Jat

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAJESH JAT, A226 103 853,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-01162

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary

of the U.S. Department of

Homeland Security, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM

On May 1, 2026, the petitioner, appearing through counsel, filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.

In this petition, Rajesh Jat, a native and citizen of India, challenges the

legality of his pre-removal immigration detention without an

individualized bond hearing. At the time of filing, Jat was being held in

the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(“ICE”) at Pike County Correctional Facility, located in Pike County,

Pennsylvania.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jat initially entered the United States without inspection at or near

Mooers, New York, on or about June 25, 2024. Jat was apprehended by

the United States Border Patrol shortly thereafter and detained briefly.

That same day, he was released on his own recognizance, pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a). Resp. Ex. 1, at 3, Doc. 4-2. At the time of his release,

Jat was served with a Notice to Appear, DHS Form I-862, dated June 25,

2024, which declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in

the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”1 and which

directed him to appear for a hearing before an immigration judge in New

York, New York, on August 6, 2025. Resp. Ex. 2, Doc. 4-3.

Jat has no criminal history, and he has complied with all legal

obligations since his entry into the United States in June 2024.

On August 6, 2025, the date of his initial hearing before an

immigration judge, Jat was re-arrested and detained by ICE officers. Jat

was transported to Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains

in civil immigration detention. He has been denied any opportunity to

post bond or to be released on other conditions.

On February 25, 2026, an immigration judge denied Jat’s

application for asylum and withholding of removal, including a claim for

1 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring him to be an “arriving

alien” was checked. Resp. Ex. 2, Doc. 4-3.

withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture,2 and he

ordered Jat’s removal to India. Resp. Ex. 3, Doc. 4-4. Jat has timely

filed an appeal of the immigration judge’s decision to the Board of

Immigration Appeals, which remains pending. Resp. Ex. 4, Doc. 4-5.

II. DISCUSSION

Since the United States began restricting

immigration into this country in the late 19th century,

it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking

entry into the country and those already residing

within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”

who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do

not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded

to persons inside the United States. But once a

noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal

circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to

due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s

borders, “whether their presence here is lawful,

unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction

between noncitizens who have entered and reside in

2 The immigration judge’s form order included a further, summary

finding that Jat had knowingly filed a frivolous application for asylum

after having been notified of the consequences, as set forth in INA

§ 208(d)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6). Resp. Ex. 3, at 1. At the time of his

re-arrest on August 6, 2025—more than one year after his entry into the

United States—Jat had not yet filed an application for asylum. Resp.

Ex. 1, at 3. Thus, it would appear that Jat’s application for asylum was

denied on the ground that it had been untimely filed, sometime after his

re-arrest. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (requiring a timely application for

asylum to be filed within 1 year after the alien’s arrival in the United

States); , 26 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 2016) (holding that an

untimely application for asylum may be found frivolous under INA

§ 208(d)(6)).

the United States and those who have not yet entered

“runs throughout immigration law.”

, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first

quoting , 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting

, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted).

Consistent with this distinction, “[t]wo statutory sections govern

the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225 and 1226.” , 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2025), , No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law

authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens

into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens pending the

outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”

, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).

Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is

present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an

‘applicant for admission.’” , 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who ( ) are arriving in the

United States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years

without being admitted or paroled, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the

“designation provision”),3 ( ) are inadmissible either for

misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to

the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of

documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited

removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

3 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of

aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of

aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security,

§ 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii), but the current scope of that designation is “the full

scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been

admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been

physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year

period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited

removal under § 1225(b)(1).

, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025);

, 962 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview

of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii));

, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).

expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have

such a fear, until removal. § 1225(b)(1)(B).

, 962 F.3d 612, 618–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing

expedited removal provisions); , 811 F.

Supp. 3d 274, 291–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same);

, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).

Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies

to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the

United States.4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); , 583 U.S. at 287.

Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary

(not expedited) removal proceedings. § 1225(b)(2)(A);

§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration

judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory

detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.

4 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to

those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not

relevant here. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).

§ 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of

Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting

removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on

land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be

returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather

than be detained); , 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (“Section

1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow

humanitarian parole.”).

Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of

removal proceedings.” , 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are

already present in the United States may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).

Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for

these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a

warrant issued by the Attorney General,[5] an alien may be arrested and

5 This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has

been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in

the applicable regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2);

§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that

such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain

pending. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide

that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that

such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the

alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),

1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities6 are tasked with an initial bond or

custody determination, §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the

alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration

judge, §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); § 1003.19 (setting out

procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges).

, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (“If the alien is

detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the

Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge

(both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that

6 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue

arrest warrants. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).

he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations

omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can

be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C.

§§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3).

, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a)

bond procedures).

Finally, “Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of

aliens who may be released under § 1226(a).” , 583 U.S. at

289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require

mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond

hearing under § 1226(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may

only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a

determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a

flight risk or a danger to the community. § 1226(c)(4);

, 583 U.S. at 289.

The petitioner in this case, Rajesh Jat, has been detained by

immigration authorities without a bond determination pending

disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.7 In his petition,

Jat argues that, because he was detained within the interior of the

United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre-removal-order

detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that he may only be

properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that he be given an

opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Jat further asserts a

claim under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), arguing that his

detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) is arbitrary and contrary to law.8 In

addition to these statutory arguments, Jat argues that his pre-removal

detention without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond

violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights.9

7 The parties appear to agree that the petitioner has been putatively

detained without an opportunity for a bond determination pursuant to

§ 1225(b)(2). The respondent has identified no other basis for his

detention. Moreover, the petitioner has not been placed in expedited

removal proceedings, as would be expected for a § 1225(b)(1) detainee, he

has no criminal record to qualify him for mandatory detention under

§ 1226(c), and immigration officials have refused to give him a bond

hearing, as required under § 1226(a).

8 Having granted relief on the basis of the petitioner’s primary

statutory claim—that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than

§ 1225(b)(2)—we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative argument

that his detention violates the APA.

9 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach the

constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for

The respondent raises multiple arguments in opposition to the

petition. First, the respondent argues that a jurisdiction-stripping

provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) prevents

this court from considering one particular form of injunctive relief

requested by the petitioner—an order enjoining the Government from

removing Jat from the United States while his removal proceedings

remain pending. Second, the respondent argues that § 1225(b)(2) does

properly apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory

detention.10 Finally, the respondent argues that applying § 1225(b)(2)

here comports with due process.11

A. Jurisdiction

We necessarily turn first to the question of this courts’ jurisdiction.

The respondent argues that, to the extent that he seeks an order

enjoining the Government from removing him from the United States,

the petitioner’s habeas claims are jurisdictionally barred under 8 U.S.C.

relief. , 485

U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of

judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional

questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”).

10 We note that the respondent’s answer does not engage with the

petitioner’s APA claim at all. In any event, see note 8.

11 note 9.

§ 1252(b)(9), a statutory provision that strips federal district courts of

jurisdiction to consider certain immigration-related habeas claims.

Section 1252(b)(9) is commonly described as a “zipper clause”

because it channels judicial review of all decisions and actions arising

from removal proceedings into a single petition for review (“PFR”) from a

final order of removal. , 164 F.4th 259, 275 (3d Cir.

2026) (“Section 1252(b)(9) works as a ‘zipper’ clause, channeling ‘most

claims that even relate to removal’ into PFRs. It ensures that petitioners

get only one bite at the apple.”) (citations omitted). Section 1252(b)(9)

provides that “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising

from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the

United States . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order

[of removal],” and that “no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus

under section 2241 of Title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision . . . to

review such an order or such questions of law or fact.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(9). “Because judicial review of a final order of removal is

available only in the court of appeals, district courts cannot review these

‘arising from’ claims either.”

, 950 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2020).

In , the Third Circuit

read the “arising from” phrase to require courts to “ask:

If not now, when? If the answer would otherwise be

never, then § 1252(b)(9) poses no jurisdictional bar.”

The “point” of that subsection, [the court]

explained, “is to channel claims into a single PFR, not

to bar claims that do not fit within that process.” So

when aliens can get review later—by litigating before

an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration

Appeals, and then by way of a PFR to a court of

appeals—they must do so. District courts play little if

any role in that sequence. But when aliens raise claims

that courts cannot “meaningfully” review through the

PFR process, those claims do not “arise from” the

“actions taken” or “proceedings brought” to remove

them.

, 164 F.4th at 273–74 (citations and brackets omitted). In ,

the Third Circuit further clarified that such “[a] now-or-never claim must

raise legal or factual that a court of appeals will not later be

able to review meaningfully on a PFR. It is not enough to assert an injury

that cannot be remedied later.” at 274–75; at 275 (“[T]o

avoid getting channeled to a PFR, a claim must raise now-or-never

, not just now-or-never harms.”).

Although this court may properly exercise jurisdiction over the

legal questions of whether § 1225(b) or § 1226(a) applies with respect to

Jat’s pre-removal detention, and whether Jat is entitled to a bond

hearing, the § 1252(b)(9) zipper clause precludes this court from

exercising jurisdiction over the petitioner’s request that we enjoin his

removal, an issue that can—and must—be reviewed through the

ordinary PFR process. , No. 3:26-CV-

00559, 2026 WL 788646, at *3 & n.2 (M.D. Pa. Mar 20, 2026) (“Requests

for relief related to removal generally do not involve now or never

questions of law that are reviewable with a writ of habeas corpus because

most issues with an order of removal or notice of removal can be reviewed

later on a PFR.”).

B. Merits

We turn then to the merits of the petition. The respondent purports

to have detained Jat pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides

for mandatory detention without the opportunity for release on bond. The

petitioner, however, contends that he could only be properly detained

under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and under that statute, he is entitled to an

individualized bond hearing.

“[F]or section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be

met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine

that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking

admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted.’” , 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)), , No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.

Dec. 23, 2025); , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (citing

); , No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL

3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (citing and );

, No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing ). Significantly, “Section

1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is an applicant for

admission and ‘seeking admission.’” , 2025 WL 3188399, at *6

(emphasis in original); , 2025 WL 3709045, at

*4 (citing and , 807 F. Supp. 3d 397,

406 (D.N.J. 2025)); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

).

Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives

in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase

“seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit

have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe

“active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the

United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” , 2025

WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045, at *4

(citing ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing

). “This reading preserves the distinction between

‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’

ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” ,

2025 WL 3188399, at *6; , 2025 WL 3709045,

at *4 (quoting ); , 2026 WL 296215, at *4

(quoting ). It also comports with the Supreme Court’s

finding in that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking

entry into the United States.” , 583 U.S. at 297;

, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting ); ,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting and ). “In

sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to

individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those

already within the country.” , 2026 WL 296215, at *4;

, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory

context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates

inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”).

By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized,

“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” ,

583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by

permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants

for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it

“permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” ,

583 U.S. at 303; , 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

); , 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (“Unlike

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[U]nder Section 1226(a) and its implementing

regulations, [an alien discretionarily detained pending removal

proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge

at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence

that he poses a danger to the community[] or . . . that he is a flight risk,

if it seeks to continue detaining him.” , 804 F. Supp. 3d

265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);12 , 812 F. Supp. 3d 459, 462–

63 (D.N.J. 2025) (“Noncitizens who are arrested after having lived in the

United States for a while do not generally have to be detained. They are

instead entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration court.” (citing

) (citations and footnote omitted)). ,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 (“[I]f an individual is detained attempting to enter

the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for

inspection and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant

to § 1225. If they are arrested after having already entered the country,

they are subject to detention under § 1226 and are entitled to a bond

12 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the court

stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the

community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by

the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. , 804 F.

Supp. 3d at 277 (citing , 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir.

2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must

prove either dangerousness flight risk by clear and convincing

evidence. , 965 F.3d 203, 213–14 (3d Cir.

2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from

a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher

than a preponderance of the evidence.”);

, 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[I]t is

a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even

temporarily, we hold the Government’ to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’

standard in the context of civil detention . . . .”) (quoting );

, 547 F. Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021)

(quoting ).

hearing.”).

Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to the detention of Jat.

We find that Jat is no longer seeking admission into the United States—

at the time of his arrest and detention, he was not actively attempting to

come into the United States at a border or port of entry. Rather, he is

already here, having resided within the United States for an extended

period of time. , 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (finding that

petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two years was not

“seeking admission” but “already here”); , 2025 WL

3709045, at *5 (citing ). Thus, Jat may only be properly

detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and therefore he is entitled to a bond

hearing. , 2026 WL 296215, at *5.

, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8,

2025) (“The overwhelming majority of federal district courts that have

addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find that persons

similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously entered the

United States and are currently residing in the United States—are not

subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)

but instead are subject to the discretionary detention pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.”); at

*4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court cases).13

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is

currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.

Accordingly, the petition will be granted in part and denied in part. The

13 , ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL

1146044, at *5, 6 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies

to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who are present in the United States, but

charged as inadmissible for entering the country without inspection and

admission. . . . Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to those noncitizens who

present themselves at a port of entry for admission, or who cross the

physical border into the United States but are apprehended at the

‘threshold of initial entry.’”);

, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 1223250, at *21 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026)

(“[T]he text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing

Executive practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants

for admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry

and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”);

, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 1243395, at *1

(11th Cir. May, 6, 2026) (“The text and statutory structure of the INA,

bolstered by the long history of detention across our immigration laws

and the congressional purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion

that no-bond detention generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful

entry to the country, and not to aliens who are simply present here.”);

, ___ F.4th ____, at *11, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th

Cir. May 11, 2026) (holding that noncitizens without lawful status who

had lived in the United States for years were not “seeking admission” and

thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention scheme).

petition will be granted to the extent that the government will be ordered

to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing within

twenty-one days or to release him from custody. The petition, however,

will be denied with respect the petitioner’s request for an order enjoining

his removal from the United States while removal proceedings remain

pending, as this court lacks proper jurisdiction to grant such relief.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: May 26, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge