Mott

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ERROL B. MOTT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2616-JLB-SPF

RICKY DIXON, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

The case is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc.

19). The Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”) implemented a

“grooming rule” that requires all inmates to be either clean-shaven or to grow

and maintain a half-inch beard. See Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-602.101.

Plaintiff Errol B. Mott, an FDOC inmate, filed this action to challenge the

FDOC’s refusal to allow him to grow a fist-length beard, which he alleges is

for religious reasons. (Doc. 1). Mr. Mott claims that the FDOC’s refusal

violates his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., and the First Amendment

to the United States Constitution. (Id. at 3–4). Prior to the undersigned’s

assignment to this matter, the Court granted Mr. Mott’s motion for

appointment of counsel and appointed Jeffery Bristol, Esq. (Docs. 18, 20).

Defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Mott’s complaint. (Doc. 19). Mr.

Mott responded to the motion (Doc. 24), and Defendants replied. (Doc. 32).

After careful review, the Court GRANTS, IN PART, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. (Doc. 19). Mr. Mott’s claim for compensatory and punitive damages,

and claims against Defendants Bowden, Welch, and Williams––FDOC

employees––are DISMISSED. The motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED.

This action will proceed solely on Mr. Mott’s claim for injunctive relief under

the First Amendment and the RLUIPA against Defendant Dixon in his

official capacity.

I. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must

allege sufficient facts to state a facially plausible claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must accept all factual allegations in the

complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). The Court “may

dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual

allegations will support the cause of action.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v.

Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).

II. Discussion

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants contend that this action should be dismissed because Mr.

Mott failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Doc. 19 at 4–11). The PLRA states as

follows in relevant part, “No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Therefore,

“when a state provides a grievance procedure for its prisoners, . . . an inmate

alleging harm suffered from prison conditions must file a grievance and

exhaust the remedies available under that procedure before pursuing a

section 1983 lawsuit.” Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir.

2005) (quotation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that the

question of exhaustion under the PLRA [is] a “threshold matter” that the

courts must address before considering the merits of the case. Chandler v.

Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). Put simply, because the PLRA

mandates exhaustion, the Court has no discretion to waive it. Alexander v.

Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 1998). State law “determines what

steps are required to exhaust.” Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1207

(11th Cir. 2015); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (stating that

“it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries

of proper exhaustion”).

The FDOC provides an internal grievance procedure for its inmates.

See Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.001 to 33-103.018. Defendants do not dispute

that Mr. Mott exhausted the FDOC’s grievance procedure, at least to the

extent that Mr. Mott completed the FDOC’s three-step grievance process.

(Doc. 19 at 6). Rather, they contend that “Mr. Mott’s challenge to FDC’s

grooming policy is ultimately a request that the FDC repeal or amend its

rules . . .”, and therefore, they contend, Mr. Mott was required by Fla. Admin.

Code r. 33-103.001(6) to submit a petition to initiate rulemaking to exhaust

his administrative remedies. (Id. at 7–9). The Court disagrees.

Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.001(6) states:

If an inmate is requesting that the Department adopt,

amend, or repeal a rule, the inmate must file a Petition to

Initiate Rulemaking in addition to utilizing the grievance process

in Chapter 33-103, F.A.C. The requirements for filing a Petition

to Initiate Rulemaking can be found in s. 120.54(7), F.S.

In his grievances, Mr. Mott never requested that the FDOC “adopt, amend, or

repeal” its grooming rule. (Doc. 1 at 12–17). Rather, he requested an

“exemption” from the grooming rule on religious grounds. (Id. at 13). Thus,

Mr. Mott was not required to file a petition to initiate rulemaking to exhaust

his administrative remedies.

Other courts that have considered this issue have found that an

inmate’s request for an exemption to the FDOC’s grooming rule was not a

request to amend or repeal the rule, and therefore, the inmate was not

required to file a petition to initiate rulemaking before seeking judicial

remedies. See Evans v. Dixon, 2024 WL 4504157, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 16,

2024) (“Mr. Evans does not seek to amend or repeal the FDOC’s grooming

policy. Rather, he requests ‘a religious exemption from the [ ] grooming

policy [that would] permit [him] to grow a free-flowing beard.’ . . . Because

Mr. Evans is not seeking to amend or repeal the grooming policy, he was not

required to file a petition to initiate rulemaking.”) (alterations in original);

Denson v. Dixon, 2023 WL 5200482, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2023) (“Shabazz

is not seeking to alter an FDOC rule. The [complaint] makes clear that

Shabazz seeks an exemption from—not a change of—the grooming policy.”).

It is Defendants’ burden to establish that Mr. Mott failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing his complaint in this case. See Whatley

v. Smith, 898 F.3d 1072, 1082 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The burden . . . is on the

defendant to show that the plaintiff has not exhausted properly his

administrative remedies.”). They have failed to meet this burden.

Accordingly, Defendants’ request to dismiss this action for Mr. Mott’s failure

to exhaust administrative remedies is denied.

B. First Amendment Claim

Defendants argue that Mr. Mott’s complaint fails to state a claim for a

First Amendment violation. (Doc. 19 at 11–14). When imposing a

substantial burden on a prisoner’s practice of his religion, a state actor

violates a prisoner’s First Amendment rights under the Free Exercise

Clause.1 Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater,

2 F.3d 1514, 1549 (11th Cir. 1993). “To plead a valid free exercise claim, [a

plaintiff] must allege that the government has impermissibly burdened one of

his ‘sincerely held religious beliefs.’” Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289,

1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489

U.S. 829, 834 (1989)). A prison regulation burdening free exercise rights is

valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In making that determination, the Court asks

“(1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and

a legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there

are alternative means of exercising the asserted constitutional right that

remain open to [Mr. Mott]; (3) whether and the extent to which

accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison staff,

inmates, and the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) whether the

regulation represents an exaggerated response to prison concerns.” Hakim v.

Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (11th Cir. 2000).

1 “[T]he First Amendment’s mandate that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting

an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’ has been made

wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Sch. Dist. of

Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).

Mr. Mott alleges that he “converted to Islam,” which requires him to

“grow a fist-length beard and trim his mustache.” (Doc. 1 at 4). He alleges

that failure to comply with this requirement is “a punishable sin.” (Id.).

On June 3, 2024, Officer Hicks ordered Mr. Mott to shave his beard in

accordance with the Department’s rule that allows a beard no longer than “a

half inch.” (Id. at 4, 12). Assuming these well-pleaded facts as true, which

the Court must when evaluating whether a complaint survives a motion to

dismiss, these allegations are sufficient to plead that Defendants

impermissibly burdened one of Mr. Mott’s sincerely held religious beliefs.

And at this early stage of the proceedings, the Court “cannot evaluate

whether the alleged restrictions on [Mr. Mott’s] religious practice were

reasonable in light of the four Turner factors.” Johnson v. Brown,

581 F. App’x 777, 781 (11th Cir. 2014). For example, the Court cannot

evaluate whether the policy allowing only a half-inch beard “represents an

exaggerated response to prison concerns.” See, e.g., Sims v. Inch, 400 F.

Supp. 3d 1272, 1277 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (“Contraband has sometimes been

hidden in a beard, but the [FDOC] has exaggerated the risk.”). Accordingly,

the Court declines to dismiss the First Amendment claim.

C. Request for Compensatory and Punitive Damages

Defendants assert that Mr. Mott’s request for compensatory and

punitive damages fails. (Doc. 19 at 14–16). The Court agrees.

Mr. Mott sues Defendants solely in their official capacities. (Doc. 1 at

2-3). Official-capacity claims are “only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

690 n.55 (1978)). Thus, Mr. Mott’s official-capacity claims against

Defendants—employed by the FDOC—are essentially claims against the

FDOC. That said, the Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits for damages

by an individual against a state, its agencies, and its employees, unless

Congress has abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity, or the state has

consented to suit. Schultz v. Alabama, 42 F.4th 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2022).

Florida has not consented to be sued under section 1983, and Congress has

not abrogated a state’s immunity for a section 1983 violation. Gamble v. Fla.

Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1515 (11th Cir. 1986)

(“Florida has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity [in federal civil

rights actions.]”); Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.

1990) (“Congress has not abrogated eleventh amendment immunity in section

1983 cases.”). Because the FDOC is entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity, Mr. Mott’s official-capacity claims for damages are dismissed. See

Leonard v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 232 F. App’x 892, 894 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The

Department of Corrections is not amenable to suit because it has immunity

under the Eleventh Amendment.” (citing Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 115

(11th Cir. 1989))).2

D. Claims against Defendants Bowden, Welch, and Williams in

their official capacities

Defendants argue that the claims against Defendants Bowden, Welch,

and Williams should be dismissed because the claims are duplicative of the

claims against Defendant Dixon. (Doc. 19 at 16–17). As discussed above, Mr.

Mott sues Defendants in their official capacities, and a lawsuit against state

officials in their official capacities is essentially against the entity they

represent. Thus, Mr. Mott actually seeks relief from the FDOC, which

Secretary Dixon represents. Therefore, the official-capacity claims against

Defendants Bowden, Welch, and Williams are duplicative of the official-

capacity claim against Secretary Dixon and will be dismissed. See, e.g.,

Heywood v. Dixon, 2024 WL 3676386 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2024) (dismissing

official-capacity claims against two defendants as duplicative of official-

capacity claims against another defendant when all three defendants were

agents of the Florida Department of Corrections) (citing Busby v. City of

Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991)).

Defendants Bowden, Welch, and Williams also argue that the claims

2 Moreover, assuming all facts as true and liberally construing Mr. Mott’s (then) pro

se complaint, Mr. Mott has neglected to plead a cause of action to obtain

compensatory damages. See Thompson v. Smith, 805 F. App’x 893, 900-01 (11th

Cir. 2020) (noting that under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), a prisoner must prove he

suffered a more than de minimis physical injury to recover compensatory damages)

(citation omitted).

against them should be dismissed because their sole involvement was

reviewing and denying Mr. Mott’s administrative grievances. (Id.). The

Court agrees.

To the extent Mr. Mott seeks to hold these defendants liable merely

because he or she denied his grievances, he does not state a claim for two

reasons. First, Mr. Mott has no stand-alone constitutional right to a

grievance procedure. See Thomas v. Warner, 237 F. App’x 435, 437 (11th Cir.

2007) (“We agree with other circuits that have decided that a prisoner does

not have a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in an inmate grievance

procedure.”). And second, a defendant’s denial of a grievance, standing alone,

does not establish personal participation or causation. See Gallagher v.

Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[A] denial of a grievance, by

itself without any connection to the violation of constitutional rights alleged

by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983.”) (cited

with approval in Coleman v. Bowden, 797 F. App’x 422, 427 (11th Cir. 2019));

Thomas v. Poveda, 518 F. App’x 614, 618 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming

dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims that were based solely on the defendants’

denial of his grievance appeal because the complaint did “not suggest that

[the defendants] had knowledge of a risk of serious harm or disregarded that

risk when they denied his appeal”). Thus, Mr. Mott must do more than

complain that a defendant denied his grievance before attributing liability to

that defendant.

Lastly, the Court notes that its ruling is based on the allegations in the

operative complaint viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Mott. In other

words, it is early in the proceedings. As in all cases, much could change once

the record develops.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) is GRANTED, IN PART.

Mr. Mott’s claims: a) against Defendants Bowden, Welch, and Williams; and

b) for compensatory and punitive damages are dismissed. The Motion to

Dismiss is otherwise DENIED. This action will proceed solely on Mr. Mott’s

claim for injunctive relief under the First Amendment and RLUIPA against

Secretary Dixon in his official capacity.

2. Secretary Dixon shall answer or otherwise respond to Mr. Mott’s

complaint (Doc. 1) within twenty-one (21) days.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on March 12, 2026.

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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