Lockhart

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

29SC FOUR POINTE LP,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:26-cv-244

Judge Algenon L. Marbley

Magistrate Judge S. Courter M. Shimeall

MARINA LOCKHART,

Defendant.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On February 12, 2026, Plaintiff, 29SC Four Pointe LP, filed a Petition in Forcible Entry

and Detainer against Defendant,1 Marina Lockhart, in the Municipal Court of Franklin County,

Ohio. See 29SC Four Pointe LP v. Marina Lockhart, Franklin County M.C. No. 2026 CVG

008109. The petition sought possession of the premises in question (3896 Summit Pointe, Apt

304, Columbus, Ohio 43230) due to Defendant’s failure to pay rent in violation of the lease

agreement. Defendant represents that she sought a continuance of the eviction hearing in

municipal court, to try to obtain counsel, but was denied. She further alleges that she was blocked

from applying for the City of Columbus’s rent assistance program.

On February 27, 2026, Defendant, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, filed a Notice of Removal in this Court. (ECF No. 1-1.) Defendant purportedly removed

this case to federal court on the basis that she is being denied Due Process and other civil rights.

1 Although the Notice of Removal references “Defendants” and includes another individual named Jessica

R. Brown, only Defendant Lockhart signed the Notice of Removal and the eviction action being challenged only

named Ms. Lockhart. Additionally, to the extent Ms. Lockhart is attempting to represent the interests of Ms. Brown,

she cannot do so as she is proceeding pro se and is not a licensed attorney. As such, the Court will only address Ms.

Lockhart as being a proper Defendant to this case.

She also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) Upon review, the

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Defendant’s Notice of Removal

(ECF No. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, and for the

reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court REMAND this action to

the Franklin County Municipal Court.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, was enacted to allow a person of

limited financial means to have access to the courts. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31

(1992). However, to prevent abuses of that leniency, the federal district courts must also review

all in forma pauperis actions and dismiss any lawsuits or causes of action that the Court determines

are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010).

Removal of actions from State court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in

relevant part that: “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the

United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to

the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such

action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Accordingly, “[o]nly state-court actions that originally

could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the

defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The defendant carries the

burden of showing that removal is proper and that the federal court has original jurisdiction to hear

the case. See Vill. of Oakwood v. State Bank and Tr. Co., 539 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2008)

(citations omitted). The defendant meets their burden by demonstrating “either that the

requirements for diversity jurisdiction were met or that the case arose under federal law.” Weir v.

Wasserman, No. 25-3208, 2025 WL 3688824, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025) (citing Caterpillar

Inc., 482 U.S. at 392). The removal statute is to be strictly construed and where jurisdiction is in

doubt, the matter should be remanded to the state court. See Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible

Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 534 (6th Cir. 1999).

Finally, “federal courts have an ongoing ‘duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction

. . . and may raise the issue sua sponte.’” Howard v. Good Samaritan Hosp., No. 1:21-CV-160,

2022 WL 92462, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2022) (quoting Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v.

Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). Thus, “[i]f

the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the

action.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)).

II. ANALYSIS

Here, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, which means was therefore improper.

First, Defendant has not identified any claims arising under federal laws or the United

States Constitution to establish subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, nor is it

otherwise apparent from the face of the Complaint that this lawsuit arises under federal law. See

Miller v. Bruenger, 949 F.3d 986, 990 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Whether a cause of action arises under

federal law must be apparent from the face of the ‘well-pleaded complaint.’”). Instead, the claim

against Defendant for eviction arises solely under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1923, which is state

law.

Moreover, although Defendant briefly references Due Process and other “civil rights” in

her Notice of Removal, the assertion of defenses or counterclaims involving federal law does not

create a basis for jurisdiction. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S.

826, 831 (2002) (holding that “a counterclaim—which appears as part of the defendant’s answer,

not as part of the plaintiff’s complaint—cannot serve as the basis for ‘arising under’ jurisdiction”).

Likewise, Defendant cannot rely on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332

to establish this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendant neither alleges that the parties are

citizens of different states nor alleges the citizenship of the parties at all. Nor does Defendant

allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Defendant therefore has not plausibly

alleged that § 1332’s diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy requirements are satisfied.

Finally, to the extent Defendant is trying to challenge the state court decisions in this case,

such a request would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,

476 (1983). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine embodies the notion that appellate review of state-

court decisions and the validity of state judicial proceedings is limited to the Supreme Court under

28 U.S.C. § 1257, and thus that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review such matters.” In

re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over

this action. It therefore is RECOMMENDED that the Court REMAND this action to the Franklin

County Municipal Court. It is further RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion for Permanent

Injunction (ECF No. 4) be DENIED AS MOOT.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination

of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ S. Courter M. Shimeall

S. COURTER M. SHIMEALL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE