Hoover

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JORGE LUIS PAJON RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-01207

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

ANGELA HOOVER, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner, Jorge Luis Pajon Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) brings this petition for writ of

habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). On May 5, 2026, Rodriguez filed the instant petition, requesting that

Respondents Angela Hoover, Brian McShane, Markwayne Mullin, and Todd Blanche1

release him from custody at the Clinton County Correctional Facility in McElhattan,

Pennsylvania or provide a bond hearing pursuant to German Santos v. Warden Pike County

Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020). (Doc. 1, at 4; Doc. 5, at 6). The government

1 The proper respondent in this case is Angela Hoover (“Hoover”), Warden of the Clinton

County Correctional Facility. “The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the

proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody over [the petitioner].’”

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242); 28 U.S.C. § 2243

(“[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the

person detained”); see Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2021)

(“if a § 2241 petitioner does not adhere to the immediate custodian rule, then the district court

lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition”). As Rodriguez is detained at the Clinton County

Correctional Facility, Hoover is the proper respondent. (Doc. 1, at 2); see Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.

at 434. As such, Brian McShane, Markwayne Mullin, and Todd Blanche are DISMISSED.

However, the government will be bound by the Court’s judgment because Hoover is acting

as an agent of the federal government by detaining Rodriguez on behalf of Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). See Madera v. Decker, 18 Civ. 7314, 2018 WL 10602037, at *9-

*10 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018) (finding the warden acts as an agent of the ICE regional director

when ICE makes initial custody determinations including setting of a bond and review of

conditions of release); Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, 3:25-cv-01896,

2025 WL 3522932, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025), adopted in part, rejected in part, 2025 WL

3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (finding same).

filed a timely response to Rodriguez’s petition on May 14, 2026 (Doc. 4), and on May 19,

2026, Rodriguez filed a traverse. (Doc. 5). For the following reasons, Rodriguez’s petition

(Doc. 1) is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following background is derived from Rodriguez’s petition, the government’s

response, and the exhibits thereto. (Doc. 1; Doc. 4; Doc. 5). Rodriguez is a citizen of Cuba,

who entered the United States on or about August 4, 2016. (Doc. 1, at 10; Doc. 4, at 2). On

June 25, 2018, the government adjusted Rodriguez to lawful permanent resident status under

the Cuban Adjustment Act. (Doc. 4, at 2). On December 12, 2024, Rodriguez was convicted

of conspiracy to offer and pay healthcare kickbacks, and the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Florida sentenced Rodriguez to fifteen months of incarceration. (Doc.

4, at 2). On February 3, 2025, ICE encountered Rodriguez at the Federal Correctional

Institution, Allenwood Low (“FCI Allenwood”), where he was incarcerated. (Doc. 4, at 2).

ICE issued Rodriguez an immigration detainer and warrant for arrest. (Doc. 4, at 2). On

October 31, 2025, when Rodriguez was released from FCI Allenwood, ICE immediately took

Rodriguez into custody and transferred him to the Clinton County Correctional Facility.

(Doc. 1, at 10; Doc. 4, at 2).

On March 2, 2026, an immigration judge ordered Rodriguez to be removed from the

United States. (Doc. 1, at 10). Rodriguez timely appealed his order of removal to the Board

of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on March 26, 2026. (Doc. 1, at 10; Doc. 4, at 3). On March

10, 2026, an immigration judge denied Rodriguez’s request for a custody redetermination due

to lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 4, at 3; Doc. 4-9). Prior to his incarceration, Rodriguez lived in

Florida with his United States citizen wife and children. (Doc. 1, at 10). Rodriguez has been

in ICE detention at the Clinton County Correctional Facility for approximately seven

months. (Doc. 1, at 10).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 2241 governs district courts’ power to grant the writ of habeas corpus.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b), the writ of habeas corpus extends to petitioners “in custody for

an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or

decree of a court or judge of the United States.” Claims where non-citizens challenge

immigration enforcement-related detention “fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus

and thus must be brought in habeas.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting

Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 167 (2022)). “For ‘core habeas petitions,’ ‘jurisdiction lies in

only one district: the district of confinement.’” J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 672. While reviewing a

noncitizen’s habeas petition, courts evaluate whether the government complied with

regulatory, statutory, and constitutional protections for noncitizens. See Martinez v. McAleenan,

385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding ICE failed to comply with regulatory and

constitutional notice requirements prior to detaining a non-citizen petitioner and granting the

petitioner’s habeas petition). A court may order a bond hearing if it determines that a

noncitizen habeas petitioner is entitled to one under relevant constitutional or statutory

protections. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 827 (W.D. Pa. 2025) (finding that a

noncitizen habeas petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing under the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment); see also Cantu-Cortes v. O’Neill, No. 25-cv-6338, 2025 WL 3171639, at

*2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (finding a habeas petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing under

relevant statutory protections).

III. JURISDICTION

“[F]ederal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter

jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v.

Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 514 (2006)). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 empowers federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus

where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States. . . in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1),

(3). Recently, in Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2026), the Third

Circuit determined that the Immigration and Nationality Act strips district courts of subject

matter jurisdiction to hear claims arising from removal actions or proceedings, when the

claims could be addressed on a petition for review of a final order of removal (“PFR”). Habeas

actions based on whether a petitioner is subject to unconstitutionally lengthy detention remain

in the jurisdiction of district courts. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 277-79 (holding detention-specific

claims, like length and conditions-of-confinement claims, do not arise from removal

proceedings and can be addressed by district courts); see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,

294 (2018) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar to challenges

unrelated to review of an order of removal, the government’s decision to detain in the first

place, and the process by which removability will be determined). The question of whether a

petitioner’s detention has been unconstitutionally long is wholly collateral to removal

proceedings and cannot be meaningfully reviewed on a PFR. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 278-79

(finding that length of confinement without a bond hearing claim “does not get channeled

into the PFR review process”). Rodriguez’s petition is soundly before the Court as Rodriguez

filed the instant petition while detained within the jurisdiction of this Court, is still currently

detained by ICE, and asserts that his continued detention violates due process. See J. G. G.,

604 U.S. at 672 (acknowledging that immigration-related detainees’ claims “fall within the

‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus”) (quoting Nance, 597 U.S. at 167); see also Kahlil, 164 F.4th

at 274-79.

IV. DISCUSSION

Rodriguez requests that Hoover release him from custody at the Clinton County

Correctional Facility or provide him with a bond hearing. (Doc. 1, at 14; Doc. 5, at 6).

Rodriguez contends that because ICE has detained him under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for about

seven months, he is entitled to a bond hearing, at which the government bears the burden of

demonstrating that continued detention is warranted. (Doc. 1, at 13). The government

counters that Rodriguez’s detention does not violate due process because the detention is

pursuant to the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c) and has not been prolonged. (Doc.

4, at 4-7). The government reasons that Rodriguez’s seven-month detention is constitutional

because it is directly tied to the adjudication of his removal proceedings. (Doc. 4, at 6).

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the

Fifth Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens],

whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). While it is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens

to due process of law in deportation proceedings, the Supreme Court has recognized that

detention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation

process. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Detention of noncitizens pending their

removal proceedings serves the purpose of preventing noncitizens from fleeing before or

during the removal proceedings. Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. However, the Due Process Clause

limits detention without a bond hearing to a “reasonable period.” German Santos v. Warden

Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). Therefore, due process affords

detained noncitizens a bond hearing once their detention becomes unreasonable. Santos, 965

F.3d at 211.

The parties do not dispute that Rodriguez is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(c),

which provides for the mandatory detention of, among others, noncitizens convicted of

certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Section 1226(c) “mandates detention of any alien falling

within its scope and that detention may end prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings

‘only if’ the alien is released for witness-protection purposes.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 305.

Although 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) provides for mandatory detention and the Supreme Court has

determined that “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part

of” the removal process, prolonged detention raises due process concerns. Demore, 538 U.S.

at 531; Santos, 965 F.3d at 210.

Section 1226(c) immigration detainees enjoy the basic due process right to an

individualized bond determination once the length of their detention before removal has

become unreasonable. Santos, 965 F.3d at 210-11. To determine whether a noncitizen’s

detention has become unreasonable, courts evaluate four factors established by the Third

Circuit in Santos: (1) the length of the detention; (2) whether the detention is likely to continue;

(3) the reasons for any delay that prolongs detention; and (4) whether the noncitizen’s

conditions of confinement are meaningfully different from criminal punishment. 965 F.3d at

211. The Court will evaluate each Santos factor to determine whether Rodriguez’s detention

has become unreasonable.

A. LENGTH OF DETENTION

Rodriguez contends that his seven-month detention is unreasonable because it has

entered the period where Third Circuit courts begin applying heightened constitutional

scrutiny. (Doc. 5, at 4). Rodriguez avers that his detention is longer than the “roughly one-

and-a-half to five months” of reasonably mandatory detention contemplated in Demore v. Kim,

538 U.S. 510, 529-30 (2003). The government counters that courts in the Third Circuit have

found periods of mandatory detention longer than seven months to be constitutional. (Doc.

4, at 5).

The Third Circuit has identified the first Santos factor, duration of detention, as the

“most important factor” in evaluating the reasonableness of a noncitizen’s detention during

removal proceedings. Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. While the Third Circuit has not adopted a

presumption of reasonableness or unreasonableness for any duration of detention, the Third

Circuit has found that detention becomes increasingly suspect after five months. Santos, 965

F.3d at 211 (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 515; Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d

Cir. 2011)); Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr., 169 F.4th 418, 433-34 (3d Cir.

2026) (citing Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2015)) (re-

affirming that detention without opportunity for bond becomes unreasonable between six

months and one year after it began).

Rodriguez has been continuously detained for about seven months. (Doc. 5, at 4).

Because Rodriguez’s detention is two months longer than Third Circuit’s five-month tipping

point, Rodriguez’s length of detention slightly favors a finding of unreasonableness. See

Santos, 965 F.3d at 211; see Michelin, 169 F.4th at 433-34. Accordingly, the first Santos factor,

duration of detention, weighs slightly in favor of unreasonable detention.

B. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUED DETENTION

Rodriguez contends that without relief from the Court, his detention is likely to extend

for several months. (Doc. 5, at 4-5). Rodriguez avers that the government has not provided

any information on an anticipated completion date for the BIA appeal, nor has the

government disputed Rodriguez’s evidence demonstrating severe BIA backlogs. (Doc. 5, at

5). The government avers that the second Santos factor, likelihood of continued detention,

weighs in the government’s favor because Rodriguez’s appeal is currently pending before the

BIA. (Doc. 4, at 7).

When a noncitizen’s removal proceedings are unlikely to end soon, continued

detention without a bond hearing weighs towards a finding of unreasonable detention. Santos,

965 F.3d at 211. Courts in the Third Circuit have found that an immigration detainee

appealing his or her order of removal creates a likelihood of continued detention that favors

granting habeas relief. J.G.J. v. Sage, No. 3:26-cv-706, 2026 WL 915576, at *10 (M.D. Pa.

April 3, 2026) (citing Joseph v. Warden, No. 3:25-cv-02428, 2026 WL 497532, at *2 (M.D. Pa.

Feb. 23, 2026)). Further, delays of an undefined duration continue to accrue during

administrative proceedings that may be necessary following an appellate court decision. Bah

v. Doll, No. 3:18-CV-1409, 2018 WL 6733959, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2018).

As a result of his appeal to the BIA, Rodriguez’s order of removal is not yet final, and

he remains in pre-order of removal detention. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(c); see J.G.J. v. Sage, 2026 WL

915576, at *10. At this time, the undersigned cannot determine precisely how long

Rodriguez’s removal proceedings will remain pending. However, as Rodriguez appealed his

order of removal on March 26, 2026, and the BIA has yet to set a briefing schedule for the

appeal, it is unlikely that Rodriguez’s removal proceedings will be resolved in the near future.

Automated Case Information, Executive Office of Immigration Review,

https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited May 22, 2026); see Santos, 965

F.3d at 212; see also J.G.J. v. Sage, 2026 WL 915576, at *10. Rodriguez has also indicated that

depending on the outcome of the BIA appeal, further petition for review to the Third Circuit

could follow, which would further prolong the duration of Rodriguez’s removal proceedings.

(Doc. 1, at 10). As such, the second Santos factor weighs in favor of a finding of

unreasonableness. See Santos, 965 F.3d at 212; see Bah, 2018 WL 6733959, at *8; see also J.G.J.

v. Sage, 2026 WL 915576, at *10.

C. REASONS FOR DELAYS

Rodriguez contends that any delays in his removal proceedings are a result of the

legitimate legal challenge to his order of removal. (Doc. 5, at 5). Rodriguez submits that he

should not be punished for seeking legal relief by appealing his order of removal. (Doc. 5, at

5). The government also submits that it has not intentionally delayed or unreasonably

prolonged Rodriguez’s proceedings. (Doc. 4, at 7).

In evaluating the third Santos factor, courts look at the reasons for the delay, such as a

detainee’s request for continuances or bad-faith errors in the removal proceedings that caused

unnecessary delay. Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. Courts should not hold a noncitizen’s good-faith

challenge to removal against him, even when his appeals or petitions for review have drawn

out the proceedings. Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. Courts should also decline to hold legal errors

against the government unless there is evidence of carelessness or bad faith. Santos, 965 F.3d

at 211. Nevertheless, detention can still grow unreasonable in the absence of governmental

bad faith. Santos, 965 F.3d at 211.

While Rodriguez’s removal proceedings have been ongoing for about seven months,

the government has not demonstrated carelessness or bad faith that would cause unnecessary

delay. See Santos, 965 F.3d at 212 (citing Diop, 656 F.3d at 224-25) (finding unnecessary delay

where an immigration judge repeatedly issued decisions that were so unclear that they

required remands for clarification and the government was slow to produce evidence relevant

to whether petitioner was properly detained). Likewise, Rodriguez’s appeal to the BIA should

not be held against him in evaluating the reasons for delay. See Santos, 965 F.3d at 211.

Accordingly, the reasons for the delay of Rodriguez’s removal proceedings are a neutral factor

in weighing whether Rodriguez’s detention is unreasonable.

D. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Rodriguez contends that his confinement at the Clinton County Correctional Facility

is not meaningfully different from criminal punishment. (Doc. 5, at 5). The government

counters that Rodriguez’s detention is not punitive because Rodriguez is not confined to his

cell for twenty-three hours a day. (Doc. 4, at 7).

To evaluate the conditions of confinement, courts examine whether the noncitizen’s

conditions of confinement are “meaningfully different” from criminal punishment. Santos,

965 F.3d at 211. If a noncitizen’s civil detention under § 1226(c) looks penal, that shifts the

scale towards finding the detention unreasonable. Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. The Clinton

County Correctional Facility is a county jail that houses criminal detainees alongside

immigration detainees. Yirenkyi v. Hoover, No. 3:25-cv-2414, 2026 WL 268230, at *4-*5 (M.D.

Pa. Feb. 2, 2026); Dong v. Hoover, No. 1:25-cv-8s, 2026 WL 711692, at *4 (M.D. Pa. March

13, 2026). The government contends that Rodriguez’s detention is meaningfully different

from criminal punishment because Rodriguez is not confined to his cell for twenty-three hours

a day, like Santos was while detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility. (Doc. 4, at 7);

Santos, 965 F.3d at 212-13. However, the government fails to provide evidence that

Rodriguez’s detention is meaningfully different from the detention of criminal detainees at

the Clinton County Correctional Facility. See Yirenkyi, 2026 WL 268230, at *4-*5 (finding

conditions of confinement weigh in favor of petitioner where the government provided no

evidence that petitioner was treated any differently from the criminal detainees at the Clinton

County Correctional Facility); see also Dong, 2026 WL 711692, at *4 (finding that the

conditions of immigration detention and criminal detention do not meaningfully differ at the

Clinton County Correctional Facility). Accordingly, the Court finds Rodriguez’s conditions

of confinement to be indistinguishable from criminal punishment, weighing in favor of

unreasonable detention.

V. CONCLUSION

Taking the four Santos factors together, Rodriguez’s detention has become

unreasonable and violates due process. Rodriguez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc.

1) is GRANTED. The appropriate remedy is for Rodriguez to be afforded a bond hearing, in

which the government bears the burden of proof to justify Rodriguez’s detention with clear

and convincing evidence. Santos, 965 F.3d at 213. The Court will conduct the individualized

bond hearing as a habeas remedy, considering the risks of perpetuating constitutional injury

with continued delays. See Centeno-Martinez v. Jamison, No. 25-3593, 2025 WL 3157711, at *3

(M.D. Pa. 2025) (citing Leslie v. Holder, 865 F. Supp. 2d 627, 634-35 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Thaxter

v. Sabol, No. 14-02413, 2016 WL 3077351, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 1, 2016)) (finding district

courts in the Third Circuit have exercised the authority to conduct bond hearings under

habeas jurisdiction, particularly where there is a risk of further injury due to delay); see also

J.G.J. v. Sage, 2026 WL 915576, at *11 n.19 (collecting cases) (noting the government

acknowledged that district courts may conduct bond hearings in habeas corpus cases brought

by immigration detainees). The Court ORDERS a bond hearing to be held before the

undersigned on FRDIAY MAY 29, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom #1 of the William J.

Nealon Federal Building and United States Courthouse.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: May 22, 2026 /s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge