Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER-MICHAEL : Case No. 2:25-cv-657

WILLIAMS, :

:

Plaintiff, : District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

:

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

vs. :

:

SHARON L. KENNEDY, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS1

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, has filed a pro se civil

rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By separate Order, Plaintiff has been granted leave to

proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 4).

This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Complaint to determine

whether the Complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from

a Defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804,

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint

A. Legal Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to the Report and Recommendations.

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(2)2 as part of the statute, which

provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires

sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or

malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands

2 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d

502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the

defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds

pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett

v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;

“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989)).

B. Complaint Allegations

Plaintiff brings this Complaint in connection with his 2016 Hamilton County, Ohio

conviction and sentence. See generally, Doc. #1-1. According to Plaintiff, he was charged and

prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute, provided an unfair jury trial, and wrongfully

convicted of two counts of rape. Id. at 11-12. As detailed below, Plaintiff names various judges

as Defendants based on his allegation that these individuals conspired and improperly denied his

post-conviction motions and related appeals in the Ohio courts. Id. at 13-17.

Plaintiff specifically alleges that on September 6, 2017, he filed a timely petition for

postconviction relief in the Hamilton County, Ohio trial court. (Doc. #1-1, PageID #13).

According to Plaintiff, the trial court “illegally dismissed my 2017 petition without findings of

Facts and conclusions or a hearing to determine the validity of the facts proffered in the affidavits”

supporting the petition. Id. at 13. Plaintiff further alleges that he filed a successive postconviction

petition in December 2019, which was also denied by the trial court. Id. at 12.

Plaintiff indicates that he appealed the decision to the Ohio First District Court of Appeals

in Case No. C-230333, which was filed on June 21, 2023. (Doc. #1-1, PageID #13). On March 27,

2024, Defendant Judge Marylin Zayas issued an Opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court.

Id. Plaintiff’s subsequent motions for reconsideration and “motion to recall the mandate” were

also denied in the Ohio appeals court. Id. at 14. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Appellate Judges

Zayas, Robert Winkler, and Jennifer Kinsley improperly failed to compel the trial court to correct

its alleged errors or properly rule on his motions. Id. at 14-15. In particular, Plaintiff claims that

“[a]fter the Appeals Court Justices of the First District of Ohio erroneously denied my appeal . . .

they took it a step further and denied me equitable tolling to timely appeal to the Ohio Supreme

Court by characterizing my motion for reconsideration as untimely.” Id. at 15. Plaintiff claims

that the appellate court judges deprived him of his right to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, as

well as his constitutional due process and equal protection rights. Id. at 13-16.

In November of 2024, Plaintiff alleges that he filed an original mandamus action in the

Ohio Supreme Court, requesting that a mandate issue to “the Hamilton County Appeals Court to

recall their mandate to reflect that [his] first motion for reconsideration was timely so that [he]

may properly appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court as a timely appeal.” (Doc. #1-1, PageID #16).

Plaintiff claims that the Ohio Supreme Court Justices—Defendant Justices Kennedy, DeWine,

Brunner, Deters, Hawkins, and Shanahan—improperly denied him relief/declined jurisdiction over

his appeal. Id.

Based on the factual allegations asserted in the Complaint, Plaintiff claims all Defendants

conspired against him and deprived him of due process and equal protection of the law. (Doc. #1-

1, PageID #17). Plaintiff states that he seeks prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, as well

as monetary damages.3 Id. at 20-21.

C. Analysis

For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

Plaintiff in essence asks this Court to review the decisions of the Ohio First District Court

of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court, declare that the state-court judgments violated Ohio App. R.

26(A) and United States Constitution, and issue an Order in effect reversing the Ohio courts. As

requested by Plaintiff, he seeks an Order requiring the Ohio First District Court of Appeals to

“reissue my mandate” and “plac[e] me back in the legal space and time continuum, so that I may

appeal the abuse of discretion under the label of a timely appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court.”

3 Plaintiff requests $70,000.02 from Defendants, in part, for “malicious and intentional misconduct, deduced and

enumerated in the emotional denial of both reconsiderations.” (Doc. #1-1, PageID #20).

(Doc. #1-1, PageID #s 20-21).4 However, this Court does not have jurisdiction to directly review

state court decisions. See Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Federal district

courts do not stand as appellate courts for decisions of state courts.”). Only the United States

Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in a state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005) (federal courts’

“authority to review a state court’s judgment” is vested “solely in [the Supreme] Court.”).

To the extent that Plaintiff asks this Court to invalidate Defendants’ actions in the state

courts, his claims should be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars “cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection

of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. See also Smith v. Lawrence Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t., 84 F. App’x 562, 563 (6th Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff does not avoid this jurisdictional problem

“by couching his claims against the various defendants in terms of a civil rights action.”). Here,

Plaintiff alleges that the judicial Defendants improperly ruled on his state-court filings, allegedly

depriving him of the ability to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court and violating his constitutional

rights. (Doc. #1-1, PageID #s 15-16). See e.g., Barnaby v. Mayfield, No. 20-1564, 2021 WL

2470304, at *2 (6th Cir. May 5, 2021) (finding that the plaintiff’s “challenge to the defendant

judges’ ‘issuance’ of state-court orders and judgments is essentially a challenge to the orders and

judgments themselves,” and properly barred under Rooker-Feldman). Thus, to the extent that

4 With respect to the Ohio Supreme Court, Plaintiff claims that the state supreme court dismissed his appeal “contrary

to established Ohio law and Federal law, which brings me here today seeking prospective equitable relief to grant me

equal protection of the law as to the equitable tolling of the Ohio statute Ohio App. R. 26(A).” (Doc. #1-1, PageID

#16). He states that he sues Defendants to stop what he characterizes as an ongoing constitutional violation stemming

from the alleged improper judgments. Id. at 17.

Plaintiff seeks the Court to review Defendants’ rulings, to declare Defendants’ rulings

unconstitutional,5 and to invalidate Defendants’ rulings, his claims should be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims should also be dismissed. According to Plaintiff, the named

Defendants—each judge/justice involved in the adjudication of his appeals—conspired against

him, resulting in an ongoing violation of his rights. (Doc. #1-1, PageID #s 17-18, 19). However,

it is well-settled in the Sixth Circuit that conspiracy claims must be pleaded with “with some degree

of specificity, and vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are not

sufficient to state a claim.” Hamilton v. City of Romulus, 409 F. App’x 826, 835 (6th Cir. 2010);

see also Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 395 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gutierrez v. Lynch,

826 F.2d 1534 (6th Cir. 1987)) (affirming dismissal of conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

because the plaintiff failed to plead the claims with the “requisite specificity”). Here, construing

the Complaint liberally, Plaintiff’s factual allegations are insufficient to suggest that the named

Defendants shared a conspiratorial objective or otherwise planned together to deprive him of his

constitutionally protected rights at every stage of his appellate and post-conviction proceedings.

Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated and conclusory claims against Defendants based on a conspiracy theory

lack the requisite specificity to state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and should

therefore be dismissed.

Additionally, the named Defendants are immune from suit. Plaintiff indicates that he seeks

to hold Defendants liable in their official capacities. (Doc. 1-1, PageID #17). However, a suit

against Defendants in their official capacities is the same as a claim against the State of Ohio.

Absent an express waiver, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suit

5 To this end, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that “the ongoing actions of Defendants, state judges, violate Plaintiff’s

rights under the Equal Protection of the Laws, and Due process of the 14th Amendment to the United States

Constitution.” (Doc. #1-1, PageID #21).

against a State or one of its agencies or departments in federal court, regardless of the nature of

the relief sought. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); Pennhurst State

School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978);

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). See also Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t. of Treasury, 987

F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment “bars all suits, whether for

injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments”). “Because

official capacity suits against state officials are suits against their employer—the state—this

immunity also extends to such officers in their official capacities.” Williams v. Parikh, 708 F.

Supp. 3d 1345, 1355 (S.D. Ohio 2023) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89, 100-02 (1984) and Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)).

“There are three exceptions to a State’s sovereign immunity” under the Eleventh

Amendment: when Congress has abrogated it, when the State has consented to suit, or when the

Ex Parte Young exception applies. See S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir.

2008) (citing Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 817 (6th Cir. 2000) and Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). The first two exceptions do not apply here, as “Ohio has not

consented to suits in federal court nor has Congress abrogated Ohio’s immunity under § 1983.”

Smith v. DeWine, 476 F. Supp. 3d 635, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2020). The third exception—the Ex Parte

Young exception—which allows some state officials to be sued in their official capacity for purely

prospective injunctive relief,6 also does not apply. “That is because the Ex parte Young exception

expressly prohibits injunctions directed toward state judicial officers regarding their adjudication

6 “The Ex parte Young exception does not, however, extend to any retroactive relief.” S & M Brands, 527 F.3d at 508

(citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979)). Here, Plaintiff requests an Order from this Court “placing me

back in the legal space and time continuum” before the Ohio Courts allegedly improperly denied his post-conviction

petitions and appeals. (Doc. #1-1, PageID #s 20-21). As in Williams, Plaintiff “asks the Court to correct the past . . .

the definition of retrospective equitable relief.” Williams, 708 F.Supp.3d at 1362-63.

of the cases and controversies put before them.” Williams, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 1355 (citing Ex

Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 163 (explaining that “an injunction against a state court” or its

“machinery” “would be a violation of the whole scheme of our government”)) (emphasis in

original). As no exception applies, all claims against Defendants in their official capacities are

barred by the State of Ohio’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and should be

dismissed.

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff may seek to hold Defendants liable in their individual

capacities, any such claims should also be dismissed. Judges are afforded absolute immunity from

damages for acts they commit while functioning within their judicial capacity. Pierson v. Ray,

386 U.S. 547 (1967); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 255 (6th Cir. 1997). Judges retain

absolute immunity from liability even if they act maliciously or corruptly, so long as they are

performing judicial acts and have jurisdiction over the subject matter giving rise to the suit against

them. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). See also Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600,

607 (6th Cir. 2001); King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no

facts plausibly suggesting that the named Defendants presided over the matter in the absence of

subject matter jurisdiction or performed non-judicial acts.

Furthermore, although Plaintiff additionally seeks prospective injunctive relief against

Defendants in their individual capacities, Section 1983 itself “bars injunctive relief against ‘a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”’ Wright v. Finley, No.

1:19-cv-819, 2021 WL 680243, *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2021) (McFarland, D.J.) (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 1983). “Thus, [although] the statute generally prohibits suits for injunctive relief against

judicial officers but provides exceptions for violations of declaratory decrees or the unavailability

of declaratory relief,” Plaintiff did not allege those exceptions in his Complaint, and they do not

otherwise appear to apply. Id. Therefore, any claims against Defendants for injunctive relief in

their individual capacities should also be dismissed. See Ward v. City of Norwalk, 640 F. App’x

462, 467 (6th Cir. 2016) (concluding that a district court “properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim

[against a judicial officer] seeking injunctive relief, because the plain language of § 1983 allows

suits for injunctions only after a litigant has sought a declaratory judgment”).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The Complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A(b)(1).

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an

appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith

and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114

F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

May 5, 2026 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed

findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and

shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and

Recommendations is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520,

530 (6th Cir. 2019). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638

F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).