Lyons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JADISOM ALAM MARTINS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-35-MMH-SJH

ACTING DIRECTOR TODD LYONS, et al.,

Respondents.

___________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Jadisom Alam Martins, an immigration detainee, initiated

this action through counsel by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and

Complaint for Administrative Procedure Act Relief (Doc. 1; Petition) on

January 7, 2026. Respondents filed a Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus and Complaint for Administrative Procedure Act Relief (Doc. 14;

Response) with exhibits (Docs. 14-1 through 14-4). Martins filed a counseled

Reply (Doc. 16; Reply). This case is ripe for review.

II. Martins’s Petition

Martins, a citizen of Brazil, entered the United States without inspection

in June 2019. Petition at 6. Approximately three months later, Martins applied

for asylum to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service. Id. at 7.

His asylum application is pending. Id.

On January 2, 2026, local law enforcement stopped Martins and

demanded vehicle documentation and immigration documentation. Id. Martins

was taken into custody and later transferred to Baker Correctional Institute,

where he remains in the custody of United States Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE). Id. On January 4, 2026, the Department of Homeland

Security served Martins with a Notice to Appear initiating removal

proceedings. Id.

In Count One of his Petition, Martins argues that he is not subject to

mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and is entitled to a bond

hearing. Id. at 29–31. In Count Two, he alleges a violation of the

Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 31–32. As relief, he requests, inter alia,

immediate release. Id. at 32–33.

III. Analysis

The Court first addresses Respondents’ arguments that two statutory

provisions—8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and § 1252(b)(9)—deprive this Court of

jurisdiction to adjudicate Martins’s claims. See Response at 7. Because the

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Court rejects those arguments, the Court then addresses the merits of

Martins’s claims.

a. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)

Section 1252(g) states in pertinent part that “no court shall have

jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by . . . any alien arising from the decision

or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,

or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. §

1252(g). “It is a ‘discretion-protecting provision’ designed to prevent the

‘deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of removal

proceedings.’” Camarena v. Dir., Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 988 F.3d 1268, 1272

(11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525

U.S. 471, 487 (1999)). Nevertheless, the provision “does not cover ‘the universe

of deportation claims.’” Id. (quoting Reno, 525 U.S. at 482). Indeed, the

Supreme Court has explained that section 1252(g) should be narrowly read to

encompass only the “three discrete actions that the Attorney General may

take: her decision or action to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or

execute removal orders.” Reno, 525 U.S. at 482 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). While “‘many other decisions or actions’ may be ‘part of the

deportation process,’ only claims that arise from one of the covered actions are

excluded from [court] review” by this section. Camarena, 988 F.3d at 1272.

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Here, Martins is not attacking ICE’s decision to commence removal

proceedings, adjudicate his case, or execute an order of removal. Indeed,

Martins seemingly does not have an order of removal. Instead, Martins is

attacking ICE’s decision to treat him as an “applicant for admission” under §

1225(b), which imposes mandatory detention, rather than as a noncitizen

under § 1226(a), which permits a bond hearing before an immigration judge.

Thus, the Court finds that § 1252(g) does not bar Martins’s claims.

b. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)—the “Zipper Clause”

Under the “Zipper Clause,” “[j]udicial review of all questions of law and

fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory

provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an

alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in

judicial review of a final order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). But “§ 1252(b)(9) ‘does

not present a jurisdictional bar’ where those bringing suit ‘are not asking for

review of an order of removal,’ ‘the decision . . . to seek removal,’ or ‘the process

by which . . . removability will be determined.’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (quoting Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294–95 (2018)). The Eleventh Circuit has “clarified

that the zipper clause only affects cases that ‘involve[ ] review of an order of

removal.’” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,

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964 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 470

F.3d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006)).

Here, Martins does not appear to have an order of removal. Nor is he

seeking to challenge the decision to seek removal or the process by which

removability will be determined. Instead, as found above, he is challenging his

classification under § 1225(b), which requires mandatory detention. Thus, §

1252(b)(9) does not bar this Court’s review of his claims.

c. Exhaustion

A petitioner need not exhaust administrative remedies if “the

administrative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise predetermined the

issue before it.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148 (1992). Recently, the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found that immigration judges have no

authority to consider bond requests from noncitizens who entered the United

States without inspection “because aliens who are present in the United States

without admission are applicants for admission as defined under section

235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the

duration of their removal proceedings.” In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec.

216, 220 (BIA 2025). Thus, the BIA has already “predetermined” the issue and

requiring Martins to make an administrative request for a bond hearing would

be futile. District courts around the country, including some judges on this

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Court, have reached this same conclusion and declined to dismiss similar cases

based on the alleged failure to exhaust. See, e.g., Patel v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-

870-JES-NPM, 2025 WL 3442706, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2025)1 (collecting

cases); see also Mohammed v. Olson, No. 1:25-CV-02404-TWP-MKK, 2025 WL

3541819, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 2025) (rejecting the respondents’ argument

that the petitioner must exhaust his administrative remedies by requesting a

bond hearing; reasoning that “[b]ecause [the p]etitioner entered the country

without inspection, if he were to move for a bond hearing, an [immigration

judge] would have to decline jurisdiction over the issue” based on binding BIA

precedent). Considering the circumstances, the Court rejects Respondents’

exhaustion argument.

d. Merits

The underlying premise of Martins’s claim in Count One is that he

should be classified under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and afforded a bond hearing

before an immigration judge instead of being mandatorily detained under 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The Court examines each of these statutes in turn.

1 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp.,

371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would

not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would

have significant persuasive effects.”).

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Section 1225 governs “applicants for admission,” which the statute

defines as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted”

or those “arriv[ing] in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); see Jennings,

583 U.S. at 287 (noting that under § 1225, “an alien who arrives in the United

States, or is present in this country but has not been admitted, is treated as an

applicant for admission” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The

statute defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien

into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration

officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). Immigration laws require applicants for

admission to be inspected by immigration officers to determine whether they

should be admitted into the country. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Certain

applicants are subject to expedited removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). But, as

relevant here, § 1225(b)(2) “serves as a catchall provision,” Jennings, 583 U.S.

at 288, and provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien

seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,

the alien shall be detained,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

On the other hand, section 1226(a) states: “On a warrant issued by the

Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision

on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §

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1226(a). The Attorney General “may continue to detain the arrested alien” or

“may release the alien on bond” or “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-

(2) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has recognized that this section

“applies to aliens already present in the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

303.

“‘For the past three decades,’” the government has recognized “this

dichotomy.” Lopez v. Hardin, No. 2:25-CV-830-KCD-NPM, 2025 WL 3022245,

at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2025) (quoting Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-CV-

12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025) (appeal filed Oct. 24,

2025)). On July 8, 2025, however, the government changed course when the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the following guidance:

An “applicant for admission” is an alien present

in the United States who has not been admitted or who

arrives in the United States, whether or not at a

designated port of arrival. INA § 235(a)(1). Effective

immediately, it is the position of DHS that such

aliens are subject to detention under INA §

235(b) and may not be released from ICE custody

except by INA § 212(d)(5) parole. These aliens are

also ineligible for a custody redetermination hearing

(“bond hearing”) before an immigration judge and may

not be released for the duration of their removal

proceedings absent a parole by DHS. For custody

purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same

manner that “arriving aliens” have historically been

treated.

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ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications

for Admission, AILA Doc. No. 25071607 (July 8, 2025). The BIA adopted and

applied this policy in In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (2025). But

district courts around the country have largely rejected the government’s new

interpretation of these regulations. See, e.g., Cetino v. Hardin, No. 2:25-CV-

1037-JES-DNF, 2025 WL 3558138, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2025); Robles v.

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 1:25-CV-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6

& n.3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Martinez-Martinez v. Noem, No. 25CV2975-

GPC(VET), 2025 WL 3552746, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (“Given the

Government’s longstanding interpretation of §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a), the

[c]ourt is further persuaded that ‘seeking admission’ applies to arriving aliens

and not aliens who have entered without inspection and lived in the United

States for years.”); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, - - - F. Supp. 3d - - -, 2025 WL 2802947,

at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (“Overwhelmingly, courts have rejected the

interpretation offered by Respondents that § 1225(b)(2) requires the detention

of all noncitizens living in the country who are ‘inadmissible’ because they

entered the United States without inspection.”); Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL

2609425, at *7 (collecting cases). But see Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t & Removal

Operations, - - - F. Supp. 3d - - -, 2026 WL 261938, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26,

2026) (disagreeing with the statutory interpretation that noncitizens seeking

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admission form “a distinct and narrower class than applicants for admission”);

Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3 (E.D.

Mo. Nov. 10, 2025) (finding that § 1225(a)(1) “explicitly includes more than just

arriving aliens in the definition of ‘applicant[s] for admission’”); Vargas Lopez

v. Trump, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1142 (D. Neb. 2025) (finding that “just because

[the petitioner] illegally remained in this country for years does not mean that

he is suddenly not an ‘applicant for admission’ under § 1225(b)(2)”).

Until recently, appellate courts had yet to weigh in on the issue. On

February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a published, but

not unanimous opinion, reaching the opposite conclusion. See Buenrostro-

Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2026). The majority concluded

that an alien without lawful admission who has been present in the United

States for a period of time is subject to mandatory detention under §

1225(b)(2).2 See id. That decision is not binding here. And while the Court

respects the reasoned decision of the majority, the dissenting opinion is more

persuasive. As such, the Court adopts the reasoning of the Buenrostro-Mendez

2 A circuit split is likely on this issue. In ruling on a motion to stay pending

appeal, the Seventh Circuit preliminarily determined that the U.S. Department of

Homeland Security was not likely to prevail on its argument that Ҥ 1225(b)(2)(A)

covers any noncitizen who is unlawfully already in the United States as well as those

who present themselves at its borders.” Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1062 (7th Cir. 2025). The issue is also before the Eleventh

Circuit. See Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, No. 25-14065 (11th Cir.) (oral

argument set for the week of April 27, 2026).

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dissent in full. See id. at 508–21 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For these reasons,

the Court rejects Respondents’ arguments that Martins is subject to

mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).

It is undisputed that Martins entered the United States without

inspection and has been residing here since 2019. Thus, he is not properly

detained under § 1225(b)(2) as Respondents contend. Instead, his detention is

governed by § 1226, and the Petition is due to be granted.

IV. Remedy

The Court next considers the appropriate relief in this case.

Respondents urge the Court to direct a bond hearing, see Response at 7, rather

than the immediate release Martins seeks, see Petition at 32. At the same time,

Respondents assert that “only EOIR [Executive Office for Immigration Review]

can provide a bond hearing. That said, if ordered, ICE would do what is in its

power to facilitate a hearing.” Id. at 7–8.

The Court is not persuaded by Respondents’ contention that an order

directing a bond hearing would be the appropriate relief. First, Respondents

had ample opportunity to argue that Petitioner is or would be subject to

detention under § 1226, but they failed to do so. Without any lawful basis for

his detention at this time, the Court can only find that Martins is entitled to

immediate release. See, e.g., Rivero v. Mina, - - - F. Supp. 3d - - -, 2026 WL

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199319, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp.

3d 397, 410 (D.N.J. 2025).

Second, Respondents’ representation that they will attempt to

“facilitate” a bond hearing is, simply, not good enough. This is particularly true

where an immigration judge is likely to refuse to conduct a bond hearing, citing

Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025). In the event

that occurs, Martins would receive no relief at all, and the writ of habeas corpus

issued in this case would be rendered entirely meaningless. Therefore, the

Court finds the most appropriate relief is release from detention.

V. Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court finds Martins is entitled to immediate

release because he is not properly detained under § 1225(b)(2). Since the Court

will grant the Petition on the basis of Count One, it does not, and need not,

address Martins’s remaining claims. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689

n.10 (2004) (declining to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after

granting relief on another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain

on that claim would be cumulative”).3

3 Insofar as Martins, requests attorney’s fees, he may make such a request in

a separate motion, if appropriate. See Local Rule 7.01, United States District Court,

Middle District of Florida. Any such motion must be supported by a memorandum of

law.

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Accordingly, itis ORDERED:

1. Martins’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for

Administrative Procedure Act Relief (Doc. 1) is GRANTED as to Count One.

Respondents shall release Martins within 24 hours of this Order, and they

shall facilitate his transportation from the detention facility by notifying his

counsel when and where he can be collected. The Petition is otherwise

DENIED without prejudice as moot.

2. The Clerk is directed to terminate any motions; enter judgment

eranting the Petition as to Count One; and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 10th day of

March, 2026.

United States District Judge

Jax-9 3/2

C:

Counsel of Record

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