Walsh

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Secretary of Labor, :

United States Department of Labor, : No. 1:22-cv-01355

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Kane)

v. :

:

MENNONITE MESSIANIC MISSION :

OF THE EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA :

MENNONITE CHURCH, :

d/b/a Liberty Ridge Farm, and NELSON :

MARTIN, :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is Defendants Mennonite Messianic Mission of the Eastern

Pennsylvania Mennonite Church, d/b/a Liberty Ridge Farm, and Nelson Martin (“Defendants”)’

motion for reconsideration. (Doc No. 67.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny

the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 17, 2025, this Court issued a Memorandum and Order (Doc. Nos. 64–65),

denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment as to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., claims brought

by Plaintiff against Defendants. On December 31, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion for

reconsideration of the Court’s December 17, 2025 Memorandum and Order (Doc. No. 67),

followed by a brief in support (Doc. No. 68) on January 2, 2026. After seeking an extension of

time to respond (Doc. No. 69), which the Court granted (Doc. No. 70), Plaintiff filed a brief in

opposition to Defendants’ motion on January 30, 2026 (Doc. No. 71). Defendants filed their

reply brief on February 13, 2026. (Doc. No. 72.)1 Accordingly, the motion is ripe for

disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for reconsideration “may be viewed and considered under either Rule 59(e) or

60(b).” See Knopick v. Downey, 963 F. Supp. 2d 378, 387 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).

Rule 59(e) permits a party to file “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment . . . no later than 28

days after the entry of the judgment.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Although Rule 59(e) does not

expressly permit reconsideration of a judgment, a district court applies the same legal standard to

a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) as it would if the moving party seeks to alter or

amend a judgment. See, e.g., Prousi v. Cruisers Div. of KCS Int’l, Inc., No. 95-cv-06652, 1999

WL 551359, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1999) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co.,

52 F.3d 1194, 1217 (3d Cir. 1995) and pointing out that “a motion for reconsideration . . . has the

same import as a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)”). Thus, a

district court may reconsider a judgment under Rule 59(e) if “the party seeking reconsideration

shows at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2)

the availability of new evidence [that was not previously available]; or (3) the need to correct a

clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” See Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros,

176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing N. River Ins. Co., 52 F.3d at 1218).

These limited, permissible grounds for Rule 59(e) relief illustrate that “[t]he purpose of a

motion for reconsideration is ‘to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly

1 On the same date that Defendants filed their reply brief, they also filed a notice of appeal of the

Court’s December 17, 2025 Memorandum and Order (Doc. No. 73), which was docketed by the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals on February 19, 2025 (Doc. No. 74). On that same date, the

Third Circuit stayed Defendants’ appeal pending this Court’s resolution of Defendants’ motion

for reconsideration. See U.S. Secretary of Labor v. Mennonite Messianic Mission of Eastern

Pennsylvania, No. 26-1334 (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 2026), ECF No. 4.

discovered evidence.’” See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Max’s Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at 677). Its purpose is not to allow a disgruntled litigant to:

“request that the Court simply rethink a decision it has already made.” Douris v.

Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2002). In such a motion, “parties

are not free to relitigate issues that the Court has already decided.” United States

v. Jasin, 292 F. Supp. 2d 670, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (internal citation and

quotations omitted). “The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is a

stringent one . . . . [A] mere disagreement with the court does not translate into a

clear error of law.” Mpala v. Smith, CIV. 3:CV-06-841, 2007 WL 136750, *2

(M.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2007) (Kosik, J.)[,] aff’d, 241 F. App’x 3 (3d Cir. 2007).

“Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments,

motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly.” Cont’l Cas. Co. v.

Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995).

See Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (M.D. Pa.

2014), aff’d sub nom. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum LLC, 809 F.3d 746 (3d

Cir. 2016).

Like a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, a motion for reconsideration under Rule

60(b) is narrow in scope, and must rely on at least one of the six grounds enumerated in the Rule

“to . . . relieve [the moving] party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding”:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier

judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no

longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)–(6). “Importantly, a Rule 60(b) motion may not be used as a

substitute for an appeal, and legal error, without more, does not warrant relief under that

provision.” Knopick, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (citing Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,

360 F.3d 155, 173 (3d Cir. 2004)).2

III. DISCUSSION

In their motion for reconsideration, Defendants rely on neither an intervening change in

controlling law nor the availability of new evidence not available previously as the basis for their

motion; rather, they rely exclusively on what they maintain are clear errors of law or fact in the

Court’s Memorandum and Order denying their motion for summary judgment and granting

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 68 at 3–19.) Specifically, Defendants

argue that the Court committed a clear error of law or fact by: (1) determining that numerous

factual assertions contained in Plaintiff’s statement of material facts should be deemed admitted

given Defendants’ failure to properly dispute them in accordance with M.D. Pa. Local Rule 56.1

(id. at 3–6); (2) determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the Minors

and Mentors were employees under the FLSA (id. at 7–13); (3) determining that there was no

genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants engaged in oppressive child labor (id. at 13–14);

(4) determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants “willfully”

violated the FLSA (id. at 14–16); (5) determining that an injunction is warranted (id. at 16); and

(6) determining that liquidated damages are appropriate without a hearing (id. at 16–19). The

Court addresses each argument in turn.3

2 Defendants have not clearly identified whether they seek relief under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b).

In their motion for reconsideration, they identify Rule 59(e) as the operative rule, see (Doc. No.

67 at 1), while in their brief in support of their motion, they identify both Rules 59(e) and 60(b)

as the rules pursuant to which they seek relief, see (Doc. No. 68 at 1).

3 In light of the parties’ intimate familiarity with the facts of this case, as well as the Court’s

detailed discussion of the factual background of this case and the legal standards applicable to it

in its December 17, 2025 Memorandum and Order, the Court limits its discussion to the points

raised by Defendants in their motion.

A. Defendants’ Failure to Cite Record Evidence to Dispute Factual Assertions in

Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Its Motion

Defendants challenge the Court’s determination that, because “only 18 out of 144

responsive paragraphs offer record citations in support of the response” of Defendants

(“DRSMF”) to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed material facts in support of its motion for

summary judgment (“PSUMF”), the factual assertions contained in the remaining paragraphs of

the PSUMF were deemed admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.1. Defendants maintain that their

statement of facts in support of their motion for summary judgment (“DSUMF”) “contained the

relevant, specific citations to admissible evidence” and so the Court should have “consider[ed]

[the] DSUMF in resolving the cross-motions for summary judgment.” (Doc. No. 68 at 4.)

Defendants also state that the Court in its Memorandum noted that “in opposing Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment, Defendants rely not only on the arguments made in their

opposing brief but also their briefing in support of their motion for summary judgment” and so

the Court “consider[ed] arguments made in both sets of briefing in assessing Plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment.” (Id. (quoting Doc. No. 64 at 28 n.18).) Accordingly, Defendants state

that “[b]y failing to consider [the] DSUMF in assessing Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment, the Court improperly failed to consider the whole record when rendering its decision.”

(Id. at 5–6.)

Defendants’ argument that the Court committed a clear error of law or fact in this regard

is unavailing, for several reasons. As an initial matter, Defendants fail to cite any cases calling

into question the Court’s treatment, consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local

Rule 56.1, of Defendants’ failure in the DRSMF to cite record evidence in support of their

purported dispute of the facts set forth in Plaintiff’s PSUMF.4 Further, as noted by Plaintiff, if a

party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the

court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

Rule 56(c)(1) requires a party seeking to demonstrate that a genuine dispute of material fact

exists to support that assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or

“showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence” of a genuine dispute. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)–(B). This Court’s Local Rule 56.1 effectuates those provisions by requiring

that “[s]tatements of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall include

references to the parts of the record that support the statement” and that “[a]ll material facts set

forth in the statements required by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless

controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party.” See L.R. 56.1

(emphasis added).

Moreover, despite Defendants’ protestation that the Court “fail[ed] to consider [the]

DSUMF in assessing Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,” see (Doc. No. 68 at 5), a review

of the Court’s Memorandum reveals that the Court did in fact consider the facts asserted in the

DSUMF in connection with its assessment of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, to the

extent they were relevant and supported by citation to the record and did not amount to legal

conclusions. A review of the factual background section of the Court’s Memorandum reveals

that the Court cited ¶¶ 2, 5–11, 14–18, and 21 of the DSUMF (Doc. No. 48-1), along with

relevant paragraphs of the PSUMF (Doc. No. 44-2), DRSMF (Doc. No. 52-1), and PCSMF

4 As noted by Plaintiff, the only case cited by Defendants in support of their position in this

regard is Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702 (3d Cir. 2006), which did not address whether

evidence was properly cited and before the Court in connection with a summary judgment

response, but instead simply held that an employee’s affidavit created a genuine issue of material

fact justifying denial of the motion.

(Doc. No. 53-1) in setting forth the relevant facts of record. See (Doc. No. 64 at 4–16).

Paragraphs 22 through 32 of the DSUMF largely contain legal conclusions to the effect that the

Mentors were volunteers and not employees for purposes of the FLSA. Paragraphs 33 through

45 of the DSUMF pertain to Defendants’ position that liquidated damages are not appropriate in

this case and largely recite the history of negotiations between Defendants and Plaintiff

regarding the amount of damages sought in this case. The remaining paragraphs of the

DSUMF—paragraphs 46 through 67—pertain to Defendants’ position that the Secretary of

Labor lacked authority to pursue this litigation, an argument that the Court concluded was moot.

See (Doc. No. 64 at 49).5 For these reasons, Defendants’ argument that the Court committed a

clear error of law or fact in connection with its treatment of Defendants’ DRSMF and DSUMF

fails.

B. The Court’s Determination That There Was No Genuine Dispute of Material

Fact That the Minors and Mentors Were Employees for Purposes of the

FLSA

Defendants next argue that the Court committed a clear error of law when it determined

that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the Minors and Mentors were employees

under the FLSA. (Doc. No. 68 at 7–13.) In doing so, Defendants assert that: (1) Liberty Ridge

Farm is “exempt” from the FLSA (id. at 7–8); (2) the Court misapplied the relevant legal test and

ignored aspects of the record in determining that Minors were employees (id. at 8–11); and (3)

the Court misapplied the relevant legal test and ignored aspects of the record in determining that

Mentors were employees (id. at 11–13). The Court addresses each challenge in turn.

5 Further, despite Defendants’ argument that the Court erred by failing to consider the DSUMF

and the facts contained within it in connection with its resolution of Plaintiff’s motion,

Defendants do not cite specific evidence that they maintain the Court should have considered—

but did not—due to Defendants’ failure to properly oppose Plaintiff’s PSUMF in the DRSMF

and that would have created a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment in

Plaintiff’s favor. See (Doc. No. 68 at 4–6).

First, Defendants’ argument that the Court committed a clear error of law by failing to

find Liberty Ridge Farm “exempt” from the FLSA (asserted for the first time in its brief in

support of its motion for reconsideration) is unavailing. As Plaintiff notes, Defendants cannot

establish that the Court committed a clear error of law by failing to find that Liberty Ridge Farm

is “exempt” from the FLSA when they fail to cite any authority suggesting that religious

organizations may be “exempt” from the FLSA. The FLSA does not contain any “express or

implied exception for commercial activities by religious or other nonprofit organizations.” See

Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1985).

Second, as to Defendants’ argument that the Court ignored aspects of the record and

misapplied the relevant law in determining that the Minors were employees and not volunteers,

the Court notes that the first part of Defendants’ argument regarding the Court’s consideration of

the record echoes their argument, discussed supra, that the Court failed to consider evidence

cited in the DSUMF in connection with Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. As noted

supra, the Court did in fact consider the evidence cited in the DSUMF in connection with its

resolution of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, to the extent such evidence was relevant,

supported by citation to the record, and did not amount to a legal conclusion. As to the second

part of Defendants’ argument—that the Court misapplied relevant law in determining that the

Minors were employees instead of volunteers—the Court concludes that Defendants’ argument

in this regard amounts to an effort to “request that the Court . . . rethink a decision it has already

made,” see Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2002), which is not the

purpose of a motion for reconsideration.

Nevertheless, if the Court were to consider the merits of Defendants’ argument as to the

Minors, it is unpersuaded. As Plaintiff notes, Defendants in their motion for reconsideration

abandon their prior argument to the Court that the Minors were student-trainees and instead

argue that the Court erred in determining that they were employees as opposed to volunteers.

(Doc. No. 68 at 8–11, 17.) However, Defendants in their brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s

summary judgment motion conceded that the Minors were not volunteers. See (Doc. No. 52 at 4

(noting that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment argues that the Minors are not volunteers

and stating that “[t]his is not in dispute, as Defendants have never categorized the [Minors] as

volunteers”) (emphasis in original)). Accordingly, Defendants cannot now contend that the

Court committed a clear error of law by failing to adopt a conclusion that Defendants never

advocated (and in fact disclaimed) in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. A

motion for reconsideration is not an appropriate vehicle to advance an argument that could have

been made to the Court before its decision. See Tatel v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 675 F. Supp. 3d

551, 558 (W.D. Pa. 2023) (Rule 59(e) motions “should not be used to advance additional

arguments which could have been made by the movant before judgment”).6 Defendants have not

demonstrated that the Court committed a clear error of law or fact when it determined that there

was no genuine dispute of material fact that the Minors were employees for purposes of the

FLSA.

6 In any event, the Court in its Memorandum addressed whether the Minors were volunteers and

concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that they were not. Defendants

contend that the Court’s determination “ignore[d] the key fact in the record that the Minors

would still be fed and have a safe bed to sleep in at Liberty Ridge Farm even if they sat in their

room and refused to participate in the vocational work” and so “ignored the record in

determining that food and shelter were a form of ‘compensation’ expected for work performed as

part of the vocational skills program at Liberty Ridge Farm . . . .” (Doc. No. 68 at 10–11.)

However, as noted by Plaintiff, Defendants’ contention is undermined by the entirety of the

record and particularly by the admitted philosophy of Liberty Ridge Farm that “if you don’t

work, you don’t eat.” See (Doc. No. 44-2 ¶ 11; Doc. No. 52-1 ¶ 11).

Third, as to the Mentors, Defendants similarly argue that the Court ignored aspects of the

record and misapplied relevant law in determining that they were employees as opposed to

volunteers. (Doc. No. 68 at 11–13.) As to the first part of Defendants’ argument regarding the

Court’s consideration of the record, the Court again notes that it echoes their argument, discussed

supra, that the Court failed to consider evidence cited in the DSUMF in connection with

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. As noted, the Court did in fact consider the evidence

cited in the DSUMF in connection with its resolution of Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment, to the extent such evidence was relevant, supported by citation to the record, and did

not amount to a legal conclusion. Regarding Defendants’ second argument that the Court

misapplied relevant law, Defendants contend that the Court failed to consider their argument that

the instant case differs from Alamo Foundation because that case “did not involve a sincerely

held religious belief that holds volunteerism as a pillar of their faith” but “[a]s explained

throughout the record, for the members of the Mennonite Messianic Mission of the Eastern

Pennsylvania Mennonite Church, volunteerism is a key obligation of church participation and is

more akin to attending Sunday mass.” (Doc. No. 68 at 12–13.) The Court notes that Defendants

fail to cite any authority in support of this argument but instead revisit argument presented in

their opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, which fails to meet the heavy

burden to justify reconsidering the Court’s decision. See Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F.

Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that a motion for reconsideration should not be used

“as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a

point of disagreement between the Court and a litigant”) (citations omitted).7 Accordingly,

7 In any event, the Court in its Memorandum noted that, pursuant to Alamo Foundation, the

relevant issue is whether the Mentors expected compensation for their work at Liberty Ridge and

Defendants have not demonstrated that the Court committed a clear error of law or fact when it

determined that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the Mentors were employees

for purposes of the FLSA.

C. The Court’s Determination That There Was No Genuine Dispute of Material

Fact That Defendants Engaged in Oppressive Child Labor

Defendants maintain that the Court “misapprehended or ignored crucial aspects of the

record” in determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants

engaged in oppressive child labor. (Doc. No. 68 at 13.) Defendants contend that the Court

misstated that Defendants’ only asserted defense to this claim was that the Minors were not

employees under the FLSA because Defendants also maintained that “(1) Defendants did not

‘force [] Minors to work longer than eighteen (18) hours in a week,’ as many of the activities

considered to be ‘work’ were a part of the Minors’ spiritual and educational learning”; and “(2)

the Department of Labor has not met its burden of establishing a violation, as the handbook

referenced in PSUMF was not in place during the relevant time period of this litigation and

therefore cannot be considered.” (Id. at 13–14.) Accordingly, Defendants maintain that “the

Court’s determination that Defendants engaged in oppressive child labor incorrectly relies on the

‘admissions’ of Defendants in DRUMF and outdated evidence (namely, the outdated handbook

for procedures at Liberty Ridge Farm) without considering the contrary evidence submitted by

Defendants” by way of the DSUMF. (Id. at 14.)

Defendants’ argument in this regard is unavailing. As an initial matter, the Court notes

that, as discussed supra, and contrary to Defendants’ argument, the Court did in fact consider the

DSUMF in connection with its assessment of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. See

concluded that there was no genuine dispute of fact that they did in fact expect compensation in

the form of a $250 stipend plus room and board. (Doc. No. 64 at 38–40.)

supra at 5–7. Further, Defendants’ argument on this point amounts to an effort to convince the

Court to “rethink a decision it has already made,” which fails to meet the heavy burden to justify

reconsideration. See Douris, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 408. Even if the Court were to consider the

merits of Defendants’ argument in this regard, it is unpersuaded that Defendants have identified

a clear error of law or fact. As to Defendants’ contention that they did not “force” Minors to

perform work, Plaintiff correctly notes that Defendants cite no authority supporting the position

that an oppressive child labor violation exists only if labor is forced. Further, regarding

Defendants’ argument about the handbook, Defendants failed to cite any evidence of record to

that effect in attempting to dispute Plaintiff’s citation to the handbook, as noted by the Court in

its Memorandum resolving the parties’ summary judgment motions. See (Doc. No. 64 at 9 &

n.10 (noting that Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s assertion that the Liberty Ridge handbook

states that Mentors supervised Minors for twenty-four (24) hours per day by stating that “the

handbook referenced is outside the relevant scope of this litigation” while offering no citation to

the record in support of their assertion so as to properly dispute its veracity or relevance). In any

event, Defendants’ arguments do not call into question the Court’s determination that

“Defendants fail to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to the question of their engagement

in oppressive child labor as defined by the Secretary of Labor because the record clearly supports

a finding that children under the age of fourteen (14) worked in the Liberty Ridge pallet shop”

(Doc. No. 64 at 47), which the Court found “is a clear violation of 29 C.F.R. § 570.2(a)” (id. at

48). Defendants have failed to identify a clear error of law or fact regarding the Court’s

conclusion that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants engaged in

oppressive child labor under the FLSA.

D. The Court’s Determination that Defendants “Willfully” Violated the FLSA

Defendants argue that the Court “misapprehended or ignored crucial aspects of the

record” in determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants

willfully violated the FLSA. (Doc. No. 68 at 14.) Defendants again reference the DSUMF in

arguing that “Defendants have cited sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable finder of fact to

conclude that they subjectively believed that their actions complied with the FLSA.” (Id. at 15.)

The universe of evidence cited by Defendants in support of this assertion is paragraph 33 of the

DSUMF, which asserts that “[d]ue to the nature of the programming at Liberty Ridge Farm, as

well as its foundation as a non-profit organization through the Church, Defendants have a

genuine belief that Liberty Ridge is not subject to the FLSA.” (Doc. No. 48-1 ¶ 33.) In support

of that statement the paragraph cites to “Exhibit E” (Doc. No. 48-9), which consists of evidence

from the Department of Labor investigation of Liberty Ridge Farm, including an investigator’s

statement that Defendants “believe because they are part of the church a non-profit organization

that they are not subject to the FLSA.” (Doc. No. 48-9 at 7.)

Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the Court committed a clear error of law or

fact in concluding as a matter of law that Defendants knew or showed reckless disregard for

whether their conduct was prohibited by the FLSA. As the Court noted in its Memorandum,

“[a]lthough willfulness is generally a question of fact, it can be treated as a question of law

where ‘there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-

moving party.’” (Doc. No. 64 at 60 (quoting Walsh v. Fusion Japanese Steakhouse, 548 F. Supp.

3d 512, 527 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (citing Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cnty., 872 F. 3d 122, 126 (3d

Cir. 2017))); see Secretary U.S. Department of Labor v. Nursing Home Care Mgmt., Inc., 128

F.4th 146, 159 (3d Cir. 2025) (affirming district court’s summary judgment finding that a

defendant willfully violated the FLSA). Defendants’ citation to a Department of Labor

investigator’s statement recording Defendants’ self-serving belief “that they are not subject to the

FLSA” is insufficient evidence to call into question the Court’s determination that, considering

all evidence of record, there was no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that

Defendants were not at least reckless in not knowing that their conduct was prohibited by the

FLSA. As the Court stated in its Memorandum,

In this case, the undisputed evidence indicates that Defendants did not consult

with “any individuals or third parties, including accountants, attorneys, and

representatives of other business” pertaining to their FLSA obligations. (Doc. No.

44-9 at 4.) Additionally in December of 2021, Defendants were informed by the

Department of Labor that they needed to pay workers “fair wages” and yet

Mentors indicated that, even after being so informed, Defendants continued to pay

them only a monthly stipend far below the appropriate wage total based on their

hours worked. (Doc. Nos. 44-35 (LRFC meeting minutes noting “Department of

Labor (DOL) comments” that “[w]orkers need to be paid fair wages” and “[t]hey

will further investigate LFR regarding their concerns”); 44-41 (records of Mentor

interviews with Department of Labor Investigator Christopher Harvey); 44-42

(Declaration of Christoper Harvey).) The Court finds that Defendants’ continued

failure to pay appropriate wages, even after being informed by the Department of

Labor that they needed to make such payments, accompanied by their failure to

take steps to ascertain their FLSA obligations, demonstrates that Defendants

cannot meet their burden of establishing a genuine dispute of material fact on the

question of whether they showed a “reckless disregard” for the FLSA. See

Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. at 133.

(Doc. No. 64 at 61–62.) Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the Court committed a clear

error of fact or law when it concluded that they failed to “meet their burden of establishing a

genuine dispute of material fact on the question of whether they showed a ‘reckless disregard’

for the FLSA.” (Id. at 62.)8

8 Defendants state in their reply brief that “[i]f the Court properly considered the DSUMF, it

would have considered facts that, undisputably, show Defendants believed the ministerial

exception applied to Liberty Ridge.” (Doc. No. 72 at 11.) To the Court’s understanding, this

appears to be Defendants’ first reference to the “ministerial exception,” an affirmative defense

grounded in the First Amendment’s religion clauses, recognized and applied by the United States

Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S.

E. The Court’s Determination That an Injunction is Warranted in This Case

Defendants contend that the Court committed “a mistake of law” in determining that an

injunction is warranted as a remedy in this case because that determination “relied on its

misstatement that Defendants engaged in ‘oppressive child labor.’” (Doc. No. 68 at 16.)

Defendants rely on their arguments challenging the Court’s finding that there was no genuine

dispute of material fact that they engaged in oppressive child labor in challenging the Court’s

imposition of an injunction. (Id.)

For the reasons set forth supra in Section III.C., Defendants have failed to identify a clear

error of law or fact regarding the Court’s conclusion that there was no genuine dispute of

material fact that Defendants engaged in oppressive child labor under the FLSA and have

therefore failed to identify a clear error of law or fact in connection with the Court’s decision that

issuance of an injunction was an appropriate remedy for Defendants’ violations. See supra at

Section III.C.

F. The Court’s Determination that Liquidated Damages Are Appropriate

Defendants argue that the Court “committed a violation of Defendants’ due process rights

in determining the amount of damages relating to this matter without a hearing.” (Doc. No. 68 at

16.) Defendants then reiterate their argument, asserted supra in connection with their challenge

to the Court’s willfulness determination (which resulted in a three year, as opposed to a two year,

statute of limitations), that the Court erred in concluding that they failed to establish a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether they showed reckless disregard for whether their conduct

violated the FLSA. See supra at Section III.D. Defendants reiterate their position that the facts

171, 188, 195 n.4 (2012) to foreclose an employment discrimination suit brought by a minister

challenging her church’s decision to fire her. See id. at 195. It is unclear to the Court, and

Defendants do not explain, how the ministerial exception would apply to the facts of the instant

case.

cited in the DSUMF (specifically, a Department of Labor investigator’s statement recording

Defendants’ self-serving belief “that they are not subject to the FLSA”) suffice to create a

genuine dispute of material fact as to the issue of willfulness (in the case of the three year statute

of limitations discussed in Section III.D.) and as to the amount of liquidated damages to be

awarded. (Doc. No. 68 at 17–18.) Defendants elide any legal distinction between the two

inquiries—willfulness and liquidated damages—and argue that both “are entirely based upon the

state of mind or intent of Defendants—whether Defendants subjectively believed it was

reasonable to not tender payment” to the Minors and Mentors. (Id. at 17.) Defendants argue

that, because the Court’s liquidated damages determination violated their due process rights, that

judgment is “void” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). (Id. at 17.) In their reply

brief, Defendants state that they “had an honest belief that employment laws, such as the FLSA,

would not apply because the Mentors/Minors did not consider themselves to be ‘employees’”

and “[a]s such, it is undisputed that the Defendants believed the ministerial exception applied to

all vocational programs at Liberty Ridge.” (Doc. No. 72 at 12.) Accordingly, Defendants

request that “this Court reconsider its damages award[] and hold a hearing to determine the

appropriate damages.” (Id. at 13.)

Defendants’ challenge to the Court’s liquidated damages determination fails to meet the

heavy burden to justify reconsideration under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b). As noted by Plaintiff,

and despite Defendants’ argument to the contrary, Defendants’ burden in opposing Plaintiff’s

summary judgment motion on the issue of liquidated damages is greater than their burden in

opposing Plaintiff’s position as to a finding of willfulness justifying a three-year statute of

limitations. This is so because “a defendant employer bears the ‘plain and substantial’ burden of

proving he is entitled to discretionary relief from the FLSA’s mandatory liquidated damages

provision.” See Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 907 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting

Williams v. Tri-County Growers, Inc., 747 F.2d 121, 128–29 (3d Cir. 1984)). This burden

requires a defendant to offer proof that he failed to obey the statute in good faith (a subjective

requirement) and did so upon “reasonable grounds” (an objective requirement). See id. at 907–

08 (citing Williams, 747 F.2d at 129). Accordingly, to attempt to meet the burden to show that a

subjective belief was objectively reasonable, a defendant “must show that he took affirmative

steps to ascertain [the FLSA’s] requirements, but nonetheless, violated its provisions.” See

Martin, 940 F.2d at 908.

Even if Defendants had offered sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material

fact on the first (subjective) inquiry, discussed supra in Section III.D., Defendants have offered

no evidence to show that they “took affirmative steps to ascertain [the FLSA’s] requirements,”

the second (objective) inquiry necessary to prove that a defendant is entitled to discretionary

relief from the FLSA’s liquidated damages provision. See Martin, 940 F.2d at 909 (stating that

the defendant’s “failure to inquire into [the requirements of the FLSA] precludes a determination

that the [defendant’s] subjective good faith was reasonable”). Defendants state in this regard that

they “did take steps to consider their compliance—it is undisputed they believed the ministerial

exception applied to the vocational programs at Liberty Ridge Farm.” (Doc. No. 68 at 18.) As

noted supra at note 8, to the Court’s understanding, Defendants’ brief in support of their motion

for reconsideration constitutes their first mention of the “ministerial exception” affirmative

defense. Also as noted supra at note 8, it is not obvious to the Court how that affirmative

defense to claims of employment discrimination brought by ministerial staff against their

employer would necessarily apply to this case in which the Secretary of Labor asserts claims for

violations of the FLSA, and Defendants offer no explanation as to its applicability. Defendants

have failed to identify a clear error of law or fact in connection with the Court’s determination

that Defendants are liable for liquidated damages.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion for reconsideration.

An appropriate Order follows.

s/ Yvette Kane

Yvette Kane, District Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania