The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER JOHN STREETER,
v. Case No. 8:20-cr-304-VMC-CPT
8:25-cv-558-VMC-CPT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
________________________________/
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on Christopher John
Streeter’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside
or Correct Sentence. (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 111). The
United States of America filed a response. (Civ. Doc. # 11).
Mr. Streeter filed a reply. (Civ. Doc. # 14). Later, with the
Court’s leave, Mr. Streeter filed a supplement to his Motion.
(Civ. Doc. # 19). The United States responded to the
supplement (Civ. Doc. # 20), and Mr. Streeter replied. (Civ.
Doc. # 24). The Motion, including the supplement, is dismissed
in part and denied in part.
I. Background
A. Filing of Criminal Case
In October 2020, Mr. Streeter pled guilty, pursuant to
a written plea agreement, to one count of sex trafficking of
children in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, as alleged in the
information. (Crim. Doc. ## 1, 6, 7). Before the information
was filed, Mr. Streeter was represented by Walter Reynoso for
purposes of the investigation. (Crim. Doc. # 27; Crim. Doc.
# 101 at 3-5). However, Mr. Reynoso’s admission to practice
in the Middle District of Florida had lapsed, such that he
could not sign the plea agreement or attend any court
hearings. (Crim. Doc. # 27). Thus, Mr. Streeter subsequently
hired Mark Rankin to be his counsel for the guilty plea and
sentencing phases. Only Mr. Rankin made an official
appearance in the criminal case after the information was
filed. See (Crim. Doc. # 3) (Mr. Streeter’s waiver of
indictment signed by Mr. Rankin and filed on the same day as
the information); (Crim. Doc. # 6) (amended plea agreement
signed by Mr. Streeter and Mr. Rankin).
The amended plea agreement contains the factual basis
for the plea, to which Mr. Streeter explicitly agreed. (Crim.
Doc. # 6 at 18-23). Mr. Streeter’s plea agreement also
contains a partial appeal waiver. (Id. at 16). Furthermore,
the plea agreement contained a statement of voluntariness.
(Id. at 17-18).
B. Change of Plea Hearing
During the change of plea hearing, Magistrate Judge
Christopher P. Tuite went over the plea agreement and other
matters in detail with Mr. Streeter, who was under oath.
(Crim. Doc. # 77). Judge Tuite first checked that Mr. Streeter
had sufficient education to read the documents in his case
and that he was not under the influence of any intoxicating
substances. (Id. at 28). He next confirmed that Mr. Streeter
had reviewed the charge, evidence, and his option to go to
trial with Mr. Rankin. (Id. at 29-32). Judge Tuite asked Mr.
Streeter if he was “fully satisfied with the advice and
representation [Mr. Streeter] received from [his] lawyer,” to
which Mr. Streeter responded “[y]es, Your Honor.” (Id. at
32). Judge Tuite also confirmed that Mr. Streeter had read
each page of the plea agreement and had reviewed “the plea
agreement in its entirety with [his] lawyer” before Mr.
Streeter signed it. (Id. at 32-33). Judge Tuite next read the
most significant terms of the plea agreement with the
government and ensured that Mr. Streeter understood those
terms. (Id. at 33-44).
Judge Tuite also asked whether Mr. Streeter had been
“threatened, coerced, or otherwise forced . . . in any way”
to plead guilty, to which Mr. Streeter responded “[n]o, your
honor.” (Id. at 41). Judge Tuite asked him if he was “pleading
guilty freely and voluntarily?” (Id.). Mr. Streeter responded
“[y]es, Your Honor.” (Id.). Mr. Streeter also agreed that he
decided to plead guilty “only after having had a full and
ample opportunity to discuss the matter with [his] lawyer,
Mr. Rankin.” (Id. at 41-42). Mr. Streeter agreed that he
understood the minimum and maximum sentences for his offense
and had “reviewed the sentencing guidelines with Mr. Rankin.”
(Id. 42, 45-46). Judge Tuite also confirmed that Mr. Streeter
understood that his plea agreement included an appellate
waiver. (Id. at 46-47). Judge Tuite reiterated that Mr.
Streeter had “the right to persist in [a] plea of not guilty”
and “the right to a jury trial at which the Government would
be required to prove the charges against [him] beyond a
reasonable doubt and to the unanimous satisfaction of a jury.”
(Id. at 47).
Judge Tuite reviewed the elements of the offense with
Mr. Streeter, including that Victim 1, “the person recruited,
enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained,
patronized, or solicited, had not attained the age of 14 years
at the time of the offense charged in Count One.” (Id. at 48-
50). Judge Tuite then reviewed the factual basis for the plea.
(Id. at 51-53).
The factual basis in the plea agreement reads:
From an unknown date but as early as September
2018, through June 2019, the defendant, Christopher
John Streeter, directly participated in a scheme to
sexually exploit children in the Philippines for
the purpose of producing child sex abuse images and
videos for his consumption and sexual
gratification.
Streeter used several facilities of interstate
and foreign commerce, including the internet and
the website Facebook, to communicate from his
residence in the Middle District of Florida with
several identified and unidentified minors and
adults in the Philippines. Streeter, using at least
two Facebook accounts - user names “Jack Reacher”
and “John Chris” - knowingly communicated with the
individuals for the purpose of recruiting,
soliciting, enticing, transporting, providing,
soliciting, and patronizing children under 18-years
old to take pornographic photographs or have sex on
video in exchange for payment.
On multiple occasions over that period,
Streeter communicated and transacted with a
recruiter (some of whom identified as minors
themselves) for the purpose of recruiting children
to engage in sex acts on camera. The children —
some of whom were as young as 12 and 13-years old
— were particularly vulnerable due to poverty and
illness. Some of the child victims were immediate
family members or classmates of the recruiters.
Streeter would then, using facilities of
interstate and foreign commerce, send payment for
their sexual performances. The money that Streeter
remitted covered recording-production costs, such
as hotel rooms, transportation, payment to the
persons engaging in sex acts (including the minor),
and a commission for the recruiter. In return,
Streeter received videos and images of minors
involved in various sex acts that tracked
Streeter’s directives, including minors engaged in
digital stimulation of their genitals, vaginal
intercourse, anal intercourse, and insemination.
Occasionally, Streeter also conversed directly with
minors in the Philippines for the purpose of that
minor producing pornography of herself.
Streeter negotiated and paid a premium for
videos and images depicting female minors losing
their virginity - negotiations that sometimes
involved the parent of the minor selling their
child’s virginity. He also negotiated and paid a
premium for media depicting female minors being
inseminated and being placed at risk of pregnancy;
a sexual fetish that he enjoyed watching. Streeter
paid increased fees and bonuses for such videos and
offered and sent additional payment for emergency
contraception pills, and, occasionally, for
abortions.
For example, Streeter communicated on several
occasions in 2018 and 2019 with a Facebook user
bearing the display name L.A. L.A. acted as a
recruiter in the Philippines to source minors for
sexual abuse. In January 2019, L.A. informed
Streeter that L.A. had a “new girl” for him.
Streeter, utilizing his Facebook account with the
username “Jack Reacher,” responded: “send pic.”
L.A. responded by sending Streeter a picture of
Victim-1 and informing Streeter that Victim-1 was
under the age of 18. Victim-1 was born in November
2006; making her 12-years old in January 2019. L.A.
sent Streeter additional pictures of Victim-1 and
stated that they would use Victim-1 to produce a
video for Streeter in March.
In March 2019, L.A. offered to produce a video
of Victim-1, referring to her throughout their
conversations as “virgin girl.” Streeter requested
additional pictures of Victim-1. On April 5, 2019,
still communicating over the internet and Facebook,
Streeter asked L.A.: “So how much to get the video,”
referring to a sex-abuse video of Victim-1. L.A.
responded: “2000 . . . 1000 hotel and 500 load like
always 500 for the guy,” listing prices in
Philippine Pesos. A few minutes later, Streeter
used an online money-transfer company named W.R.,
which operates in interstate commerce, to transfer
2041 Philippine Pesos to a person bearing the
initials A.B.T. — a previously designated recipient
for L.A. Streeter then messaged the transaction
receipt number to L.A. Streeter’s name and
residential address in the Middle District of
Florida were listed in the transaction’s sender
information.
Several hours later, L.A. sent Streeter two
videos through Facebook. The first video, over two
minutes long, shows Victim-1 removing her clothes
and a penis making contact with her genitals. The
second video, 16 seconds long, shows sperm on
Victim-1’s genitals.
Streeter and L.A. continued to discuss Victim-
1 in June 2019. On June 11, 2019, L.A. again offered
Victim-1 to Streeter, sending a picture of her and
referring to her as the “virgin girl.” Streeter
commented that they had already produced a “bad”
video of Victim-1. L.A. quoted Streeter a price for
a new video of Victim-1, adding that Victim-1 was
ready and waiting. Two hours later, Streeter used
W.R. to send 4,500 Philippine Pesos to recipient
A.B.T. The IP address associated with the online
transaction resolves to Streeter’s former residence
in Land O’Lakes, Florida, which is in the Middle
District of Florida. Streeter supplied L.A. with a
receipt number through Facebook.
Several days later, Streeter and L.A.
discussed producing yet another sex abuse video of
Victim-1. They discussed two separate prices for
sex abuse videos of Victim-1; 4,000 Philippine
Pesos for a video with “no pills” (referring to
emergency contraception) and 4,700 for a video with
“pills.” The higher price for a video with “pills”
was intended to reflect a premium paid for Victim-
1’s insemination during the sex abuse video. Around
midnight on June 26, 2019, L.A. sent a photograph
of Victim-1 and messaged Streeter saying: “Hon sent
[sic] now cause big white is here and virgin girl
sent [sic] 4700 hon.” “Big white” referred to the
male being paid to sexually abuse Victim-1 in the
video. Two minutes after L.A. requested 4,000
Philippine Pesos for a sex abuse video of Victim-
1, Streeter sent 4,016 Philippine Pesos through
W.R. to recipient A.B.T. Two days later, L.A. sent
Streeter two additional videos over Facebook,
requesting 3,800 Philippine Pesos. The next day,
Streeter again used W.R. while in the Middle
District of Florida to send 3,250 Philippine Pesos
to recipient A.B.T. Streeter then messaged L.A.
stating that the recording was the third “bad”
video of the same girl and further commented: “How
hard is it to just fuck that girl,” referring to
Victim-1. L.A. responded: “The guy think hon is
afraid to get her preggy cause she is under age she
13 not 14,” later repeating that Victim-1’s age is
13-years old. Streeter voiced displeasure that
video only showed semen outside of Victim-1’s
vagina, adding: “You get the pills for her and make
her take them.” Defending her actions, L.A.[]
stated she would not take commission from the video
and claimed that she provided Victim-1 with money
to buy the emergency contraception at a pharmacy.
Streeter directed that next time L.A. buy the
emergency contraception pills for Victim-1 and make
her take them. Victim-1 was paid for her
participation in the sex abuse videos that Streeter
had ordered and received.
(Crim. Doc. # 6 at 18-23).
Judge Tuite asked Mr. Streeter specifically if he agreed
with the factual basis listed in the plea agreement and if he
had reviewed “all of those facts in detail with [his] lawyer
before [he] initialed those pages.” (Crim. Doc. # 77 at 51).
Mr. Streeter stated “Yes, I did, Your Honor.” (Id.). When
asked if he had “any disagreement with those facts,” Mr.
Streeter replied “No, I don’t, Your Honor.” (Id.). The Court
accepted Mr. Streeter’s guilty plea. (Crim. Doc. # 15).
C. Sentencing & First Section 2255 Motion
On January 7, 2021, this Court held a sentencing hearing,
and it held a separate hearing on restitution on April 1,
2021. (Crim. Doc. ## 48, 63). On April 1, 2021, the Court
entered an amended judgment reflecting Mr. Streeter’s
sentence: a term of life imprisonment, a lifetime term of
supervised release, a special assessment of $5,000, and
restitution in the amount of $70,000. (Crim. Doc. # 64). On
April 8, 2021, at the parties’ request, the Court entered a
second amended judgment that amended only the restitution
repayment terms. (Crim. Doc. # 69). Mr. Streeter did not file
a direct appeal.
In December 2021, Mr. Streeter filed his first Section
2255 Motion, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to pursue a direct appeal, despite Mr. Streeter’s
request that he do so. (Crim. Doc. # 73). Mr. Streeter wrote
that he told Mr. Rankin at his sentencing that “he wanted to
file a direct appeal because [Mr. Streeter] felt that he had
been denied his constitutional rights [and] was denied all of
his discovery in his case.” (Id.). Mr. Rankin allegedly
refused to file an appeal on Mr. Streeter’s behalf. (Id.).
The Court granted Mr. Streeter’s first 2255 motion as to that
one claim so that Mr. Streeter could file an out-of-time
appeal of his judgment of conviction. (Crim. Doc. # 82). While
Mr. Streeter raised other claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel that pertained to counsel’s actions during the
representation, the Court dismissed those claims without
prejudice. (Id. at 6).
D. Direct Appeal & This Section 2255 Motion
Mr. Streeter then timely filed a direct appeal. (Crim.
Doc. # 88). On appeal, Mr. Streeter was represented by Thomas
Burns. Mr. Burns filed an Anders brief.1 United States v.
Streeter, No. 22-11857, at (Doc. # 29) (11th Cir. Dec. 12,
2022). Although appellate counsel could not argue in good
faith that the conviction and sentence should be vacated and
thus moved to withdraw, counsel also briefed numerous
potential issues in the record that might arguably have
supported the appeal. These included whether Mr. Streeter had
knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty, whether Mr. Streeter’s
counsel was ineffective at the plea stage, and whether his
sentence was subject to reversible error. Id.
After the Anders brief was filed, Mr. Streeter responded
pro se, raising numerous arguments for reversal of his
conviction. These included prosecutorial-misconduct claims
related to alleged Brady violations, plea negotiations,
threats, and conflicts of interest, claims based on factual
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
challenges, discovery issues, videos, his alleged innocence,
claims based on the victim-impact statements and purported
inconsistencies in the evidence, as well as discussion about
the victims, their credibility, and ages. Id. at (Doc. # 52
at 4-20) (11th Cir. June 27, 2023).
“Because independent examination of the entire record
reveal[ed] no arguable issue of merit,” the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed Mr. Streeter’s conviction and sentence. United
States v. Streeter, No. 22-11857, 2023 WL 8447360, at *1 (11th
Cir. Dec. 6, 2023).
Mr. Streeter then filed the instant Section 2255 Motion,
raising fourteen grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel
and prosecutorial misconduct. (Civ. Doc. # 1). The grounds
are muddled and largely repetitive of one another, as well as
each ground often attempting to raise more than one claim for
relief. For example, in Ground Ten, Mr. Streeter accuses the
prosecutor of various types of misconduct (hiding exculpatory
evidence, committing perjury, etc.) and accuses attorney Mr.
Rankin of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his
cross-examination of the United States’ witness at sentencing
and a supposed conflict of interest in the form of Mr. Rankin
wanting to protect the prosecutor for an unspecified reason.
(Id. at 31-32). The United States has responded (Civ. Doc. #
11), and Mr. Streeter has replied. (Civ. Doc. # 14).
Subsequently, with the Court’s leave, Mr. Streeter filed
a supplement, in which he primarily argues that he is actually
innocent of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591 and reiterates his
belief that his counsel was ineffective. (Civ. Doc. # 19).
The United States has responded to the supplement (Civ. Doc.
# 20), and Mr. Streeter has replied. (Civ. Doc. # 24).2
The Motion, including the supplement, is ripe for
review.
II. Discussion
A. Procedural Bar & Default
First, the Court addresses the issue of procedural bar
and procedural default. The United States argues “[a]ll of
[Mr.] Streeter’s claims not based on ineffective assistance
of counsel are procedurally barred” or, alternatively, are
2 The Court does not interpret either of Mr. Streeter’s
replies (Civ. Doc. ## 14, 24) as asserting additional claims.
To the extent they could be construed as asserting additional
claims, these claims are waived. See McKiver v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 991 F.3d 1357, 1365 (11th Cir. 2021)
(“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a party’s reply
brief are waived.”); Wallace v. United States, No. 8:11-cr-
287-SCB-MAP, 2014 WL 12605465, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2014)
(“Petitioner’s § 2255 motion did not contend that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the Fourth
Amendment issues, and this ineffectiveness claim was raised
for the first time in his reply brief. . . . Arguments raised
for the first time in a reply brief are deemed waived.”).
procedurally defaulted. (Civ. Doc. # 11 at 10-11). The Court
agrees.3
“The terms ‘procedurally barred’ and ‘procedurally
defaulted’ have distinct meanings.” Seabrooks v. United
States, 32 F.4th 1375, 1383 (11th Cir. 2022). “A procedural
bar prevents a defendant from raising arguments in a § 2255
proceeding that he raised and [the appellate court] rejected
on direct appeal.” Id. “Once a matter has been decided
adversely to a defendant on direct appeal, it cannot, except
in the case of an intervening change in the law, be re-
litigated in a collateral attack under section 2255, as it is
procedurally barred.” United States v. Chmieleski, No.
4:17CR24/MW/MAL, 2023 WL 3205344, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 3,
2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. United
States v. Chmielewski, No. 4:17CR24-MW/MAL, 2023 WL 3199980
(N.D. Fla. May 2, 2023). In contrast, “[u]nder the procedural
default rule, a defendant generally must advance an available
challenge to a criminal conviction or sentence on direct
appeal or else the defendant is barred from presenting that
3 Again, the Motion’s grounds are largely repetitive of one
another and frequently combine multiple claims in the same
ground. Because of this organization, the Court addresses the
claims by their substance (e.g., an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim regarding the decision to plead guilty) rather
than by the ground number assigned to them in the Motion.
claim in a § 2255 proceeding.” Lynn v. United States, 365
F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004).
All of Mr. Streeter’s prosecutorial misconduct grounds
and any other non-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds
that could be construed from the Motion or supplement are
procedurally barred because he raised them in his response to
counsel’s Anders brief in the direct appeal. See United States
v. Streeter, No. 22-11857, at (Doc. # 52 at 4-20) (11th Cir.
June 27, 2023); see also Chmieleski, 2023 WL 3205344, at *2
(“Broad discretion is afforded to a court’s determination of
whether a particular claim has been previously raised.”).
Also, in the Anders brief, appellate counsel flagged
potential issues involving the involuntariness of the plea
and whether Mr. Streeter’s sentence was imposed in error.
United States v. Streeter, No. 22-11857, at (Doc. # 29). The
Eleventh Circuit considered these arguments in its review of
the entire record. By affirming the conviction and sentence,
the Eleventh Circuit rejected these arguments. Streeter, 2023
WL 8447360, at *1. And Mr. Streeter has not identified an
intervening change in the law, as would be necessary to
overcome the procedural bar. See Seabrooks, 32 F.4th at 1383
(“A defendant can overcome a procedural bar when, as here,
there is an intervening change in law.”). Thus, the Motion is
dismissed as procedurally barred as to these grounds.
Alternatively, even if these grounds had not been
sufficiently raised before the Eleventh Circuit, they would
still be procedurally defaulted because they could have been
raised on direct appeal. “A defendant can avoid a procedural
bar only by establishing one of the two exceptions to the
procedural default rule. Under the first exception, a
defendant must show cause for not raising the claim of error
on direct appeal and actual prejudice from the alleged error.
Under the second exception, a court may allow a defendant to
proceed with a § 2255 motion despite his failure to show cause
for procedural default if a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent.” Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Court emphasizes that “[a]ctual innocence is not
itself a substantive claim.” United States v. Montano, 398
F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, actual innocence is
an exception to procedural default that Mr. Streeter cannot
establish. He admitted under oath the truth of the factual
basis for his plea during his plea colloquy. And Mr. Streeter
has not met the heavy burden of showing that his statements
during his plea colloquy were false. See Winthrop-Redin v.
United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“[B]ecause Winthrop–Redin made statements under oath at a
plea colloquy, ‘he bears a heavy burden to show his statements
were false.’” (citation omitted)). Mr. Streeter’s admission
of guilt under oath, which is supported by the overwhelming
evidence in this case including chat logs and payment records,
establishes that he is not actually innocent.
The Court is not persuaded by Mr. Streeter’s
supplemental argument that he is guilty of production of child
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), but not guilty of sex
trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1591. (Civ. Doc. # 19 at 3, 8-
12). The facts in the factual basis to which Mr. Streeter
agreed establish a violation of Section 1591. Furthermore,
the United States is correct that the fact “that [Mr.]
Streeter’s conduct also violated another criminal statute
does not exonerate him of violating” Section 1591. (Civ. Doc.
# 20 at 7-8); see United States v. Cespedes, 151 F.3d 1329,
1332 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he federal courts have long
recognized ‘that when an act violates more than one criminal
statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as
it does not discriminate against any class of defendants.’”
(citation omitted)). Mr. Streeter has not satisfied the
burden of establishing actual innocence.
Nor can Mr. Streeter establish cause and prejudice.
True, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel qualifies
as cause. However, Mr. Streeter has not established that
appellate counsel was ineffective. Even though appellate
counsel filed an Anders brief, Mr. Burns did raise numerous
potential issues for the Eleventh Circuit to review on appeal
in that brief. United States v. Streeter, No. 22-11857, at
(Doc. # 29). Given the issues counsel raised in the Anders
brief and the appellate waiver that limited the grounds for
appeal, the Court cannot agree that Mr. Burns was ineffective.
Furthermore, Mr. Streeter has not established that he
was prejudiced by any ineffectiveness of counsel. The
Eleventh Circuit reviewed the entire record and found no basis
to vacate Mr. Streeter’s conviction or sentence. Mr. Streeter
has not convinced the Court that any of his current arguments
regarding prosecutorial misconduct, alleged Brady claims,
credibility of witnesses, or other evidentiary issues — if
raised by appellate counsel — would have led to a different
result on direct appeal. Rather, the Court agrees with the
United States that these arguments all lack merit for the
reasons explained by the United States. (Civ. Doc. # 11 at
13-35).
In short, all Mr. Streeter’s grounds for relief not based
upon the ineffective assistance of counsel are procedurally
barred or, alternatively, procedurally defaulted. This
includes all claims of prosecutorial misconduct, including
the claim that the prosecutor coerced him into pleading
guilty. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998)
(“The voluntariness and intelligence of a guilty plea can be
attacked on collateral review only if first challenged on
direct review. Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy and
will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)). Mr. Streeter’s Motion
is thus dismissed as procedurally barred as to all non-
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
B. Waiver
Furthermore, and apart from the procedural bar, all of
Mr. Streeter’s grounds for relief – except those alleging
that his guilty plea was involuntary or ineffective
assistance of counsel claims that relate to his decision to
plead guilty — are waived by virtue of his guilty plea. (Civ.
Doc. # 11 at 12-13).
By pleading guilty, a defendant waives all non-
jurisdictional arguments except “an attack on the voluntary
and knowing nature of the plea.” Wilson v. United States, 962
F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992). This waiver also applies to
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except when the
claim of ineffective assistance is about the decision to plead
guilty. See Armano v. United States, No. 21-14426, 2024 WL
3888185, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 2024) (“[H]e does waive an
ineffective assistance claim by entering a plea when the
‘claim of ineffective assistance is not about his decision to
plead guilty.’” (quoting Wilson, 962 F.2d at 997)). Finally,
“a valid guilty plea relinquishes any claim that would
contradict the ‘admissions necessarily made upon entry of a
voluntary plea of guilty.’” Class v. United States, 583 U.S.
174, 183 (2018) (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S.
563, 573-74 (1989)).
Because Mr. Streeter pled guilty, all his claims,
besides claims that he was threatened to plead guilty and all
his ineffective assistance of counsel claims about his
decision to plead guilty, are waived. These include his claims
regarding other alleged prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective
assistance of counsel not relating to the decision to plead,
and the sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v.
Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Viscome’s
guilty plea waived all non-jurisdictional defects in the
proceedings against him; and Viscome’s sufficiency of the
evidence challenge is non-jurisdictional.”); United States v.
Coleman, 653 F. App’x 712, 713 (11th Cir. 2016) (“By entering
a knowing and voluntary unconditional guilty plea, Coleman
waived his right to challenge the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress evidence. . . . [and] also waived his
right to raise on appeal his argument about prosecutorial
misconduct during the grand jury proceedings.” (citations
omitted)); Caceres v. United States, No. 13-22901-CIV, 2014
WL 5761112, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2014) (“Caceres pled
guilty freely and voluntarily, thereby waiving any claims
relating to non-jurisdictional defects in his criminal
proceeding such as counsel’s failure to investigate certain
evidence during pretrial discovery.”). Thus, all grounds for
relief raising such arguments are dismissed as waived.
C. Merits
Finally, as to Mr. Streeter’s grounds for relief that
are not procedurally barred or waived, these grounds fail on
the merits. Mr. Streeter bears the burden of proving that he
is entitled to relief under Section 2255. Rivers v. United
States, 777 F.3d 1304, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015).
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Mr.
Streeter must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
“that particular and identified acts or omissions of counsel
were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314
(11th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In other words, he must show that “no competent counsel would
have taken the action that [his] counsel did take.” Id. at
1315. In deciding whether an attorney’s performance was
deficient, courts are “highly deferential” and “indulge [the]
strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable
and that counsel made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 1314
(internal quotation marks omitted).
To satisfy Strickland’s second prong — prejudice — Mr.
Streeter must show that “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The
Supreme Court has held that “the two-part Strickland [] test
applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective
assistance of counsel,” and that “to satisfy the ‘prejudice’
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985). “There
is a strong presumption that statements made during the plea
colloquy are true. Consequently, a defendant bears a heavy
burden to show that his statements under oath were false.”
Patel v. United States, 252 F. App’x 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2007)
(citations omitted). The Court is mindful that a “section
2255 motion is not designed to account for buyer’s remorse
regarding a defendant’s decision to plead guilty.” Dawson v.
United States, No. 8:16-cr-500-VMC-AEP, 2019 WL 11704149, at
*6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2019).
As mentioned before, only Mr. Streeter’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims regarding his guilty plea have
not been waived. These claims fail on the merits. Mr. Streeter
made numerous statements under oath at his change of plea
hearing that disprove that his counsel was ineffective
regarding the decision to plead guilty. During the plea
colloquy, Mr. Streeter confirmed that he had reviewed the
charge, evidence, and his option to go to trial with Mr.
Rankin. (Crim. Doc. # 77 at 29-32). Judge Tuite asked Mr.
Streeter if he was “fully satisfied with the advice and
representation [Mr. Streeter] received from [his] lawyer,” to
which Mr. Streeter responded “[y]es, Your Honor.” (Id. at
32). Judge Tuite also confirmed that Mr. Streeter had read
each page of the plea agreement and had reviewed “the plea
agreement in its entirety with [his] lawyer” before Mr.
Streeter signed it. (Id. at 32-33). Mr. Streeter agreed that
his decision to plead guilty was “a decision that [he had]
made only after having had a full and ample opportunity to
discuss the matter with [his] lawyer, Mr. Rankin.” (Id. at
41-42). Mr. Streeter further agreed that he understood the
minimum and maximum sentences for his offense and had
“reviewed the sentencing guidelines with Mr. Rankin.” (Id.
42, 45-46).
Mr. Streeter has not satisfied the heavy burden of
showing that his statements made under oath during his plea
colloquy were false. See Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1217
(“[B]ecause Winthrop–Redin made statements under oath at a
plea colloquy, ‘he bears a heavy burden to show his statements
were false.’” (citation omitted)). Thus, the Court does not
credit Mr. Streeter’s new allegations that his counsel’s
alleged ineffectiveness rendered his plea involuntary and
unknowing. He has not established that his counsel was
ineffective or that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.
To the extent Mr. Streeter also argues his counsel failed
to provide effective assistance regarding the plea process
because counsel was absent or failed to test the prosecution’s
case, this claim fails. “The right to the effective assistance
of counsel is [] the right of the accused to require the
prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
656 (1984). “The Court has uniformly found constitutional
error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either
totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused
during a critical stage of the proceeding.” Id. at 659 n. 25.
Mr. Streeter insists that his first attorney, Mr.
Reynoso, was in essence “totally absent” because Mr. Reynoso
had allowed his admission to the Middle District of Florida
Bar to lapse, so was unable to appear in this Court during
this case. (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 5, 8; Civ. Doc. # 19 at 6, 13-
15, 18). Mr. Reynoso is admitted to practice law in the State
of Florida, but he had allowed his membership in the Middle
District of Florida Bar to lapse. (Reynoso Affidavit at 1,
7). Mr. Reynoso was hired after a search warrant was executed
at Mr. Streeter’s home but before any information or
indictment had been filed. (Civ. Doc. # 19 at 14).
Importantly, Mr. Streeter admits he hired Mr. Reynoso to
represent him during the pre-information investigation stage
of the case and with the understanding that Mr. Reynoso would
not make any court appearances. (Id.). This fact dooms his
ineffective assistance claim regarding Mr. Reynoso’s pre-
information representation. The Sixth Amendment right to
counsel “does not attach until a prosecution is commenced,
that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings — whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.” Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167–68 (2001)
(citation omitted). And “a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel cannot stand if the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to counsel had not yet attached.” United States v. Frye, No.
4:01-CR-8-WHB, 2011 WL 13284767, at *5 (S.D. Miss. July 7,
2011); see also United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1250
(10th Cir. 1998) (“On the morning of April 15, 1994, when Mr.
Alvarez gave his second statement to the DEA agents, the
government had not initiated formal proceedings against him.
Accordingly, because Mr. Alvarez had no Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel at the time the DEA agents
questioned him, he cannot argue that Mr. Christiansen’s
performance before or during questioning fell short of the
Sixth Amendment’s requirements.”). Thus, Mr. Streeter’s claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning Mr. Reynoso’s
conduct before the filing of the information fails.
Even if an ineffective assistance claim could be based
on Mr. Reynoso’s pre-information representation or if Mr.
Streeter maintains Mr. Reynoso continued to provide
ineffective assistance as out-of-court co-counsel after the
information was filed, Mr. Reynoso’s lack of admission to the
Middle District of Florida Bar did not render him absent
because Mr. Streeter agreed Mr. Reynoso would not represent
him in Court. Mr. Streeter also acknowledges Mr. Reynoso did
communicate with the prosecutor, received early discovery,
discussed the possibility of a proffer agreement, and
attempted to negotiate a resolution of the case for Mr.
Streeter during the investigation phase. (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 8;
Civ. Doc. # 19 at 14-15). In short, Mr. Reynoso was not
“totally absent” and did not fail to assist Mr. Streeter
during a critical stage of the proceedings.
Likewise, Mr. Rankin, who was hired to represent Mr.
Streeter in Court and through the plea and sentencing process,
was not “totally absent” from any phase of the case and did
not fail to subject the United States’ case to adversarial
testing. To the extent Mr. Rankin represented Mr. Streeter
for a time before the information was filed (Civ. Doc. # 19
at 16-17), Mr. Rankin’s pre-information conduct cannot
support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Frye,
2011 WL 13284767, at *5. Regarding post-information
representation, Mr. Streeter swore at his change of plea
hearing that he had fully reviewed the charge, evidence, and
plea agreement with Mr. Rankin, had made the decision to plead
guilty with the benefit of Mr. Rankin’s advice, and was
satisfied with his representation. (Crim. Doc. # 77 at 29-
33). For sentencing, Mr. Rankin filed a sentencing memorandum
on Mr. Streeter’s behalf, arguing for a downward variance to
the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. (Crim.
Doc. # 40). During sentencing, Mr. Rankin reiterated this
argument and cross-examined the United States’ task force
officer witness. (Doc. # 79 at 43-46). While Mr. Streeter is
clearly dissatisfied with the assistance Mr. Rankin and Mr.
Reynoso provided, he falls far short of establishing a Cronic
claim.
Next, to the extent Mr. Streeter’s ineffective
assistance claim is based on his counsel having an alleged
conflict of interest that affected his decision to plead
guilty, this claim fails. “[A] defendant must show first,
that his attorney had an actual conflict of interest, and
second, that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s
performance.” Pegg v. United States, 253 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th
Cir. 2001). “Only when ‘a defendant shows that his counsel
actively represented conflicting interests’ does he establish
an actual conflict under the Sixth Amendment.” Quince v.
Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)). “That fact-specific
inquiry requires the defendant to make a factual showing of
inconsistent interests or point to specific instances in the
record to suggest an actual impairment of his interests.”
Kennedy v. United States, 799 F. App’x 697, 700 (11th Cir.
2020). As to the second element, “[i]f there is a guilty plea
involved, this Court looks at whether the attorney’s actual
conflict adversely affected the defendant’s decision to plead
guilty.” Pegg, 253 F.3d at 1278.
Mr. Streeter has not established that either of his
attorneys during the investigation and district court
proceedings, Mr. Reynoso or Mr. Rankin, or his appellate
counsel, Mr. Burns, had an actual conflict of interest.
Rather, Mr. Streeter’s claims of a conflict of interest,
involving Mr. Reynoso, Mr. Rankin, and Mr. Burns all desiring
to protect the AUSA from facing consequences for
prosecutorial misconduct or to protect each other because of
alleged friendships or other concerns, see, e.g., (Civ. Doc.
# 1 at 23, 30, 32-33, 36, 41-42), are conclusory and
insufficient. See Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th
Cir. 1991) (holding that conclusory statements, unsupported
by specific facts or the record, are insufficient to
demonstrate entitlement to habeas relief); see also Kennedy,
799 F. App’x at 700 (“A mere speculative, hypothetical, or
possible conflict of interest is insufficient to establish an
ineffective-assistance claim.”). Thus, Mr. Streeter cannot
establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on
a conflict of interest.
The Motion is denied as to Mr. Streeter’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims concerning his plea.
To the extent this claim is not waived, the Motion is
also denied as to Mr. Streeter’s claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. Again, Mr. Streeter has not
established that Mr. Burns had an actual conflict of interest.
Furthermore, as explained in the procedural default section
of this Order, Mr. Burns did not provide ineffective
assistance by filing the Anders brief, and Mr. Streeter was
not prejudiced by any alleged ineffectiveness.
2. Involuntary Plea
As mentioned before, Mr. Streeter’s claim that his
guilty plea was involuntary is procedurally barred (or
defaulted) and dismissed as such. Nevertheless, in the
alternative, the Court addresses the merits of this claim. “A
guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive
it of the character of a voluntary act, is void. A conviction
based upon such a plea is open to collateral attack.”
Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Machibroda v.
United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962)). “A guilty plea is
knowing and voluntary if the defendant entered the plea
without coercion and with the understanding of the nature of
the charges and the consequences of the plea.” United States
v. Speight, 454 F. App’x 785, 787 (11th Cir. 2011).
Here, Mr. Streeter insists his guilty plea was
involuntary because of prosecutorial misconduct, including
various threats to sign the plea agreement. These include the
threat that, if Mr. Streeter did not quickly sign the plea
agreement, he would “be leaving with” “two officers
displaying sidearms.” (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 13). According to Mr.
Streeter, the “threat was real as was the fear, if you don’t
sign you are not going home tonight, or any other night.”
(Id.).
Again, however, Mr. Streeter made numerous statements
under oath at his change of plea hearing undercutting that
his plea was involuntary. The Court fully explained the
elements of the offense, the factual basis, and maximum
penalties to Mr. Streeter, who agreed that he understood and
had reviewed the plea agreement with counsel. (Crim. Doc. #
77 at 42, 45-53). Mr. Streeter agreed that his decision to
plead guilty was “a decision that [he had] made only after
having had a full and ample opportunity to discuss the matter
with [his] lawyer, Mr. Rankin.” (Id. at 41-42). Mr. Streeter
agreed that he was “pleading guilty freely and voluntarily”
and that he had not been “threatened, coerced, or otherwise
forced . . . in any way” to plead guilty. (Id. at 41).
Mr. Streeter has not satisfied the heavy burden of
showing that his statements made under oath during his plea
colloquy were false. See Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1217
(“[B]ecause Winthrop–Redin made statements under oath at a
plea colloquy, ‘he bears a heavy burden to show his statements
were false.’” (citation omitted)). The Court “is entitled to
discredit a defendant’s newly-minted story about being
threatened when that story is supported only by the
defendant’s conclusory statements.” Id. Thus, the Court does
not credit Mr. Streeter’s conclusory allegations that his
plea was involuntary, including that the prosecutor
threatened him and he had insufficient time to review the
plea agreement with counsel. Mr. Streeter’s plea was knowing
and voluntary.
Thus, in the alternative, all Mr. Streeter’s grounds
that assert his guilty plea was involuntary are denied.
III. Evidentiary Hearing
As the Court readily determined that Mr. Streeter’s
Motion was procedurally barred, waived, and lacks merit, no
evidentiary hearing is required. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)
(stating that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary if “the
motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief”); see also
Hernandez v. United States, 778 F.3d 1230, 1232-33 (11th Cir.
2015) (“To establish that he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing, Hernandez had to allege facts that would prove that
his counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced
by his counsel’s deficient performance.”).
IV. Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Appeal In
Forma Pauperis Denied
The Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability because Mr. Streeter has failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor will the Court
authorize Mr. Streeter to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis
because such an appeal would not be taken in good faith. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Mr. Streeter shall be required to pay
the full amount of the appellate filing fee pursuant to
Section 1915(b)(1) and (2).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Christopher John Streeter’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. # 1;
Crim. Doc. # 111), including the supplement (Civ. Doc.
# 19), is DISMISSED as procedurally barred as to all
grounds for relief not based upon the ineffective
assistance of counsel, is DISMISSED as waived as to all
grounds not addressing the voluntariness of his plea and
ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the plea,
and DENIED as to all other grounds.
(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and
to CLOSE this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
12th day of March, 2026.
fan Hunaby (mei¥h
VIR! IA M. HERNANDEZ’*COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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