The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
CHRISTAIN LAZARO CORTES VINENT,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 3:26-cv-257-MMH-LLL
WARDEN, BAKER COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER, and U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents.
___________________________________
ORDER
Petitioner Christain Lazaro Cortes Vinent initiated this action by filing
a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc.
1; Petition). Vinent alleges that the immigration court ordered him removed
on May 22, 2018, and he did not file an appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Id. at 4. According to Vinent, since January 14, 2026, United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has detained him pending
removal. Id. Vinent contends that his continued detention is unlawful and
requests the Court order his immediate release. Id. at 6–7.
In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001), the Supreme Court held
that indefinite detention of aliens raises serious constitutional concerns. Once
an order of removal is final, ICE should make every effort to remove the alien
within a reasonable time. Id. at 701. Further, the Court concluded that six
months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien
awaiting deportation. Id. “Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court
appears to view the six-month period to include the 90-day removal period plus
90 days thereafter.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002).
After that six-month period has passed and the alien “provides good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the Government to
provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 701). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien not only
must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must
provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d
at 1052.
Because ICE took Vinent into custody on January 14, 2026, any claim
seeking release under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, and is thus premature. When
Vinent’s Zadvydas claim becomes ripe, he may file a new petition to seek
discharge from custody while he awaits removal. Should he wish to file a new
petition, Vinent must pay a filing fee of $5.00 or file a complete motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. Additionally, Vinent must use the form approved
2
for use in the Middle District of Florida. See Local Rule 6.04(a) (“A pro se
person in custody must use the standard form[.]”).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
3. The Clerk shall send Vinent a habeas corpus petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (prisoner
filings).
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of
March, 2026.
United States District Judge
Jax-9 3/13
C: Christain Lazaro Cortes Vinent, A06146344