The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
STEPHEN WEBSTER BENTLEY,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 3:22-cv-1431-JEP-LLL
SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
____________________________________/
ORDER
I. Status
Petitioner, Stephen Webster Bentley, is proceeding on a petition for writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). He challenges a 2019 state
court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for which he is serving a
life sentence. See Doc. 1 at 1. Respondents filed a response (Doc. 9) with
exhibits (Docs. 9-1 to 9-12).1 Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 10) with exhibits
(Docs. 10-2 to 10-5). This action is ripe for review.2
1 When citing pleadings and exhibits, the Court will use the page numbers
assigned by this Court’s electronic docketing system.
2 In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish
the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647
F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary
hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an
applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the
applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007);
II. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. Ledford v. Warden,
Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016)
(explaining AEDPA deference), abrogation in part on other grounds recognized
by Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023).
“The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a
guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and
not as a means of error correction.” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34,
38 (2011)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits.
Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The
state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state
court’s decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. Harrington v.
Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows
that if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes
habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro,
550 U.S. at 474. The Court finds that “further factual development” is unnecessary.
Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing
will not be conducted.
2
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the
merits is unaccompanied by an explanation,
the federal court should “look through” the unexplained decision
to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant
rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning. But the State may rebut the
presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or
most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state
court’s decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that
were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the
record it reviewed.
Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125–26 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a
federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of
the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted
“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).
AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating
state court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be
given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773
(2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas
relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the
correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter,
3
562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It
bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean
the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court
has repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an
unreasonable application of law requires more than mere error or
even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18
(2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to
give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear
error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect application of federal law.”).
Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2013) (parallel
citations omitted).
“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners
whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S.
12, 19 (2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court
blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in existing law’
and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility fairminded
jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337–38 (11th Cir.
2016) (explaining in detail the parameters “for limited federal review” of state
court decisions under § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)). This standard is “meant to be” a
“difficult” one to meet. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the
petitioner’s claims were adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they
must be evaluated under § 2254(d). Also, deferential review under § 2254(d)
4
generally is limited to the record that was before the state court that
adjudicated the claim on the merits. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182
(2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an examination of the
state-court decision at the time it was made”).
B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a
federal habeas action under § 2254, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly
present[]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court,
either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,
351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state
prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established
appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see
also Pope v. Rich, 358 F.3d 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting “that Boerckel
applies to the state collateral review process as well as the direct appeal
process”).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner
must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1),
5
thereby giving the State the “‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’
alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry,
513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor,
404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). To provide the State with the necessary
“opportunity,” the prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with
powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the
federal nature of the claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365–66;
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (parallel citations omitted).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default, which raises a potential bar to federal habeas
review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state
prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to
ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and
respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings
within our system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine
of procedural default, under which a federal court will not review
the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state
court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a
state procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman, 501 U.S. at 747–48;
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84–85 (1977). A state court’s
invocation of a procedural rule to deny a prisoner’s claims
precludes federal review of the claims if, among other requisites,
the state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to
support the judgment and the rule is firmly established and
consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120,
1127–28 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612, 617–18 (2009).
The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being
heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal
review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and
6
prejudice from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at
750.
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2012) (parallel citations omitted). Thus,
procedural defaults may be excused under certain circumstances.
Notwithstanding that a claim has been procedurally defaulted, a federal court
may still consider the claim if a state habeas petitioner can show either (1)
cause for and actual prejudice from the default or (2) a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). For
a petitioner to establish cause and prejudice,
the procedural default “must result from some objective factor
external to the defense that prevented [him] from raising the claim
and which cannot be fairly attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy
v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting [Murray
v.] Carrier, 477 U.S. [478,] 488 [(1986)]). Under the prejudice
prong, [a petitioner] must show that “the errors at trial actually
and substantially disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied
fundamental fairness.” Id. at 1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at
494).
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999) (parallel citation omitted).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would
result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
7
[I]f a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice, there remains
yet another avenue for him to receive consideration on the merits
of his procedurally defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case,
where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for
the procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496. “This exception
is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however, and requires proof of
actual innocence, not just legal innocence. Johnson v. Alabama,
256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001).
Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157 (parallel citation omitted). “To meet this standard, a
petitioner must ‘show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted him’ of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256
F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327
(1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be
based on reliable evidence not presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523
U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such
evidence, in most cases, allegations of actual innocence are ultimately
summarily rejected. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)
(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Strickland v. Washington,
8
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a person must
show that (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of reasonable,
professional assistance, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the
challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s deficient performance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the
Strickland test before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs
of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment
violation, “a court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner
cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley,
209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland, “[i]f it is easier
to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which . . . will often be so, that course should be followed.” 466 U.S.
at 697.
Further, “[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state
court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but
whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher
threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[i]n addition to the deference to
9
counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds another layer
of deference—this one to a state court’s decision—when [federal courts] are
considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s
decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004).
If there is “any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s
deferential standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court
decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. As such, “[s]urmounting
Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
371 (2010). “Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s
representation was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.’” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
III. Facts & Procedural History
On April 15, 2019, a jury found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder
as charged in the Information for the 2014 death of his (short-term) roommate.
See Doc. 9-2 at 38–39, 975; see also Doc. 9-1 at 296. The victim died from
multiple stab wounds caused by a sharp weapon prosecutors suspected was a
machete given the extent of the victim’s wounds, including a “traumatic
amputation” of one extremity. See Doc. 9-2 at 37, 757, 763–64, 773, 779–80,
784. At trial, the state presented mostly circumstantial evidence to support its
10
case against Petitioner, in the form of the following: witness testimony by other
residents or visitors of the apartment complex (McClain, Oneal, and Bethea),
who said they stopped by the victim’s apartment to purchase cigarettes from
him, but Petitioner answered the door acting and looking suspicious;3
testimony of a crime scene detective, who reported that a machete sleeve was
found under the couch in the victim’s apartment; testimony of witness Oneal,
who said she saw a machete in Petitioner’s vehicle a couple of months before
the murder and saw Petitioner leave the parking lot quickly—with a duffel
bag—sometime after he answered the victim’s apartment door; testimony of
witness McNeil, who said that Petitioner borrowed a key to the victim’s
apartment from him on the day of the murder, and when Petitioner returned
the key, he had a cloth wrapped around his right hand with blood on it;
testimony of Petitioner’s former boss, who said Petitioner quit his job the
morning of the murder abruptly and without notice; surveillance footage
showing Petitioner left his job a few minutes before 10:00 a.m.; testimony of
Petitioner’s ex-girlfriend and her mother, who both said Petitioner arrived at
their house near Tampa around dinner time on the day of the murder and slept
in his car for the first couple of nights; testimony of the clubhouse manager of
3 The victim would have visitors throughout the day because he operated a
“bootleg” convenience store out of his apartment, selling mostly cigarettes and beer.
See, e.g., Doc. 9-2 at 116–18.
11
Petitioner’s ex-girlfriend’s subdivision, who noticed Petitioner was wearing
what “looked like a food service glove” on his right hand; surveillance footage
from Petitioner’s ex-girlfriend’s subdivision that showed Petitioner wearing a
plastic glove on his right hand with what appeared to be bandaging
underneath; testimony of a homicide detective, who said Petitioner had “fresh
skin growth” on his knuckles when he was arrested; and testimony of a crime
scene detective who processed a first-aid kit found in Petitioner’s vehicle when
he was arrested, which was missing one clear glove similar to the one
Petitioner was seen wearing at his ex-girlfriend’s subdivision. See generally id.
Witnesses who testified to seeing Petitioner at the victim’s apartment
complex gave somewhat contradictory testimony (when compared to each other
and surveillance evidence) about the time of day they saw or interacted with
Petitioner on the day of the murder, and the state could not pinpoint with any
precision the time of the victim’s death. Although circumstantial evidence of
the timeline was vague, the state also presented direct physical evidence
connecting Petitioner to the murder: the victim’s blood was on a pair of
sunglasses recovered from a trashcan in the victim’s apartment, and those
sunglasses matched a pair Petitioner was wearing earlier that day, as captured
by surveillance cameras; the victim’s blood also was found in Petitioner’s car,
on toiletry bags inside Petitioner’s duffel bag, and on a piece of paper that also
12
had Petitioner’s fingerprint on it; Petitioner’s blood was found inside the
victim’s apartment and on the duffel bag he left town with; and an inmate who
was in a holding cell with Petitioner after Petitioner’s arrest testified that
Petitioner told him he (Petitioner) “hacked [a] faggot up”4 with a tool he used
to cut tile, constructed an alibi by swiping his ID card at his gym around the
time of the murder, and threw the murder weapon into the St. Johns River on
his way out of town. See generally id.; see also Doc. 9-1 at 298 (exhibit list).
