Brandt

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KIEL BRENDAN BRANDT, Civil No. 3:26-cv-906

Petitioner . (Judge Mariani)

v .

WARDEN JESSICA SAGE, .

Respondent .

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Kiel Brendan Brandt (“Brandt”), an inmate confined at the Federal

Correctional Institution, Lewisburg, Satellite Camp, initiated the above-captioned action by

filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Brandt

alleges that officials at the Lewisburg Satellite Camp did not provide him with a proper

review for prerelease placement under the Second Chance Act. (/d.).

For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the habeas petition.

I. Background

A. Brandt's Criminal History

Brandt is serving a 27-month term of imprisonment imposed by the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for his conviction of wire fraud. (Doc. 7-2,

Declaration of BOP Unit Manager Chase Emerson (“Emerson Decl.”), at 1 q 3; Doc. 7-3,

Public Information Inmate Data). According to BOP documentation submitted by

Respondent, Brandt’s projected release date, via First Step Act release, is January 17,

2027. (Id.). However, a review of the BOP’s inmate locator indicates that Brandt's

projected release date is now January 2, 2027.!

B. Administrative Remedy History

The Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval reveals that, while in BOP

custody, Brandt filed the following three administrative remedies. (Doc. 7-2, Emerson Decl.

at 2 5; Doc. 7-4, Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval).

On August 28, 2025, Brandt filed administrative remedy 1252532-F1 with the

institution, requesting a review of his residential reentry center (“RRC”) placement time.

(Doc. 7-4, at 2). The institution denied the remedy on September 23, 2025. (/d.). Brandt

appealed to the Regional Director, and, on December 8, 2025, the Regional Director denied

his appeal. (/d.). Brandt did not appeal to the Central Office. (See Doc. 7-4).

On February 23, 2026, Brandt filed administrative remedy 1269193-F1 with the

institution, requesting legal mail logs. (Doc. 7-4, at 3). The institution denied the remedy on

March 13, 2026. (/d.). Brandt did not appeal to the Regional or Central Offices. (See Doc.

7-4),

C. Facts Related to the Second Chance Act

Brandt's Unit Team conducted an Individualized Needs Plan-Program Review. (Doc.

7-2, Emerson Decl. at 2 J] 6-7; Doc. 7-5, Institutional Referral for Community Corrections

1 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ INMATE LOCATOR, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (searching

Inmate Number 52132-511) (last visited May 20, 2026).

Center (“CCC”) Placement). The Unit Team reviewed Brandt for prerelease placement

under the five factors of the Second Chance Act of 2007, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621 and

3624.2 (Id.). The Unit Team considered and evaluated the five factors as follows: (1) there

are available RRCs in Brandt's release area; (2) there are no extenuating circumstances

that would preclude placement; (3) Brandt has an established residence and community

ties; (4) the sentencing court’s Judgment and Commitment Order does not contain any

statements regarding RRC placement; and (5) there are no pertinent policies from the

United States Sentencing Commission. (Doc. 7-5, at 2; see also 18 U.S.C. 3621(b}). Asa

result of the review, the Unit Team recommended a placement date of August 30, 2026.

(Doc. 7-5, at 2). Brandt is currently scheduled to transfer to home confinement on

September 8, 2026. (Doc. 7-2, Emerson Decl. at 2 { 7; Doc. 7-6, Inmate History

Destination).

D. Claims Raised in the Habeas Petition

In his Section 2241 petition, Brandt alleges that the BOP did not provide him with a

proper review for prerelease placement and failed to award him enough prerelease

2 The Second Chance Act states in pertinent part as follows:

The [BOP] shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that a prisoner serving a term of

imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that term (not to exceed 12 months),

under conditions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and

prepare for the reentry of that prisoner into the community. Such conditions may include a

community correctional facility.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c),

placement time under the Second Chance Act. (Doc. 1). Respondent contends that the

Section 2241 petition must be dismissed because Brandt failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 7). Alternatively,

Respondent argues that the petition must be denied because Brandt has no right to

prerelease placement, no right to credits under the Second Chance Act, and Brandt has

been properly reviewed under the five factors of the Second Chance Act and will be

transferred to home confinement. (/d.). The Court concludes that Brandt has not exhausted

his administrative remedies and that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Brandt's claims.

Therefore, the Court does not reach Respondent's alternative arguments.

Il. Discussion

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Review

While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus petitions

brought pursuant to Section 2241, the Third Circuit has recognized that “[flederal prisoners

are ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to [Section] 2241.” Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98

F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d

Cir. 2000). Exhaustion is required because: “(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop

a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to

grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the

opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.” Moscato, 98 F.3d

at 761-62 (citations omitted); Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981).

However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where these

underlying reasons for exhaustion would not be served. See Coleman v. U.S. Parole

Comm'n, 644 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished). For example, exhaustion is

unnecessary if the issue presented is one that involves only statutory construction. See

Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw, 682 F.2d at

1052). Exhaustion is also excused when it would be futile. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 516 n.7 (1982): see also Brown v. Warden Canaan USP, 763 F. App’x 296, 297 (3d

Cir. 2019). “In order to invoke the futility exception to exhaustion, a party must ‘provide a

clear and positive showing’ of futility before the District Court.” Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475

F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting D'Amico v. CBS Corp., 297 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir.

2002)).

To exhaust administrative remedies, a federal inmate must comply with the

procedural requirements of the BOP’s administrative remedy process, which are set forth in

the Code of Federal Regulations. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19. Under these

regulations, an inmate shall first attempt informal resolution of his complaint with staff and, if

the inmate is unable to resolve his complaint informally, he shall submit a formal, written

request on the proper form to the designated staff member. See id. §§ 542.13-542.14. If

the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden’s response, the inmate shall then submit an

appeal to the Regional Director, using the appropriate form. See id. § 542.15(a). And,

finally, if the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional Director's response, then the inmate

shall submit an appeal to the Office of the General Counsel, located in the BOP Central

Office, using the appropriate form. See id. An inmate is not deemed to have exhausted his

administrative remedies until his complaint has been pursued at all levels. See id.

(explaining that an “[a]ppeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal’).

Here, the record reflects that, although Brandt filed an administrative remedy

concerning RRC placement—number 1252532—he undisputably failed to properly exhaust

that remedy. (Doc. 7-4, at 2). Brandt filed administrative remedy 1252532-F1 at the

institution level. (/d.). Upon review, the institution denied the remedy. (/d.). Brandt

appealed to the Regional Director, and, on December 8, 2025, the Regional Director denied

his appeal. (/d.). The record confirms that Brandt did not appeal to the Central Office—the

necessary step to fully exhaust his administrative remedy. (/d.). Rather than comply with

the Administrative Remedy process, Brandt bypassed the statutorily mandated procedures

and, instead, filed the instant habeas petition in federal court.

Brandt mistakenly claims that he fully exhausted his administrative remedies. (Doc.

1, at 6-7). He avers that “[hJis BP-8 and BP-9 were denied with boilerplate responses; his

BP-10 was acknowledged, extended, and ultimately denied (delivered to Petitioner) on

February 24, 2026” and his “BP-11 was submitted and received.” (/d.). However, Brandt

has not presented any evidence that the Central Office received his appeal of administrative

remedy 1252532. Brandt has submitted a United States Postal Service certified mail

tracking number of a mailing which purportedly contained his BP-11. (Doc. 1-19).

However, this documentation only shows that Brandy mailed an unidentified item to

Washington, DC. (/d.). There is no evidence showing what Brandt mailed in this package.

More importantly, there is no evidence that the Central Office received and logged his BP-

11. Instead, the official BOP documentation confirms that the Central Office never received,

processed, or logged a BP-11 from Brandt. (See Doc. 7-4).

As stated, if the Regional Director denies a grievance appeal and the inmate remains

dissatisfied, the inmate must lodge a final appeal to the BOP’s Central Office within 20 days

of the denial. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). Only if the grievance is denied by the Central Office

has exhaustion been completed and the inmate may then file a civil action. 28 C.F.R. §§

542.10, 542.15. Brandt's argument that he fully exhausted administrative remedy 1252532

based on his belief that the Central Office received his BP-11 is unavailing. Pursuant to 28

C.F.R. § 542.18, “a Request or Appeal is considered filed on the date it is logged into the

Administrative Remedy Index as received.” The “statutory or regulatory scheme ]’

applicable to BOP administrative appeals “clearly require[s] actual receipt by a specific

date.” Longenette v. Krusing, 322 F.3d 758, 764 (3d Cir. 2003). Brandt failed to submit any

competent evidence that the Central Office actually received his final appeal or that he

received a final decision from the Central Office.

Brandt has not identified any BOP actions that would clearly and unambiguously

violate statutory or constitutional rights, and he has not set forth any facts or advanced any

argument that would permit this Court to find that exhaustion of administrative remedies

would subject him to irreparable injury. (See Doc. 1). Additionally, the fact that Brandt's

sentence currently falls within the 12-month period that the BOP could place him in pretrial

release is not a basis to excuse exhaustion.

The Court finds that Brandt’s claim must first be presented to BOP officials and fully

exhausted. Because Brandt failed to fully and properly exhaust his administrative remedies

before petitioning this Court, and because no exception to the exhaustion requirement

applies here, his Section 2241 petition must be dismissed. See, e.g., Vasquez, 684 F.3d at

434 (district court properly dismissed federal prisoner's Section 2241 petition because he

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies)

B. Brandt's Claim is Not Cognizable under Section 2241

Assuming that administrative exhaustion could be excused, Brandt's claim is not

cognizable under Section 2241. Brandt is challenging the BOP’s alleged failure to provide

him with a proper review for prerelease placement and the failure to award him enough

prerelease placement time. (Doc. 1). His challenge essentially involves a request for

3 The Court notes that the Second Chance Act does not entitle a federal inmate to any

guaranteed placement in prerelease custody. See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 244-

51 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding, in exercising its discretion to make halfway house placement decisions, the BOP

must consider the factors set forth in § 3621(b); “[hlowever, that the BOP may assign a prisoner to a CCC

does not mean that it must’).

earlier transfer to prerelease custody. However, this Section 2241 challenge, which

implicates the execution of his sentence (i.e., where the remainder of his sentence is

served), is not cognizable on habeas review.

The core of habeas corpus usually involves a challenge to the fact or duration of

confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88, 500 (1973). In Woodall v.

Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005), the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit held that—in addition to the fact or duration of confinement—prisoners

may also challenge the “execution” of their sentences in a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 241-44. The Woodall Court acknowledged that “the precise

meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy.” /d. at 242.

In Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2012), the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals clarified the jurisdictional boundaries for execution-of-sentence habeas challenges.

In Cardona, the Third Circuit considered whether a claim challenging the BOP’s decision to

transfer the petitioner to the Special Management Unit—a highly restrictive form of

confinement—was cognizable in a Section 2241 habeas petition as a claim challenging the

execution of the petitioner's sentence. Cardona, 681 F.3d at 535-37. The court

summarized two earlier Third Circuit cases that analyzed what claims could be brought to

challenge the execution of a sentence under Section 2241—Woodall and McGee v.

Martinez, 627 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 2010). The court reasoned that the claims at issue in

Woodall and McGee were cognizable because they “both challenged BOP conduct that

conflicted with express statements in the applicable sentencing judgment.” Cardona, 681

F.3d at 536. “That is, both petitions claimed that the BOP was not properly ‘put[ting] into

effect or carry[ing] out’ the directives of the sentencing judgment.” /d. (quoting Woodall, 432

F.3d at 243). The court in Cardona thus held, “[i]n order to challenge the execution of [a]

sentence under § 2241, [a petitioner] would need to allege that BOP’s conduct was

somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment."

Id. at 537. Because the petitioner's claim did not argue that such an inconsistency was

present, the court found that he was not properly challenging the “execution” of his sentence

and held that it was not a cognizable Section 2241 habeas claim. Id. at 537, 538.

Similarly, Brandt has not alleged that the BOP’s conduct regarding prerelease

custody is inconsistent with an express command or recommendation in his judgment of

sentence. Brandt's sentencing judgment does not address or discuss prerelease custody.

See United States v. Brandt, No. 1:24-cr-250-1 (E.D. Va.), Doc. 27. Accordingly, Brandt's

habeas petition does not properly challenge the “execution” of his sentence and this court

lacks jurisdiction over his claim. See Cardona, 681 F.3d at 537, 538. As such, the Section

2241 petition must be dismissed.

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Ill. | Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). A separate Order shall issue.

fo 7 Vee

Robert D. Mariani

United States District Judge

Dated: May QV , 2026

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