the Complaint and by a person who is at least 18 years old and not a
party to the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c). Additionally, Rule 4(e) permits service on individuals
to be made (i) pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is located, (ii) by
delivering the summons and complaint to the individual personally, or (iii) by leaving a copy of
the summons and complaint “at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone
of suitable age and discretion who resides there. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).Courts have held that
service on employees, co-workers, receptionists, doormen, and other indiv iduals who meet
the “suitable age and discretion” standard at a defendant’s actual place of business is valid. See
Templos v. Luna Cuisine, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 3d 325, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (stating that under
New York law, “suitability of the person served depends on context, but courts routinely find
service on employees and co-workers sufficient”). Here, Defendants A. Hernandez and C.
Hernandez were served with a copy of the Summons and Complaint on February 11, 2025, when
a process server delivered the documents to the Defendants’ employee, Ms. Diana, a person of
suitable age and discretion at the property. (ECF Nos. 6-7.)
Further, Rule 4(h) provides that a domestic or foreign corporation may be served by
“delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general
agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. . .
.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Queens Cnty. Carting, Inc., No. 20-
CV-01844 (NSR), 2022 WL 254367, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(h)(1)(A); (e)(1)) (“Under Rule 4(h)(1)(A), a corporation may be served ‘in the manner
prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual,’ which includes ‘following state law for
serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the
district court is located or where service is made[.]’”). Under New York law, service on a
corporation may be made by serving the authorized agent. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 311(a)(1)
(“Personal service upon a corporation… shall be made by delivering the summons… to an
officer, director, managing or general agent, cashier or assistant cashier or to any other agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service.”); see also Flagstar Fin. & Leasing,
LLC v. ANR Logistics LLC, No. 24-CV-08469 (JS) (JMW), 2025 WL 3451989, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 28, 2025) (finding service was proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h), where an entity was served
delivering the Summons & Complaint to an authorized agent of the Defendant).
Here, Defendant Salon was served with a copy of the Summons and Complaint on
February 11, 2025, by service upon Diana, who affirmatively represented upon verbal inquiry
that she was authorized to accept service on behalf of the Salon. (ECF No. 5.) Accordingly,
service on all Defendants was proper.
“Personal jurisdiction in a diversity case is determined by the law of the state in which
the district court sits.” SAS Grp., Inc. v. Worldwide Inventions, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Kernan v. Kurz–Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir.1999)). The
same goes for a case arising under federal question jurisdiction unless the applicable federal
statute contemplates nationwide service of process, which, as relevant here, the FLSA does not.
Bonilla, 2025 WL 745906, at *4 (citing Pettenato v. Beacon Health Options, Inc., 425 F. Supp.
3d 264, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)). Thus, the Court first looks to New York law for the purpose of
determining personal jurisdiction over Defendants in New York. Then, the Court evaluates
whether the “exercise of jurisdiction under state law satisfies federal due process requirements of
‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Mortg. Funding Corp. v. Boyer Lake Pointe, LLC, 379 F.
Supp. 2d 282, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477
(1985)). Under New York law, there are two routes for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction.
The Court considers each in turn below:
i. General Jurisdiction
The Court considers this issue in light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in
Daimler and Goodyear, where the Court noted that other than in “exceptional cases” the exercise
of general jurisdiction is confined to a corporation’s “place of incorporation and principal place
of business.” See Aybar v. Aybar, 177 N.E.3d 1257, 1265 (2021) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014)); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
924 (2011)). Here, Defendant Salon is a New York Corporation, with its place of business in
Freeport, New York. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 14.) Thus, the Court has general jurisdiction over
Defendant Salon.
Additionally, the Court has general jurisdiction over individual Defendant A. Hernandez
and C. Hernandez who were served in New York. See Burham v. Superior Court of Cali., 495
U.S. 604, 610–11 (1990) (“Among the most firmly established principles of personal
jurisdiction” is that courts have general jurisdiction over those who are physically present in the
state and who were properly served with process while in the state, thereby empowering courts to
“retain jurisdiction to enter judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit.”); J McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880–81 (2011) (“Presence within a State at the time suit
commences through service of process . . . support[s] exercise of the general jurisdiction of the
State’s courts . . . .”); see also Reich v. Lopez, 38 F. Supp. 3d 436, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“For
general jurisdiction over an individual to comport with due process, Defendants must be
domiciled in New York, served in New York, or have otherwise consented to the court’s
jurisdiction.”) Accordingly, the undersigned recommends a finding that the Court does have
“general jurisdiction” over Defendants.
ii. Specific Jurisdiction
On the other hand, specific jurisdiction is present when “a [s]tate exercises personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the
forum.” Great W. Ins. Co. v. Graham, No. 18-CV-6249 (VSB), 2020 WL 3415026, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2020) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 n.8 (1984)). However, having found general jurisdiction is present, a finding of specific
jurisdiction is not required. See Posven, C.A. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 303 F. Supp. 2d 391, 397
n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Where general jurisdiction is asserted, the claim need not arise out of the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state ….”) Indeed, specific jurisdiction is required over non-
residents, unlike here, where Defendants are domiciled in New York. See In re Stillwater Cap.
Partners Inc. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 556, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that a court may exercise
specific jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary if certain requirements are met).
III. Default factors
In evaluating whether to grant a default judgment, courts consider: (i) whether the
defendant’s default is willful; (ii) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense to plaintiff’s
claims; and (iii) the level of prejudice the non-defaulting party would suffer if the motion for
default judgment is denied. See Trustees of Empire State Carpenters Annuity, Apprenticeship,
Lab. Mgmt. Co-op., Pension & Welfare Funds v. Flooring Experts, Inc., No. 12-CV-6317
(ADS)(AKT), 2013 WL 4042357, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2013), report and recommendation
adopted, 2013 WL 4761151 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2013); cf. Brown v. Gabbidon, No. 06-CV-8148
(HB), 2007 WL 1423788, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2007) (“A discussion of prejudice,
willfulness and meritorious defenses is required once there is an entry of default or a default
judgment and the court considers a request by a defaulting party to vacate that entry pursuant to
Rules 55(c) or 60(b).”).
