Kehoe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------x

NELIN KEHOE,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

25-CV-6172 (EK)(VMS)

-against-

TAMRA WALKER, Queens Family Court

Judge et al.,

Defendants.

------------------------------------x

ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Nelin Kehoe brings this action alleging

violations of her constitutional rights under Rev. Stat. § 1979,

42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of Sections 241, 242, 2261, and

2265 of the federal criminal code, and violations of the New

York Family Court Act. She names as defendants Queens County

Family Court Judge Tamra Walker, Administrative Judge Anne-Marie

Jolly, court attorney Regine Riggins, and Family Court Clerk

Keisha Kearse. Plaintiff moves to proceed in forma pauperis.

That motion is granted, but the complaint is dismissed with

prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel,

ECF No. 8, is also denied.

Background

The following factual allegations are drawn from the

complaint and are presumed true for purposes of this order.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).1

Plaintiff’s sister “committed crimes including

stalking [and] harassment” by “travel[ing] from New York to

Nevada and plac[ing] an illegal tracking device in plaintiff’s

car.” Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff, a Nevada resident,

“sought an order of protection against her sister, but before

receiving one, [p]laintiff was served with a protective order

initiated by her sister.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 16. Plaintiff alleges that

her “sister filed three identical petitions for an order of

protection in Queens Family Court; [and] the first two were

rejected.” Id. ¶ 17.

However, during a proceeding on June 11, 2024, Judge

Walker “accepted the third filing despite inconsistencies,

errors in witness statements, and improper dates.” Id. ¶¶ 18-

19. Plaintiff alleges that she was “not given proper notice” of

this hearing “or an opportunity to present evidence.” Id. ¶ 19.

She also “requested court documents and transcripts repeatedly

but was denied access.” Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. 6-7.

1 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order

accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal

quotation marks.

Legal Standard

A complaint must plead facts sufficient to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570. The Court must accept the truth of “well-pleaded,

nonconclusory factual allegations,” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch

Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010), but it need not

accept “legal conclusions” as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009).

A pro se complaint should be liberally construed.

Ceara v. Deacon, 916 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2019). Still, an

unrepresented plaintiff is not exempt from “compliance with

relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v.

Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). District courts will

dismiss an in forma pauperis action if it concludes that the

action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary

relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Discussion

A. Criminal Claims

“[I]t is axiomatic that a private citizen cannot bring

a criminal complaint.” Brown v. Seniuk, No. 01-CV-1248, 2002 WL

32096576, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2002) (collecting cases); see

also Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86 (1981) (private

plaintiff cannot seek an arrest warrant). Accordingly,

plaintiffs’ claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 2261, and 2265

are dismissed.

B. Section 1983 Claim

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Judge Walker

and Judge Jolly are barred by judicial immunity. “It is well

settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits

for money damages for their judicial actions.” Bliven v. Hunt,

579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009). That immunity is only

“overcome” when a judge is being sued for “actions not taken in

the judge’s judicial capacity” or for “actions, though judicial

in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Plaintiff does not

allege any non-judicial acts here. And even assuming Judge

Walker “did not possess proper personal jurisdiction over”

plaintiff, “the judge did not act in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction.” Ceparano v. Southampton Just. Ct., 404 F. App’x

537, 539 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Compl. ¶ 23 (alleging only

that Judge Walker lacked personal jurisdiction over plaintiff).

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief in

addition to damages, but that relief is also barred. Section

1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial

capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. So, where — as here —

plaintiff does not allege that “a state-court declaratory decree

was violated” and she is able to “appeal [the] Family Court

Judge’s decision in the state appellate court,” no relief is

available under Section 1983. Yi Sun v. Saslovsky, No. 19-CV-

10858, 2020 WL 6828666, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2020).

Court attorney Regine Riggins and Family Court Clerk

Keisha Kearse also have absolute immunity, so plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claims against them must be dismissed. Plaintiff

alleges that Riggins was an “[a]ttorney representing the judge,”

Compl. ¶ 11, and “for purposes of absolute judicial immunity,

judges and their law clerks are as one.” Oliva v. Heller, 839

F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988). Meanwhile, court clerks are

entitled to absolute immunity “for performance of tasks which

are judicial in nature and an integral part of the judicial

process,” Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997),

or “undertaken pursuant to the explicit direction of a judicial

officer or pursuant to the established practice of the court.”

Raghubir v. Cogan, No. 21-CV-6705, 2022 WL 1085298, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2022). Here, plaintiff alleges that the

Clerk “didn’t provide any forms” and “didn’t inform [plaintiff

of] the court dates [by] mail.” Compl. ¶ 13. Providing parties

with forms and informing them of court dates are actions that

would typically be undertaken either at the explicit direction

of a judicial officer or in accordance with court practices.

C. New York Family Court Act Claims

Having dismissed plaintiff’s federal claims, we

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.

Wullsch leger, 604 U.S. 22, 31-32 (2025).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to

proceed in forma pauperis is granted, but her federal claims are

dismissed with prejudice. See McKie v. Kornegay, No. 21-1943,

2022 WL 4241355, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2022) (dismissal of a

pro se complaint without leave to amend is appropriate “where

the complaint gives no indication that a valid claim might be

stated”). Plaintiff’s New York Family Court Act claims are

denied without prejudice to refiling in an appropriate state

court. Plaintiff’s application for the appointment of pro bono

counsel is also denied.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)

that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good

faith, and therefore denies in forma pauperis status for the

purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,

444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of

this order to plaintiff, note the mailing on the docket, and

close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United State

s District Judge

D ated: April 2, 2026

Brooklyn, New York