Sanchez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

JOSE SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-383-JES-DNF

SHERIFF DAVID HARDIN, et al.,

Respondents.

___________________________________

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Petitioner Jose Eugenio Sanchez’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s

response. (Doc. 5). For the reasons below, the Court grants the

petition to the extent set forth in this Order.

I. Background

Sanchez is a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the

United States without inspection in 2009. (Doc. 1 at 1). He is

married to a United States citizen and is the father of five United

States citizen children. (Id. at 3.) Sanchez is actively pursuing

legal status. (Id. at 4). He has an approved immigrant visa

petition (Form I-130) and a pending Provisional unlawful presence

waiver (Form I-601A). His immigration proceedings were reopened

and terminated following a successful motion to reopen. (Id.)

Sanchez has no criminal record. (Id.)

Sanchez was taken into custody by Immigration and Customs

(Doc. 1 at 4). He is currently detained at the Glades County

Detention Center under the mandatory provisions of 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2). (Doc. 5 at 3). Sanchez now argues, among other

things, that he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §

1226(a). (Doc. 1 at 9–10).

II. Discussion

The core dispute before this Court is whether 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) applies to Sanchez. The distinction matters because §

1225(b)(2) mandates detention throughout removal proceedings,

whereas noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) have the right to a

bond hearing before an immigration judge.

Section 1225(b)(1) establishes the procedures for expedited

removal. It allows immigration officers to remove noncitizens

“without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).

As expedited removal affords substantially fewer protections to

the noncitizen's rights, the INA limits its applicability in two

ways. First, noncitizens may be eligible for expedited removal

“only if they are inadmissible on the basis that they either lack

proper entry documents or falsified or misrepresented their

application for admission.” Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights

v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48,61 (D.D.C. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§

1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). And “[a]mong that

set, only two categories of noncitizens are eligible for expedited

removal: (1) noncitizens ‘arriving in the United States,’ and (2)

noncitizens who ‘ha[ve] not been admitted or paroled into the

United States’ and cannot affirmatively show that they have been

‘physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-

year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of

inadmissibility.’ ” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–

(iii)).

Section 1226 of the INA also “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome

of removal proceedings[.]” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,

289 (2018). But § 1226 provides additional safeguards, including

the right to an individualized bond hearing. Id. at 306 (“Federal

regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive

bond hearings at the outset of detention.”)(citing 8 C.F.R. §§

236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). Noncitizens already in the country

are treated differently than those seeking entry. As the Supreme

Court observed, “our immigration laws have long made a distinction

between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission

. . . and those who are within the United States after an entry,

irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance, the Court

has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to

those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of

initial entry.’” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)

(quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206

(1953)); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)(“But

once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes,

for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the

United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is

lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). And until recently,

DHS has treated aliens—such as Sanchez—already present in the

country as detained under § 1226 and entitled to bond hearings.1

Respondents argue that Sanchez is properly detained under

section 1225(b).2 Indeed, the Court recognizes that in Buenrostro-

Mendez v. Bondi, et al., No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir.

Feb. 6. 2026), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—the only circuit

court to have addressed the issue thus far—recently concluded that

1 The Government’s recent about-face toward mass mandatory

detention under § 1225 was blessed by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) in In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I.& N. Dec. 216, 229

(B.I.A. 2025). But the Court owes no deference to the BIA’s

statutory interpretations. In 2024, the Supreme Court concluded

that “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory

ambiguities. Courts do.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603

U.S. 369, 400–01 (2024). And “[c]ourts interpret statutes, no

matter the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory

construction, not individual policy preferences.” Id. at 403.

2 In Patel v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-870-JES-NPM (M.D. Fla. Dec.

1, 2025), Respondents argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to

consider this petition and that the petitioner has not properly

exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court rejected those

arguments in Patel and in scores of other recent cases presenting

the same issues. See e.g., Cetino v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-1037-

JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. December 12, 2025); Reyes Rodriguez v. Florida

Southside Facility, No. 2:25-cv-1012-JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. December

15, 2025). In those cases, the Court was satisfied of its

jurisdiction and determined that exhaustion was excused because it

would be futile. The Court’s reasoning on these issues also

most noncitizens apprehended anywhere in the United States are

never eligible for release on bond, no matter how long they have

resided inside the United States. This is contrary to the

overwhelming majority of district court judges to have considered

the issue. This Court respectfully disagrees with the Fifth

Circuit’s analysis and notes that it is not binding precedent in

this Court. Thus, the Court rejects the government’s argument

that Sanchez is subject to expedited removal and concludes that

Respondents’ authority to detain him stems from section 1226(a).

As a noncitizen detained under section 1226(a), Sanchez has a right

to a bond hearing.

The Court will thus order Respondents to either bring Sanchez

before an immigration judge for a merit-based § 1226 bond hearing

or release him within ten days. At the hearing, the immigration

court must make findings as to whether Sanchez is a flight risk or

3

is a danger to the community. The Court is aware that the

Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) is the agency

that schedules bond hearings. In other cases, Respondents have

claimed they cannot direct the EOIR when to conduct a bond hearing.

3

In recent cases in the Middle District of Florida the

immigration judge has declined to provide a merit-based bond

hearing, determining that under Hurtado he had no discretion to

issue a bond. See e.g., Nahadian Fard v. Bondi, et al., No. 6:26-

cv-157-GAP-RMN, Doc. 23 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2026). If the

immigration judge in this case reaches the same conclusion,

Petitioner must be released.

Regardless, subjecting Sanchez to mandatory detention under §

1225 (6) (1) is unlawful. If Respondents are unable to ensure that

Sanchez timely receives the meaningful and thorough bond hearing

to which he is entitled under § 1226(a), they must release him.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Jose Sanchez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

1) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in this Order.

2, Within TEN (10) DAYS Respondents shall either provide

Sanchez with the statutory process required under § 1226—- which

includes a bond hearing at which findings are made as to whether

he is a flight risk or is a danger to the community—or release him

under reasonable conditions of supervision.

3. If Respondents release Sanchez, they shall facilitate

his transportation from the detention facility by notifying his

counsel when and where he may be collected.

4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions

and deadlines, enter judgment, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 10, 2026.

J9GHN E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE