Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GARNET SMITH :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : No. 24-cv-1422

:

WELLPATH, LLC, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. March 30, 2026

United States District Judge

Garnet Smith asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two Wellpath doctors, Dr.

Anthony Letizio and Dr. Saeed Bazel, and the SCI Phoenix Health Care Administrator, Britney

Huner. He alleges that he was denied medical treatment for chronic skin conditions when he was

housed at SCI Pheonix. All three Defendants have moved to dismiss the claims asserted against

them.1 For the reasons that follow, Huner’s Motion will be granted in part and denied in part and

all claims asserted against Dr. Bazel and Dr. Letizio will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

A. Alleged Facts

Since as early as 2015, Smith has suffered from “severe” skin conditions, such as chronic

dermatitis, eczema, psoriasis, lichen planus, and others, and has used topical creams such as

1 Wellpath, LLC was also a movant in the Motion to Dismiss filed by Dr. Bazel and Dr.

Letizio. However, Smith has voluntarily dismissed his claims against Wellpath and has

indicated that he wishes to proceed only against the Doctors and Huner. (See ECF No. 42.)

2 The factual allegations are taken from the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 29) and any

exhibits attached to the parties’ briefing that are incorporated into the Amended Complaint by

reference, such as grievance documents. Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 261 n.1 (3d Cir.

2018). The Court adopts the sequential pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

hydrocortisone to treat these conditions. (Am. Compl. at 9.) In 2022, Smith made multiple sick

call requests for “severely chronic pain from dermatitis” because the topical creams were not

helping but instead “exacerbating” his skin conditions. (Id.) One request was made specifically

to Huner on November 22, 2022. (Id.) Three days later, Smith was seen by a physician’s

assistant named Kirklin Mitchell, who prescribed medications and scheduled Smith for a skin

biopsy. (Id. at 9-10.) From December of 2022 through January of 2023, Smith “repeatedly

complained” to Huner about “agonizing pain from [his] chronic dermatology problems” and the

“discontinuation of medication for painful rashes [and] itching.”3 (Id. at 5, 10.) However, due to

a “dispute with Huner concerning payment for chronic medical care,” Smith was denied medical

treatment over the course of those two months until he was finally seen by Dr. Bazel on January

11, 2023. (Id. at 10.)

During the January 11, 2023 appointment, Dr. Bazel performed a biopsy on Smith’s left

knee and renewed a topical medication. (Id.) Dr. Bazel later wrote in Smith’s record that the

biopsy showed eczema, psoriasis, and possible lichen planus; that Smith’s case exhibited

“treatment failure;” and that a “dermatologist consult will be considered, after authorization.”

(Id. at 10-11.) On February 14, 2023, Smith was “rushed to triage” on an emergency basis for

his “agonizing body rashes and itching” and seen by CRNP Ashley Senkowski. (Id. at 11.)

Senkowski prescribed Smith a higher dose of hydrocortisone with lotrimin but would not agree

to schedule him for an outside dermatology consult unless the creams proved ineffective. (Id.)

Smith was charged for the “emergency sick call request” and for the medication he was

3 Smith alleges that Huner was the “overseer” of the medical department and was tasked

with the day-to-day “operation, supervision, and provision of health care services to inmates of

SCI Pheonix.” (Am. Compl. at 5.)

prescribed, despite his skin condition being chronic. (Id.) Pursuant to DOC policy, inmates are

provided free medical care for “documented chronic illnesses.” (Id.)

During the three months of February through April of 2023, Smith “repeatedly

complained to Huner [through] DC-153 slips” about the discontinuation of his medications for

pain and of the treatment of his skin condition “due to payment disputes.” (Id.) He was seen in

triage by Dr. Bazel on April 18, 2023, who noted that his conditions were getting worse and that

he was not responding to conventional therapy. (Id. at 12.) Dr. Bazel referred him for a

“telederm consult” and performed a biopsy of Smith’s upper chest area. (Id.) Two days later, on

April 20, 2023, Smith was seen in the wound care clinic, where it was discovered that Smith

developed a staph infection at his biopsy site. (Id.) On April 29, 2023, the antibiotic and pain

medications he needed for the infected biopsy incision were discontinued “by CHCA Huner and

medical staff because of a payment dispute.” (Id.) In May of 2023, Smith sent DC-135A request

slips to Dr. Letizio, Dr. Bazel, Huner, and others about the discontinuation of his pain medication

for his staph infection and other dermatological issues. (Id.) He also requested an in-person

consultation with a dermatologist. (Id.) The Defendants did not respond to his request. (Id.)

