Sebastian-Juan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

SEBASTIAN SEBASTIAN-JUAN,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-312-JES-NPM

JUAN AGUDELO, official

capacity, TODD LYONS,

official capacity, and

KRISTI NOEM, official

capacity,

Respondents.

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Petitioner Sebastian Sebastian-Juan’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and the government’s

response. (Doc. 8). For the reasons below, the Court grants the

petition to the extent set forth in this Order.

I. Background

Sebastian-Juan is a native and citizen of Guatemala who

entered the United States on July 26, 2018 at the age of seventeen.

(Doc. 1 at 4-5). He was briefly detained by border patrol at that

time before being released to a sponsor. (Doc. 8-1 at 2).

Sebastian-Juan has work authorization and pending I-589

application for asylum. (Doc. 1 at 5). He has no criminal history.

(Id.) Sebastian-Juan was detained by Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) on December 12, 2025 after a traffic stop. (Id.)

Sebastian-Juan is currently detained at Glades County

Detention Center under the mandatory detention provisions of 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Doc. 8 at 4). He now argues, among other

things, that he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §

1226(a). (Doc. 1 at 21).

II. Discussion

The core dispute before this Court is whether 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) applies to Sebastian-Juan. The distinction matters

because § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention throughout removal

proceedings, whereas noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) have the

right to a bond hearing before an immigration judge.

Section 1225(b)(1) establishes the procedures for expedited

removal. It allows immigration officers to remove noncitizens

“without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).

As expedited removal affords substantially fewer protections to

the noncitizen's rights, the INA limits its applicability in two

ways. First, noncitizens may be eligible for expedited removal

“only if they are inadmissible on the basis that they either lack

proper entry documents or falsified or misrepresented their

application for admission.” Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights

v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48,61 (D.D.C. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§

1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). And “[a]mong that

set, only two categories of noncitizens are eligible for expedited

removal: (1) noncitizens ‘arriving in the United States,’ and (2)

noncitizens who ‘ha[ve] not been admitted or paroled into the

United States’ and cannot affirmatively show that they have been

‘physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-

year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of

inadmissibility.’ ” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–

(iii)).

Section 1226 of the INA also “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome

of removal proceedings[.]” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,

289 (2018). But § 1226 provides additional safeguards, including

the right to an individualized bond hearing. Id. at 306 (“Federal

regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive

bond hearings at the outset of detention.”)(citing 8 C.F.R. §§

236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). Noncitizens already in the country

are treated differently than those seeking entry. As the Supreme

Court observed, “our immigration laws have long made a distinction

between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission

. . . and those who are within the United States after an entry,

irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance, the Court

has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to

those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of

initial entry.’” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)

(quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206

(1953)); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)(“But

once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes,

for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the

United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is

lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). And until recently,

DHS has treated aliens—such as Sebastian-Juan—already present in

the country as detained under § 1226 and entitled to bond hearings.1

Respondents argue that Sebastian-Juan is properly detained

under section 1225(b).2 Indeed, the Court recognizes that in

1 The Government’s recent about-face toward mass mandatory

detention under § 1225 was blessed by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) in In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I.& N. Dec. 216, 229

(B.I.A. 2025). But the Court owes no deference to the BIA’s

statutory interpretations. In 2024, the Supreme Court concluded

that “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory

ambiguities. Courts do.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603

U.S. 369, 400–01 (2024). And “[c]ourts interpret statutes, no

matter the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory

construction, not individual policy preferences.” Id. at 403.

2 In Patel v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-870-JES-NPM (M.D. Fla. Dec.

1, 2025), Respondents argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to

consider this petition and that the petitioner has not properly

exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court rejected those

arguments in Patel and in scores of other recent cases presenting

the same issues. See e.g., Cetino v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-1037-

JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. December 12, 2025); Reyes Rodriguez v. Florida

Southside Facility, No. 2:25-cv-1012-JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. December

15, 2025). In those cases, the Court was satisfied of its

jurisdiction and determined that exhaustion was excused because it

would be futile. The Court’s reasoning on these issues also

applies here.

Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, et al., No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330

(5th Cir. Feb. 6. 2026), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—the

only circuit court to have addressed the issue thus far—recently

concluded that most noncitizens apprehended anywhere in the United

States are never eligible for release on bond, no matter how long

they have resided inside the United States. This is contrary to

the overwhelming majority of district court judges to have

considered the issue. This Court respectfully disagrees with the

Fifth Circuit’s analysis and notes that it is not binding precedent

in this Court.

The government could have prosecuted this case and designated

Sebastian-Juan for expedited removal when he entered the country

in 2018. Instead, they released him to the custody of a sponsor

and allowed him to stay for more than seven years before re-

arresting him. Thus, the Court rejects the government’s argument

that Sebastian-Juan is subject to expedited removal and concludes

that Respondents’ authority to detain him stems from section

1226(a). As a noncitizen detained under section 1226(a),

Sebastian-Juan has a right to a bond hearing.

The Court will thus order Respondents to either bring

Sebastian-Juan before an immigration judge for a merit-based §

1226 bond hearing or release him within ten days. At the hearing,

the immigration court must make findings as to whether Sebastian-

3

Juan is a flight risk or is a danger to the community. The Court

is aware that the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”)

is the agency that schedules bond hearings. In other cases,

Respondents have claimed they cannot direct the EOIR when to

conduct a bond hearing. Regardless, subjecting Sebastian-Juan to

mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) is unlawful. If Respondents

are unable to ensure that Sebastian-Juan timely receives the

meaningful and thorough bond hearing to which he is entitled under

§ 1226(a), they must release him.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Sebastian Sebastian-Juan’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in this Order.

2. Within TEN (10) DAYS Respondents shall either provide

Sebastian-Juan with the statutory process required under § 1226—

which includes a merit-based bond hearing—or release him under

reasonable conditions of supervision.

3

In recent cases in the Middle District of Florida the

immigration judge has declined to provide a merit-based bond

hearing, determining that under Hurtado he had no discretion to

issue a bond. See e.g., Nahadian Fard v. Bondi, et al., No. 6:26-

cv-157-GAP-RMN, Doc. 23 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2026). If the

immigration judge in this case reaches the same conclusion,

Petitioner must be released.

3. If Respondents release Sebastian-Juan, they shall

facilitate his transportation from the detention facility by

notifying his counsel when and where he may be collected.

5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions

and deadlines, enter judgment, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 10, 2026.

— OL

JGHH E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE