The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAMAR A. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff, CIVIL NO. 3:25-cv-00259
v.
(LATELLA, M.J.)
KEVIN ROBERT SWEENEY, et
al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Lamar A. Williams was previously advised of deficiencies
regarding his initial pleadings. He was afforded an opportunity to file
an amended complaint to remedy those defects. Because his Amended
Complaint fails to satisfy the mandates of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and fails to state any claim upon which relief can be
granted, we are constrained to recommend that his Amended Complaint
be dismissed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this matter by filing a Complaint on February
12, 2025. (Doc. 1). On that same date, he filed a Motion for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2). He subsequently filed two
Certified Motions for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Docs. 5, 6).
Plaintiff then filed five additional documents, variably titled
“Document,” “Supplement,” and “Exhibit.” (Docs. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13).
On April 22, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Phillip J.
Caraballo issued an Order granting Plaintiff’s application to proceed in
forma pauperis, but holding service of the Complaint in abeyance
pending screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 (Doc. 15). On that
same date, Judge Caraballo filed an additional Order observing that
Plaintiff had filed multiple supplements or amendments adding factual
allegations or legal theories to his initial Complaint. (Doc. 16). He
directed Plaintiff to file a single, “comprehensive amended complaint.”
(Id. at 4). Judge Caraballo also identified several potential flaws with
Plaintiff’s original Complaint and provided guidance on filing an
amended complaint. (Id. at 2). He pointed out that “many of Williams’s
legal theories may lack the ‘factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
1 On February 17, 2026, the matter was reassigned to the
undersigned.
misconduct alleged.’” (Id. at 2) (quoting Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp.,
809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016)). Additionally, Judge Caraballo
highlighted that with respect to certain claims, such as “fraudulent
business practices,” Plaintiff must state “with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud.” (Id. at 2–3) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b)). Further, Judge Caraballo indicated that Section 1983 enables
lawsuits against state actors, not private entities such as Wyndham
Hotels & Resorts, Inc. and its subsidiaries. (Id. at 3). Finally, he noted
that “the law affords some state officials (including police officers and
prosecutors) privileges and immunities, which require certain
circumstances and careful pleading to be overcome.” (Id.).
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May 12, 2025, against
Defendants Baymont Hotel/Wyndam Resorts and Defendants Kevin R.
Sweeney, James Petrucci, John Munley, Danielle Guari, Christopher J.
Osborne, Jr., who he alleges are employed by the Lackawanna County
District Attorney’s Office and the Scranton Police Department & Street
Crimes Unit (the “Law Enforcement Defendants”). (Doc. 17).
In his Amended Complaint, which consists of a lengthy narrative,
Plaintiff alleges that on January 9, 2025, members of the Scranton
Police Street Crimes Unit unlawfully arrested him at the Baymont
Hotel. (Doc. 17 at 3). He claims that he was sleeping in a rented room
at the Baymont Hotel when he heard a knock at the door. (Id. at 5). He
was expecting a friend. (Id.). He got up and let the friend inside. (Id.).
He then heard another knock at the door. (Id.). He alleges that “he
looked through the peep hole and saw two (2) white male police officers
at [his] door.” (Id.). One officer was in uniform. (Id.).
Officer Petrucci asked Plaintiff to open the door and indicated that
he wanted to ask Plaintiff a few questions. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that
when he opened the door, both officers came rushing in and
aggressively grabbed him and his friend, brought them into the
hallway, and handcuffed them. (Id.).
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Kevin R. Sweeney,
James Petrucci, John Munley, Danielle Guari and Christopher J.
Osborne, Jr. maliciously made false statements in an affidavit of
probable of probable cause and criminal complaint. (Id. at 8). He also
avers that he noticed that there has been “tampering going on with [his]
paperwork.” (Id.). He indicates that in one set of documents, James
Petrucci and John Munley’s names were present, but those names do
not appear on a subsequent version that he received. (Id.). He also
claims that on his docket sheet, the arresting agency is the Scranton
City Police Department but that he was arrested in Dunmore,
Pennsylvania. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that a preliminary hearing that
occurred on February 27, 2025 is not listed on his docket sheet. (Id. at
9). He also alleges that a docket entry indicates a waiver of appearance
of arraignment and entry of plea on March 3, 2025 in front of Judge
Barrasse, but Plaintiff claims he never physically appeared before
Judge Barrasse. (Id.).
Mr. Williams asserts claims of negligence, breach of contract, and
breach of fiduciary duty against Baymont Hotel. (Doc. 17 at 3). He also
alleges that the Baymont Hotel violated his civil rights. He claims that
the actions of the Law Enforcement Defendants violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and the Public
Accommodations Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(A). (Doc. 17 at 4, 9, 10). He
claims that they violated 18 U.S.C. § 1201(A), 18 U.S.C. § 1201(C), 18
U.S.C. § 1583, 18 U.S.C. § 1593A, 18 U.S.C. § 1519. (Id. at 7, 10). He
also asserts claims of negligence, intentional misrepresentation, fraud
and deceit, abuse of judicial process, obstruction of justice, tampering
with court records, and intentional abuse of due process. (Id. at 10).
Plaintiff asserts that his damages have increased from $1,000,000.00 to
$3,000,000.00. He also requests that the Court grant “protection from
these Defendants from retaliation” and from further abuse and judicial
misconduct and award compensation for lost wages and pain and
suffering. (Id. at 12).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a court “shall dismiss” an
in forma pauperis case “at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]”
Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides that “[t]he court shall review,
before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after
docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.” Section 1915A goes on to say that the court shall
“identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the complaint . . . fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is identical to the legal standard
used when ruling on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. See
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109–10 & n.11 (3d Cir.
2002). In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must “take as true all the factual
allegations of the [complaint] and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from them, but we disregard legal conclusions and recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir.
2010) (quotation marks omitted and citation omitted).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply
with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which sets forth the requirements for complaints and
provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief
must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless
the court already has jurisdiction and the
claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which
may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Thus, a pro se plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint must recite
factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed
right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short
and plain” statement of a cause of action. Indeed, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)
requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give
the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007); Phillips
v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
The pleadings of self-represented plaintiffs are held to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys and are
to be liberally construed. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; Higgs v. Att’y
Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, the complaint still
“must contain allegations permitting ‘the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Jackson v. Div. of
Developmental Disabilities, 394 F. App’x 950, 951 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (nonprecedential) (quoted case omitted). Pro se litigants are to
be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint even when a
plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. See Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty.
Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 861 (3d Cir. 2014).
III. DISCUSSION
Here, because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and
because he is a prisoner seeking redress from government employees,
we must screen his Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A). In order to satisfy that obligation,
we will first consider whether Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint satisfies
the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and then
proceed to consider whether Plaintiff has sufficiently stated any claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure
12(b)(6).
A. The Amended Complaint Fails to Comply with Rule 8(a)
As an initial matter, we note that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,
like his original Complaint, fails to comply with Rule 8’s requirement
that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint ignores
the guidance provided by Judge Caraballo in his Order of April 22,
2025, (Doc. 16), which specifically instructed Plaintiff on the pleading
requirements of Rule 8.
Plaintiff includes a nearly ten (10) page factual narrative as his
“Statement of Claim” with factual allegations that are not tethered to
specific legal claims. Throughout that narrative, he mentions multiple
legal claims and theories, without anchoring those claims to any specific
facts or Defendants. This type of pleading is not sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 8(a) that a complaint provide fair notice to the
defendants of what a plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which
they rest. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
therefore runs afoul of Rule 8(a)(2)’s basic tenant that the “plain
statement possess enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545–55 (internal quotation omitted).
Because the Amended Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. As an alternative basis for dismissal, however,
we will consider whether Plaintiff has stated any claim upon which
relief can be granted.
B. Plaintiff Fails to State Any Claim Upon Which Relief
Can Be Granted
The Court is often called upon to decipher indecipherable claims
in disjointed pleadings. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has coined some memorable phrases to describe this task. United
States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like
pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”); Nw. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Baltes,
15 F.3d 660, 662–63 (7th Cir. 1994) (Judges are not “archaeologists.
They need not excavate masses of papers in search of revealing
tidbits.”); U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378
(7th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 8(a) requires parties to make their pleadings
straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need not try to fish
a gold coin from a bucket of mud.”). Although “[t]he Court is under no
obligation to do the work of manufacturing a claim for judicial review
for plaintiff,” Lowrance v. Berryhill, No. 4:18-CV-89, 2019 WL 1085187,
at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2019), an attempt was made to wade through the
mass of verbiage contained in the Amended Complaint in search of a
viable claim, none was found. Because the Amended Complaint,
against Judge Caraballo’s directive, contains a narrative and a litany of
claims not tethered together with specific factual allegations, a liberal
construction will be afforded to Plaintiff’s claims in an effort to
ascertain whether he has failed to state any plausible basis for relief.
First, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the Baymont Hotel
will be considered followed by his claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a).
Consideration will then be given to claims against the Law Enforcement
Defendants pursuant to the various criminal statutes Plaintiff cites
before turning to his Section 1983 claims against the Law Enforcement
Defendants. Finally, Plaintiff’s state law claims will be addressed.
a. Section 1983 Claims Against Baymont Hotel
Plaintiff alleges that the Baymont Hotel violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights. (Doc. 17 at 4). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a source of
substantive rights, but rather “provides a vehicle for vindicating the
violation of rights created by the United States Constitution or federal
law.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989); Morse v. Lower
Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1997). In order to
establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show “that the
official acting under color of state law caused the deprivation of a
federal right.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). “A plaintiff cannot
state a viable claim under § 1983 without alleging that the violation of
federal rights of which he complains ‘was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.’” Anderson v. Keim, 247 F. App’x. 347, 348 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189
(3d Cir. 2005)). A “private entity can qualify as a state actor in a few
limited circumstances— including, for example, (i) when the private
entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function; (ii) when the
government compels the private entity to take a particular action; or
(iii) when the government acts jointly with the private entity.”
Egli v. Chester Cnty. Libr. Sys., 394 F. Supp. 3d 497, 505 (E.D. Pa.
2019) (quoting Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S.
802, 809 (2019)).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to establish that the
limited circumstances in which a private entity qualifies as a state actor
are present. Plaintiff merely alleges that the Baymont Hotel “co-
conspired” with the Lackawanna County Detectives by allowing the
County Detectives “to arrive outside of [Plaintiff’s] room door and start
banging on the door unannounced, without verification, or at least, a
courtesy phone call to accommodate [Plaintiff] as a customer of theirs.”
(Doc. 17 at 4–5). These allegations do not suggest that the Baymont
Hotel was performing a traditional, exclusive public function or that the
Baymont Hotel compelled a government entity to take a particular
action. And while Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants conspired with
one another, there are no facts alleged suggesting that the Baymont
Hotel acted jointly with the Law Enforcement Defendants. Plaintiff has
not alleged that the Baymont Hotel had any advance warning from or
communication with the Law Enforcement Defendants regarding their
efforts to arrest him. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege that anyone from
the Hotel was aware of law enforcement’s presence or in any way
facilitated or assisted them. He simply alleges that he was sleeping and
that law enforcement knocked on the door to his room. There are no
allegations regarding the Hotel’s participation in the event.
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state any claim against the Baymont Hotel
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and we recommend dismissal of those
claims.
b. Claim Against Baymont Hotel Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(A)
Plaintiff also brings a claim against the Baymont Hotel pursuant
to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a). (Doc. 17
at 4). Section 2000(a) prohibits discrimination in places of public
accommodation “on the ground of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a); Rhoades v.
Days Inn by Wyndham, No. 3:21-CV-01990, 2023 WL 4565467, at *5
(M.D. Pa. July 17, 2023). There are no facts alleged suggesting that the
Baymont Hotel discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his race.
Accordingly, we recommend that this claim be dismissed.2
2 We also note that the remedy for a Title II violation is limited to
a civil injunction for preventative relief. Rhoades, 4565467, at *5 (citing
Three Rivers Center for Independent Living v. Housing Authority of
City, 382 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2004); Livingstone v. Hugo Boss Store,
c. Claims for Violations of Criminal Statutes Against
the Law Enforcement Defendants
Plaintiff alleges that the Law Enforcement Defendants violated
several criminal statutes including 18 U.S.C. § 1201(A),(C), Kidnapping,
18 U.S.C. § 1583, Enticement into Slavey, 18 U.S.C. § 1593A, providing
for mandatory restitution, and 18 U.S.C. § 1519, Destruction,
Alteration, or Falsification of Records in Federal Investigations and
Bankruptcy. (Doc. 17 at 7, 10).
However, a private party has no right to enforce criminal statutes.
See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85–86 (1981) (per curiam).
Courts have repeatedly found that criminal statutes do not give rise to a
basis for civil liability. See Brown v. City of Philadelphia Office of
Human Res., 735 F. App’x 55, 56 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“[plaintiff]
alleges that the defendants violated various criminal statutes, but most
do not provide a private cause of action.”); Davis v. Warden Lewisburg
USP, 594 F. App’x 60, 61 n.3 (3d Cir. 2015) (“§ 242 is a criminal statute,
Atl. City, NJ, No. CV2101971RBKAMD, 2021 WL 3910149, at *5
(D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2021), appeal dismissed sub nom. Livingstone v. Hugo
Boss Store Atl. City, No. 21-2757, 2022 WL 845249 (3d Cir. Mar. 2,
2022). Plaintiff is seeking no such relief here against the Baymont
Hotel.
through which no private cause of action is created.”); Greenblatt v.
Klein, 634 F. App’x 66, 69 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Finally, we agree that there
is no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.”); Carpenter v.
Young, No. Civ.A. 04-927, 2005 WL 1364787, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 1,
2005) (“[P]laintiff may not maintain a private cause of action based on
violations of criminal provisions of the Bankruptcy Code [including 18
U.S.C. § 153].”); Pankey v. Webster, 816 F. Supp. 553, 559 (W.D. Mo.
1993) (“18 U.S.C. § 4 defines a criminal offense and does not provide
civil complaints with a private right of action. Thus, plaintiff cannot
base a civil cause of action on 18 U.S.C. § 4, and cannot invoke that
statute as a jurisdictional basis for her present complaint.”) (internal
citations omitted); Risley v. Hawk, 918 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1996)
(“First, 18 U.S.C. [§ 113] define[s] certain acts ... as criminal offenses.
Such criminal offense provisions do not create a private cause of
action.”) (citing Lundt v. Hodges, 627 F. Supp. 373, 375 (N.D. Iowa
1985)).
None of the criminal statutes cited by Plaintiff provide for a civil
cause of action and Plaintiff “may not bring criminal charges against
defendants through a private lawsuit.” Ellerbe v. Mayor of
Philadelphia, No. 19-2716, 19-2718, 2019 WL2866085, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
July 3, 2019) (citing U.S. ex rel. Savage v. Arnold, 403 F. Supp. 172
(E.D. Pa. 1975)). Accordingly, we recommend that all claims in
Plaintiff’s Complaint based upon federal criminal statutes be dismissed.
d. Section 1983 Claims Against Law Enforcement
Defendants
Plaintiff claims that the Law Enforcement Defendants violated his
Constitutional Rights “protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause.” (Doc. 17 at 8). He also alleges procedural and
substantive due process violations (id. at 9), and cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id.). Each claim
will be considered in turn.
i. Equal Protection Violation
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that “no state shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Kaplan v. Chertoff, 481 F. Supp. 2d 370, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2007), as
amended (Apr. 16, 2007). The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike”
under the law. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985). To establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that he is either a member of a protected class or a
“class of one,” and that he was treated differently than others who are
similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference in
treatment. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563
(2000); see also Johnson v. Fuentes, 704 F. App’x 61, 65 (3d Cir. 2017);
Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 151 (3d
Cir. 2005); Oliveira v. Twp. of Irvington, 41 F. App’x 555, 559 (3d Cir.
2002). Persons are considered similarly situated when they are “alike
in all relevant aspects.” Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A successful equal protection claim requires proof that the
plaintiff was subjected to intentional or purposeful discrimination. See
Hassan v. City of N.Y., 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015); Shuman, 422
F.3d at 151. A plaintiff shows discriminatory purpose by demonstrating
that the defendant took the challenged action “at least partially because
the action would benefit or burden an identifiable group.” Doe ex rel.
Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524, 548 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 676–77 (finding that a discrimination claim requires pleading facts
that show challenged policy was adopted “not for a neutral,
investigative reason but for the purpose of discrimination”).
To maintain such a claim, a plaintiff must establish that he has
been irrationally singled out for disparate treatment. Engquist v. Or.
Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008). “[A]t the very least, to state a
claim under [a class of one theory], a plaintiff must allege that (1) the
defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the
defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for
the difference in treatment.” Mosca v. Cole, 217 F. App’x 158, 164 (3d
Cir. 2007).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that he was treated differently than
any others who are similarly situated. Accordingly, he has failed to
state a claim for a class of one equal protection violation and we
recommend that this claim be dismissed.
ii. Substantive Due Process
“Substantive due process is a component of the [Fourteenth
Amendment] that protects individual liberty against certain
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.” Newark Cab. Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146,
155 (3d Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (cleaned up). “The
substantive component of the Due Process Clause safeguards against
certain deprivations of individuals’ life, liberty, and property by state
actors regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them. In a substantive due process challenge to governmental conduct,
the threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental
officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock
the contemporary conscience.” McKee v. A. Jordan, et al., No. 4:25-CV-
02196, 2026 WL 777691, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2026) (cleaned up). A
violation of substantive due process rights is demonstrated if the
government’s actions were not rationally related to a legitimate state
interest or were motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive.
Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d
Cir. 1998); Independent Enter., Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth.,
103 F.3d 1165, 1179 (3d Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff has not alleged that the Law Enforcement Defendants’
deprivation of a protected interest shocks the conscience. He alleged
that two police officers, one in uniform, knocked on his hotel door. (Doc.
17 at 6). Plaintiff was able to observe them through a “peep hole.” (Id.).
After knocking, one of the officers indicated that he wanted to ask the
Plaintiff some questions. (Id.). The Plaintiff opened the door. (Id.).
The officers proceeded to handcuff and arrest him. (Id.). He also makes
various allegations relating to purported discrepancies on his criminal
docket sheet, but fails to allege how any of those discrepancies deprived
him of due process. Based upon the facts alleged, we are unable to find
that Plaintiff has stated a claim for a substantive due process violation
upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, we recommend that this
claim be dismissed.
iii. Procedural Due Process
Generally, to state a claim alleging a procedural due process
violation, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an
individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the
procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.’” Hill v.
Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted).
A cognizable claim of a violation of procedural due process cannot
be discerned the narrative contained in the Amended Complaint. This
claim appears to possibly be connected to Plaintiff’s claims that the
preliminary hearing held before Judge Corbett does not appear on his
docket sheet. (See Doc. 17 at 9). However, he does not allege that he
was deprived of a preliminary hearing. Rather, he alleges that a
preliminary hearing was held but that it is not documented on his
docket sheet. Allegations that there are errors on Plaintiff’s docket
sheet, without more, cannot be construed to constitute a procedural due
process violation. Plaintiff does not allege how he suffered any
prejudice or was denied any right by errors contained on docket sheet in
his criminal case. There is nothing in the narrative that can reasonably
be construed to support a due process claim.
iv. Eighth Amendment Claim
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment,
which includes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by prison
officials. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII.; see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
There are several types of Eighth Amendment claims, including claims
alleging: denial of, or inadequate access to, medical care; exposure to
adverse conditions of confinement; the use of excessive force; and failure
to protect from assaults by other inmates. An Eighth Amendment claim
includes both objective and subjective components. See Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Under the objective prong, the Court must
consider “if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively ‘harmful enough’ to
establish a constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,
8 (1992) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). However, “[w]hat is
necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause depends upon the claim at issue.” Id.
The subjective component is met if the person or persons causing the
deprivation acted with “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson,
501 U.S. at 298. Moreover, “the Eighth Amendment only applies to
convicted and sentenced prisoners.” Johnson v. Russo, 2022 WL
4472623, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2022) (citing Thomas v. Cumberland
Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has been convicted and
sentenced, nor has he named any prison officials as Defendants. It is
not clear what type of Eighth Amendment claim he is raising, but it
does not appear he has stated facts that would support an Eighth
Amendment Claim of any nature, and so, we recommend that this claim
be dismissed.
e. State Law Claims
As set forth supra, we recommend that all of Plaintiff’s federal
claims be dismissed. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if “the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction” unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, or
fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for exercising
supplemental jurisdiction. Patel v. Meridian Health Sys., Inc., 666 F.
App’x 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2016). We find no such factors exist here and
therefore recommend that the Court decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, given our recommendation
that all federal claims be dismissed. Alternatively, we recommend that
the state law claims be dismissed as Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted as to any state law claims.
i. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Against
Baymont Hotel
Plaintiff asserts claims of negligence, breach of contract, and
breach of fiduciary duty against Baymont Hotel. (Doc. 17 at 3). We
consider each claim in turn.
a. Negligence3
In order to state a claim negligence, a plaintiff must allege a legal
duty, a breach of that duty, a causal relationship between the
defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s injuries, and damages. City of
Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 422–23 n.9 (3d Cir.
2002). Plaintiff’s chief complaint with respect to the Baymont Hotel’s
actions appears to be the failure to provide a “courtesy phone call” to
give Plaintiff advance warning that Law Enforcement Defendants were
approaching his hotel room. (Doc. 17 at 5). Plaintiff has not alleged
any facts establishing that the Baymont Hotel had a duty to provide
such a warning or that its failure to do so constituted a breach.
3 We note that where a court hears a state-law claim based on its
supplemental jurisdiction, it applies the substantive law of the forum
state. Chin v. Chrysler, 538 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly,
here, we consider Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to Pennsylvania
substantive law.
Further, as noted supra, Plaintiff has failed to allege that the Baymont
Hotel was aware of the Law Enforcement Defendants’ plan in advance.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for negligence against
the Baymont Hotel and we recommend that the claim be dismissed.
b. Breach of Contract
We next consider Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. A plaintiff
must generally establish three elements to support a breach of contract
claim: (1) “the existence of a contract, including its essential terms”; (2)
“a breach of a duty imposed by the contract”; and (3) “resultant
damages.” Fortunato v. CGA L. Firm, No. 1:17-CV-00201, 2018 WL
4635963, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2018) (citing Gorski v. Smith, 812
A.2d 683, 692 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (citing Corestates Bank v. Cutillo,
723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)). Fatal to his breach of
contract claim, Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a contract
between the Baymont Hotel and Plaintiff nor has he alleged the specific
terms of any such contract that the Baymont Hotel breached.
Accordingly, we likewise recommend that this claim be dismissed.
c. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Turning to Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, we note that
in order to establish such a claim, under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff
must establish “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) that the
defendant negligently or intentionally failed to act in good faith and
solely for the plaintiff's benefit; and, (3) that the plaintiff suffered an
injury caused by the defendant's breach of its fiduciary duty.” Adair v.
Cigna Corp. Services, LLC, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-2384, 2026 WL
295744, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr.
Co., 288 A.3d 76, 88 (Pa. 2023) (citing Snyder v. Crusader Servicing
Corp., 231 A.3d 20, 31 (Pa. Super. 2020)). There is no allegation in the
Amended Complaint regarding the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between Plaintiff and the Baymont Hotel. Accordingly, we recommend
that this claim also be dismissed.
ii. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Against the
Law Enforcement Defendants
Plaintiff asserts claims of negligence, fraud and deceit, intentional
misrepresentation, abuse of judicial process, obstruction of justice,
tampering with court records, and intentional abuse of due process
against the Law Enforcement Defendants. We consider each claim.
a. Negligence
In order to state a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must allege a
legal duty, a breach of that duty, a causal relationship between the
defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s injuries, and damages. City of
Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 422–23 n.9 (3d Cir.
2002).
We are unable to find that Plaintiff has alleged facts indicating
that the Law Enforcement Defendants breached any legal duty
resulting in damages to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim for negligence against the Law Enforcement Defendants
and we recommend that this claim be dismissed.
b. Fraud and Deceit
To state a fraud claim under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) a misrepresentation or concealment; (2) material to the
transaction at issue; (3) made with knowledge of its falsity or
recklessness as to its truth or falsity (for a misrepresentation) or
calculated to deceive (for a concealment); (4) with the intent of
misleading another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the
misrepresentation; and (6) resulting injury proximately caused by the
reliance. K&G Contracting, Inc. v. Warfighter Focused Logistics, Inc.,
689 F. Supp. 3d 35, 43 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (citing SodexoMAGIC, LLC v.
Drexel Univ., 24 F.4th 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2022)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that where a party
alleges fraud, he must “state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The Rule
“essentially requires Plaintiffs to allege the who, what, when, where,
and how elements to state a claim arising in fraud.” Weske v. Samsung
Elecs., Am., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 698, 703 (D.N.J. 2013) (citing In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1423 (3d Cir. 1997)).
We are unable to find that Plaintiff has stated a claim for fraud.
To the extent Plaintiff’s claim of fraud is based upon his initial
encounter with the police officers at his hotel room, we note that
Plaintiff alleged that he was able to identify two officers, one of whom
was in uniform, through his “peep hole.” (Doc. 17 at 5–7). Thus,
Plaintiff alleged that he was aware of the identity of the individuals
knocking on his door, before he opened the door for the officers. We are
unable to say that the facts, as alleged, support a claim for fraud in
light of the heightened pleading standard required for such claims.
Therefore, we recommend that Plaintiff’s claim for fraud against the
law enforcement officers be dismissed.
c. Intentional Misrepresentation
Similarly, under Pennsylvania law, to establish intentional
misrepresentation, the plaintiff must show: (1) A representation
(2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with
knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false;
(4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; (5)
justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and, (6) the resulting
injury was proximately caused by the reliance. Hanover Ins. Co. v.
Ryan, 619 F. Supp. 2d 127, 141 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Heritage
Surveyors & Engineers, Inc. v. National Penn Bank, 801 A.2d 1248,
1250–51 (Pa. 2002)). “[T]he heightened pleading requirements of Rule
9(b) apply to claims of intentional misrepresentation.” In re Shop-Vac
Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 964 F. Supp. 2d 355, 360
(M.D. Pa. 2013).
For the same reasons that we concluded Plaintiff failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted for fraud, we find that Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted for intentional
misrepresentation. While Plaintiff alleges that he opened the door to
his hotel room because he was “[u]nsure of who these men really
[were],” he also alleged that he was able to see a uniformed officer
through the peep hole of the hotel door. (Doc. 17 at 5–6). Accordingly,
given the heightened pleading standard required to state a claim of
intentional misrepresentation, we are unable to find that Plaintiff has
sufficiently stated a claim upon which relief can be granted and
recommend that this claim be dismissed.
d. Abuse of Judicial Process
Under Pennsylvania law, “abuse of process is the improper use of
process after it has been issued.” McGee v. Feege, 535 A.2d 1020, 1023
(Pa. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Schwartz v. OneWest
Bank, FSB, 614 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2015). To demonstrate abuse of
process, the plaintiff must prove that “the defendant (1) used a legal
process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for
which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to
the plaintiff.” DeForte v. Borough of Worthington, No. 2:16-CV-00067,
2017 WL 2445890, at *17 (W.D. Pa. June 6, 2017) (citing Rosen v. Am.
Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)); see also Price v.
City of Phila., No. CV 15-1909, 2017 WL 895586, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
7, 2017). Illegitimate purposes include, for example, “extortion, forcing
a defendant to surrender a legal right, or blackmail.” Mawson v. Pittson
Police Dep’t, No. 13-1714, 2014 WL 3735133, at *10 (M.D. Pa. July 28,
2014). Notably, “‘[a]buse of process differs from malicious prosecution
in that the gist of the tort is not commencing an action or causing
process to issue without justification, but misusing, or misapplying
process justified in itself for an end other than that which it was
designed to accomplish.’” DeForte, 2017 WL 2445890, at *17 (quoting
Gen Refractories Co., v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297, 305 (3d
Cir. 2003)).
Here, the basis of Plaintiff’s abuse of judicial process claim is not
clear. He has not alleged “an after-the-fact, improper perversion of
process.” See DeForte, 2017 WL 2445890, at *18. It may be the case
that Plaintiff is attempting to allege malicious prosecution rather than
abuse of legal process. But as set forth supra, the gist of those two
claims is different and Plaintiff has not stated facts that give rise to a
plausible abuse of process claim. Accordingly, we recommend that his
abuse of legal process claim against the Law Enforcement Defendants
be dismissed.
e. Obstruction of Justice
Pennsylvania does not recognize a civil action for obstruction of
justice. Ballard v. City of Philadelphia, 541 F. App’x 143, 144–45 (3d
Cir. 2013); Bennett v. Maier, CIV.A. 97–3555, 1998 WL 386129, at *4
(E.D. Pa. July 7, 1998) (“No civil cause of action for “obstruction of
justice” exists under either federal law or the law of the state of
Pennsylvania.”). Further, a plaintiff cannot maintain a civil claim
under Pennsylvania’s criminal obstruction of justice statute. Brookins
v. Bristol Tp. Police Department, 642 F. App’x 80, 81 (3d Cir. 2016)
(citing D’Errico v. DeFazio, 763 A.2d 424, 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000);
Pelagatti v. Cohen, 536 A.2d 1337, 1342 (Pa. Super. 1987)).4
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for obstruction of
4 To the extent Plaintiff intended to state a claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1985(2) for obstruction of justice, his factual averments are
likewise insufficient. To establish such a claim, a plaintiff must allege a
“class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Burgos v. Canino,
641 F. Supp. 2d 443, 457–58 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Brawer v.
Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir. 1976)). Plaintiff does not include
any allegations regarding class-based discriminatory animus.
Accordingly, a claim under Section 1985(2) would likewise fail.
justice against the Law Enforcement Defendants and we recommend
that this claim be dismissed.
f. Tampering with Court Records
As with Plaintiff’s obstruction of justice claim, there is no private
cause of action for tampering with public records under Pennsylvania’s
Crimes Code. Bennett v. Heap, No. 4:25-CV-1349, 2026 WL 243212, at
*6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2026) (citing Williams v. Wetzel, No. 1:17-cv-79,
2020 WL 583983, at *17 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (no private cause of action for
“tampering with public records” under Pennsylvania Crimes Code)).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. We recommend, therefore, that his claim for tampering
with court records against the Law Enforcement Defendants be
dismissed.
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
We recognize that pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an
opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed
with prejudice, see Fletcher–Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors,
Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to
amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363
F.3d 229, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, Mr. Williams has already
had an opportunity to amend his complaint to state a viable cause of
action. (See Docs. 16, 17). The Court previously advised Mr. Williams
of multiple deficiencies with respect to his initial Complaint. However,
even after amendment, Mr. Williams failed to correct the identified
issues. Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that leave to
amend be DENIED, as filing a second amended complaint would be
futile. However, we note that the dismissal of state law claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) should be without prejudice. See Kach
v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we will
recommend that Plaintiff’s state law claims be dismissed without
prejudice.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) be DISMISSED in its
entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and for
failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure;
2. Plaintiff's claims brought against the Baymont Hotel pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
3. Plaintiff’s claims against the Baymont Hotel pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 2000(A) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
4. Plaintiff’s claims against the Law Enforcement Defendants
pursuant to various federal criminal statutes be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE;
5. Plaintiff’s claims against the Law Enforcement Defendants
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be DIMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE;
6. Plaintiff’s state law claims dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
7. Leave to further amend the complaint be DENIED as futile;
and
8. The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
Date: April 17, 2026 /s/ Leo A. Latella
Leo A. Latella
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAMAR A. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff, CIVIL NO. 3:25-cv-00259
v.
(LATELLA, M.J.)
KEVIN ROBERT SWEENEY, et
al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered
the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated April 17, 2026
Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation
pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s
proposed findings, recommendations or report
addressing a motion or matter described in 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation
for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas
corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after
being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall
file with the clerk of court, and serve on the
magistrate judge and all parties, written
objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings,
recommendations or report to which objection is
made and the basis for such objections. The
briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2
shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made and may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing
only in his or her discretion or where required by
law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own
determination on the basis of that record. The
judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Dated: April 17, 2026 s/ Leo A. Latella
LEO A. LATELLA
United States Magistrate Judge