Soto

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILSON HARMANDO JUELA

LUCERO :

Petitioner, : 3:26-cv-1198

: (JUDGE MARIANI)

V. :

CRAIG LOWE', Warden, Pike County :

Correctional Facility, et al., :

Respondents. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

l. BACKGROUND

On April 27, 2026, Petitioner Wilson Harmando Juela Lucero (“Petitioner”), a citizen

of Ecuador residing in the United States since 2007, filed a counseled petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the District of New Jersey along with a

motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. 1). That same day, Chief Judge Renee

Marie Bumb enjoined Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside of New Jersey.

(Doc. 3).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to amend the caption to reflect that Petitioner's immediate custodian

is Craig Lowe, Warden of the Pike County Correctional Facility, not Luis Soto, Warden of Delaney Hall

Detention Facility. As set forth in the parties’ stipulation, (Doc. 11), “Petitioner remains in the Pike County

Correctional Facility, and was detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility when, on May 1, 2026,

Petitioner filed the amended petition, challenging his detention by ICE.” (/d. at 1).

Petitioner thereafter a filed an Amended Petition before Chief Judge Bumb on May 1,

2026. (Doc. 7). At that time, however, Petitioner was detained at the Pike County

Correctional Facility within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. On May 4, 2026, Petitioner

and Respondents entered into a Joint Stipulation agreeing, “in the interest of justice,” that

the Amended Petition should be transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc.

10). On May 5, 2026, Chief Judge Bumb transferred the Amended Petition to this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. (Doc. 11).

Petitioner alleges he entered the United States without inspection on or about 2007

and “has resided continuously in the United States for nearly two decades.” (Doc. 7, | 2).

Petitioner has substantial ties to the United States, including a wife who is a Lawful

Permanent Resident and “adult children residing in the United States.” (/d.). On April 22,

2026, ICE arrested Petitioner while he was driving and detained him at the Delaney Hall

Detention Facility in Newark, New Jersey from April 22, 2026, through April 27, 2026. (/d.,

3-4). Petitioner was thereafter transferred to the Pike County Correctional Facility within

the Middle District of Pennsylvania where he remains detained to this day. (Doc. 11 at ‘).

Petitioner claims he is being unlawfully detained by Respondents without a bond

hearing under the mandatory detention provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), instead of the discretionary detention provision of the INA,

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This distinction matters because noncitizens detained pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) are not entitled to a bond hearing, whereas noncitizens detained

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing before an IJ. Patel v. O’Neil,

2025 WL 3516865, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (citations omitted).

As directed by the Court, the Respondents filed a response to the petition on May

12, 2026. (Doc. 15). The Respondents do not dispute the factual allegations contained in

the petition. Rather, they set forth legal arguments as to why Petitioner's detention is lawful

under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). (/d. at 2) (“Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b) and is not eligible for release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); therefore, his Petition

should be denied.”). But, as discussed more fully below, Respondents’ interpretation of the

INA—the same one they advance here—has already been rejected by this Court and the

overwhelming majority of federal judges to address this issue. See Patel, 2025 WL

3516865, at *4 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025 (collecting cases). The United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit has rejected the same interpretation advanced by the

Respondents. See Cunha v. Freden,__F.4't __, 2026 WL 1146044, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 28,

2026) (“That text makes clear that Section 1226(a) governs detention of noncitizens like

Petitioner. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to such noncitizens, who are present in the

United States after entering the country without inspection and admission, and who were

not apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter.”). The United States Court

of Appeals for the Eleventh and Sixth Circuit have also rejected the Respondents’

interpretation of the statutory provision at issue here. See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden

Fed. Det. Cir. Miami, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 1243395, at *1 (11 Cir. May 6, 2026) (“We are

unpersuaded by the Government's re-interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A)."); see also Lopez-

Campos v. Raycraft, __F.4th__, 2026 WL 1283891, at *1 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026) (similar).

I. | STANDARD OF REVIEW

Absent suspension, the Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas

corpus “to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.

507, 525 (2004 (Citing U.S. Const., Art |, § 9, cl. 2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal

district court may grant a habeas petition where a petitioner’s immigration detention is “in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of

Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” /.N.S.

v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Claims brought by immigration detainees seeking

relief from their confinement “fall within the core of the writ of habeas corpus.” Trump v.

J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025). It is well established that a federal habeas corpus

petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a discharge from

custody. Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations omitted).

Ill. © ANALYSIS

Although not raised by either party, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the

petition.2 Turning to the merits of the petition, the Court will first consider the two statutory

2 The Court incorporates by reference its prior analyses set forth in similar habeas petitions filed by

civil immigration detainees. See Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *1-7; see also Diallo v. Warden, 2026 WL

1081502 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2026). Furthermore, Petitioner is not required to exhaust his administrative

remedies. /d.

provisions at issue here. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is a statute entitled “Inspection by immigration

officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” It provides,

in relevant part:

(b) Inspection of applicants for admissions

(2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In General

Subject to subparagraph (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines

that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding

under section 1229a [removal proceedings] of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1226, in contrast, is entitled “Apprehension and

detention of aliens.” It provides, in relevant part:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained

pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.

Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney

General—

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on—

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing

conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or

(B) conditional parole; but

(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an ‘employment

authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien

is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without

regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

Respondents are detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). It is

undisputed that Petitioner has never been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offense.

It is further undisputed that Petitioner does not have a final order of removal. As the Court

previously found, “the overwhelming majority of federal district courts that have addressed

this issue have interpreted the INA to find that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—

noncitizens who previously entered the United States and are currently residing in the

United States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.” Patel, 2025 WL 3519895, at *4

(collecting cases). “These courts have further found that the statutory provisions of the INA

that Respondents’ claim divest this Court of jurisdiction do not apply to persons similarly

situated to Petitioner and that there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies prior to

filing a habeas petition.” /d.

As before, “the Court finds that the near universal rejection of Respondents’

interpretation of the INA by federal district courts to be highly persuasive and will adopt the

same approach,” /d. at *5. Petitioner's detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful

because the plain language of this provision and the statutory framework of the INA

compels a finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are affirmatively

seeking admission to the United States, not noncitizens like Petitioner who have resided in

the United States for years. See Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d. 397, 408

3 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “generally governs the process of

arresting and detaining ... aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.”

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018) (emphasis added); /d. at 303 (“As noted, § 1226 applies

to aliens already present in the United States.”). In addition, despite the Board of Immigration Appeals holding

(D.N.J. 2025) (“For all these reasons, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only

to noncitizens who are actively, i.e., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the United States.

Accordingly, it does not apply to individuals like Petitioner, wno has been residing in the

United States ‘for over seven years.””); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *5 (same).

Like other Courts to address this issue, the Court finds that Respondents’

interpretation of the phrase “seeking admission” violates the rule against surplusage, would

negate the plain meaning of the text, and make redundant Section 1226(c) mandatory

detention of noncitizens who have committed or are charged with certain specified crimes.‘

See Centeno Ibbara, 2025 WL 3294726, at *5-6 (“The government's interpretation of §

1225(b)(2) violates the rule against surplusage. □□ □□□ applicant seeking admission’ is the

same as ‘an applicant for admission,’ then ‘seeking admission’ is surplusage. Congress has

also recently adopted provisions in § 1226 that would be made superfluous under the

government's interpretation. If a noncitizen enters the country illegally and is subsequently

convicted or charged with certain crimes, these new provisions require that noncitizens be

detained without a bond hearing. Under the government's interpretation, § 1225 would

in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b}(2)(A) applies to

noncitizens like Petitioner, “[t]his Court owes no deference to an agency's interpretation that conflicts with

the statute’s unambiguous text.” Bethancourt Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 408 (citing Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400-01 (2024)).

4 “If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt

accipienda). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to

duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Resading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (Thomson/West eds., 1st Ed. 2012).

require such mandatory detention regardless of criminal charges or conviction. If this was

the case, Congress would have no need to create additional requirements for mandatory

detention.”).

Here, although Petitioner is an “applicant for admission,” he is not “seeking

admission” into the United States. Because Petitioner is not “seeking admission” into the

United States, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him. See Cunha, _F.4""__, 2026

WL 1146044, at *6 (“Here, although Petitioner is an applicant for admission under the

Statutory definition because he is present in the country and has never been admitted, it

simply cannot be said that he is ‘seeking admission,’ as he is not requesting lawful entry into

the United States.”). Accordingly, the Court will grant the petition and order Petitioner's

release from custody. Petitioner's request for fees and costs under the Equal Access to

Justice Act will be held in abeyance pending the receipt of a fee petition. Michelin v.

Warden Moshannon Valey Corr. Cent., 169 F.4th 418, 429-32 (3d Cir. 2026) (allowing fees

under EAJA in immigration habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241).

5 The Court acknowledges that Respondent cite to the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Buenrosto-

Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), in which the Fifth Circuit—in a 2-1 decisiion—held that

noncitizens like Petitioner were “applicants for admission” to the United States who were “seeking admission”

and were thus subject to the INA’s mandatory detention provision. The Fifth Circuit's ruling is not binding on

this Court. Similarly, the Court is aware of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Avila v. Bondi, holding that

noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention as an “applicant for admission” who was “seeking admission.”

Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). The Eighth Circuit's holding is not binding on this Court.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition will be granted because his

mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing is unlawful.

Because the Respondents maintain that a bond hearing is not required and the

Respondents’ interpretation is inconsistent with the INA, Respondents will be directed to

immediately release Petitioner from the custody of the Warden of Pike County Correctional

Facility and file a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 confirming that Petitioner has

been released from custody. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008)

(acknowledging that a habeas court has “the power to order the conditional release of an

individual unlawfully detained—though release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not

the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.”); see also Bethancourt Soto,

807 F. Supp. 3d at 410 (ordering immediate release); Flores Obando, 2025 WL 3452047, at

*3 (same); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *8 (same); Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6

(same).

Respondents will further be permanently enjoined from detaining Petitioner under 8

U.S.C. § 1225, absent a compelling change in circumstances. See Bethancourt Soto, 807

F. Supp. 3d at 410 (perrianently erijoiining respondents from detaining petitioner under §

1225 wiere petitioner did not file 4 motion for temporary restraining order or motion for

preliminary injunction); see also Maldonado, 2025 WL 2985256, at *7 (“The Court grants the

writ of habeas corpus and orders Respondents to release Petitioner within 24 hours. ...

Following Petitioner's release, Respondents are permanently enjoined from rearresting or

otherwise detaining Petitioner under § 1225(b)(2).”); Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *7. If

Respondents elects to later detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Respondents

must provide Petitioner with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a timely individyalized

bond hearing, where an lJ will assess whether he is a danger or flight risk. A separate

Order follows.

Robert D- Mariani

United States District Judge

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