Consideration of these three factors leads to a recommendation that an entry of default
judgment is appropriate where, as here, Defendants appeared initially through counsel (ECF No.
1) until their counsel withdrew representation (ECF No. 13) and since then they have failed to
appear and present any defense, and Plaintiff is left with no further steps to take to secure relief.
See ADI Glob. Distribution, 2023 WL 3355049 at *4; see also Flooring Experts, Inc., 2013 WL
4042357 at *3 (when a defendant is continuously and completely unresponsive the failure to
respond is considered willful), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 4761151
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2013); Empire State Carpenters Welfare v. Darken Architectural Wood, No.
11-CV-46 (JS) (AKT), 2012 WL 194075, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012) (“[T]he Court is unable
to make a determination whether the Defendants have a meritorious defense since no such
defense has been presented to the Court”), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL
832452 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012); Northwell Health, Inc. v. Northwell Staffing Agency, LLC,
No. 17-CV-1611 (DRH) (AKT), 2018 WL 1525803, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2018) (noting that
denying the motion for default judgment would be prejudicial to Plaintiff since “there are no
additional steps available to secure relief in this Court”), report and recommendation adopted,
2018 WL 1525698 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018) (citations omitted). As previously noted, Salon
may not represent itself pro se in this Court. See Grace, 443 F.3d at 192 (2d Cir. 2006); DMKA
LLC, 2024 WL 406549, at *1.
IV. Liability
In cases of default, the court “is required to accept all of the [plaintiff’s] factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor[.]” Finkel, 577 F.3d at 84. A
defendant’s default is considered an admission of all of the well-pleaded allegations of liability.
See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d. Cir. 1992);
Morales v. B&M Gen. Renovation Inc., No. 14-CV-7290, 2016 WL 1266624, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 9, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 1258482 (Mar. 29, 2016).
A. Statute of Limitations
Before addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court must determine if Plaintiff
brought her claims in a timely manner. See Quintero v. Angels of the World, Inc., No. 19-cv-
6126 (DG), 2021 WL 4464123, at *3 (E.D.N.Y Sep. 10, 2021) (analyzing the statute of
limitations to ensure the causes of action were not time barred before delving into the merits of
each), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4463488 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2021).
“The limitations period for FLSA claims is two years, ‘except that a cause of action
arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action
accrued.’” Whiteside v. Hover-Davis, Inc., 995 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 255(a)). “When a defendant defaults, the violation is considered ‘willful’ and the three-year
statute of limitations applies.” Esquivel v. Lima Rest. Corp., No. 20-CV-2914 (ENV) (MMH),
2023 WL 6338666, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (citation omitted). Though the statute of
limitations begins when the employee starts her employment, for purposes of establishing the
statute of limitations under the FLSA, “a new cause of action accrues with each payday
following an allegedly unlawful pay period.” Callari v. Blackman Plumbing Supply, Inc., 988 F.
Supp. 2d 261, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
“Pragmatically speaking, therefore, where willful conduct has been proven, FLSA
overtime claims asserted three years prior to commencement of the lawsuit are considered
timely.” Bonilla, 2025 WL 745906, at *6 (citing Fakir v. Skyrise Rock Corp., No. 16-CV-4695
(JPO), 2016 WL 7192095, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2016)) (concluding that some of plaintiff’s
FLSA claims, which seek redress for conduct beginning as early as May 1, 2010, are untimely as
she filed her complaint on June 20, 2016, thus FLSA overtime claims prior to June 20, 2013
were subject to dismissal); Gunawan v. Sake Sushi Restaurant, 897 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) (finding, where the complaint was filed on November 16, 2009 and alleged willful conduct
under the FLSA, “[plaintiff] may recover on her federal claims for unpaid wages that accrued on
or after November 16, 2006.”).
Here, Plaintiff commenced this action on February 3, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff was
employed by Defendants from on or about November 25, 2024, through December 19, 2024. (Id.
at ¶ 7.) Because Defendants have defaulted, their conduct is presumed willful for purposes of
Plaintiff’s FLSA claims, thereby extending the statute of limitations to three years. Accordingly,
any FLSA claims arising on or after February 3, 2022, are timely. Because Plaintiff’s entire
period of employment, from November 25, 2024, through December 19, 2024, falls within this
three-year period, all of Plaintiff’s FLSA claims are timely.
Conversely, the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) provides for a six-year statute of
limitations for wage-and-hour claims. See N.Y. Lab. L. §§ 198(3), 663(3). The limitations period
begins to run when the employee performs the work for which he was allegedly underpaid.
See Rodriguez v. Queens Convenience Deli Corp., 2011 WL 4962397, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18,
2011). Because Plaintiff commenced this action on February 3, 2025 (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff’s
NYLL claims arising on or after February 3, 2019, are timely. Plaintiff’s entire period of
employment from November 25, 2024, through December 19, 2024, falls within this six-year
limitations period. See Fermin v. Las Delicias Peruanas Restaurant, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 3d 19, 38
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“As the Complaint was filed on January 27, 2014, the state law limitations
period [under the NYLL] includes claims dated from January 27, 2008 to January 27, 2014.”).
Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s NYLL claims are timely.
B. FLSA Overtime Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to pay her overtime wages in excess of forty hours
(40) per workweek that she was statutorily owed under the FLSA. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 27, 44, 57.)
To successfully plead an overtime claim under the FLSA, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) the
employer was an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce;
(2) the plaintiff is an ‘employee’ within the meaning of the FLSA; and (3) that the plaintiff
worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a given workweek and did not receive overtime
compensation for such work.” Erdemir v. Allstate Marble & Granite, Kitchens & Baths Inc., 704
F. Supp. 3d 337, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1)).
1. Whether Defendants were engaged in Commerce or in the Production of
Goods for commerce
Employers are subject to FLSA’s overtime requirements if the employees are “engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” or “employed in an enterprise engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Courts have
deemed these two methods as individual coverage and enterprise coverage, respectively. Cao v.
Flushing Paris Wedding LLC, 727 F. Supp. 3d 239, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2024); Erdemir, 2023 WL
8270891, at *11.
a. Enterprise Coverage
Enterprise coverage is defined statutorily as when an employer has: (i) employees
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce; and (ii) an annual gross
volume of sales greater than $500,000. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A). The burden on plaintiffs to
establish enterprise coverage is light. Oyenuga v. Presidential Sec. Servs. LLC, No. 22-CV-4972
(DG) (RER), 2023 WL 7687237, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2023) (recognizing enterprise
coverage notwithstanding conclusory allegations in the complaint). Courts may make logical
inferences based on the nature of the business to find that employees are engaged in commerce.
See Fermin v. Las Delicias Peruanas Rest., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 3d 19, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(inferring a restaurant is engaged in commerce to procure cooking supplies).
Merely parroting statutory language without including specific facts is oftentimes
insufficient to meet enterprise coverage. See Zavada v. Mehbizar, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-03682-
OEM-ARL, 2024 WL 759351, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2024) (“Plaintiff’s barebones invocation
of the statutory language under the FLSA does not suffice to plead enterprise coverage under the
FLSA.”). However, in the context of a default, courts generally do not require additional factual
allegations to establish enterprise coverage, and the statutory language may be satisfactory.
Garcia v. 2390 Creston Realty LLC, No. 22-CV-09172-LGS, 2023 WL 4849889, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2023). Importantly, courts may make logical inferences based on the nature
of the business to find that employees engaged in commerce. See Rodriguez v. Almighty
Cleaning, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (inferring a cleaning enterprise is
engaged in commerce to procure cleaning supplies); see also Gao v. Kerry Nails Salon Corp.,
No. 18-CV-10448 (PGG) (KHP), 2020 WL 8734739, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2020), (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CIV-10448 (PGG)(KHP), 2021
WL 673460 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) (inferring material handled by nail salon employees are
not different than material handled by janitorial or cleaning services).
Here, the Complaint specifically alleges that Salon “engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce and handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or
materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person, including scissors,
barbicide, curling irons, dryers, and salon equipment.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16.) These allegations are
sufficient to show that Plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce in cleaning services for
enterprise coverage purposes. Indeed, “[o]ther cases discussing this element in an FLSA context
have held that it is logical to conclude that janitorial/cleaning supplies have moved in interstate
commerce.” Almighty Cleaning, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (concluding that it was “logical to
infer that the cleaning supplies utilized by the Plaintiffs originated outside of New York”); see
also Soto v. Miss Laser Inc., No. 19-CV-04745 (HG)(CLP), 2023 WL 319547, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 19, 2023) (concluding it reasonable to infer that at least some of the soaps, chemicals, derma
rollers, and/or laser hair removal tools used by laser employees originated outside of New York).
Plaintiff’s duties included coloring of hair, sweeping floors and cleaning the bathroom. (Id. 1 at ¶
7.) See Shu Lan Chen v. Gypsophila Nail & Spa Inc., No. 15-CV-2520 (JPO), 2015 WL
3473510, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2015) (holding that it was reasonable to infer that defendants’
employees handled goods or materials that had moved in interstate commerce because the
complaint alleged that plaintiff worked as a nail technician and beautician performing manicures
and cleaning duties, including sweeping and garbage removal).
Under the second prong to establish enterprise coverage, Plaintiff alleges that Salon has
“an annual gross volume of sales in excess of $500,000.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) Ordinarily, though
conclusory, such a statement suffices in circumstances where a business engaging in interstate
commerce grosses over $500,000 in annual revenue by virtue of the enterprise itself. See Ore v.
H&C Cleaning Corp., No. 22-CV-20 (AMD) (RER), 2022 WL 19520879, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
14, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2522814 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2023)
(concluding that the allegation that “upon information and belief, the gross annual volume of
sales made or business done by H & C Cleaning in 2020 and 2021 was not less than
$500,000.00” was sufficient to “meet the pleading requirement for enterprise liability under the
FLSA”).
Here, Plaintiff further alleges that she worked seven days per week (id. at ¶ 9), supporting
an inference as to the volume of business conducted. See Shu Lan Chen, 2015 WL 3473510, at
*3 (holding that enterprise coverage was adequately alleged where the nature of the nail salon
business, its days of operation, and number of employees supported a reasonable inference that
the statutory requirements were satisfied). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding
that Plaintiff has sufficiently established enterprise coverage over Salon under the FLSA.
a. Individual Coverage
Individual coverage is an alternative means by which a plaintiff could establish FLSA
coverage, protecting employees based on their own job duties relevant to the employer’s
business. See Kim v. J&J Safetymate Corp., No. 22-CV-1070 (OEM) (TAM), 2024 WL 734130,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2024). Individual coverage is implicated where plaintiff demonstrates he
was personally “engaged in commerce or in the production of good for commerce.” Zavada,
2024 WL 759351 at *3. An employee is engaged in commerce when “a substantial part of [an]
employee’s work [is] related to interstate commerce.” Id. Commerce is known as the “trade,
commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between
any State and any place outside thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(b). As such, employees are “engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the [FLSA] when they are performing work involving or
related to the movement of persons or things (whether tangibles or intangibles and including
information and intelligence) among the several States or between any State and any place
outside thereof”. Santacruz v. Blok Chocolatier LLC, No. 19-CV-544-EK-SJB, 2021 WL
4341103, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2021) (internal quotations omitted). Employment activities
that “simply affect or indirectly relate to interstate commerce” are insufficient to establish
individual coverage. Zavada, 2024 WL 759351 at *3.
Here, Plaintiff provides no nexus between her employment and interstate commerce, nor
does Plaintiff allege facts demonstrating that she engaged in the production of goods so as to
establish individual coverage under the FLSA. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was
employed as a colorist and cleaner, performing duties such as coloring clients’ hair, sweeping
floors, and cleaning the salon. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 7.) It further asserts, in conclusory fashion, that
Defendants were engaged in commerce and that Plaintiff handled goods or materials that had
moved in interstate commerce, including salon equipment such as scissors, barbicide, curling
irons, and dryers. (Id. at ¶ 16.) These allegations are insufficient to establish an interstate
component to Plaintiff’s work. See Santacruz, 2021 WL 4341103, at *4 (“As a basic rule, if the
plaintiff did not have any contact with out-of-state customers or businesses, he cannot be
individually covered under the FLSA.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Zavada, 2024 WL
759351, at *3 (concluding that although food may have traveled in interstate commerce,
plaintiff’s work itself did not involve an interstate component). Plaintiff does not allege that she
interacted with out-of-state customers, processed interstate transactions, or otherwise directly
participated in the flow of interstate commerce.
Moreover, Plaintiff provides no additional factual support beyond these bare assertions.
The allegations merely restate the statutory language without connecting Plaintiff’s specific job
duties to interstate activity. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that her work had the
requisite interstate nexus. For these reasons, the undersigned respectfully submits that individual
coverage under the FLSA has not been established.
2. The Employer-Employee Relationship under the FLSA
Where coverage as to the enterprise or individual is established, the Court next analyzes
whether Plaintiffs have established an employer-employee relationship under the FLSA. To hold
a defendant accountable, a plaintiff must also establish an employee-employer relationship
between the parties. See Payamps v. M & M Convenience Deli & Grocery Corp., No. 16-CV-
4895 (LDH) (SJB), 2019 WL 8381264, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019). “Employee” is broadly
defined under the FLSA as any “individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
The FLSA defines an employer as “any person [or corporation] acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). “Employ” is defined
as to “suffer or permit to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Pleadings that allege employee status are
sufficient to qualify as an employee under the FLSA. Cao v. Flushing Paris Wedding LLC, 727
F. Supp. 3d 239, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (noting a plaintiff satisfies the definition when he alleges
that the “defendants employed them in various positions within this statutory meaning”).
The Second Circuit has provided that the employer-employee inquiry should be grounded
in “economic reality rather than technical concepts.” Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 104
(2d Cir. 2013). “To determine whether an employee-employer relationship exists under the
FLSA, courts within the Second Circuit consider: ‘(1) the degree of control exercised by the
employer over the workers, (2) the workers’ opportunity for profit or loss and their investment in
the business, (3) the degree of skill and independent initiative required to perform the work, (4)
the permanence or duration of the working relationship, and (5) the extent to which the work is
an integral part of the employer's business.’” Schwartz v. Qazi, No. 24-cv-00911 (JMW), 2026
WL 63323, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2026) (quoting Velu v. Velocity Exp., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 2d
300, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). None of these factors are dispositive but courts must look at the
“totality of the circumstances” when applying this test. See Erdemir, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 358.
When determining whether these control factors have been established, courts may analyze the
complaint and plaintiff's declarations. See Thompson v. Hyun Suk Park, No. 18-cv-6
(AMD)(ST), 2019 WL 1299194, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2019), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 1298563 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2019).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Defendants and therefore qualifies as an
employee under the FLSA. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 31.) The Complaint alleges that the individual
Defendants had the authority to hire and fire employees, assign work, supervise employees, and
maintain payroll records. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-22.) Plaintiff further alleges that these Defendants
maintained control, oversight, and direction over her employment, including her work schedule
and compensation. (Id.) In particular, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant A. Hernandez hired her and
exercised control over her rate of pay and job duties, while Defendant C. Hernandez Ayala
participated in the termination of her employment. (Id. at ¶¶ 19–21.) Additionally, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants jointly operated the business as a single enterprise and acted in the
interest of the employer with respect to Plaintiff, including establishing and implementing
employment and pay practices. (Id. at ¶ 22.) These allegations support a finding that Defendants
exercised operational control over the business and Plaintiff’s employment conditions.
Further, the FLSA contains numerous exemptions for certain employees. See 29 U.S.C. §
213. Some exempted employees include bona fide “professional” employees who are
compensated on a salary basis at a rate not less than $455 per week and whose primary duties
require advanced knowledge in a field of science or learning. Ghosh v. Neurological Servs. of
Queens, No. 13-CV-1113 (ILG) (CLP), 2015 WL 431807, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2015).
However, exemption under the FLSA is an affirmative defense, and the employer bears the
burden of proving the exemption by a preponderance of the evidence. E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v.
Carrera, 604 U.S. 45, 54 (2025). Because Defendants have defaulted, any such affirmative
defense is deemed waived.
Moreover, none of the FLSA exemptions apply to Plaintiff. Plaintiff performed non-
managerial, manual, and routine tasks, including coloring hair, sweeping floors, and cleaning the
salon (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 7), and did not exercise the discretion, independent judgment, or advanced
knowledge required for the executive, administrative, learned professional, or creative
professional exemptions. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 88 (2018)
(holding that FLSA exemptions are to be given a fair, not narrow, interpretation); Kadden v.
VisuaLex, LLC, 910 F.Supp.2d 523, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that vocational cosmetology
training does not meet the learned professional exemption). Courts in this Circuit have
consistently held that manual laborers and cleaning service providers are not exempt.
See McLauglin v. Onanafe Management Solutions LLC, No. 22-CV-6792 (PKC) (MMH), 2024
WL 4184485, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2024) (holding that cleaning and janitorial service
providers are not exempt from FLSA protections); Ore, 2022 WL 19520879, at *9 (holding that
statutory exemptions did not apply to manual laborers). Because Plaintiff’s duties fall squarely
outside any FLSA exemption, she is entitled to all applicable minimum wage and overtime
protections, and an employer-employee relationship is properly established.
3. Whether Plaintiff Was Compensated for Work
Performed in Excess of Forty Hours
If Judge Brown agrees and finds that Plaintiff has made sufficient showings that the
employment is covered under the FLSA, the Court next analyzes the merits of the Plaintiff’s
FLSA overtime claims. Under the FLSA, to plead a plausible overtime claim, “Plaintiffs must
provide sufficient detail about the length and frequency of their unpaid work to support a
reasonable inference that they worked more than forty hours in a given week.” Nakahata v. New
York-Presbyterian Healthcare System, Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2013).
