Opinion

Grohol

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Jun 2, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.2%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LORI GROHOL, individually and on behalf

of all others similarly situated,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-CV-01437

Plaintiff,

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

v.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF

PENNSYLVANIA COURTS, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court are six emergency motions for temporary restraining orders filed by

Lori Grohol (“Grohol”). (Doc. 2; Doc. 3; Doc. 4; Doc. 5; Doc. 8; Doc. 9). Along with her

fourth motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 5), Grohol filed a brief in support. (Doc.

7). Grohol initiated this action on May 26, 2026, alleging inter alia mass malpractice by

Defendants. (Doc. 1). This case stems from Grohol’s replevin action in the Northumberland

County Court of Common Pleas, in which Grohol’s counsel in that matter, Attorney

Schwartz from North Penn Legal Services, has allegedly failed to proceed with case for six

years. (Doc. 2, at 3). For the following reasons Grohol’s motions for a temporary restraining

order (Doc. 2; Doc. 3; Doc. 4; Doc. 5; Doc. 8; Doc. 9) are DENIED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A temporary restraining order (“TRO”) constitutes “an extraordinary and drastic

remedy. . .that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden

of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). A TRO is intended to preserve the status quo. See Bullock v. Carney, 463 F. Supp. 3d

519, 523 (D. Del. 2020), aff'd, 806 Fed. Appx. 157 (3d Cir. 2020), and aff'd, 20-2096, 2020 WL

7038527 (3d Cir. June 4, 2020); see also Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).

To determine whether to issue a TRO, the court assesses (1) whether the movant has “a

reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation”; (2) whether the movant “will be

irreparably injured . . . if relief is not granted”; (3) “the possibility of harm to other interested

persons from the grant or denial of the injunction”; and (4) “the public interest.” Reilly v. City

of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2017).

In assessing these factors, the Third Circuit “has placed particular weight on the

probability of irreparable harm and the likelihood of success on the merits.” Ortho Biotech

Products, L.P. v. Amgen Inc., 2006 WL 3392939 at *5 (D.N.J.) (quoting Apollo Tech Corp. v.

Centrosphere Indus. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1157, 1205 (D.N.J. 1992)). “[T]he irreparable harm

must be actual and imminent, not merely speculative.” Angstadt ex rel. Angstadt v. Midd-West

Sch., 182 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437 (M.D. Pa. 2002). To show likelihood of success on the merits,

a plaintiff need only show “a reasonable chance, or probability, of winning.” Singer Mgmt.

Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011).

II. DISCUSSION

First, Grohol requests inter alia that the Court issue a TRO requiring Attorney

Schwartz from North Penn Legal Services to either represent Grohol meaningfully, arrange

substitute counsel, or move to withdraw with full client-protective safeguards in Grohol’s

underlying state court case. (Doc. 2, at 10). Second, Grohol requests inter alia that the Court

order Defendants not to retaliate Attorney Martineau, Grohol’s counsel in this matter, for

Attorney Martineau’s criticism of Defendants and Attorney Martineau’s exercise of her First

Amendment rights. (Doc. 3, at 3; Doc. 4, at 4; Doc. 5, at 5; Doc. 8, at 1). Third, Grohol

requests that the Court issue a TRO and protective order protecting Attorney Martineau from

adverse action while Attorney Martineau appears in the Snyder County Courthouse for an

unrelated matter. (Doc. 9, at 1-2). The Court will address each of Grohol’s requests for a TRO

in turn.

A. GROHOL’S REQUEST THAT THE COURT REQUIRE NORTH PENN LEGAL

SERVICES TO REPRESENT GROHOL MEANINGFULLY IN THE UNDERLYING

MATTER IS BARRED BY THE YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE.

Grohol’s request that the Court issue a TRO requiring Attorney Schwartz of North

Penn Legal Services to represent Grohol meaningfully, arrange substitute counsel, or move

to withdraw with full client-protective safeguards in Grohol’s state court case is barred by the

Younger abstention doctrine. (Doc. 2, at 10). The Younger abstention doctrine, informed by the

principles of comity, provides federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction

over a claim when a resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.

Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41

(1971); Addiction Specialties, Inc. v. Twp. Of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005). The

Younger abstention doctrine allows a district court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over

a particular claim, but that discretion can properly be exercised only when (1) there are

ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate

important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise

federal claims. Kendall, 572 F.3d at 130 (citing Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC, 545

F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2008)). Once these three legal requirements are met, the decision to

abstain rests in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an

abuse of that discretion. Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319,

325 (3d Cir. 2004).

Grohol’s replevin matter is ongoing in the Northumberland County Court of Common

Pleas, where Grohol can fully and fairly litigate the issues of her representation. (Doc. 2, at

5); see C.E. Williams Co. v. Henry B. Pancoast Co., 194 A.2d 189 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963) (holding

the question of whether an attorney should be permitted to withdraw is within the discretion

of the trial court). Attorney Martineau may move to withdraw Attorney Schwartz and

substitute herself in Grohol’s state court proceeding, avoiding unnecessary federal court

interference with the ongoing state court case. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16(b) (“a

lawyer may withdraw . . . if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect

on the interests of the client”); Pa.R.C.P. No. 1012(b) (“An attorney’s appearance for a party

may not be withdrawn without leave of court unless another attorney has entered or

simultaneously enters an appearance for the party . . .”). Moreover, the State of Pennsylvania

has an important interest in maintaining and ensuring the professional conduct of its attorneys

and the adequate representation of parties in state court. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v.

Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 434-35 (1982). The due process concerns associated with

Grohol’s representation breakdown with North Penn Legal Services and Attorney Schwartz

can also be adequately addressed in the state court proceedings, where the attorney-client

relationship breakdown occurred. Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013) (quoting Tafflin v.

Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“state courts have inherent authority, and are thus

presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States”).

With the legal requirements for Younger abstention fully met, the Court’s proper exercise of

the discretion weighs in favor of abstention and Grohol’s request for a TRO requiring North

Penn Legal Services to represent Grohol meaningfully, arrange substitute counsel, or move

to withdraw with full client-protective safeguards in the underlying state court proceeding is

DENIED. (Doc. 2).

B. GROHOL’S REQUESTS THAT THE COURT ORDER DEFENDANTS TO NOT

RETALIATE AGAINST ATTORNEY MARTINEAU ARE UNRELATED TO

GROHOL’S INSTANT CASE.

Grohol’s requests that the Court order Defendants not to retaliate against Attorney

Martineau, for Attorney Martineau’s criticism of Defendants and Attorney Martineau’s

exercise of her First Amendment rights are unrelated to Grohol’s instant case. (Doc. 3, at 3;

Doc. 4, at 4; Doc. 5, at 5; Doc. 8, at 1). “[B]ecause the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief

is to prevent irreparable injury pending the resolution of underlying claims on the merits, the

injury claimed in the motion for preliminary injunctive relief must relate to the conduct

alleged and permanent relief sought in the plaintiff’s complaint.” Preacher v. Overmyer, No.

1:17-CV-18, 2019 WL 3213533, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 17, 2019) (citing Ball v. Famiglio, 396

Fed. Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010)). Federal district courts lack jurisdiction over claims raised

in motions for injunctive relief, where those matters are unrelated to the underlying

complaint. Stewart v. Verano, 2015 WL 1636124, at *2 (M.D. Pa. April 8, 2015); Preacher, 2019

WL 3213533, at *2.

The alleged silencing of Attorney Martineau at Defendant Union County Criminal

Justice Advisory’s board meeting by Judge Michael Piecuch and the alleged retaliation

against Attorney Martineau with the cancellation of the Survivors of Tragedy Outreach

Program (“STOP”) Coalition meeting are unrelated to Grohol’s underlying claims against

Defendants for inter alia inadequate representation and mass malpractice. (See Doc. 1; Doc.

4, at 3; Doc. 5, at 7; Doc. 8, at 1-2). Speculative future retaliation against Attorney Martineau

for her criticisms of Defendants are likewise unrelated to Grohol’s underlying claims. (See

Doc. 1; Doc. 3, at 3). While Attorney Martineau may pursue her own litigation to remedy

the alleged violations of her First Amendment rights, the Court does not have jurisdiction to

hear Attorney Martineau’s claims that are unrelated to her client’s complaint. Ball, 396 Fed.

Appx. at 837; Preacher, 2019 WL 3213533, at *2; Stewart, 2015 WL 1636124, at *2.

Accordingly, Grohol’s requests that the Court order Defendants not to retaliate against

Attorney Martineau, for Attorney Martineau’s criticism of Defendants and Attorney

Martineau’s exercise of her First Amendment rights are DENIED. (Doc. 3, at 3; Doc. 4, at

4; Doc. 5, at 5; Doc. 8, at 1).

C. GROHOL’S REQUEST FOR THE COURT TO PROTECT ATTORNEY MARTINEAU

FROM ADVERSE ACTION ON MAY 29, 2026 IS MOOT.

Grohol’s request that the Court issue a TRO and protective order protecting Attorney

Martineau from adverse action while Attorney Martineau appears in the Snyder County

Courthouse for an unrelated matter is moot. (Doc. 9, at 1-2). On May 29, 2026, Attorney

Martineau filed an emergency motion for a TRO and protective order from 2:00 p.m. to 8:00

p.m. for that same day, while she appeared for an unrelated matter in the Snyder County

Courthouse. (Doc. 9, at 1-2). Attorney Martineau filed the motion for TRO and protective

order because Defendant Brian Ulmer was to appear at the proceeding. (Doc. 9, at 1-2). The

relief Attorney Martineau requests is outside of the Court’s jurisdiction because her

appearance in an unrelated matter at the Snyder County Courthouse is unrelated to her client,

Grohol’s claims. See supra Section III.B; Ball, 396 Fed. Appx. at 837; Preacher, 2019 WL

3213533, at *2; Stewart, 2015 WL 1636124, at *2. Additionally, the relief Attorney Martineau

requested for May 29, 2026, is now moot. Accordingly, Grohol’s request that the Court issue

a TRO and protective order protecting Attorney Martineau from adverse action while

Attorney Martineau appears in the Snyder County Courthouse for an unrelated matter is

DENIED as moot. (Doc. 9).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Grohol’s motions for a TRO (Doc. 2; Doc. 3; Doc. 4; Doc.

5; Doc. 8; Doc. 9) are DENIED. Grohol’s request for a TRO requiring North Penn Legal

Services to represent Grohol meaningfully, arrange substitute counsel, or move to withdraw

with full client-protective safeguards in the underlying state court proceeding is barred by the

Younger abstention doctrine and DENIED. (Doc. 2). Grohol’s requests that the Court order

Defendants not to retaliate against Attorney Martineau, for Attorney Martineau’s criticism of

Defendants and Attorney Martineau’s exercise of her First Amendment rights are DENIED.

(Doc. 3; Doc. 4; Doc. 5; Doc. 8). Finally, Grohol’s request that the Court issue a TRO and

protective order protecting Attorney Martineau from adverse action while Attorney

Martineau appears in the Snyder County Courthouse for an unrelated matter is DENIED as

moot. (Doc. 9).

BY THE COURT:

Date: June 2, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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