BRUNSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KHAREE BRUNSON, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-6526

:

COMMONWEALTH OF :

PENNSYLVANIA, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

SCHMEHL, J. APRIL 2, 2026

Plaintiff Kharee Brunson, a pretrial detainee who is currently housed at Chester County

Prison, brings this pro se civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Named as

Defendants are the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Valley Township Police Department,

Warden Howard Holland, and Valley Township Police Officer Katelynn Duca. Brunson seeks to

proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Brunson in forma

pauperis status and dismiss his Complaint. He will be given leave to file an amended complaint

if he can cure the deficiencies noted by the Court.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

The allegations in Brunson’s Complaint are brief. He states that he was arrested by

Officer Duca on January 2, 2025, “pursuant to a felony arrest warrant as stated in Police criminal

complaint #5571 (Exhibit B)” and that “an arrest warrant never existed at the time of [his] arrest

and still does not exist. Magisterial Docket #MJ-15307-CR-0000001-2025 (Exhibit C).”

(Compl. at 3.) He further alleges that the state court docket does not reflect an entry indicating

1 The following allegations are taken from the Complaint. (ECF No. 2.) The Court

adopts the sequential pagination supplied to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.

an arrest warrant was issued at the time of the arrest, “only a criminal complaint.” (Id.) He

contends that he is being falsely imprisoned by Warden Holland at the Chester County Prison.

(Id.) Brunson avers that he has suffered physically and mentally due to the Defendants’ actions.

(Id.) As relief, he seeks release from custody and monetary damages.2 (Id. at 4.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Brunson leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that

he does not have the ability to pre-pay the fees to commence this case.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim.

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same

standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to

determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

2 To the extent Brunson seeks release from custody, such relief cannot be granted in a

civil action, such as this, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (when a prisoner “is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release

or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas

corpus”); see also Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 695 F. App’x 38, 41-42 (3d Cir.

2017) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent Jaffery seeks dismissal of the charges against him as a

result of constitutional violations, such relief is only available through a writ of habeas corpus.”);

Duran v. Weeks, 399 F. App’x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent that Duran

is seeking dismissal of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, he is

essentially asking for relief only available through habeas corpus.”). The Court notes that, along

with the papers for this case, Brunson also submitted to the court for filing a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241, as well as another civil rights complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Brunson v. Hillegas, et al., Civ. A. No. 25-6524 (E.D. Pa.) and Brunson

v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., Civ. A. No. 25-6525 (E.D. Pa.)

3 However, since Brunson is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in

installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

(quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At the screening

stage, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se Complaint as true, draw all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed,

contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374

(3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th

197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also

Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (“A plaintiff cannot survive

dismissal just by alleging the conclusion to an ultimate legal issue.”).

As Brunson is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v.

Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,

244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the

complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts

in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). An unrepresented

litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other

litigants.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Brunson seeks damages for alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl. at 2.) “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show

that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Brunson’s Complaint is best construed as alleging violations of

his Fourth Amendment rights.4 For the following reasons, Brunson has failed to allege any

plausible claim.

Brunson asserts that his constitutional rights were violated because he was falsely

arrested in connection with criminal charges filed against him. (Compl. at 2.) The Court

understands Bruson to allege that on January 2, 2025, a criminal complaint was filed in

Commonwealth v. Brunson, MJ-15307-CR-0000001-2025 (Chester), and that he was then

arrested by Officer Duca, but that state court docket does not reflect that an arrest warrant issued

in the case. (Compl. at 3.) A review of Pennsylvania’s publicly available docketing system

reveals that Brunson has an active criminal prosecution that appears to be the basis of his

allegations. See Commonwealth v. Brunson, MJ-15307-CR-0000001-2025 (Chester)5;

Commonwealth v. Brunson, CP-15-CR-0002860-2025 (C.P. Chester); see also Buck v. Hampton

Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (the Court may take judicial notice of facts

reflected in publicly available state court records). Additionally, Brunson attached to his

4 Although Brunson alleges that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights were

violated (see Compl. at 2), only the Fourth Amendment is relevant to his allegations. The Fourth

Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Brunson does not

allege any facts that would invoke the Fifth or Sixth Amendments and passing references to legal

provisions are insufficient to bring a plausible constitutional claim before the Court. See Higgins

v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763 (3d Cir. 2023) (“A passing reference to an

issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.” (cleaned up) (quoting Laborers’ Int’l

Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994))).

Accordingly, any claim based on a violation of the Fifth or Sixth Amendment will be dismissed.

5 As noted supra, Brunson submitted a § 2241 habeas petition simultaneously with this

Complaint in which he challenges three state court criminal prosecutions: (1) MJ-15304-CR-

0000444-2023 (Chester); (2) MJ-25307-CR-000000-1-2025 (Chester); and (3) MJ-15307-CR-

0000023-2024 (Chester). See Brunson v. Hillegas, et al., Civ. A. No. 25-6524 (E.D. Pa.), ECF 2

at 3. Indeed, Brunson attached to the § 2241 petition, inter alia, a portion of the docket in MJ-

15307-CR-0000001-2025 (Chester). See id., ECF 2-1 at 3.

Complaint an “Affidavit of Probable Cause” completed by Duca seeking an arrest warrant for

Brunson in connection with the charges. (ECF No. 2-1.)

Thus, to the extent Brunson seeks to allege a Fourth Amendment claim based on his

arrest in Commonwealth v. Brunson, MJ-15307-CR-0000001-2025 (Chester), because it appears

that Brunson was arrested pursuant to a criminal complaint in that matter, his Fourth Amendment

claim sounds in malicious prosecution. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 (2007)

(explaining that the tort of malicious prosecution “remedies detention accompanied, not by

absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process”); Noviho v. Lancaster Cty.

of Pa., 683 F. App’x 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Arrests made pursuant to a ‘validly

issued—if not validly supported—arrest warrant’ generally occur after the institution of

legal process and, thus, sound in malicious prosecution rather than false arrest or imprisonment.”

(quoting Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2013)). To state a Fourth

Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a government

official charged him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person.

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, 602 U.S. 556, 558 (2024) (citing Thompson v. Clark, 596

U. S. 36, 43, and n.2 (2022)). A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 has five elements: (1)

the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the

plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants

acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff

suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal

proceeding. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and

citation omitted). “Probable cause exists if there is a fair probability that the person committed

the crime at issue.” Id. at 199 (quotations omitted).6 A “favorable termination” occurs when a

prosecution ends “without a conviction.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 49 (“In sum, we hold that a

Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution does not require the plaintiff to

show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence. A

plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.”).

Of the five elements of a malicious prosecution claim, Brunson’s sparse Complaint

alleges only that a criminal proceeding was initiated against him and that he was detained

pursuant to these charges. He has not alleged that the criminal proceeding ended in his favor, the

proceeding was initiated without probable cause, and that the defendants acted maliciously or for

a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice. Accordingly, the malicious prosecution

claim must be dismissed because it is not plausible as pled. See, e.g., Santiago v. Humes, No.

14-7109, 2015 WL 1422627, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2015) (dismissing false arrest, false

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims when plaintiffs failed to “affirmatively assert

6 For the “lack of probable cause” element, where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant

or a previously sworn criminal complaint, a plaintiff must allege plausibly “(1) that the police

officer knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false

statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such

statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Wilson v.

Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Pinkney v.

Meadville, Pennsylvania, 95 F.4th 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2024) (same); see also Evans v. Newark

City, 152 F.4th 537, 545-47 (3d Cir. 2025) (discussing “lack of probable cause” element). An

omission is made with reckless disregard if it were something a reasonable person would realize

that the judge would want to know. Wilson, 212 F.3d. at 788. To determine whether an

omission is material, the Court must predict whether a reasonable judge would conclude that a

corrected affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d

396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997); Pinkney, 95 F.4th at 748-49. The existence of probable cause is

typically a question of fact for a jury, unless the evidence “reasonably would not support a

contrary factual finding,” in which case the court may determine the existence of probable cause

as a matter of law. Basile v. Twp. of Smith, 752 F. Supp. 2d 643, 651 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (granting

Rule 12(b)(6) motion in part and dismissing false arrest claim with leave to amend); see also

Slack v. McHugh, No. 24-2153, 2025 WL 2753671, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 29, 2025) (“[A] plaintiff

must adequately allege a lack of probable cause to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”).

facts to show that the Officer Defendants did not have probable cause” when plaintiffs simply

alleged that all allegations against them in the underlying criminal proceedings were false); see

also Slack, 2025 WL 2753671 at *1-3 (affirming dismissal of malicious prosecution claim

“because there is prima facie evidence of probable cause for [plaintiff’s] arrest and

prosecution”).

There are other problems with Brunson’s claims. Generally, a sub-division of a local

government is not separate from the municipality of which it is a part and, accordingly, is not a

proper defendant in a § 1983 action. See, e.g., Martin v. Red Lion Police Dep’t, 146 F. App’x

558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he Red Lion Police Department, as the sub-

division of defendant Red Lion Borough through which the Red Lion Borough fulfills its

policing functions, was not a proper defendant.”); Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20,

25 (3d Cir. 1997) (“As in past cases, we treat the municipality and its police department as a

single entity for purposes of section 1983 liability”) (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Township,

838 F.2d 663, 671 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988)); Bush v. City of Philadelphia Philadelphia Police Dep’t,

684 F. Supp. 2d 634, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (same). Thus, the Valley Township Police Department

is not a proper defendant in this matter.

Additionally, states are not considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See Will v.

Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989). Furthermore, the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania is immune from suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment and has

not waived that immunity for lawsuits filed in federal court. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 309-10

(3d Cir. 2020); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8521-22. Accordingly, the claims for money

damages Brunson seeks to assert against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not proceed.

With regard to Warden Holland, Brunson fails to allege factual allegations about his

involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. To the extent that the Warden is named

simply due to his high-ranking position at the Chester County County Prison, this is not

sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per

curiam). In any event, it is not clear how Warden Holland would bear any legal responsibility

for any alleged false arrest or prosecution. Accordingly, any claims against Warden Holland will

be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Brunson leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and will dismiss the claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Valley

Township Police Department with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure

to state a claim.

The balance of Brunson’s claims will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Brunson will be given an opportunity to

correct the defects in these claims by filing an amended complaint. Any amended complaint

must clearly describe the factual basis for his claims and how each defendant was personally

involved in the alleged violation of his rights.7

7 It bears noting that this Court has an obligation to abstain from considering certain types

of cases pursuant to the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “To promote

comity between the national and state governments,” the Younger abstention doctrine “requires

federal courts to abstain from deciding cases that would interfere with certain ongoing state

proceedings.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing

Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77-78 (2013)). When determining whether

Younger abstention is proper, a court first must examine the underlying state court litigation to

determine whether it falls into one of three categories of cases: (1) criminal prosecutions, (2)

civil enforcement proceedings, and (3) civil proceedings involving orders in furtherance of the

state courts’ judicial function. See PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce

Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 882 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). Because Brunson has not

An appropriate Order follows, which provides further instruction about amendment.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl

Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J.

pled any plausible claims, the Court need not address at this time whether Younger abstention

necessitates that any claims be stayed pending resolution of the state criminal proceedings.