Here, Plaintiff claims she is owed $5,818.00 in unpaid overtime wages as a result of
Defendants’ failure to properly compensate her for hours worked in excess of forty hours per
week statutory requirement. (ECF Nos. 1 at ¶¶ 39–43, 26-7 at ¶ 6.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts
that she worked approximately seven days per week for a total of approximately eighty-four
hours each week. (ECF No.1 at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff further alleges that she was paid a flat daily rate of
$300 and did not receive premium overtime compensation for hours worked over forty in a
workweek. (Id. at ¶¶ 10–11.) As such, Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to recover overtime
damages based on Defendants’ failure to pay her at the statutorily required regular rate of pay for
hours worked in excess of forty per week. (Id. at ¶¶ 39–43.) Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, as the Court must do on a motion for default judgment, see Bricklayers & Allied
Craftworkers Local 2 v. Moulton Masonry & Construction, LLC, 779 F.3d 182, 187 (2d Cir.
2015), the Court recommends finding that Plaintiff has established that Defendants failed to pay
her statutorily required overtime wages. Bonilla, 2025 WL 745906, at *11.
C. NYLL Claims
Because the Court recommends a finding of Defendants’ liability under the FLSA, the
undersigned will explore the merits of Plaintiff’s NYLL claims to determine whether an exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims is appropriate. Here, Plaintiff seeks to hold
Defendants liable under the NYLL for unpaid overtime wages, failure to pay minimum wages
and for Defendants’ failure to provide wage notices and wage statements and failure to pay
spread of hours compensation. (See generally ECF No. 1.)
“New York’s Labor Law is the state analogue to the federal FLSA.” Santillan v. Henao,
822 F. Supp. 2d 284, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). However, the NYLL “does not require that a
defendant achieve a certain minimum in annual sales or business in order to be subject to the
law.” Garcia v. Badyna, No. 12-cv-4021 (RPM) (CLP), 2014 WL 4728287, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 2014). Similarly, a plaintiff need not show that defendants engaged in interstate
commerce to recover under the NYLL. See Ethelbert v. Choice Sec. Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 339, 360
(E.D.N.Y. 2015). To recover under the NYLL, a plaintiff must prove “that he was an employee
and that Defendants were employer[s] as defined by the statute and accompanying regulations.”
Id. (citing NYLL § 650 et seq.; N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 142–2.2). The NYLL
defines an employer as any “individual, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability
company, business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons acting as
employer.” NYLL § 651(6). An employee is one who is “employed for hire by an employer in
any employment.” NYLL § 190(2). Further, the test for the employer-employee relationship is
based on the same factors as that under the FLSA. Miranda v. Astoria Provisions, LLC, No. 19-
CV-02923 (EK) (PK), 2020 WL 6370058, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020).
Here, Plaintiff is entitled to coverage under the NYLL. Even if it is determined that
Plaintiff failed to meet the statutory requirements of enterprise or individual coverage under the
FLSA, she established the employment relationship under the NYLL by identifying Defendants’
control over the daily operations of Salon. Indeed, the NYLL does not require Plaintiff to
establish whether the relationship (i) entailed interstate commerce or (ii) involved a defendant
that made over $500,000 in annual sales. Therefore, the NYLL applies here.4
1. Unpaid Overtime Wages
To successfully plead an overtime claim under the NYLL, the plaintiffs “must allege only
that [they] worked compensable overtime in a workweek longer than forty hours, and that [they
were] not properly compensated for that overtime.” Tackie v. Keff Enter., Inc., No. 14-cv-2074
(JPO), 2014 WL 4626229, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014).
Plaintiff, through the Complaint, alleges that during her employment, she worked
approximately seven days per week, totaling eighty-four hours per week. (See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.)
During her employment, Defendants paid Plaintiff $300 per day. (Id. at ¶ 10.) These assertions
4 If Judge Brown decides that Plaintiff’s FLSA claim falls short of a successful claim and subsequently
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, the Court recommends that the
Complaint be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to renew to cure any deficiencies.
are sufficient for Plaintiff to receive damages for lack of overtime compensation under the
NYLL. See Lopez v. Royal Thai Plus, LLC, No. 16-CV-4028-NGG-SJB, 2018 WL 1770660, at
*7–8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2018) (finding plaintiff sufficiently pled an overtime claim under NYLL
where he demonstrated through his complaint the amount of hours worked in excess of forty
hours).
2. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages
Here, as Defendants have defaulted, “it would be unfair to require Plaintiff[] to
submit substantial proof of improper compensation given [Defendants’] non-
participation in the instant litigation and Plaintiff’[s] inability to obtain the
relevant employment records through discovery. See … Hart v. Rick's Cabaret
Int'l, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 447, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“It would be manifestly
unfair to allow employers to avoid, or reduce, their liability simply because they
kept shoddy records.”).
Kim v. Kini LIC Corp., 806 F. Supp. 3d 277, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2025)
New York regulations provide that the “minimum wage” for employees working in in
Nassau County is $16.00 per hour on and after January 1, 2024. See N.Y. Lab. Law § 652.
Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendants paid her less than the New York statutory
minimum wage rate. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 11, 48.) Plaintiff alleges that she worked approximately
eighty-four hours per week over seven days, or approximately twelve hours per day. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff was paid a flat rate of $300 per day. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Thus, when simply dividing the daily
flat rate of $300 by the twelve hours worked daily, the total hourly rate then equates to $25.00.
This hourly rate is not lower than the applicable minimum wage rate for employees working in
Nassau County at the relevant timeframe. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a valid
NYLL claim for failure to pay minimum wages.
3. Wage Notice and Wage Statement Claims
Plaintiff brings claims under the NYLL alleging that Defendants failed to furnish
accurate wage statements for each of her pay periods as required under as required under NYLL
§ 195(3), along with Defendants’ failure to provide her with a wage notice upon her hire as
required under NYLL § 195(1). (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 55-66.)
Under NYLL’s notice and wage statement provisions, employers are statutorily required
to provide each employee with notice of their rate of pay and a wage statement listing specific
information with each paycheck. N.Y. Lab. L. §§ 195(1)(a), 195(3). The notice must contain “the
rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece,
commission, or other.” Id. § 195(1)(a). Further, the employer must also “obtain from the
employee a signed and dated written acknowledgment, in English and in the primary language of
the employee, of receipt of this notice.” Id. The wage statements must include “the dates of work
covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone
number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day,
week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; deductions.” Id. § 195(3). An employer
who fails to provide notices and statements is liable for statutory damages. See id. § 198(1-b), (1-
d).
The Supreme Court has rejected “the proposition that ‘a plaintiff automatically satisfies
the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to
authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.’” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 413,
426 (2021) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016)). Article III standing must
be satisfied in order to comply with TransUnion. “The requirements of Article III standing are
well established: ‘[A] plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.’” Lacewell v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency, 999 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir.
2021) (quoting Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 338). At the default judgment stage, as at the motion to
dismiss stage, “the plaintiff still bears the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively and
plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has standing to sue.” Calcano v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd., 36
F.4th 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
The Second Circuit has held that “a plaintiff cannot rely on technical violations of the
Labor Law” to establish standing. Guthrie v. Rainbow Fencing, 113 F.4th 300, 305 (2d Cir.
2024). “A plaintiff may establish standing, however, by establishing ‘some causal connection
between the lack of accurate notices and [a] downstream harm.’” Cinar v. R&G Brenner Income
Tax, LLC, No. 20-CV-1362, 2024 WL 4224046, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2024) (quoting
Guthrie, 113 F.4th at 305). Indeed, when the “gravamen of the complaint is that the denial of
plaintiff’s statutory right to these documents caused plaintiff to fail to realize that defendants
were deducting certain benefits from his wages, resulting in his underpayment,” courts have
found this demonstrates “a tangible injury resulting from the violation” thus sufficient for Article
III standing. Stih v. Rockaway Farmers Mkt., Inc., No. 22-CV-3228 (ARR)(RER), 2023 WL
2760492, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2023)
Further, as Guthrie makes clear:
The legislature may have intended to empower employees to advocate for
themselves, but unless the plaintiff-employee can show that he or she would have
undertaken such advocacy and plausibly would have avoided some actual harm or
obtained some actual benefit if accurate notices had been provided, the plaintiff-
employee has not established a concrete injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing
to seek statutory damages under § 195.
Id. at 308.
Here, Plaintiff has adequately pled that she suffered an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy
the standing requirement. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide her with the required
wage notices and wage statements under the New York Labor Law. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 56, 64.)
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants “failed to furnish Plaintiff with wage notices as
required by § 195(1) of the Labor Law” and “failed to furnish Plaintiff with accurate statements
of wages, as required by § 195(3).” (Id. at ¶¶ 25–27.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants’
violations were willful, in that Defendants knowingly failed to provide the required
documentation. (Id. at ¶¶ 57, 65.)
Plaintiff contends that the absence of proper wage notices and statements deprived her of
critical information regarding her pay, including the number of hours worked and the wages
owed. (Id. at ¶ 59.) As a result, Plaintiff was unable to determine whether she was being properly
compensated, including whether she was entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay. (Id. at ¶
60.) Plaintiff further avers that Defendants’ failure to provide accurate wage statements
prevented her from maintaining accurate records of her wages and hindered her ability to take
timely action to recover unpaid compensation or advocate for the lost wages properly. (Id. at ¶¶
59–61.) Consequently, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she suffered a concrete and
particularized injury, including ongoing underpayment and related economic harm, as a direct
result of Defendants’ violations of the NYLL. (See id.)
Courts in this District have found these allegations to be sufficient for conferring Article
III standing upon a plaintiff claiming defendants failed to provide accurate wage notice and wage
statement claims. See, e.g., Reyes v. Crystal Window & Door Sys., Ltd., No. 23-CV-2578 (RPK)
(JRC), 2024 WL 4028308, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2024) (concluding plaintiff satisfied Article
III standing after pleading “that (1) their notices listed an inaccurate overtime rate and pay
frequency; (2) as a result, they were kept in the dark about how much and how often they should
be paid; (3) they suffered harms in the form of under- and late payments; and (4) had they
received the proper disclosures, they would have advocated for themselves and ‘acted to rectify
the situation’ sooner”); Cinar, 2024 WL 4224046, at *4 (finding Article III standing satisfied
because plaintiff alleged that because of the inaccurate wage notices and statements, plaintiff
“did not realize they were misclassified as exempt employees and thus underpaid,” and that had
they received accurate information, they “would have confronted Defendants and advocated for
the proper payment of wages”); Stih, 2023 WL 2760492, at *7 (determining plaintiff had
standing to bring the wage notice and wage statements claims because he alleged that
defendant’s failure to provide a proper wage notice injured plaintiff by “denying him the right to
be adequately apprised of the terms and conditions of his employment”); Cuchimaque v. A.
Ochoa Concrete Corp., No. 22 CV 6136 (RPK) (RML), 2023 WL 5152336, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July
18, 2023) (holding plaintiff possessed Article III standing where he alleged the breach of
defendant’s wage statement and notice obligations “injured [plaintiff] by denying [him] the right
to know the conditions of [his] compensation, resulting in the underpayment of wages”), report
and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 9104384 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2023). Plaintiff, therefore,
has established it has standing to maintain these causes of action.
Moreover, Plaintiff credibly asserts that Defendants never provided her with an
“acknowledgment of pay” notifying her of the rate of pay or a wage statement when she received
wages, during her tenure with Defendants, as required under NYLL §§ 195(1) and (3). (See ECF
No. 27-1, Coreas Decl. ¶ 7.) As such, the undersigned recommends finding that Plaintiff has
established a valid NYLL claim for failure to provide wage statements and notices.
4. Spread of Hours Pay
Under New York law, “[a]n employee shall receive one hour’s pay at the basic minimum
hourly wage rate . . . for any day in which (a) the spread of hours exceeds 10 hours . . . .”
N.Y.C.R.R. § 142-2.4; Rana v. Islam, 887 F.3d 118, 123 n.3 (2d Cir. 2018). “Spread of hours” is
defined as “the interval between the beginning and end of an employee’s workday,” and includes
“working time plus time off for meals plus intervals off duty.” N.Y.C.R.R. § 146-1.6; Alonso
Vazquez v. Azoulay, 834 F. App'x 653, 654 (2d Cir. 2021). Courts calculate spread of hours
damages “by multiplying the number of days an employee worked more than ten hours by the
basic minimum wage rate.” Pastuizaca v. Mihwa Jo Corp., No. 22-CV-5561 (MKB), 2025 WL
437929, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2025) (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12 § 142-
2.4(a)).
Here, during her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff alleges that she worked seven
days per week and eighty-four hours in total per week—averaging 12 hours per day. (ECF No. 1
at ¶ 9.) As Plaintiff contends, she never received her spread of hours compensation when
Plaintiff worked these shifts in excess of ten hours. (Id. at ¶¶ 29, 69.) Accordingly, Plaintiff is
entitled to spread of hours compensation under NYLL.
V. Damages
Once liability for default is established, the next inquiry is damages. A party’s default
constitutes a concession of all well-pleaded allegations, however such default “is not considered
an admission of damages.” Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Metro
Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2012). While “the default establishes a
defendant's liability, unless the amount of damages is certain, the court is required to make an
independent determination of the sum to be awarded.” See Griffiths v. Francillon, No. 10-CV-
3101, 2012 WL 1341077, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012) (quotations omitted), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1354481, at *2 (Apr. 13, 2012); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.
v. El Norteno Rest. Corp., No. 06-CV-1878, 2007 WL 2891016, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
2007) (citing Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105,
111 (2d Cir. 1997)) (“The court must conduct an inquiry to ascertain the amount of damages
with reasonable certainty.”) Under Rule 55(b)(2), “it [is] not necessary for the District Court to
hold a hearing” to determine the amount of damages, “as long as it ensured that there was a basis
for the damages specified in the default judgment.” Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 873
F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Gilbert, No. 20-
CV-1441, 2022 WL 344270, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2022) (“A hearing is not necessary where
the record contains detailed affidavits and documentary evidence that enables the court to
evaluate the proposed sum and determine an award of damages.”). Here, Plaintiff requests a sum
of $18, 782.00 representing the following damages:
• $5,818 in unpaid minimum wage and overtime;
• $5,818 in liquidated damages for unpaid minimum wage and overtime;
• $1,250 WTPA notice;
• $5,000 WTPA paystub;
• $448 in spread of hours pay; and
• $448 in liquidated damages for spread of hours pay.
(ECF Nos. 29-1 at 4; 27-3 at 3.)
In addition, Plaintiff requests $405.00 in costs for the initial filing of the Complaint.
(ECF No. 27-3 at 3.) However, Plaintiff waives any request for pre-judgment interest and does
not seek post-judgment interest as that is absent from the memorandum of law. (ECF No. 29-1 at
3.) Each request is analyzed separately below.
A. Unpaid Overtime Wages & Minimum Wages
“When a defendant fails to appear and produce employment records, the Court may credit
a plaintiff's assertions regarding the hours they worked and the compensation they received, even
when based only on plaintiff's recollection.” Singh v. Mowla, No. 19 CV 4687 (PKC)(LB), 2022
WL 17820099, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022). Notably, a plaintiff may not recover twice
under the FLSA and NYLL. Hosseini v. Miilkiina LLC, No. 22-CV-1459 (LJL), 2023 WL
7128092, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2023) (“Although Defendants violated the overtime
requirements of both the FLSA and NYLL, Plaintiff may not recover twice by collecting awards
under both statutes.”). Here, Plaintiff seeks a total actual damages award under the FLSA and
NYLL of $5,818 but fails to specify how she arrived at this figure. (See ECF Nos. 27-1-2.) As
such, the Court will determine the amount owed as set forth below.
The minimum wage at the time Plaintiff was employed by Defendants was $16.00, which
then means that her overtime rate was $24.00. Plaintiff worked eighty-four (84) hours a week
from the time period of November 25, 2024 to December 19, 2024. (See ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF
No. 27-2.) Put simply, Plaintiff worked an additional 44 hours a week without overtime pay for
the four-week period, which totals 176 hours. (See ECF No. 27-2.) As reflected in the following
chart, taking the difference between the overtime rate Plaintiff was owed and the minimum wage
rate that she should have been paid, multiplying that figure by the number of hours Plaintiff
worked in excess of forty hours on a given week, and multiplying that number by the number of
weeks worked in a payment period results in the total overtime wage figure of $1,408.00. See
Bonilla, 2025 WL 745906, at *15 (conducting identical math); Juarez v. Precision Apparel, Inc.,
No. 12-CV-2349 (ARR)(VMS), 2013 WL 5210142, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2013) (“Where a
plaintiff was paid straight time for hours worked in excess of 40 hours, the amount paid for these
excess hours is credited against the overtime pay per week. The remainder is the overtime total
owed for that week. The totals owing for each week are then aggregated to determine the total
amount of overtime wages owed.”)
Payment Period Minimum Overtime Difference Hours in Weeks Totals
Wage Rate Rate Between the Excess of 40 Worked
Rates Per Week
11/25/2024 – 12/19/2024 $16.00/hour $24.00/hour $8 44 4 $1408.00
Total $1408.00
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends awarding Plaintiff $1,408.00 in unpaid
overtime wages and declines to recommend any unpaid minimum wages for the reasons
established supra.
B. Spread of Hours
Plaintiff also requests unpaid spread of hours compensation in the amount of $448.00
(ECF No. 29-1 at 4.) “Pursuant to the NYLL, employees are entitled to an additional hour of pay
at the minimum wage rate for each day an employee's spread of hours exceeded ten hours.” Ore,
2022 WL 19520879, at *12 (citing 12 N.Y.C.C.R. § 142-2.4) see Fermin, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 46.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she worked seven days per week and eighty-four hours in total per
week, thereby exceeding 10 hours per day. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 28-29.) Plaintiff contends, she never
received her spread of hours compensation when Plaintiff worked these shifts in excess of ten
hours. (ECF No. 29-1 at 3.) Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to one extra hour of pay at the then-
applicable minimum wage for each day that she worked more than ten hours per day. The Court
calculates the spread of hours pay owed to Plaintiff as follows:
Payment Period Weeks Worked Spread of Hours Applicable Minimum Spread of Hours Wages
Days Per Week Wage Owed (Total)
11/25/2024 – 12/19/2024 4 7 $16.00 $448.00
Total $448.00
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends awarding Plaintiff $448.00 in unpaid spread
of hours wages under the NYLL. See Prudencio Trejo v. Blanca's Bakery & Deli Inc., No. 23-
CV-06063 (NJC) (JMW), 2025 WL 1029523, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted as modified, No. 2:23-CV-6063 (NJC) (JMW), 2025 WL 850625
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2025).
C. Liquidated Damages
Under the NYLL, “[e]mployees may recover liquidated damages of 100% of wages owed
unless ‘the employer proves a good faith basis for believing that its underpayment of wages was
in compliance with the law.’” Fermin, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 47 (internal citation omitted); see also
N.Y. Lab. L. § 198(1–a). Because the FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages deter the same
conduct, the Second Circuit has interpreted the FLSA and NYLL “as not allowing duplicative
liquidated damages for the same course of conduct.” Rana v. Islam, 887 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir.
2018). “In light of the principle that ‘the law providing the greatest recovery will govern,’
[p]laintiff may be awarded liquidated damages pursuant to the NYLL or the FLSA.” Jian Hua Li
v. Chang Lung Grp. Inc., No. 16-CV-6722 (PK), 2020 WL 1694356, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7,
2020) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff asserts she is entitled to $5,818 for liquidated damages for the amount
owed in overtime wages. However, as the Court has found Plaintiff is only entitled to $1408.00
for unpaid overtime wages, her entitlement is limited to that sum. Plaintiff is entitled to recover
liquidated damages because Defendants did not comply with the NYLL and failed to
demonstrate good faith. Indeed, Defendants’ lack of good faith is evidenced through the failure
to defend this action, even despite receiving ample notice throughout the course of this litigation.
See Lu Nan Fan v. Jenny & Richard's Inc., No. 17-CV-6963 (WFK), 2019 WL 1549033, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1547256 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 9, 2019) (“As a result of defendants’ default in this action, the record is devoid of evidence
of their good faith or reasonable belief.”); Peralta v. M & O Iron Works, Inc., No. 12-CV-3179
(ARR) (RLM), 2014 WL 988835, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2014) (“Obviously, as a result of
defendants’ default in this action, the record is devoid of evidence of defendants’ good faith or
reasonable belief.”). Likewise, Plaintiff seeks liquidated damages for the failure to pay spread of
hour wages in the amount of $448.00. (ECF No. 29-1 at 4.) Plaintiff may recover for this as well.
See Villanueva v. 179 Third Ave. Rest Inc., 500 F. Supp. 3d 219, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), report
and recommendation adopted sub nom. Villanueva v. 179 Third Ave. Rest. Inc., No. 16-CV-8782
(AJN)(RWL), 2021 WL 2139441 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2021) (“Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled
to recover liquidated damages. The amount of liquidated damages is equal to 100% of the
amount owed to the Plaintiffs in unpaid wages, which includes unpaid minimum wage, unpaid
overtime, and unpaid spread-of-hours.”)
Therefore, Plaintiff should be entitled to an amount of liquidated damages equal to the
overtime wage damages amount and unpaid spread of hours amount—$1,856.00. See Leo v.
Province Therapeutics, LLC, No. 23-CV-05418 (NJC) (JMW), 2024 WL 2923945, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 23-CV-05418 (NJC)
(JMW), 2024 WL 2891798 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2024).
D. Defendants’ Statutory Violations
Plaintiff seeks $6,250.00 for statutory damages concerning Defendants’ violations
pursuant to NYLL §§ 195(1), (3) for failure to provide wage notices and wage statements. (ECF
Nos. 1 at 10-11; 27-1.) “Violations of NYLL § 195(1) carry damages of $50 per workday, for a
maximum of amount of $5,000.” Rowe v. CC Restaurant & Bakery, Inc., No. 17-CV-01423
(CBA) (PK), at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2019) (citing NYLL § 198(1-b)). Similarly, “[v]iolations
of NYLL § 195(3) carry damages of $250 per workday, for a maximum amount of $5,000.” Id.
As recommended supra, Plaintiff has established the requisite liability to recovery. Accordingly,
Plaintiff is entitled to the statutory maximum of $5,000 under § 195(3), and then $1,250.00 under
§ 195(1), a figure arrived by multiplying $50.00 per each day worked, for a total of $6250.00
(see ECF No. 29-1 at 4). See Ming Hui v. Shorty's Seafood Corp., No. 15-CV-7295 (RJD) (ST),
2017 WL 5054401, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017
WL 5125527 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2017). (finding defendants never provided plaintiff with any
written notice or wage statements and thereby awarding plaintiff an award under §§ 195 (1), (3)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 27) be GRANTED, and that judgment be limited to the
following damages: (i) $1,408.00 in unpaid overtime wages; (ii) $448.00 in unpaid spread of
hours compensation; (iii) $1,856.00 in liquidated damages under the NYLL; and (iv) $6,250.00
in statutory violations pursuant to NYLL §§ 191(1), (3), for a total sum of damages in the
amount of $9,962.00.
OBJECTIONS
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being electronically served through ECF
on all counsel. Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to serve copies of this Report and
Recommendation upon Defendant on or before April 27, 2026, and file proof of service of the
same ECF. Any written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of service of this Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2011); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(a), 72(b); see also Nambiar v. The Central Orthopedic Group LLP, No. 24-1103 (2d
Cir. Oct. 28, 2025) (addressing timing and scope of objections to Reports and
Recommendations). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed
to the District Judge assigned to this action prior to the expiration of the fourteen (14) day period
for filing objections. Failure to file objections within fourteen (14) days precludes further review
of this Report and Recommendation either by the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 145 (1985) (“a party shall file objections with the district court or else
waive right to appeal”); Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008) (“failure to
object timely to a magistrate's report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the
magistrate’s decision”); see Monroe v. Hyundai of Manhattan & Westchester, 372 F. App’x 147,
147–48 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (same).
Dated: Central Islip, New York.
April 22, 2026
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED,
James M. Wicks
/S/
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge