The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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LIDIA M. ORREGO,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
v. AND ORDER
20-CV-3361-SJB-AYS
KEVIN KNIPFING, et al.,
Defendants.
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BULSARA, United States District Judge:
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff Lidia M.
Orrego’s claims against Defendants Kevin Knipfing, Stephanieanna Knipfing, Teresa
Zantua, Old Westbury Eddie LLC, and Old Westbury LLC (“Defendants”). Orrego,
who worked for the Knipfings as a nanny and housekeeper for several months in 2018,
brings claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 for hostile work environment and retaliation. Orrego alleges that Zantua—the
aunt of the children she cared for—harassed her with repeated racist remarks, and after
she complained to her employer, she was terminated. For the reasons explained below,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted, and Orrego’s motion is denied.
And for the reasons explained, including Orrego’s vexatious and harassing litigation
conduct, the Court imposes a permanent filing injunction on Orrego.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
“A genuine issue of material fact exists if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Nick’s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas.
Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986)). “In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, [the
Court] must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the
moving party.” Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The movant bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “This is true even though the court [is]
presented with cross-motions for summary judgment; each movant has the burden of
presenting evidence to support its motion that would allow the district court, if
appropriate, to direct a verdict in its favor.” Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 236 (2d
Cir. 1988). “When both parties have moved for summary judgment, the court must
evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all
reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Alta
Partners, LLC v. Getty Images Holdings, Inc., 165 F.4th 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2026) (quotation
omitted).
“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support
the assertion” in one of two ways. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). It may cite to portions of the
record “including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Id. R.
56(c)(1)(A). Alternatively, it may show that “the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” Id. R. 56(c)(1)(B); cf. Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d
917, 924 (2d Cir. 1988).
In moving for summary judgment or answering such a motion, litigants are
required by the Local Rules to provide a statement (a Rule 56.1 statement) setting forth
purported undisputed facts or, if controverting any fact, responding to each assertion.
See Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(a)–(b). In both instances, the party must support its position by
citing to admissible evidence from the record. Id. R. 56.1(d); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)
(requiring reliance on admissible evidence in the record in supporting or controverting
a purported material fact). “The purpose of Local Rule 56.1 is to streamline the
consideration of summary judgment motions by freeing district courts from the need to
hunt through voluminous records without guidance from the parties.” Holtz v.
Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2001).
Where claims in opposing Rule 56.1 statements are “genuinely disputed,” the
Court will consider the evidentiary sources of the claims. Halberg v. United Behav.
Health, 408 F. Supp. 3d 118, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (adopting report and recommendation).
In evaluating the sources of claims made in dueling Rule 56.1 statements, the Court
cannot—as is true for the summary judgment motion as a whole—weigh evidence or
assess the credibility of witnesses. See United States v. Rem, 38 F.3d 634, 644 (2d Cir.
1994). Furthermore, “[l]egal arguments are impermissible in any Rule 56.1 Statement
and are to be disregarded.” Taveras v. HRV Mgmt., Inc., No. 17-CV-5211, 2020 WL
1501777, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020); Lawrence v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 12-CV-412, 2013
WL 4458755, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013) (“Both parties have submitted Local Rule
56.1 statements and responses to each other’s statements that mix factual assertions
with legal argument and therefore fail to meet the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. The
facts . . . are taken from those assertions contained in the Local Rule 56.1 statements that
comply with Local Rule 56.1[.]” (citations omitted)). The court may not grant summary
judgment based on a fact in a Rule 56.1 statement—even if undisputed—not supported
by admissible evidence. E.g., Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 142–43 (2d Cir.
2003) (vacating grant of summary judgment to defendants based on facts enumerated in
Rule 56.1 statement supported only by arguments in briefs rather than admissible
evidence). The Court must also disregard conclusory denials that lack citations to
admissible evidence. Rodriguez v. Schneider, No. 95-CV-4083, 1999 WL 459813, at *1 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1999) (“Rule 56.1 statements are not argument. They should contain
factual assertions, with citation to the record. They should not contain conclusions[.]”),
aff’d, 56 F. App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2003). Also, where the opposing party fails to
specifically controvert a numbered paragraph in the Rule 56.1 statement, the statement
by the moving party “will be deemed to be admitted.” Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(c). The Court
also does not give any consideration to hearsay, speculation, or inadmissible evidence
in evaluating declarations or affidavits. Pacenza v. IBM Corp., 363 F. App’x 128, 130 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“[A] court is obliged not to consider inadmissible evidence at the summary
judgment stage[.]”); Crawford v. Dep’t of Investigation, No. 05-CV-5368, 2007 WL 2850512,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2007) (“[A] non-moving party ‘must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial;’ he or she ‘may not rely on mere
conclusory allegations nor speculation, but instead must offer some hard evidence
showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.’” (quoting Woodman v.
WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 2005))), aff’d, 324 F. App’x 139, 143 (2d Cir.
2009).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court finds the following facts—drawn from the pleadings, the parties’
respective Rule 56.1 statements, and supporting affidavits and exhibits attached
thereto—are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
The Knipfings, Kevin (“Mr. Knipfing”) and Stephanieanna (“Ms. Knipfing”),
have four children, and hired Orrego to work as a nanny in February 2018. (Defs.’ Rule
56.1 Statement (“Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 221-1 ¶¶ I(3), 11; Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp.
(“Pl.’s 56.1 Resp.”), Dkt. No. 224-2 ¶¶ I(3), 11).1 At that time, the Knipfings had a staff
of five that they employed through their company, Old Westbury Eddie, LLC.2 (Id.
¶¶ I(7), 1; Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ I(7), 1). The staff included: Skylar Testa, the house
1 The numbering of Defendants’ 56.1 Statement restarts at Section II.
Accordingly, the Court notes paragraphs from Section I as, for example, ¶ I(3). All
references to numbered paragraphs without a section label directly preceding that
number correspond to the continuous numbering that begins at Section II.
2 Orrego named both Old Westbury Eddie, LLC, and Old Westbury, LLC, as
defendants seemingly because the termination letter she was issued came from “Old
Westbury, LLC,” but she acknowledges there is no such company registered in New
York. (See Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 226-3 ¶ 17).
Defendants respond that their company, which was “incorporated in New York to serve
as the employer of record for the Knipfings’ domestic employees,” is “Old Westbury
Eddie, LLC,” and omitting “Eddie” from the termination letter was a typographical
error. (Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Resp. (“Defs.’ 56.1 Resp.”), Dkt. No. 227-3 ¶ 17). The Court
refers to the entity generally as “Old Westbury,” and all parties have briefed the motion
understanding there is only a single entity defendant.
manager, Rebecca Uzcategui, the primary nanny, Cristina Coimbra, the housekeeper,
Gerardo Guarino, the chef, and Shannon Sha, who homeschooled the Knipfings’
children. (Id. ¶¶ 1–6; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 1–6).
Before beginning her employment, Orrego signed a non-disclosure agreement
(“NDA”). (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 13–18).3 The NDA generally prohibits employees from
discussing confidential information—which the NDA broadly defines to include,
among other things, personal information about the Knipfings and their employees—
with any third party absent Mr. Knipfing’s express written permission, subject to
several exceptions, such as to report possible violations of federal or state law. (Id.
¶¶ 15–17). Under the NDA, photographs pertaining to the Knipfings were also deemed
confidential information, and a separate provision forbade taking photos or videos of
the Knipfings without express permission. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 18).
3 Orrego says she denies these statements in her 56.1 Response, but the bases she
offers do not appear to contest the heart of the statements. For example, Orrego denies
that she ever received any documents to sign prior to her employment, on the ground
that her text messages with Testa about the hiring process, that she supplied to the
Court, do not show that she received any documents to sign. (Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 13). She
adds a comment, describing that text message exhibit: “NDA Never Received.” (Id.).
The crux of her contestation, more clearly in her explanations for her denials of the
descriptions of the NDA, seems to be that she was never given a complete copy of the
NDA before or after signing. (Id. ¶¶ 14–18 (noting “NDA require to have copy” and “I
never get a copy of the NDA”)). But Defendants provided a complete copy of an NDA
with Orrego’s signature. (See NDA, attached to Defs.’ Mot. as Ex. F, Dkt. No. 221-8).
And even if the Court were to not consider the NDA, there are other legitimate, non-
retaliatory reasons for her termination, which entitle Defendants to summary judgment.
See infra pp. 20–22.
At some point, Orrego also assumed some housekeeping duties for the
Knipfings—the date is disputed, but is not material.4 On October 31, 2018, Ms. Knipfing
and Testa informed Orrego that she would no longer be a nanny and housekeeper—she
would only serve as a nanny. (Id. ¶ 75; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 75). Two days later, on
November 2, 2018, Orrego sent Ms. Knipfing and Testa an email raising allegations that
Uzcategui, the primary nanny, had been harassing Orrego and mistreating the children,
and that Zanuta, Ms. Knipfing’s sister, had been harassing Orrego with racially
discriminatory comments. (Id. ¶¶ I(4), 78–81; Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ I(4), 78–81). Testa
forwarded the email to Mr. Knipfing the same day, and on November 6, 2018, Mr.
Knipfing met with Orrego to discuss her complaints and asked her to send him any
evidence she had, which she did over the next week. (Id. ¶¶ 88–92; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp.
¶¶ 88–92). Testa informed Orrego on November 11, 2018, that the Knipfings had hired
investigators to look into the allegations she raised, and those investigators met with
and interviewed Orrego the following day. (Id. ¶ 99; Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 98–99).5
After the investigation concluded, Orrego was informed on November 27, 2018
that her employment was terminated. (Id. ¶ 103; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 103). The
4 Orrego contends at one point that she was hired as a nanny and housekeeper,
and at another that she began housekeeping duties in March 2018. (Pl.’s 56.1 Resp.
¶¶ 68, 70). Defendants assert that Orrego asked to also serve as a housekeeper around
July 2018, when the Knipfings were looking for a second housekeeper. (Defs.’ 56.1
Stmt. ¶¶ 70–72).
5 Though it is not detailed in the parties’ 56.1 Statements, the Court notes that it
appears from an audio transcription submitted by Orrego that when she met with Mr.
Knipfing on November 6, 2018, she was told that she would not be working, but would
be paid, until the investigation resolved. (Audio Transcription, attached to Pl.’s Opp’n
as Ex. 17, Dkt. No. 224-20 at 7).
termination letter gave multiple reasons, including: 1) breach of the NDA; 2) a
statement Orrego made in the course of the investigation that she was unwilling to
continue working with Uzcategui; and 3) the conclusion that Orrego made false
statements in her initial complaint. (Id. ¶ 104; Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 104; Termination
Letter, attached to Defs.’ Mot. as Ex. X, Dkt. No. 221-26).
Orrego then initiated this lawsuit on July 23, 2020, (Compl., Dkt. No. 1), and filed
the Amended Complaint on August 17, 2020, (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 8). The Amended
Complaint named as Defendants the Knipfings, Old Westbury Eddie LLC, Old
Westbury LLC, Steve Savitsky, and Zantua. (Id. at 2–3, 9–10). She brought claims for
race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
the NYSHRL, New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), and New York Labor
Law (“NYLL”). (Id. at 4, 11). She also asserted claims under state criminal laws for
forgery and perjury. (Id. at 4).
The Court dismissed Orrego’s claims asserted under the NYCHRL, NYLL, and
state criminal laws, and dismissed her discrimination claims brought under § 1981 and
the NYSHRL. (Mem. & Order dated Sep. 30, 2021, Dkt. No. 30 at 1). The Court also
dismissed the retaliation claim against Zantua, and all claims against Savitsky. (Id.).
The parties agree that the remaining claims are: 1) Orrego’s § 1981 and NYSHRL hostile
work environment claims based on race and national origin against the Knipfings,
Zantua, and Old Westbury; and 2) Orrego’s § 1981 and NYSHRL retaliation claims
against the Knipfings and Old Westbury. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 117; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp.
¶ 117).6
Defendants’ fully briefed motion for summary judgment was filed on the Court’s
docket on October 3, 2025. (See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. dated Aug. 8,
2025 (“Defs.’ Mot.”), Dkt. No. 221-54; Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. dated Aug. 12,
2025 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 224-3; Defs.’ Mem. in Reply dated Oct. 3, 2025 (“Defs.’
Reply”), Dkt. No. 222). Orrego’s fully briefed motion was filed that same day.7 (See
Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. dated Aug. 8, 2025 (“Pl.’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 226-
4; Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. dated Sep. 12, 2025 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 227-
2; Pl.’s Mem. in Reply dated Oct. 3, 2025 (“Pl.’s Reply”), Dkt. No. 228-3).
6 This case was first reassigned from the Honorable Gary R. Brown to the
Honorable Joan M. Azrack on May 18, 2023, and then to the undersigned on January 31,
2025.
7 Orrego submitted USB flash drives with her motion papers. (See Notice dated
Oct. 6, 2025, Dkt. No. 229). However, the Court cannot access or review the contents of
flash drives. And Orrego was expressly informed of the Court’s protocol for
submission of large electronic files in the event they cannot be filed on ECF. (Order
dated July 8, 2025 (“The Court has received from Plaintiff multiple requests to submit
electronic evidence. The protocol for submission of large electronic files set forth in the
Court’s Individual Practices § II.D, however, is only to be utilized for trial or motion
practice where exhibits are appropriate for the Court’s consideration of the issues
involved, such as summary judgment. Both sides are therefore informed that, outside
of such limited practice, documents should be filed only on ECF.”)). According to a
letter Orrego submitted, it appears the flash drives contain: the pictures and videos
Orrego took while employed by the Knipfings, social media accounts of other
employees and Mr. Knipfing, the reports Orrego sent to Mr. Knipfing, and a worker’s
compensation recording. (Pl.’s Letter dated Oct. 3, 2025, Dkt. No. 226 at 3–4). From the
descriptions, this evidence appears largely duplicative of material submitted on the
Court’s docket, though the Court is unable to review it.
DISCUSSION
I. Hostile Work Environment
“Section 1981 and NYSHRL8 hostile work environment claims are governed by
the same substantive standard.” Alvarado v. Nordstrom, Inc., 685 F. App’x 4, 6 (2d Cir.
2017). “To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment, the plaintiff must
show that the discriminatory harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,
and that a specific basis exists for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer.”
Id. (quotation omitted). While § 1981 permits a plaintiff to sue individuals in addition
to employers, id., the NYSHRL generally does not permit individual liability for
employment discrimination, see Nezaj v. PS450 Bar & Rest., 719 F. Supp. 3d 318, 329
(S.D.N.Y. 2024) (“[A]s the divided New York Court of Appeals clarified . . . , where a
corporate entity is the plaintiff’s employer, an individual affiliated with the entity
cannot himself qualify as the employer . . . even if the individual holds a high post at
the employer or owns the entity.” (citing Doe v. Bloomberg, L.P., 36 N.Y.3d 450, 457–58
(2021))) (collecting cases).
8 Because the complained-of conduct occurred prior to October 11, 2019—when
amendments to the NYSHRL made certain standards more lenient—Orrego’s NYSHRL
hostile work environment claim is analyzed under the Title VII standard. Wheeler v.
Praxair Surface Techs., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 3d 432, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“[F]or a plaintiff
whose claim is based on conduct before October 11, 2019, the Title VII standard still
applies.”); Lee v. Riverbay Corp., 751 F. Supp. 3d 259, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (explaining that
before the amendment, “the pleading standards were generally the same for Title VII,
section 1981, and NYSHRL claims” (quotation omitted)). Orrego does not suggest
otherwise.
A. Claim Against Zantua
“[I]ndividuals may be held liable under § 1981.” Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food
Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2000). But in those instances “the individuals
have been supervisors who were personally involved in the discriminatory activity.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
A supervisor “is empowered by the employer ‘to take tangible employment
actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” Wiercinski v.
Mangia 57, Inc., 787 F.3d 106, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570
U.S. 421, 431 (2013)) (applying Vance’s “supervisor” definition under Title VII to a
§ 1981 claim). “In other words, a supervisor is an individual empowered by the
company as a distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other
employees under his or her control.” Id. at 114 (quotation omitted); e.g., Bentley v.
AutoZoners, LLC, 935 F.3d 76, 91 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that “to raise a triable issue of
fact” as to whether a defendant was a supervisor, plaintiff “had to adduce admissible
evidence” showing that her employer had authorized defendant “to do more than
oversee her day-to-day performance of assigned tasks”—that is, “to take tangible
employment actions that could inflict direct economic injury”).
Defendants contend that Zantua was not Orrego’s supervisor, and in fact, was
never employed by the Knipfings. (Defs.’ Mot. at 7). And they point to several pieces
of evidence, including Orrego’s own admissions, to demonstrate as much. Defendants
point to Orrego’s deposition testimony that she never submitted her timesheets to
Zantua, that she did not know whether Zantua had any authority to suspend, demote,
or terminate her employment, or change her salary, and that she did not know whether
the Knipfings ever paid Zantua to perform any work. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 19–22; see
also Dep. of Lidia Orrego (“Orrego Dep.”), attached to Defs.’ Mot. as Ex. A, Dkt. No.
221-3 at 141:20-25, 152:5–154:2). Defendants also point to Orrego’s Worker’s
Compensation claim filed in September 2019, in which she identifies Testa—not
Zantua—as her supervisor. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 23). Orrego does not meaningfully
contest much of this evidence; the evidence she does contest is unsupported by the
record portions she cites. Orrego states that Zantua “is the second shift nanny to help
with 4 kids,” but she cites and provides no evidence in support of that assertion. (Pl.’s
56.1 Resp. ¶ 22). And as for naming Testa as her supervisor in her Worker’s
Compensation material, she responds that supervisor and house manager mean the
same thing to her, but provides no record evidence in support. (Id. ¶ 23). Orrego
argues that Zantua had a supervisory role because she “direct[ed] Plaintiff’s tasks,” but
again points to no evidence that could support that contention.9 (Pl.’s Opp’n at 9).
Thus, given the undisputed evidence identified by Defendants, the Court
concludes that Zantua cannot be considered a supervisor for purposes of Orrego’s
9 In light of Orrego’s pro se status, the Court has considered the factual assertions
and arguments regarding Zantua’s supervision that Orrego makes in support of her
own summary judgment motion, which are slightly more detailed than those opposing
Defendants’ motion. For example, Orrego there claims that Zantua “order[ed] Plaintiff
to take photographs and videos of the Knipfings’ children.” (Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 2, 4).
But no documents cited actually support the assertion, and in any event, directing tasks
like taking photos does not demonstrate Zantua’s supervisory liability or role.
hostile work environment claim, and accordingly, the claim against Zantua is
dismissed. E.g., Bentley, 935 F.3d at 91–92 (finding no supervisory authority where the
defendant could not hire, fire, promote, demote, or set compensation or work hours);
Lekettey v. City of New York, 637 F. App’x 659, 662 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that the plaintiff
presented no facts from which the court could find that defendant was “empowered by
the employer to take tangible employment actions against” the plaintiff).
B. Claims Against the Knipfings and Old Westbury
Under federal law governing hostile work environment claims, the same
standard for imputing harassment by non-supervisory co-workers to employers applies
to imputing harassment by non-employees, with the qualification that the court “will
consider the extent of the employer’s control and any other legal responsibility which
the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employees.” Summa v.
Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted) (applying the test for
imputing harassment by co-workers where plaintiff, team manager of the football team,
sued the university for the hostile work environment created by football players). That
is, “the employer will be held liable only for its own negligence, and the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or
that it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the
harassment yet failed to take appropriate remedial action.” Id. (quotation omitted). “In
determining the appropriateness of an employer’s response,” courts “look to whether
the response was immediate or timely and appropriate in light of the circumstances,
particularly the level of control and legal responsibility [the employer] has with respect
to [the employee’s] behavior.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Although Zantua was not Orrego’s supervisor, she was a family member of
Orrego’s employer—and Orrego worked in the home of her employer, taking care of
their children and assisting around the house. Thus, like in Summa, the Court applies
the test for imputing harassment by co-workers—even if Zantua is not an employee at
all—given the degree of control that the Knipfings presumably had over Zantua’s
conduct in their own home, with their own children. See id. But even under this
approach, the Knipfings and Old Westbury may only be held liable for non-supervisor
misconduct if they “provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the
harassment but did nothing about it.” Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 72 (quotation omitted).
Orrego had multiple avenues to raise a complaint—by texting or emailing the
Knipfings or Testa—and the fact that she did in fact email Testa and Ms. Knipfing with
her complaint on November 2, 2018 establishes the existence and feasibility of that
process. (Defs.’ Mot. at 17; Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 80; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 80). Defendants also
submitted Orrego’s deposition testimony, where she says she does not remember
having “raised any issues or any of the conduct[] by Ms. Zantua” to Ms. Knipfing prior
to the November 2, 2018 email, and says she would have to check her diary. (Defs.’ 56.1
Stmt. ¶ 8310; Orrego Dep. at 185:14-20). That diary, both parties agree, does not mention
10 In her responsive 56.1 Statement, Orrego qualifies her admission of this
statement with the additional fact that she once mentioned Zantua’s harassment to Ms.
Knipfing, but the only response she received was that Ms. Knipfing was not interested.
(Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 83). But Orrego presents no evidence or details to support that vague
contention, so the Court cannot credit it.
Orrego ever complaining about Zantua’s harassment to Ms. Knipfing. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 84; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 84).
Orrego does not allege that there was no avenue to complain, but she argues
that the Knipfings knew of Zantua’s conduct through two complaints11 she lodged—
one to Testa on October 16, 2018, and the other being the November 2, 2018 email she
sent to Testa and Ms. Knipfing—but that they took no corrective action. (Pl.’s Mot. at
9). The evidence Orrego points to regarding the October 16, 2018 report is a
transcription of an audio recording of a conversation between her and Testa, where
almost every line is largely marked “inaudible,” and the Court can discern no evidence
of a report to Testa of Zantua’s misconduct. (Audio Transcription, attached to Pl.’s
Opp’n as Ex. 8, Dkt. No. 224-11). That leaves the November 2, 2018 report, for which
there is no genuine dispute that the Knipfings took prompt action, including:
immediately forwarding Orrego’s complaint to Mr. Knipfing, who met with Orrego
four days later to discuss her complaints, requested Orrego send whatever evidence she
had, and then retained a private security company to investigate the allegations the
following week. (Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 88–102; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 88–102).
“The standard for reviewing the appropriateness of an employer’s response to
co-worker harassment is essentially a negligence one, and reasonableness depends
among other things on the gravity of the harassment alleged.” Summa, 708 F.3d at 125
11 Orrego seems to claim that she was “demot[ed] from nanny to housekeeper on
August 15, 2018, following earlier complaints”—but none of the cited evidence supports
the contention that earlier complaints existed or were the cause of termination. (Pl.’s
Opp’n at 11).
(quotation omitted). The Knipfings immediately met with Orrego and hired an external
investigation company to evaluate her complaint, which cannot be found to be an
unreasonable or inappropriate response. See, e.g., id. at 125 (finding the employer’s
response reasonable and appropriate because it “took action at once” when misconduct
was reported); Lekettey, 637 F. App’x at 662 (“Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no facts from
which it can be plausibly inferred that defendants were negligent or unresponsive to
her complaints about the workplace.”). Orrego has “failed to produce evidence that
[Defendants were] dilatory in [their] response,” Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 73, and there are no
other incidents where Defendants took no action in response to a complaint by Orrego;
thus summary judgment is appropriate on Orrego’s hostile work environment claim.
Although Orrego does not clearly make the argument, the Court separately
evaluates whether the Knipfings should have, in the exercise of reasonable care, known
about Zantua’s alleged misconduct. Uzcategui had complained about Zantua’s conduct
approximately one year before Orrego did. (Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 33; Investigative Memo
dated Nov. 21, 2018, attached to Pl.’s Mot. as Ex. 13, Dkt. No. 226-18 at 3). The external
investigation found that Uzcategui admitted “to approaching [Mr. Knipfing] with
regards to the way [Zantua] was treating her,” and that “things were somewhat better”
after that, but then “reverted back” to how things were. (Investigative Memo at 3).
Orrego says the Knipfings “took no corrective action,” which allowed Zantua’s alleged
harassment to persist, including against her. (Pl.’s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 33). But that
mischaracterizes the report, which clearly states that conditions improved after
Uzcategui made her complaint to Mr. Knipfing. (Investigative Memo at 3). The fact
that the alleged misconduct started again, after having resolved, does not automatically
suggest that the Knipfings knew or should have known Orrego was being harassed.
E.g., Summa, 708 F.3d at 125 (finding imputation of liability improper despite multiple
separate instances of harassment, since each report brought to a supervisor’s attention
was “dealt with quickly and in proportion to the level of seriousness of the event”);
Bentley, 935 F.3d at 92–93 (holding that inconsistent evidence suggesting defendant had
notice about harassment could not create a fact issue, and prompt investigation
followed the report of allegedly hostile work environment shown by the record, so
employer could not be found negligent and summary judgment was appropriate).
To summarize, Zantua’s conduct cannot be imputed to the Knipfings or Old
Westbury under § 1981. The federal and state standards differ with respect to the
Knipfings’ and Old Westbury’s liability for Zantua’s alleged harassment, since she is
not a supervisor, in one regard: under the NYSHRL, “[a]n employer cannot be held
liable for an employee’s discriminatory act unless the employer became a party to it by
encouraging, condoning, or approving it.” Hoit v. Cap. Dist. Transp. Auth., 805 F. App’x
41, 45 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). Because the Court finds that Zantua’s conduct
cannot be imputed to the other Defendants under the more relaxed federal standard, it
also does not meet the NYSHRL’s more rigorous requirement of encouragement or
approval.
Since the Court concludes that Zantua’s conduct cannot be imputed to the
Knipfings or Old Westbury, it need not and does not determine whether Orrego’s
“showing of harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile
work environment.” Summa, 708 F.3d at 124. Orrego’s hostile work environment claim
against the Knipfings and Old Westbury is dismissed.
II. Retaliation
Section 1981 and NYSHRL retaliation claims are analyzed under the three-step
burden shifting framework derived from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), and according to Title VII principles. Alvarado, 685 F. App’x at 7. Under that
framework, if the plaintiff establishes a prima face case of retaliation, “the defendant
must then articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.” Hernandez v.
Kwiat Eye & Laser Surgery, PLLC, No. 23-7679, 2024 WL 5116365, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 16,
2024). “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must make four
showings: that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer was aware of
this activity; (3) the employer took adverse employment action against her; and (4) a
causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.”
Id. *3 (quotation omitted). If the defendant produces a non-retaliatory reason for the
adverse action, the plaintiff “must then prove that her protected activity was a ‘but-for’
cause of her firing, which she can do by showing that [defendant’s] proffered reason is
pretextual.” Knox v. CRC Mgmt. Co., LLC, 134 F.4th 39, 49 (2d Cir. 2025) (quotation
omitted); see also Alvarado, 685 F. App’x at 7 (“’[B]ut-for’ causation does not require
proof that retaliation was the only cause of the employer’s action, but only that the
adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.”
(quotation omitted)); Ferrara v. Sterling, Inc., No. 23-0454, 2024 WL 485742, at *2 (2d Cir.
Feb. 8, 2024) (“[W]ith respect to causation, [plaintiff] must establish that retaliation . . .
was a ‘but-for’ cause of his demotion, not simply a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in
the employer’s decision.” (quotation omitted)).
Defendants do not dispute that Orrego has made out a prima facie case of
retaliation. There is no dispute that Orrego engaged in protected activity and that her
employer was aware of it: she complained of racial discrimination to Testa and Ms.
Knipfing on November 2, 2018. (Defs.’ Mot. at 19; Pl.’s Opp’n at 10–11). And Orrego’s
employment was terminated on November 27, 2018, an adverse employment action that
is close enough in temporal proximity to presumptively establish a causal connection
with her protected activity. (Defs.’ Mot. at 20; Pl.’s Opp’n at 11); e.g., Summa, 708 F.3d at
128 (“[T]he combination of reasonably close temporal proximity and the particular
context in this case is sufficient to infer causation in establishing a prima facie case of
retaliation[.]”).
Under McDonnell Douglas, the burden now shifts back to Defendants “to
articulate some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the employment action.”
Philbert v. N.Y.C Dep’t of Educ., No. 24-0804, 2025 WL 3251187, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 21,
2025) (quotation omitted) (noting that defendants’ burden here “is one of production,
not persuasion” (quotation omitted)). “The plaintiff must then produce evidence and
carry the burden of persuasion that the proffered reason is a pretext.” Id. (quotation
omitted). “At the third step, the presumption of retaliation dissipates, and the plaintiff
must prove that the desire to retaliate was [a] but-for cause of the challenged
employment action.” Carter v. TD Bank, N.A., No. 23-0950, 2024 WL 2828470, at *3 (2d
Cir. June 4, 2024) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff “need not prove that the employer’s
stated reason was false”; she “need only show that the employer’s stated reason—even if
true or factually accurate—was not the ‘real reason,’ in the sense that it was not the
entire reason due to a coexisting impermissible consideration.” Bart v. Golub Corp., 96
F.4th 566, 575 (2d Cir. 2024) (emphasis in original). In other words, it is the plaintiff’s
burden “to produce admissible evidence showing circumstances that would be
sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the defendant’s employment
decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination.” Id. at
576 (quotation omitted).
Defendants have articulated multiple non-retaliatory reasons for Orrego’s
termination, which were also provided contemporaneously with her termination letter:
1) Orrego had been secretly recording conversations and taking unauthorized pictures
and videos in violation of the NDA she signed; 2) Orrego told the outside investigators
that she did not want to continue working for the Knipfings if Uzcategui remained
employed; and 3) Orrego made allegations that the Knipfings’ children were being
physically abused by Uzcategui, but later confirmed no such abuse was taking place.
(Defs.’ Mot. at 20; Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 104–110; Termination Letter).
Orrego makes several arguments that these proffered reasons are pretextual. See
Licinio v. New York, No. 24-2564, 2025 WL 1693108, at *2 (2d Cir. June 17, 2025) (“To
prove pretext, a plaintiff can demonstrat[e] weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory
reasons for its action.” (quotation omitted)), cert. denied, No. 25-0587, 2026 WL 79971
(U.S. Jan. 12, 2026). Her strongest arguments challenge the reason related to her
supposedly unauthorized pictures and videos. Orrego argues that the photos and
videos she took were authorized by Zantua and the Knipfings, and that Ms. Knipfing
was previously aware of them. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 12). She also asserts, in conclusory
fashion, that the NDA was void and that prior employees took photos without any
repercussions.12 (Id.). In support of these arguments, Orrego produced several text
messages with Ms. Knipfing in which Orrego sent photos—for example, of the children
in the playroom in March 2018—to a warm reception by Ms. Knipfing. (Text Messages,
attached to Pl.’s Opp’n as Ex. 6, Dkt. No. 224-9). But Orrego has not produced evidence
that the Knipfings knew other employees had taken photos, nor does the evidence she
supplied—of a few pictures shared only with Ms. Knipfing in response to questions
about where the children were—support her blanket statement that the 821 photos and
172 videos she took were “authorized.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 12).
Orrego’s burden at this stage is not merely one of production. She must
persuasively show that the proffered reasons for her termination are a pretext for the
true retaliatory motive. Philbert, 2025 WL 3251187, at *2 (affirming grant of summary
judgment where plaintiff’s evidence of pretext “d[id] not provide a reasonable basis on
12 “[E]vidence of disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals allows for the
conclusion that the reasons advanced by an employer . . . are pretextual.” Summa, 708
F.3d at 130 (emphasis added). Orrego never alleges that the other employees who took
photos were remotely similarly situated to her. Orrego took hundreds of photos and
videos, and also secretly recorded a conversation with another nanny in the presence of
a third party not employed by the Knipfings, told external investigators that she did not
want to keep working for the Knipfings if the other nanny remained employed, and
finally, made claims of child abuse to the Knipfings and then later confirmed that no
such abuse was occurring. She has thus, not met her burden in showing that other
employees that engaged in similar conduct were treated more favorably to permit a
factfinder to conclude that the proffered rationale for her termination was pretextual.
which a jury could conclude that [defendant’s] desire to retaliate against her was a but-
for cause of her termination,” given the other enumerated bases for firing). But she has
not done so. She has essentially disputed the bases offered for her termination. That,
however, does not suggest that the real (or even partial) motivation for her firing was
that her employer was retaliating against her for complaining about harassment in the
first instance. So, even fully crediting Orrego’s contention that some photos she took
seem to have been authorized by Ms. Knipfing, a reasonable factfinder still could not
conclude retaliation was a but-for cause of Orrego’s termination. See Licinio, 2025 WL
1693108, at *2 (“The existence of a scintilla of evidence is insufficient to defeat a
summary judgment motion.” (quotation omitted)).13
As for the other non-retaliatory reasons, Orrego calls them pretextual because
her complaint focused on Zantua’s harassment, not Uzcategui, and because she says she
did not retract her claim of child abuse, contrary to Defendants’ characterization. (Pl.’s
Opp’n at 12). These quibbles do not demonstrate Defendants’ proffered reasons are
without merit, let alone that they are pretextual.
“Even construing this evidence in the light most favorable” to Orrego, as this
Court must, she “has failed to produce sufficient admissible evidence from which a
reasonable juror could infer that the explanations given by [Defendants] were
pretextual.” Licinio, 2025 WL 1693108, at *2 (quotation omitted); e.g., Uttarwar v. Lazard
Asset Mgmt. LLC, No. 24-1085, 2025 WL 704278, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2025) (“While
13 Orrego’s termination letter took significant issue with Orrego having recorded
a conversation with Uzcategui discussing their work “in the presence of a member of
the public”—a reason Orrego does not refute at all. (Termination Letter).
temporal proximity, together with other evidence such as inconsistent employer
explanations, may be enough to defeat summary judgment, Uttarwar has failed to
provide evidence calling into question the legitimacy of the defendants’ explanations
for his termination[.]”); Carter, 2024 WL 2828470, at *4 (“Simply put, the evidence Carter
has adduced through discovery would not allow a reasonable factfinder to find the
required but-for causal connection between his complaint and his termination, despite
the modest temporal proximity between the two.”); Ferrara, 2024 WL 485742, at *3
(“Here, assuming arguendo that Ferrara established a prima facie case of retaliation, he
has not set forth evidence to rebut Sterling’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
his demotion from district manager to store manager[.]”).
Thus, after evaluating Orrego’s retaliation claim under each step of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the Court concludes that summary judgment is
appropriate, and the claim is dismissed.
III. Sanctions
Both parties, in their respective summary judgment motions, ask the Court to
sanction the other side. (E.g., Defs.’ Mot. at 22; Pl.’s Mot. at 14–15).
Orrego requests sanctions based on alleged discovery misconduct. (Pl.’s Mot. at
14). Her requests are largely baseless and do not warrant sanctions—for example,
stating that Defendants’ “depositions were evasive” and that they contained “forged
signatures.” (Id.). To the extent that Orrego requests leave under Rule 15(a)14 to file a
second amended complaint to account for additional damages and based on alleged
discovery misconduct in this case and “ongoing abuse,” largely premised on filings or
determinations made years ago in other judicial or administrative proceedings that
Orrego initiated, (id. at 9–10, 15–16), the request is denied, e.g., AEP Energy Servs. Gas
Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 626 F.3d 699, 726 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of
request to amend made “three years after the commencement of the lawsuit and several
months after cross-summary judgment motions had been filed”); McCarthy v. Dun &
Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007) (collecting cases affirming denial of
leave to amend in light of delay and advanced stage of case).
Defendants ask for Orrego to be deemed a vexatious litigant and for the
imposition of monetary sanctions. (Defs.’ Mot. at 22). As a preliminary matter,
Defendants’ request for monetary sanctions incurred with their summary judgment
motion practice and Orrego’s conduct in this lawsuit, (id.), is denied. This particular
lawsuit is not entirely frivolous: it survived a motion to dismiss and proceeded to
summary judgment.
That being said, the Court previously instituted filing injunctions to prevent
abusive frivolous filings. (See Order dated Aug. 14, 2025, Dkt. No. 210; Order dated
Sep. 16, 2025). This is one of nine lawsuits Orrego has filed stemming from her
14 Under that Rule—and since there has not been any Rule 16 scheduling order in
this case—“the only ‘grounds on which denial of leave to amend has long been held
proper’ are upon a showing of ‘undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, [or] futility.’”
Sacerdote v. New York Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 115 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No.
3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 190 (2d Cir. 2015)).
employment with the Knipfings, and the fifth in federal court, numbers that do not
begin to capture the numerous related administrative complaints she has filed with
various state agencies. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 128, 131, 138, 140, 148, 150, 152, 155).
She has filed lawsuits or administrative complaints against three law firms, (id. ¶¶ 131,
148, 160, 163), two employers, (id. ¶ 144), and twelve judges (id. ¶¶ 127, 152, 155), as
well as judicial staff, (id. ¶¶ 152, 155). She has also lodged judicial complaints and
sought to recuse four District and Magistrate Judges—almost every federal judge
assigned to this case. (Id.¶ 171). In this case alone, Orrego has filed twelve notices of
appeal, requests for interlocutory appeals, or petitions for a writ of mandamus. (Dkt.
Nos. 152, 166, 176, 178, 206, 212, 216, 217, 219, 234, 239, 240).15 She has filed nineteen
motions for reconsideration or vacatur of orders—including of orders denying
reconsideration, (Dkt. Nos. 48, 90, 110, 113, 114, 117, 129, 131, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148,
149, 150, 151, 172, 199), until she was eventually prohibited by this Court from “seeking
reconsideration or a redo of prior decisions,” (Order dated July 8, 2025). With rare
exception, limited to avoiding a single motion to dismiss, Orrego has not prevailed in
these actions or individual motions. And she has already been separately subject to
monetary sanctions and admonishments for frivolous litigation and threatening judicial
15 The latest of these—appeals from filing injunctions and recusal denials, with
requests to proceed in forma pauperis—were recently consolidated and dismissed sua
sponte by the Second Circuit for lack of jurisdiction. (See Mandate of USCA dated May
6, 2026, Dkt. No. 243 at 2 (dismissing appeals in: 25-2225, 25-2434, 25-3217, 25-2239, 25-
2437, and 25-3208)).
officers in a state court proceeding.16 Orrego has also engaged in a pattern of initiating
judicial misconduct complaints, sending emails to the judges of this court, including the
Chief District Judge, and bombarding the Clerk’s Office and chambers of judges with
phone calls and filings, behaviors that are not evident from the face of the dockets of her
cases, but demonstrate why the Court is obligated to enter an injunction in the case.
This Court has already instituted filing injunctions in Orrego’s open cases in this
District, after multiple warnings, because it found “Plaintiff has abused her ability to
file papers with the Court,” including by “filing repetitive motions on issues that have
previously been denied.” (Order dated Aug. 14, 2025, Dkt. No. 210 at 2). After that
injunction, Orrego “filed multiple applications seeking leave to file additional motions
and/or open new cases” that “not only violate the filing injunction, but are
unnecessarily duplicative material.” (Order dated Sep. 16, 2025). As a result, the Court
prohibited Orrego from making any further filings in her open cases and from using the
pro se portal, absent further order of the Court. (Id.). The Court noted that it would lift
16 Defendants included a transcript of proceedings from one of Orrego’s state
court cases, in which she was fined $ 2,500 for a frivolous letter that intimidated and
threatened an expert witness in the case. (See Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 129). In imposing the
sanction, the court was required to remove Orrego from the courtroom for disobeying
court orders, and stated on the record to her: “You have attempted to intimidate me,
you’ve harassed me, you’ve harassed my staff[.]” (Id.). That court also determined that
“there may be criminal conduct that arises from the contents of [Orrego’s] letter,” and
referred it to the district attorney to investigate. (Id.).
In a recent letter, Defendants separately drew the Court’s attention to the fact
that Orrego just initiated yet another state court lawsuit against Defendants’ counsel,
Savitsky, and others, which she served on May 1, 2026. (Defs.’ Letter dated May 5,
2026, Dkt. No. 242 at 1–2). Defendants also noted a March 24, 2026 social media post by
Orrego directed at Defendants, their lawyers, the undersigned, Magistrate Judge
Shields, and several other public officials, saying “[s]omething very bad is going to
happen.” (Id. at 2).
the injunction following resolution of all pending motions, to permit Orrego to object,
appeal, seek reconsideration, or make any pre-trial filings. (Id.).
In deciding whether to impose an anti-filing injunction, the Second Circuit has
identified the following factors for consideration:
(1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed
vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in
pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith
expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by
counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other
parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their
personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect
the courts and other parties.
Eliahu v. Jewish Agency for Israel, 919 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).
It is plain from the above recitation—and the litigation history that has been
chronicled at length in Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement, (see Defs.’ 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 118–
78)—that all factors weigh in favor of imposing a filing injunction, e.g., Zappin v.
Comfort, No. 23-7363, 2024 WL 5001624, at *3 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2024) (“Given that other
sanctions have proven ineffective at protecting the courts and the parties, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the district court to enter a pre-filing injunction here.”);
Immerso v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 20-4064, 2022 WL 17333083, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 30, 2022)
(affirming bar against further filings or initiating new proceedings in the Eastern
District absent leave of the court). Although Orrego is currently pro se, she has been
assisted by counsel at various stages in this litigation and others, and there is “no basis
to afford [her] the latitude usually granted to pro se litigants.”17 Eliahu, 919 F.3d at 715.
While filing injunctions are only warranted by “extraordinary circumstances,”
that bar is met here. Id. at 714 (quotation omitted). Orrego is enjoined from initiating
future actions in the Eastern District of New York.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
granted, and Orrego’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Orrego’s pending
motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, (Dkt. No. 238), is denied for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s December 5, 2025 Order, and the pending premotion conference
request, (Dkt. No. 232), is denied as moot.
The present filing injunction is lifted solely for the purpose of filing any notice of
appeal. Aside from filings related to her appeal, Orrego is enjoined from further filings
in this case, and from initiating future actions in the Eastern District of New York absent
17 As noted above, Orrego has fired and sued several law firms that represented
her in related matters. And in this case, while the Court initially declined to appoint
Orrego pro bono counsel, the Court did ultimately appoint counsel for Orrego, (Order
dated Nov. 16, 2021), but she requested their removal within a matter of months, and
ultimately opted to proceed pro se, (Order dated Apr. 19, 2022, Dkt. No. 52).
a Court order.18 The Clerk of Court is directed to distribute this memorandum and
order to all Clerk’s Office personnel as appropriate.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sanket J. Bulsara
SANKET J. BULSARA
United States District Judge
Date: May 8, 2026
Central Islip, New York
18 To eliminate the need to write a decision every time Orrego makes a frivolous
filing, the Clerk of Court is directed to open a miscellaneous case entitled “In re
Orrego,” and to file a copy of this Order under that docket number. The matter is then
to be administratively closed. Any future filings by Orrego, including any motion for
reconsideration, shall be filed under that miscellaneous docket number. The Court will
review each filing. If the filing is found to be frivolous, no further action will be taken.
If the filing states a claim that is not frivolous or does not fail to state a claim, the Court
will direct the Clerk of Court to open a new civil matter in which the filing will be
docketed, and the matter will proceed as a new case in the ordinary course. E.g., Mai v.
NYSOTDA, No. 25-MC-2840, 2025 WL 2947168, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2025).