At Petitioner’s sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Petitioner’s
motion for a new trial and sentenced him to life. See Doc. 9-1 at 402, 413–16.
Judgment was entered on May 15, 2019. Id. at 366.
On direct appeal, Petitioner’s appointed appellate counsel filed an
Anders5 brief identifying three judicial acts to be reviewed and requesting that
Petitioner be permitted an opportunity to file a pro se brief. See Doc. 9-3 at 34,
38. In his pro se brief, Petitioner sought review of five issues. See Doc. 9-4 at
34. The First District Court of Appeal (“First DCA”) per curiam affirmed
Petitioner’s judgment and sentence without a written opinion. See Doc. 9-6 at
3. The mandate issued on April 19, 2021. Id. at 2. Petitioner filed a pro se
4 There was testimony that the victim was homosexual or bisexual and had
HIV, and other apartment residents presumed the victim and Petitioner were in a
sexual relationship. See Doc. 9-2 at 119, 129, 131.
5 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
13
motion for rehearing and request for a written opinion, which the First DCA
denied. See Docs. 9-7, 9-8.
Proceeding pro se in the trial court, Petitioner sought postconviction
relief by filing a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (“Rule
3.850 Motion”). See Doc. 9-9 at 6–13, 50–68. The trial court summarily denied
Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 Motion without an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 69–76.
Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing, id. at 227, which the trial court denied,
id. at 315. Petitioner appealed. See Doc. 9-10 at 3. The First DCA per curiam
affirmed the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 Motion without a
written opinion and issued its mandate. See Doc. 9-12 at 2–3.
IV. Claims & Conclusions
In his petition before this Court, Petitioner raises three grounds for
relief: (1) the state’s “circumstantial evidence was insufficient to sustain the
conviction by failing to prove the identity element,” violating the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) Petitioner was denied
effective assistance of trial counsel because his lawyer failed to impeach two
state witnesses, violating the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution; and (3) the state knowingly offered false testimony, violating
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). See Doc. 1 at 5–8.
14
Overall, Petitioner complains that several state witnesses were not
consistent in their separate recollections of when they saw or spoke to
Petitioner at the victim’s apartment, and his lawyer should have more
effectively highlighted the contradictory and unclear timeline. See id. at 16–
27. According to Petitioner, undisputed evidence of Petitioner’s whereabouts
at verified times (surveillance footage and an electronic log from Petitioner’s
gym) demonstrated he could not have been inside the victim’s apartment with
enough time to have committed the murder. See id. at 18–19, 21, 27. For
instance, Petitioner alleges that “[v]ideo surveillance photo’s [sic] verified
[Petitioner was] with Neal at two pawn shops and the gas station during the
same time Regina McClain, Tasha Oneal, and Carlos Bethea testified to seeing
[Petitioner] inside [the victim’s] apartment ….” Id. at 18.
A. Ground One
Petitioner argues the state’s circumstantial evidence was insufficient to
sustain a conviction for second degree murder, specifically with respect to the
“identity” element. Id. at 5. Petitioner raised a similar claim on direct appeal,
and the First DCA denied the claim, affirming Petitioner’s judgment and
conviction without a written opinion. See Doc. 9-4 at 3. To the extent Petitioner
raises a federal constitutional challenge in his petition, the claim is
unexhausted because Petitioner did not present the federal nature of the claim
15
to the state appellate court. When briefing the issue on direct appeal,
Petitioner did not state or even suggest that it was a federal claim about due
process or any other federal constitutional guarantee. Id. at 35, 39, 41. Instead,
Petitioner argued violations of state law, primarily relying on the Florida
Supreme Court’s ruling that “where a conviction is based wholly upon
circumstantial evidence, a special standard of review applies.” Id. at 35
(quoting Lindsey v. State, 14 So. 3d 211, 214 (Fla. 2009)).
Because Petitioner relied solely on state law, he did not present the
federal nature of this claim to the state court. See Preston v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 785 F.3d 449, 451 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding the petitioner did not fairly
present the federal nature of his claim in the state court where he argued only
a state sufficiency of the evidence claim without citing any federal
constitutional provisions or case law). As such, his claim is unexhausted and
procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner has failed to show cause for or prejudice
from this procedural default.
However, in an attempt to overcome the procedural bar, Petitioner
argues a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if his claim were not
addressed on the merits because he is actually innocent of the murder. See Doc.
10 at 3. In support of that argument, he contends that blood test results show
he had not been exposed to HIV, which proves he was not the assailant because
16
if he in fact had cut himself while murdering a victim with HIV, he “would
have been exposed to [the virus].” See id. But “[t]o meet this [actual innocence]
standard, a petitioner must ‘show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him’ of the underlying offense.”
Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1171 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). In addition, “‘[t]o
be credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not
presented at trial.” Calderon, 523 U.S. at 559 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).
The record here shows that at trial but outside the presence of the jury,
Petitioner requested permission to introduce his HIV test results, which
showed he was “negative or nonreactive.” Doc. 9-2 at 563–65. Petitioner also
asked to cross-examine the medical examiner on whether HIV can be
transmitted wound to wound. Id. at 682. After the medical examiner informally
told the attorneys (for the state and defense) that he could not opine with any
certainty about the likelihood of wound-to-wound transmission between the
victim and Petitioner, the trial court denied the request to cross-examine the
medical examiner on that topic. Id. at 565, 681–82, 695. The court also denied
the request to admit medical records with no “sponsoring witness” to explain
their relevance. Id. at 697. However, the court continued the trial to give the
parties time to investigate the issue and obtain expert witnesses, if necessary.
Id. at 697–99.
17
Ultimately, based on “new information” discovered during the recess,
Petitioner “chose not to continue to pursue that potential part of his defense.”
Doc. 9-1 at 411. As the trial court summarized at Petitioner’s sentencing
hearing, the parties learned that “the infection rate of the victim . . . was so
miniscule and low, that . . . . [there would have been] [n]o infection risk even if
there had been wound to wound contact between the victim and [Petitioner].”
Id. at 419.
Upon review of the record, the Court concludes Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if ground one
were not addressed on the merits. The position Petitioner takes now—that his
HIV test results prove he could not have committed the murder—is not new
reliable evidence not known at the time of trial. Thus, ground one is denied.
B. Ground Two
Petitioner argues he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel
because his lawyer did not impeach two state witnesses. See Doc. 1 at 7, 20–
23. Petitioner explains as follows: (1) witness McNeil testified Petitioner
borrowed McNeil’s key to the victim’s apartment at about 12:45 p.m. and
returned the key about fifty-five to seventy minutes later, but undisputed
evidence showed Petitioner clocked in to his gym at 1:12 p.m. and detectives
were dispatched to the apartment complex as early as 1:29 p.m.; and (2)
18
witness Mazzaferro testified that Petitioner told Mazzaferro when they were
in jail together that he (Petitioner) threw the “tool” he used to commit the
murder in the river and clocked in at the gym before he committed the murder
to “have an alibi,” but no tool was recovered from the river, Petitioner clocked
in at the gym at 1:12 p.m., and the first detective was dispatched to the scene
at 1:29 p.m. Id. at 21–22.
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 Motion, alleging his lawyer
was ineffective with respect to six “key points.”6 See Doc. 9-9 at 8–12, 54–59.
In its order denying Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 Motion, the trial court set forth the
Strickland standard and concluded Petitioner did not demonstrate that his
lawyer’s failure to impeach the witnesses “would have changed the outcome of
the trial.” Id. at 69–70. The trial court addressed each point individually and
found all of them meritless. Id. at 71–74. In addressing all points in their
totality, the trial court concluded as follows:
With respect to all of the “key points” set forth in
[Petitioner’s] Motion, this Court finds that they do nothing more
than contradict Mr. McNeil and Mr. Mazzaferro, and at least two
of the “key points” do not even rise to the level of contradiction.
[Petitioner] has not stated any points of contradiction that would
be relevant to proving or disproving a material fact in issue, and
none that point out the witnesses’ bias, corruption, or lack of
competency.
6 Petitioner does not raise all six “key points” in his § 2254 petition.
19
While it is possible that Mr. Mazzaferro, like Mr. McNeil,
could have been contradicted on certain collateral matters,
[Petitioner] has not identified any evidence to contradict the most
incriminating portions of his testimony or shown that he was
biased, corrupt, or otherwise incompetent. Jonathan Mazzaferro
was an inmate in the Pretrial Detention Facility in Jacksonville
when [Petitioner] was brought in [days after the murder]. Upon
learning [Petitioner] was charged with murder, Mr. Mazzaferro
suggested “maybe they won’t find the gun” and “maybe you can
claim self-defense,” but [Petitioner] smirked; replied “no, it wasn’t
a gun, it was a knife;” and admitted “I hacked that faggot up.”
[Petitioner] said he clocked into the gym in order to have an alibi,
pawned a laptop to get money for gas, and expressed concern that
two women saw him leaving the victim’s apartment complex,
because he had blood on him. [Petitioner] also said the victim owed
him money in connection with an “underground business” deal.
Mr. Mazzaferro, who was serving a 10-year sentence, denied
receiving any benefit in return for his testimony.
The State also presented a substantial amount of
circumstantial evidence. In addition to Mr. McNeil’s testimony
that [Petitioner] obtained a key to the victim’s apartment,
witnesses including Regina McClean [sic], Tasha Neal [sic], and
Carlos Bethea placed [Petitioner] in the apartment on the day of
the murder and described his suspicious behavior. They indicated
he was the one who answered the door, he was sweating, he
cracked the door only a little so that they could not see into the
apartment, and he gave vague explanations about the victim being
out. These witnesses returned to the apartment soon afterward
and found the victim dead. Carlos Bethea [sic7] also testified about
seeing a machete in the back of [Petitioner’s] truck about two
months earlier.
Physical evidence included the presence of the victim’s blood
in and on [Petitioner’s] duffel bag, toiletry bags, and wallet as well
as [Petitioner’s] fingerprint on a piece of paper with the victim’s
blood on it. In addition, bloodstains on the bathroom sink in the
victim’s apartment and on [Petitioner’s] duffel bag matched
7 Tasha Oneal was the witness who testified to seeing Petitioner with a
machete. See Doc. 9-2 at 207.
20
[Petitioner’s] DNA profile. There were healing injuries to
[Petitioner’s] hands when he was apprehended in Tampa.
This Court concludes there was sufficient evidence of
[Petitioner’s] guilt, and again, there is no reasonable probability
that impeaching Jmarr McNeil and Jonathan Mazzaferro on the
points raised in [Petitioner’s] Motion would have changed the
outcome of the trial.
Id. at 74–79 (record citations omitted).
The First DCA per curiam affirmed the trial court’s denial without a
written opinion. See Doc. 9-12 at 3. The Court addresses this claim in
accordance with the deferential standard for federal court review of state court
adjudications. Upon thorough review of the record and the applicable law, the
Court finds that the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was neither
contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, and it was not based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the evidence presented to
the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ground two is denied.
C. Ground Three
Petitioner argues the state committed a Giglio violation by “making use
of false testimony.” See Doc. 1 at 8, 24. He says the state knew witnesses
McClain, Oneal, and Bethea provided false testimony about the times they
claimed to have seen or interacted with Petitioner at the victim’s apartment
complex because surveillance footage verified Petitioner was in other locations
at those times. Id. at 26. In addition, he contends the state knew McNeil’s and
21
Mazzaferro’s testimonies regarding the timeline were false, because
undisputed evidence showed when detectives were dispatched to the
apartment complex and when Petitioner clocked in at the gym. Id.
Petitioner raised this claim in his pro se brief on direct appeal. See Doc.
9-4 at 3, 42–43. The First DCA per curiam affirmed Petitioner’s judgment and
sentence without a written opinion. See Doc. 9-6 at 3. As such, the Court
addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential standard for federal
court review of state court adjudications. In doing so, the Court notes that a
Giglio claim requires a petitioner to show the state obtained “a conviction … by
the knowing use of perjured testimony . . . [and] there is a[] reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment.” Ventura
v. Att’y Gen., Fla., 419 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted); see
also Rodriguez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 756 F.3d 1277, 1302 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“[T]o succeed on a Giglio claim, a petitioner must prove (1) that the
prosecution used or failed to correct testimony that he knew or should have
known was false and (2) materiality—that there is any reasonable likelihood
the false testimony could have affected the judgment.”).
First, Petitioner does not demonstrate any witness intentionally made a
false statement regarding when they said they observed or interacted with
Petitioner on the day of the murder. Importantly, the witnesses Petitioner
22
contends falsified their testimony acknowledged the times they provided were
approximations, estimates, or guesses. See Doc. 9-2 at 173, 204, 249, 280.
However, even if the times they testified to were wrong when compared to
physical evidence (i.e., surveillance footage), a witness’s inability to recall a
fact with specificity does not mean the witness perjured himself. See United
States v. Horner, 853 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Perjured testimony
‘must be given with the willful intent to provide false testimony and not as a
result of a mistake, confusion, or faulty memory.’”); see also United States v.