On May 5, 2023, Smith filed grievance number 1033099 concerning the “prolonged pain

and suffering” he was experiencing due to the “inordinate delay or the complete denial of

medical care and medicine” for his staph infection and for his worsening skin conditions, which

by this point had already caused him “permanent damage . . . psychologically, emotionally, and

physically.” (Id.) The grievance names Dr. Letizio, Dr. Bazel, other medical providers, and the

“medical administrator.” (Id. at 12; ECF No. 44 at 25.) Grievance number 1033099 was denied

on June 1, 2023, and Smith appealed the denial on June 9, 2023. (Am. Compl. 13.) Smith stated

in his appeal that all of his medications were discontinued with no reason, which caused him to

have to make sick call requests at his own expense. (Id.) The denial was upheld by the

Superintendent on July 5, 2023, and upheld by the Chief Grievance Officer on November 14,

2023. (Id. at 14.)

Shortly after filing the grievance, Smith had a “telemedical consultation” with an

outside dermatologist, who prescribed Smith pain medication and “intensive dermatological

treatment for 6-8 weeks.” (Id. at 13.) Smith states that he never received the medication. (Id. at

14.) From June 2023 through October 2023, Smith sent several inmate request slips to medical

staff, including Dr. Letizio and Huner, in which he complained about the discontinuation of his

medications for his chronic skin conditions and related pain. (Id. at 14.) Smith alleges that

because his grievance (No. 1033099) was pending at the time, no Defendant responded to his

inmate requests.4 (Id.) Smith states that his pain was so severe during these months that he

contemplated suicide. (Id.) On October 21, 2023, Smith attended another telehealth consultation

with an outside dermatologist, during which he complained that he was being denied medication.

(Id.) When the consultation ended, several unidentified nurses said to Smith, “we don’t treat

inmates [who] file grievances.” (Id.) Smith was never transported to an in-person dermatologist

consultation. (Id. at 14-15.)

Based on these allegations, Smith asserts claims for deliberate indifference and retaliation

against all Defendants and an additional negligence claim against the Wellpath Doctors. (Id. at

18-26.) He seeks money damages.

4 In his Response, Smith discussed a June 12, 2023 grievance (No. 1038242) he filed

against Huner about the “co-pay issue.” (See ECF No. 44 at 16.) Although Smith purports to

attach a copy of the grievance (see id. at 23-24), it is so faint or illegible and cannot be verified

by the Court.

B. Relevant Procedural History

Smith commenced this action by filing an initial Complaint on April 5, 2024. (ECF No.

1.) The Court granted Smith leave to proceed in forma pauperis, screened his complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and directed that it be served for a responsive pleading. (ECF No. 5.)

Smith filed an Amended Complaint, the operative pleading in this case, on October 21, 2024.

(ECF No. 20.) Dr. Bazel and Dr. Letizio filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on

November 12, 2024 (ECF No. 33), and Huner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint

on November 14, 2024 (ECF No. 34). Just after these motions were filed, on November 15,

2024, Defendants Wellpath, LLC, Dr. Letizio, and Dr. Bazel filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy

and Notice of Stay in light of the Voluntary Petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the

United States Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas,

Houston Division (Case No. 24-90533), filed by Wellpath Holdings, Inc. (ECF No. 35.) This

case was stayed pending the bankruptcy. (See ECF No. 37.) After Confirmation of the Plan of

Reorganization filed by Wellpath Holdings, Inc., see In Re Wellpath Holdings, Inc., No. 24-

90533 (Bankr. S.D. Tx. May 1, 2025) (Bankr. Doc. No. 2596), the stay was lifted by Order dated

May 27, 2025 (ECF No. 39). The Court’s Order also directed Smith to respond to Huner’s

Motion to Dismiss within thirty (30) days and directed the Wellpath Defendants to show cause as

to the effect of Wellpath’s Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation on Smith’s claims against them. (Id.)

The Wellpath Defendants responded to the Court’s Order by contending that Smith’s

claims against Wellpath are discharged and that they were not sure if Smith had opted in or out

of the Third-Party Release applicable to claims against non-Debtor Wellpath employees such as

Dr. Letizio and Dr. Bazel. (ECF No. 41.) Smith responded to the Order by stating that he no

longer wished to proceed against Wellpath but did wish to proceed against Huner, Dr. Bazel, and

Dr. Letizio. (ECF No. 42.) In a July 29, 2025 letter to Wellpath’s counsel, Smith indicated that

he intended to opt out of the Plan’s Third-Party Release.5 (ECF No. 46.) Smith also filed a

Response to Huner’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 44.) Huner filed a Reply. (ECF No. 45.)

On September 6, 2025, Smith advised that he would soon be released from prison and provided

an address where he could be contacted. (ECF No. 48.)

On October 6, 2025, the Court entered an Order directing Smith to respond to Dr. Bazel

and Dr. Letizio’s Motion to Dismiss within thirty (30) days. (ECF No. 49.) The Order was

served on Smith at the address he provided to the Court. (Id.) On December 4, 2025, Dr. Bazel

and Dr. Letizio filed a “Response” to the Order, requesting the Court to rule on their Motion to

Dismiss as unopposed, as Smith has not responded to it within the deadline provided. (ECF No.

50.) On March 13, 2026, Dr. Bazel and Dr. Letizio filed a “Notice” with the Court, again

requesting an order dismissing their claims as unopposed and noting that Smith appears to have

abandoned his claims. (ECF No. 51.) Dr. Bazel and Dr. Letizio served both the December 4,

2025 Response and the March 13, 2026 Notice on Smith at the address he provided to the Court.

Smith never responded to Dr. Bazel and Dr. Letizio’s Motion to Dismiss. It has been over a year

since the Motion was filed and over five months since the Court last ordered him to respond.

II. HUNER’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in

whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “A 12(b)(6)

5 Counsel for Bazel and Letizio advised the Court that the document was sufficient to opt

out of the Third-Party Release. (ECF No. 47.)

motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint.” Kost v. Kozakiewicz,

1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court

must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.) “Although the plausibility

standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809

F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It is the

defendants’ burden to show that a complaint fails to state a claim. See Hedges v. United States,

404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the

“defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented”).

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits

attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents

if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,

230 (3d Cir. 2010). To determine whether a complaint filed by a pro se litigant states a claim, a

court must accept the facts alleged as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,

and “ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed contains facts sufficient to state a

plausible . . . claim.” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up),

abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir.

2024); see also Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).

B. Discussion

Smith asserts constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, the vehicle by which federal

constitutional claims may be brought against state actors in federal court. “To state a claim

under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws

of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person

acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In a § 1983 action, the

personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required

element, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events

and occurrences giving rise to the claims. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d

Cir. 1998).

Huner first argues that all official capacity claims against her should be dismissed. The

Court agrees. “Official capacity claims are indistinguishable from claims against the

governmental entity that employs” the defendant, here the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections (“DOC”). See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-

capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of

which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

690, n.55 (1978)). Because the DOC is an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, it is

not a “person” subject to liability under § 1983, and is in any event entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190,

195 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that, “[b]ecause the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s

Department of Corrections is a part of the executive department of the Commonwealth, it shares

in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity” and is also not considered a person for

purposes of § 1983). Thus, official capacity claims against Huner are really claims against the

Commonwealth, which is shielded from § 1983 suits by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See

Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Eleventh Amendment

immunity bars actions for retroactive relief against state officers acting in their official

capacity.”). Accordingly, Huner’s Motion will be granted as to the official capacity claims.

These claims will be dismissed.

Huner argues that all individual capacity claims asserted against her should be dismissed

for two principal reasons, neither of which have merit. First, Huner contends that Smith failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies against her because grievance no. 1033099 failed to mention

her by name. The PLRA “mandates that prisoners exhaust internal prison grievance procedures

before filing suit.” Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013); see 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). The PLRA requires

proper exhaustion, meaning “complet[ing] the administrative review process in accordance with

the applicable procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006). These procedural

rules are supplied by the individual prisons. Jones v. Block, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (“[I]t is

the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”);

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (determining whether “a prisoner has

‘properly’ exhausted a claim . . . is made by evaluating the prisoner’s compliance with the

prison’s administrative regulations governing inmate grievances”).

In grievance No. 1033099, Smith complains about the “prolonged pain and suffering” he

experienced due to the discontinuation of his medications and care for his staph infection and

chronic skin conditions. (Am. Compl. at 12-13.) He specifically names Dr. Bazel and Dr.

Letizio and other medical providers by their names. (Id. at 13.) Smith does not identify Huner

by name but instead refers to her by her title, “medical administrator.” (Id.) The DOC’s

applicable grievance policy, DC-ADM 804, sets forth a three-step process for review of inmate

grievances and specifically requires inmates to “identify individuals directly involved in the

event(s).”6 However, “exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later

sued was not named in the grievances.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 219; see also Spruill, 372 F.3d at

225, 234 (“[T]he purpose of the regulation here is to put the prison officials on notice of the

persons claimed to be guilty of wrongdoing. As such, the prison can excuse an inmate’s failure

to do so by identifying the unidentified persons and acknowledging that they were fairly within

the compass of the prisoner’s grievance.”).

Here, Smith states that he did not know Huner’s name at the time he drafted grievance

1033099, so instead referred to her by her title. This is sufficient to put the prison on notice that

Smith intended to assert a claim against Huner, the health care administrator at SCI Phoenix at

that time. See Travillion v. Wetzel, 765 F. App’x 785, 789 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (noting

that reference to defendants in grievance as “RHU Staff and Unit Management” was sufficient to

comply with DC-ADM 804 §1(A)(11)); see also Godfrey v. Little, No. 22 -892, 2025 WL

2792250, at *16 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025) (“Thus, courts have found a plaintiff fully exhausted

their claims even though they did not include a defendant’s name in their grievance where the

6 The policy is also available online at https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-

pagov/en/cor/documents/about-us/doc-policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievances.pdf (last visited

Mar. 27 , 2026).

plaintiff provided the title of the unnamed prison official or a functional description of the prison

official’s job.”). Smith properly exhausted his claims against Huner.

Second, Huner contends that the Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege facts

showing that she acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. To state a

constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical treatment, a prisoner must allege

facts indicating that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). A prison official is not deliberately

indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “Mere

negligence is not sufficient.” Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2012) (per

curiam) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “A medical need is serious, . . . if it

is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that

a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty.

Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted).

Deliberate indifference is properly alleged “where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s

need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical

treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or

recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A

serious medical need exists where “failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and

unnecessary suffering.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).

Smith alleges that, over the course of nearly a year, from November 2022 through

October 2023, he repeatedly wrote to Huner—through inmate requests, DC-153 slips, DC-135A

slips, and prison grievances—about his chronic skin conditions, the “agonizing pain” they

caused, and his need for medications to treat them. (Am. Compl. at 10-14.) Smith also alleges

that despite repeatedly putting her on notice, Huner continually denied Smith his medications

and the treatment for his skin conditions—medications and treatments that had been prescribed

by doctors—because of “payment disputes.” (Id.) Smith further alleges that Huner also

discontinued his antibiotic and pain medications to treat a staph infection he developed at the

infected biopsy site, again because of a “payment dispute.” (Id. at 12.)

“[I]f necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons, a case of deliberate

indifference has been made out.” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346. Deliberate indifference can also be

established “where prison officials erect arbitrary and burdensome procedures that result in

interminable delays and outright denials of medical care to suffering inmates.” Id. at 347

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Smith has alleged sufficient facts to reasonably

infer that Huner delayed or denied him necessary medical treatment for his skin conditions for

non-medical reasons. See id. (stating the prison officials may not “condition provision of needed

medical services on an inmate’s ability or willingness to pay”); Gioffre v. County of Bucks, No.

08-4232, 2009 WL 3617742, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2009) (finding that plaintiff adequately pled

deliberate indifference against non-medical personnel who ratified policy or practice whereby

drug users were denied necessary medications for “impermissible financial reasons”); see also

Moriarty v. De LaSalle, No. 12-3013, 2014 WL 7011169, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2014) (stating

that “when a prescribed medical treatment is denied, reduced or changed for non-medical

reasons, including financial, administrative or logistical, the so-denied/reduced/changed

treatment suggests an act of deliberate indifference”). Thus, Smith has plausibly alleged that

Huner was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs to state an Eighth Amendment

claim.7 Accordingly, Huner’s Motion to Dismiss will be denied.

III. DR. LETIZIO AND DR. BAZEL’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allows for the dismissal of an action when a

plaintiff fails to prosecute the case, fails to comply with the rules of procedure, or fails to comply

with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “A District Court has the authority to dismiss a

suit sua sponte for failure to prosecute by virtue of its inherent powers and pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” See Sebrell ex rel. Sebrell v. Phila. Police Dep’t, 159 F. App’x

371, 373 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31

(1962)). Ordinarily, a court determining whether to sua sponte dismiss a case because of a

plaintiff’s failure to prosecute must consider several factors as set forth in Poulis v. State Farm

Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). See, e.g., Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-

55 (3d Cir. 1994). However, an analysis under Poulis usually is not required when a plaintiff

willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F.

App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that

he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff’s behavior is so contumacious as

7 Huner also contends that her status as the prison Health Care Administrator is not

sufficient to establish the requisite personal involvement to state a constitutional claim under

§ 1983. This argument is easily rejected. Smith’s allegations against Huner are not based on

Huner’s status as a health care administrator alone. Rather, he alleges her personal involvement

in a systematic way by which Huner repeatedly denied or delayed treatment for his skin

conditions for non-medical reasons. See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346. This is sufficient to state a

deliberate indifference claim. Finally, Huner contends that Smith fails to state a retaliation claim

because he did not specifically identify her in his grievance, and thus, he failed to properly

exhaust this claim. As the Court already determined, however, Smith properly exhausted his

claims since he identified Huner by her title even though he did not provide her name in the

grievance.

to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”);

Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court

need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons

her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).

In the context of a pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss a case where the plaintiff has failed to respond thereto

is effectively akin to sanctioning the plaintiff for failing to comply with a local rule or court

order, and a “drastic” sanction like dismissal with prejudice requires a Poulis analysis. See

Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 29-30 (3d Cir. 1991). A court cannot grant a Rule 12

motion as “unopposed” or “uncontested” without a Poulis analysis. See, e.g., Washington v.

Wenerowicz, No. 21-2741, 2022 WL 39870, at *2 n.5 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 2022) (per curiam); Adkins

v. Reynolds, 788 F. App’x 824, 828 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam). That is so even if, as here, the

plaintiff has been ordered to respond and fails to do so. See Brzozowski v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 738

F. App’x 731, 734 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, the Court will consider the Poulis factors

to determine whether it is appropriate to dismiss Smith’s claims against Dr. Letizio and Dr.

Bazel for failure to prosecute.

B. Discussion

In Poulis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit articulated six factors

to consider when determining whether to dismiss an action due to a plaintiff’s failure to

prosecute:

(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the

adversary . . . ; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or

the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other

than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the

meritoriousness of the claim or defense.

747 F.2d at 868 (emphasis omitted). When balancing the Poulis factors, there is no “magic

formula,” “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and all six factors need not be satisfied for a

court to dismiss a complaint. See Briscoe v. Klause, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008). In this

case, an assessment of the Poulis factors weighs in favor of dismissing Smith’s claims against

Dr. Letizio and Dr. Bazel for failure to prosecute.

As to the first Poulis factor, the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, it is Smith’s

sole responsibility to prosecute his case and comply with Court orders since he is proceed pro se.

See id. at 258-59 (explaining that “a pro se plaintiff is personally responsible for complying with

the court’s orders” and “it is logical to hold a pro se plaintiff personally responsible for delays in

his case because a pro se plaintiff is solely responsible for the progress of his case”); Emerson v.

Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002) (where litigant was proceeding pro se, any failure

to comply with orders was attributable to him). On August 23, 2025, Smith requested an

informal stay through October 1, 2025, due to his pending release from prison. (ECF No. 48).

He also attached a copy of a letter sent to defense counsel the same day, which included his

change of address. (Id.) On October 6, 2025, he was ordered to file a response to Dr. Letizio

and Dr. Bazel’s Motion within thirty days, which was mailed to his new address. (ECF No. 49.)

The Defendants’ December 4, 2025 Response and March 13, 2026 Notice were also mailed to

Smith at the address he provided to the Court. (ECF Nos. 50 & 51.) More than five months

have passed since the Order was entered, and Smith has neither filed a response to the Motion

nor communicated with the Court in any other respect since his release. Moreover, nothing on

the docket suggests that Smith did not receive the Order, which was sent to the address he

provided to the Court where he would be staying after his release.8 Smith, as a self-represented

litigant, is solely responsible for complying with the Court’s orders. Smith appears to have

abandoned his claims against Dr. Letizio and Dr. Bazel. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor

of dismissal.

The second factor, prejudice to the defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal.

“Examples of prejudice include ‘the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of

witnesses’ memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the

opposing party.’” Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emp. Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d

Cir. 1994) (quoting Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1984)). “[W]hile ‘prejudice’

for the purpose of Poulis analysis does not mean ‘irremediable harm,’ the burden imposed by

impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently

prejudicial.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). It is unclear how

this case could proceed against Dr. Bazel and Dr. Letizio without Smith’s participation. “Simply

put, there is no way for Defendants to defend against Plaintiff’s claims in his absence.” Stephen

v. United States Attorney Gen., No. 18-0615, 2020 WL 832914, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2020).

Accordingly, requiring Defendants to proceed in this context would be prejudicial.

The third factor, a history of dilatoriness, must be assessed over the lifetime of the case,

keeping in mind that “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at

261. However, “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of

dilatoriness, such as . . . consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at

874. Although Smith never technically missed a filing deadline aside from his response to Dr.

8 There is also no indication that either the Response or Notice mailed to Smith by

Defendants was undeliverable.

Bazel’s Motion to Dismiss, Smith has a history of delaying the case by requests for extensions of

time. (See, e.g. ECF Nos. 22, 26, 38, 48). Having been granted the extension following his

release, Smith nevertheless failed to respond to the Motion to Dismiss, nor has he made any

other communications with the Court in more than six months. This factor therefore weighs in

favor of dismissal or is, at best, neutral.

The fourth factor, whether the plaintiff’s conduct was willful or in bad faith, also weighs

in favor of dismissal. As noted above, Smith has been expressly instructed on what he was

required to do to prosecute his claims against Dr. Letizio and Dr. Bazel, namely respond to their

pending Motion to Dismiss. The Order directing him to respond was sent to the address Smith

provided to the Court. Moreover, Smith was served with the Defendants’ December 4, 2025

Response to Court Order and March 13, 2026 Notice, both of which express that Smith must

have abandoned his claims against them because he has not responded. Smith’s failure to file a

response to the Motion, especially after accusations of abandonment, may fairly be understood as

willful.

An examination of the fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal,

reveals that no other sanction would be effective. Smith is proceeding pro se and his apparent

refusal to respond to the pending Motion, if left unaddressed, would be a complete barrier to his

claims against Dr. Letizio and Dr. Bazel proceeding beyond the pleadings stage. Moreover, it

would cause further delay for the other Defendant, Britney Huner, who is defending against

claims asserted against her. Given the procedural posture of this case, Smith’s pro se and in

forma pauperis status, and Smith’s apparent unwillingness to prosecute his claims against Dr.

Letizio and Dr. Bazel by responding to their pending Motion, it is difficult to determine what

lesser sanction might be available or appropriate in this context. See Adonai-Adoni v. King, 506

F. App’x 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Because Adonai-Adoni proceeded pro se and in

forma pauperis, monetary sanctions were not a viable form of alternative sanction.”); Guyer v.

Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1430 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of case where dilatory conduct

“made adjudication of the case impossible [because] any lesser sanction would not have

furthered the interests of justice”). As such, no other sanction would be effective. The fifth

factor thus weighs in favor of dismissal.

Under the sixth Poulis factor, the Court must consider if the claims or defenses are

meritorious. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70 (“A claim or defense, will be deemed meritorious

when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff

or would constitute a complete defense.”). As the Court previously determined when it screened

Smith’s Amended Complaint and ordered it to be served on the Defendants, Smith has stated

plausible deliberate indifference claims against Dr. Bazel and Dr. Letizio. However, the other

Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal. A plaintiff may have a meritorious claim, but he must

prosecute that claim in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s

orders to prove that claim and entitle him to judgment if warranted. When a plaintiff fails to

participate in the legal process, those claims cannot move forward.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Britney Huner’s

Motion to Dismiss. It will be granted as to the official capacity claims and denied as to all

individual capacity claims. In addition, the Court concludes that the Poulis factors weigh in

favor of dismissing Smith’s claims against Dr. Bazel and Dr. Letizio pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 41(b) for Smith’s failure to prosecute. Simply put, there is no way for his claims

against these Defendants to proceed without Smith’s participation. An appropriate order will be

filed separately.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.

JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.

United States District Judge