The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JAVIER SERRANO-LARRONDO,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 3:26-cv-261-MMH-LLL
WARDEN, BAKER COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER, and U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents.
___________________________________
ORDER
Petitioner Javier Serrano-Larrondo initiated this action by filing a pro
se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1;
Petition). Serrano-Larrondo is currently being held in the Baker County
Correctional Institute by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
According to Serrano-Larrondo, the immigration court ordered him removed
on November 22, 2025, ICE took him into custody on that same day, and he
did not file an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Id. at 3, 5. Serrano-
Larrondo contends that his continued detention is unlawful and requests the
Court order his immediate release. Id. at 6–8.
In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001), the Supreme Court held
that indefinite detention of aliens raises serious constitutional concerns. Once
an order of removal is final, ICE should make every effort to remove the alien
within a reasonable time. Id. at 701. Further, the Court concluded that six
months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien
awaiting deportation. Id. “Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court
appears to view the six-month period to include the 90-day removal period plus
90 days thereafter.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002).
After that six-month period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the Government to provide
evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
701). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien not only must
show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must
provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d
at 1052.
Serrano-Larrondo’s removal order became final, and his removal period
began to run, on November 22, 2025. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Thus, his
claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, and the Petition is premature. When
Serrano-Larrondo’s Zadvydas claim becomes ripe, he may file a new petition to
seek discharge from custody while he awaits removal. Should he wish to file a
new petition, Serrano-Larrondo must pay a filing fee of $5.00 or file a complete
2
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Additionally, Serrano-Larrondo must use
the form approved for use in the Middle District of Florida. See Local Rule
6.04(a) (“A pro se person in custody must use the standard form|[.]”).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
3. The Clerk shall send Serrano-Larrondo a habeas corpus petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and an application to proceed in forma pauperis
(prisoner filings).
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 11th day of
March, 2026.
United States District Judge
Jax-9 3/10
Javier Serrano-Larrondo, A203522953