Grobman, 550 F. Supp. 3d 1286, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (“[There is no] Giglio
violation when the witness’s testimony was false due to mistake, confusion, or
faulty memory.”).
Second, assuming the state knew certain witnesses’ time estimates could
not have been correct, the state did not rely on those witnesses to establish
Petitioner was inside the victim’s apartment at a precise time. In other words,
the precise hour and minute each witness saw Petitioner was not material to
the state’s case. The medical examiner testified that the victim’s death could
have occurred anywhere from two to thirty-six hours before his body was found.
See Doc. 9-2 at 781. Because a specific time of death could not be established,
the state did not offer the testimony of its lay witnesses to prove when precisely
they saw Petitioner, but rather to explain what they observed when they saw
23
him (i.e., behavior and appearance) and to establish that Petitioner was inside
the apartment at some point during which he would have had an opportunity
and time to commit the murder.
The state also did not represent or argue that the witnesses’ testimonies
regarding time approximations were facts the jury had to accept. Indeed, in its
closing argument, the state confronted head-on the murky timeline, conceding
“people’s timelines varied” and urging the jurors to use their common sense in
understanding that lay witnesses “would be approximating times and … would
all be a little bit off.” Id. at 865, 869. The state told the jury,
I suspect you’re going to hear some argument from the defense
about the timing being off on some of the witnesses’ testimony and
how they recall last time they saw [the victim] alive, the times
being a little different about when they went to the [victim’s]
door[], the timing being a little bit off about Ronald Neal’s
testimony and in what order [he and Petitioner] … went … to pawn
shops and Gate gas stations that morning.[8]
This is important to note that the State doesn’t have to prove
every single detail of this case beyond a reasonable doubt. What
we have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that this defendant
committed the crime and that it was a second degree murder.
. . . .
8 Defense counsel, in closing, did in fact argue that the state’s proposed
timeline did not make sense, explaining that, based on surveillance footage, the time
Petitioner clocked in at his gym, distances between various locations, and the times
detectives were dispatched, Petitioner would have had a window of at most twenty
minutes to have murdered the victim, cleaned himself up, packed his duffel bag, and
left. See Doc. 9-2 at 889–90.
24
These witnesses didn’t know that that morning they needed to
watch their clocks and take detailed notes to be ready to testify five
years later about the exact moment they saw [the victim] last alive.
Id. at 863–64.
Not only did the state acknowledge the unclear timeline, but it
necessarily conceded certain witnesses had faulty memories when it came to
the times certain events occurred by presenting to the jury evidence that
contradicted some testimony: surveillance photos with time stamps; testimony
from detectives about the times they were dispatched; and a log from
Petitioner’s gym showing when he clocked in. See Doc. 9-1 at 298; see also Doc.
9-2 at 108, 733, 831, 886–88. Considering all the evidence presented, the jury
reasonably could have deduced that Petitioner had time to have murdered the
victim, even if the precise time of death was unknown and even if some
witnesses remembered incorrectly the times events occurred.9
Because there is no indication witnesses McClain, Oneal, Bethea,
McNeil, or Mazzaferro intentionally lied about the timeline, and their time
approximations were not material to the state’s case, Petitioner does not
9 Even the witness whose time spent with Petitioner was captured on and
verified by surveillance cameras, Neal, remembered incorrectly the time he and
Petitioner left the apartment complex together, approximating it was between 9:00
and 10:00 a.m. See Doc. 9-2 at 125. Surveillance footage showed Petitioner quit his
job at about 10:00 a.m., and witnesses testified it takes between twenty to forty-five
minutes to get to the downtown area (where the apartment complex was) from the
job site. Id. at 220, 228, 235.
25
demonstrate “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief”
on his Giglio claim. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. To that end, upon thorough
review of the record and the applicable law, the Court finds that the state
court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable
application of federal law, and it was not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts given the evidence presented to the state court. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ground three is denied.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED
with prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
3. If Petitioner appeals this dismissal, the Court denies a certificate
of appealability.10 Because this Court has determined that a certificate of
appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending
10 This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner
makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were
‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
Upon due consideration, this Court will deny a certificate of appealability.
26
motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed
in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 11, 2026.
£ JORDAN E. PRATT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jax-6
Stephen Webster Bentley
Counsel of record
27