Snyder

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

MATTHEW SNYDER, : Case No. 2:26-cv-114

:

Plaintiff, :

: Judge Michael H. Watson

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

:

STATE OF OHIO, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS1

Plaintiff Matthew Snyder, an inmate housed at the Noble Correctional Institution (“NCI”),

has filed a pro se Complaint against multiple Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

(“ODRC”) and NCI employees,2 and against the State of Ohio, ODRC, and NCI.3 (Doc. 1).

Plaintiff raises allegations against Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Id. at 1-

4. The Court understands the Complaint to be filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has also

filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. 2). By separate Order, Plaintiff has been granted leave

to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 5).

1 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendations.

2 Plaintiff names the following Defendants: the State of Ohio; ODRC; ODRC Director Annette Chambers-Smith;

NCI Warden Jay Forshey; and NCI employees J. Gifford, HCA Pittman, Inspector R. Cobb, “All staff and medical

staff and nurses,” Unit Manager Neff, Officer Rush, Officer Scofield, Karen Stanford, G. White, K. Morrow, J.

Wilson, V. Brown, and J. Starr. (Complaint, Doc. 1, PageID 1-4).

3 Although Plaintiff does not name NCI in the caption, he does appear to raise allegations against this entity. (See

Complaint, Doc. 1, PageID 7). Other district courts in the Sixth Circuit have found that the caption of a complaint

does not determine the parties and that courts must look to the allegations within the complaint to make such a

determination. Eberhard v. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co., No. 1:11-cv-834, 2013 WL 12293449, at *5 (N.D. Ohio

Sept. 13, 2013) (collecting cases); Burley v. Quiroga, No. 16-cv-10712, 2019 WL 4316499, at *15 (E.D. Mich. June

6, 2019) (same).

This matter is first before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Complaint pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

I. SCREENING STANDARD

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking “redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity,” and is proceeding in forma pauperis (see Order Granting

“IFP” Status, Doc. 5), the Court is required to conduct an initial screening of his Complaint. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss the Complaint, or any portion

of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b);

1915(e)(2).

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with

a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010)

(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196,

1198 (6th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant

is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not

exist. McGhee v. Light, 384 F. Supp. 3d 894, 896 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at

327-28). An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the

level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., 727 F.3d 580, 585

(6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (citations

omitted); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1198 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328) (noting that courts can

dismiss “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless”). The Court need not accept as

true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness.

Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).

A complaint must also be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must set forth “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). The Court must construe the complaint in plaintiff’s favor, accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations as true, and evaluate whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 570 (2007)

(citations omitted).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, a

complaint that consists of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor does a complaint

suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557. Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide

“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In the interest of justice, this Court is also required to construe a pro se complaint liberally

and to hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)) (citing Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(f) [now (e)]); Heyward v. Cooper, 88 F.4th 648, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2023). Even with

such a liberal construction, a pro se complaint must still adhere to the “basic pleading standards.”

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (2004) (citing Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989)). Specifically, a pro se “complaint ‘must contain either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all the material elements’ to recover under some viable legal theory.” Barhite v. Caruso,

377 F. App’x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir.

2005)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

II. ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges that although he had serious medical needs that existed before his

incarceration, while housed at NCI, he “did lose the use of bodily functions and was left laying in

his own vomit without proper medical care for about three days while having heat exhaustion and

stroke symptoms thus worsening several other already debilitating medical issues.” (Complaint,

Doc. 1, PageID 5-6, 8). Plaintiff alleges that the “denial and or delay of treatment has resulted in

deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment” and other statutory rights, including medical negligence. Id. at 7.

Plaintiff alleges that ODRC and NCI are “liable for medical negligence/malpractice from

the omissions or inactions of its medical staff by failing to properly identify, assess, and provide

adequate health care attention.” Id. According to Plaintiff, the “medical staff ‘failed to properly

assess, identify and properly treat the plaintiff with any medical care’ after he experienced

complications of stroke related matters that led to worsening constant vertigo at which now the

Plaintiff is unusable to perform his once normal day to day duties and activities due to the

negligence and care of the prison.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that he was placed in

Administrative Segregation as retaliation for making numerous complaints to staff and that his

status as a sex offender has caused him further retaliation, humiliation, and threats. Id.

Plaintiff seeks monetary relief against Defendants. Id. at 6.

III. ANALYSIS

Based on the above allegations, the Undersigned understands Plaintiff to be bringing

Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims, First Amendment retaliation claims, and

Ohio state law medical malpractice and negligence claims. Plaintiff also alleges in passing that

Defendants violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. But in screening

Plaintiff’s allegations, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint be

DISMISSED in its entirety because he fails to allege a plausible claim for relief, as explained

below. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b).

A. Official Capacity Claims for Monetary Relief

Notwithstanding the issues detailed below, any official capacity claims for monetary

damages should be dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States

Constitution. Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 270 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985)). Absent an express waiver, a state is immune from damage suits

under the Eleventh Amendment. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139,

144 (1993) (citations omitted). The State of Ohio has not constitutionally nor statutorily waived

its Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d

389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999); Smith v. DeWine, 476 F. Supp. 3d 635, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (citations

omitted).

The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to actions where the state is not a named party, but

where the action is essentially one for recovery of money from the state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415

U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).

A suit against state defendants in their official capacities would be a way of pleading the action

against the entity of which defendants are agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

690 (1978); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165 (1985)) (“While personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a

government official for actions he takes under color of state law, individuals sued in their official

capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Actions against state officials in their official capacities are therefore included in this bar. Maben,

887 F.3d at 270; Smith, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 650-52; Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir.

2010) (quoting Cady v. Arenac Cnty., 574 F.3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009)) (“[A]n official-capacity

suit against a state official is deemed to be a suit against the state and is thus barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, absent a waiver.”).

Plaintiff indicates that he is suing the state Defendants in their individual and official

capacities, and Plaintiff seeks monetary relief. (Complaint, Doc. 1, PageID 1-4, 6). Plaintiff’s

official capacity claims are considered claims against the State of Ohio and any request for

monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities should be DISMISSED with

prejudice. Smith, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 650-51; Colvin, 605 F.3d at 289; Maben, 887 F.3d at 270.

B. Claims Against the State of Ohio and State Agencies

To the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise claims against the State of Ohio and Ohio state

agencies ODRC and NCI (see Complaint, Doc. 1, PageID 1, 7), he fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. “Section 1983 creates liability for ‘persons’ who deprive others of federal

rights under color of law. Only a ‘person’ faces liability under the statute.” Hohenberg v. Shelby

Cnty., Tenn., 68 F.4th 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of St. Police, 491 U.S.

58, 64 (1989)). The State of Ohio is not a person and thus not capable of being sued under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Thompson v. Branch, No. 1:24-cv-02, 2024 WL 579756, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 13,

2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-cv-02, 2024 WL 4278310 (S.D. Ohio Sept.

24, 2024) (citations omitted). Also, as noted above, the State of Ohio has not waived its Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Mixon, 193 F.3d at 397; Smith, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 652.

Furthermore, a state corrections department is also not a “person” subject to civil action

under § 1983. E.g., Marcum v. Ohio, No. 2:24-cv-4048, 2025 WL 1347266, at *6 (S.D. Ohio May

8, 2025) (collecting cases). Plaintiff does not appear to allege that these Defendants adopted an

unconstitutional official policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690

(1978). Accordingly, any claims against the State of Ohio, ODRC, and NCI should be

DISMISSED without prejudice, and these parties should be DISMISSED as defendants here.

C. Failure to Satisfy Basic Pleading Standards

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the remaining

Defendants. As noted above, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a short and plain

statement that shows how Plaintiff is entitled to relief from each Defendant. A plaintiff must allege

personal involvement by the defendant in causing the plaintiff’s injury. Hardin v. Straub, 954

F.2d 1193, 1196-98 (6th Cir. 1992). “A plaintiff, even one proceeding pro se, must plead sufficient

facts to show how each defendant allegedly violated plaintiff’s rights.” Johnson v. Chambers-

Smith, No. 2:22-cv-4179, 2023 WL 2555446, at *18 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2023) (citations omitted),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-cv-4179, 2023 WL 6065130 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 18,

2023); Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710,714 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (noting that pro se

plaintiffs must still satisfy the basic pleading standards). “Merely listing names in the caption of

the complaint and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is not enough to

sustain recovery under § 1983.” Gilmore v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir.

2004) (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978)). The complaint must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Plaintiff fails to satisfy these basic pleading requirements because he merely lists multiple

Defendants in the caption of his Complaint without raising any factual allegations against each

individual Defendant. (See generally Doc. 1). In conclusory fashion, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants showed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs when he was left untreated

for three days while experiencing symptoms from heat exhaustion and a stroke. Id. at 5-6. He

also alleges that he was sent to segregated housing as retaliation for filing grievances about the

issue and because of his classification as a sex offender. Id. at 7. But Plaintiff fails to identify

how each Defendant was personally involved in these alleged violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In other words, Plaintiff fails to specify

which Defendants are responsible for the alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs and fails to specify which Defendants retaliated against him. And his formulaic recitation

of the legal elements to an Eighth Amendment claim (id. at 8) is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s generalized

allegations should be DISMISSED without prejudice because Plaintiff fails to meet the basic

pleading requirements to state a plausible claim for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a); 16630

Southfield Ltd. Partnership v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544; Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662); see also Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

D. State Law Medical Malpractice and Negligence Claims

Plaintiff also appears to raise medical malpractice and negligence claims under Ohio state

law. (Complaint, Doc. 1, PageID 4-9). But because no federal claims remain, the Court should

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims should be

DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]”); Harper v. AutoAlliance Intern, Inc., 392 F.3d

195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (“Generally, if the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, . . . the state law claims should be dismissed as well.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

IV. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Plaintiff also seeks the appointment of counsel to assist him with this case. (Doc. 2).

Plaintiff alleges that he is “both physically and currently visually impaired,” and requests counsel

because of “his disabilities and lack of competency of legal and judicial proceedings or having

access to adequate legal assistance to help him.” Id. at 10. This Court has statutory authority to

appoint counsel in a civil case. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). But the appointment of counsel is not a

constitutional right in such a case. Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing

Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605-06 (6th Cir. 1993)). A court has discretion to appoint

counsel in civil matters, but the appointment of counsel is a “privilege that is justified only by

exceptional circumstances.” Lanier, 332 F.3d at 1006 (citing Lavado, 992 F.2d at 604-06). In

determining whether to exercise its discretion, a court should consider the complexity of the issues,

the procedural posture of the case, and the plaintiff’s apparent ability to prosecute the case without

the help of counsel. See id. (citations omitted); Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606.

In evaluating whether exceptional circumstances exist here and considering the

recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint at the screening stage, the Undersigned

concludes that the appointment of counsel is not warranted. As other courts in this District have

noted, “there are not enough lawyers who can absorb the costs of representing persons on a

voluntary basis to permit the Court to appoint counsel for all who file cases on their own behalf.”

E.g., Straughter v. Eddy, No. 2:23-cv-1268, 2023 WL 3900673, at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2023);

Hillman v. Phipps, No. 2:25-cv-579, 2025 WL 3525302, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2025). Because

extraordinary circumstances do not exist, Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (Doc. 2) is

DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for monetary damages be

DISMISSED with prejudice; and

2. Plaintiff’s remaining claims be DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (Doc. 2) is DENIED.

May 4, 2026 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

Peter B. Silvain, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE OF PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed

findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and

shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and

Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).