Lyons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NELSON ELMER VALLES

AGUILLAR, A206 529 380,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-00756

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director,

Immigration and Customs

Enforcement, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM

On March 24, 2026, the petitioner, appearing through counsel, filed

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc.

1. In this petition, Nelson Elmer Valles Aguillay, a native and citizen of

Peru, challenges the legality of his pre-removal-order immigration

detention without an individualized bond hearing. At the time of filing,

Valles Aguillar was being held in the custody of United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Clinton County

Correctional Facility, located in Clinton County, Pennsylvania.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Valles Aguillar has resided in the United States since 2018. He

entered the United States without inspection on an unknown date and at

an unknown location.

Valles Aguillar resides in South Williamsport, Pennsylvania. He is

married to a United States citizen, who has filed a DHS Form I[-1380

petition for alien relative seeking a visa on his behalf. That petition

remains pending, Prior to his detention, Valles Aguillar was employed,

and he has no criminal record.

On February 26, 2026, ICE officers arrested Valles Aguillar as he

left his residence. Following his arrest, Valles Aguillar was served witha

Notice to Appear, DHS Form 1-862, dated February 26, 2026, which

declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the United

States who has not been admitted or paroled,”! and which directed him

to appear for a hearing before an immigration judge in Elizabeth, New

Jersey, on March 10, 2026. Resp. Ex. 2, at 2, Doc. 4-3.

Valles Aguillar was then transported to Clinton County

Correctional Facility, where he remains in civil immigration detention.

He has been denied any opportunity to post bond or to be released on

1 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring him to be an “arriving

alien” was not checked. Resp. Ex. 2, at 2, Doc. 4-3.

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other conditions.

II. DISCUSSION

Since the United States began restricting

immigration into this country in the late 19th century,

it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking

entry into the country and those already residing

within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”

who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do

not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded

to persons inside the United States. But once a

noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal

circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to

due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s

borders, “whether their presence here is lawful,

unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction

between noncitizens who have entered and reside in

the United States and those who have not yet entered

“runs throughout immigration law.”

Quiada Cordoba v. Knight, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first

quoting Kaplan v, Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted).

Consistent with this distinction, “[t}wo statutory sections govern

the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225 and 1226.” Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-7429 (8th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law

authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission

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into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the

outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).

Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is

present in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an

‘applicant for admission.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).

Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who (A) are arriving in the

United States, see § 1225(b)(1)(AM) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years

without being admitted or paroled, see § 1225(b)(1)(A)Gu) (the

“designation provision”),2 and (B) are inadmissible either for

2 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of

aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of

aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, see

§ 1225(b)(1)(a) Gi), but the current scope of that designation is “the full

scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been

admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been

physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year

period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited

(continued on next page)

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misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to

the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation. See

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); see also § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of

documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited

removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have

such a fear, until removal. See § 1225(b)(1)(B). See generally Make the

Rd. N.Y, v. Wolf 962 F.3d 612, 618-20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing

expedited removal provisions); Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 811 F.

Supp. 3d 274, 291-92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same); Coal, for Humane

Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59-64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).

removal under § 1225(b)( 1). See Designating Aliens for Expedited

Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025); see also Make the Rd. NY. v.

Wolf 962 F.3d 612, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview

of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)Gi)); Coal. for Humane

Immigrant Rts. v, Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62-64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),

appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).

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Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader .. . catchall provision” that applies

to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the

United States.3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287.

Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary

(not expedited) removal proceedings. See § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also id.

§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration

judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory

detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.

See § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of

Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting

removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on

land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be

returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather

than be detained); Quijada Cordoba, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1118 (“Section

1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow

humanitarian parole.”).

Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to

3 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to

those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not

relevant here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).

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detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of

removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are

already present in the United States may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).

Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for

these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a

warrant issued by the Attorney General,“! an alien may be arrested and

detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that

such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain

pending. Jd. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide

that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that

such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the

alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.FR. §§ 236.1(¢)(8),

1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities® are tasked with an initial bond or

{This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has

been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in

the applicable regulations. See 8 C.FR. § 287.5(e)(2); see also id.

§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).

5 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue

arrest warrants, See 8 C.FR. §§ 286.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).

7.

custody determination, see id. §§ 236.1(c){8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the

alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration

judge, see id, §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); see also § 1003.19 (setting out

procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges).

See generally Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 8397 (2019) (“If the alien is

detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the

Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge

(both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that

he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.) (citations

omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can

be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(8). See generally Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty,

Corr, Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (8d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a)

bond procedures).

Finally, “Section 1226(c)... carves out a statutory category of

aliens who may not be released under § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require

mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond

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hearing under § 1226(a). See8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may

only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a

determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a

flight risk or a danger to the community. See id. § 1226(c)(4); see also

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289.

The petitioner in this case, Nelson Elmer Valles Aguillar, has been

detained by immigration authorities without a bond determination

pending disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.® In his

petition, Valles Aguillar argues that, because he was detained within the

interior of the United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre-

removal-order detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that he

may only be properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that he

be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Valles

6 The parties appear to agree that the petitioner has been putatively

detained without an opportunity for a bond determination pursuant to

§ 1225(b)(2). The respondent has identified no other basis for his

detention. Moreover, the petitioner has not been placed in expedited

removal proceedings, as would be expected for a § 1225(b)(1) detainee, he

has no criminal record to qualify him for mandatory detention under

§ 1226(c), and immigration officials have refused to give him a bond

hearing, as required under § 1226(a).

. 9

Aguillar further asserts a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act

(“APA”) based on the agency’s failure to follow its own bond regulations.7

In addition to these statutory arguments, Valles Aguillar argues that his

pre-removal detention without an opportunity to be considered for

release on bond violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights.8

The respondent, on the other hand, argues that § 1225(b)(2) does

properly apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory

detention.? The respondent further argues that applying § 1225(b)(2)

here comports with due process.10

The respondent purports to have detained Valles Aguillar pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides for mandatory detention without

the opportunity for release on bond. The petitioner, however, contends

7 Having granted relief on the basis of the petitioner’s primary

statutory claim—that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than

§ 1225(b)(2)—we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative argument

that his detention violates the APA.

8 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach the

constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for

relief. See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485

U.S. 439, 445 (988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of

judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional

questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”).

9 We note that the respondent’s answer does not engage with the

petitioner’s APA claim at all. In any event, see supra note 7.

10 See supra note 8.

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that he could only be properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and

under that statute, he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.

“[Flor section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be

met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine

that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking

admission’; and (8) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)), appeal dismissed, No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.

Dec. 23, 2025); see also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (citing

Martinez); Ramirez-Montoya v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL

3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (citing Martinez and Kashranov);

Carrero Romero v. Lowe, No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing Ramirez-Montoya). Significantly, “Section

1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is both an applicant for

admission and ‘seeking admission.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 31883899, at *6

(emphasis in original); see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at

*4 (citing Kashranov and Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d 397,

406 (D.N.J. 2025)); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

Ramirez-Montoya).

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Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[aln alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives

in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase

“seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit

have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe

“active and ongoing conduct—-physically attempting to come into the

United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” Kashranov, 2025

WL 3188399, at *6; see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4

(citing Kashranov); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing

Ramirez-Montoya). “This reading preserves the distinction between

‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’

ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” Kashranov,

2025 WL 3188399, at *6; see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045,

at *4 (quoting Kashranov); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4

(quoting Ramirez-Montoya). It also comports with the Supreme Court’s

finding in Jennings that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking

entry into the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297; Ramirez

Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting Jennings); Carrero Romero,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Jennings and Ramirez-Montoya). “In

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sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to

individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those

already within the country.” Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4; see

also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory

context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates

inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”).

By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized,

“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” Jennings,

583 U.S. at 303; see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

Jennings). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by

permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants

for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it

“permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” Jennings,

583 U.S. at 303; see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting

Jennings); Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 8709045, at *“5 (Unlike

§ 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[U]nder Section 1226(a) and its implementing

regulations, lan alien discretionarily detained pending removal

proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge

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at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence

that he poses a danger to the communityl] or... that he is a flight risk,

if it seeks to continue detaining him.” Gomes v. Hyde, 804 FE. Supp. 3d

265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);1! see also YZ. v. Soto, 812 F. Supp. 8d 459, 462—

63 (D.N.J. 2025) ““Noncitizens who are arrested after having lived in the

United States for a while do not generally have to be detained. They are

instead entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration court.” (citing

Gomes) (citations and footnote omitted)). See generally Carrero Romero,

2026 WL 296215, at *4 (“[I]f an individual is detained attempting to enter

the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for

11 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the Gomes court

stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the

community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by

the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See Gomes, 804 F.

Supp. 3d at 277 (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (st Cir.

2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must

prove either dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing

evidence. See German Santos v. Warden, 965 F.3d 203, 213-14 (8d Cir.

2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from

a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher

than a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Gayle v. Warden

Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (8d Cir. 2021) is

a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even

temporarily, we hold the Government to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’

standard in the context of civil detention... .”) (quoting German Santos);

Luciano-Jimenez v. Doll, 547 FE. Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021)

(quoting German Santos).

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inspection and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant

to § 1225. If they are arrested after having already entered the country,

they are subject to detention under § 1226 and are entitled to a bond

hearing.”).

Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to the detention of

Valles Aguillar. We find that Valles Aguillar is no longer seeking

admission into the United States—at the time of his arrest and detention,

he was not actively attempting to come into the United States at a border

or port of entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the

United States for an extended period of time. See Kashranov, 2025 WL

3188399, at *1 (finding that petitioner who lived in the United States for

almost two years was not “seeking admission” but “already here”);

Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (citing Kashranov). Thus,

Valles Aguillar may only be properly detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and

therefore he is entitled to a bond hearing. See Carrero Romero, 2026 WL

296215, at *5. See generally Patel v. O'Neill, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL

3516865, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (“The overwhelming majority of

federal district courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the

INA to find that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens

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who previously entered the United States and are currently residing in

the United States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision

of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary

detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to

a bond hearing.”); id. at *4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court

cases). 12

12 Accord Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, _ F.4th ___, 2026 WL

1146044, at *5, 6 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies

to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who are present in the United States, but

charged as inadmissible for entering the country without inspection and

admission.... Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to those noncitizens who

present themselves at a port of entry for admission, or who cross the

physical border into the United States but are apprehended at the

‘threshold of initial entry.”); Castafion-Nava v. U.S. Dep’ of Homeland

Sec, _ F4th ___, 2026 WL 1223250, at *21 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026)

[T]he text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing

Executive practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants

for admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry

and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”);

Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, __ F4th __, 2026 WL 1243395, at *1

(11th Cir. May, 6, 2026) (“The text and statutory structure of the INA,

bolstered by the long history of detention across our immigration laws

and the congressional purpose in passing ITRIRA, yield the conclusion

that no-bond detention generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful

entry to the country, and not to aliens who are simply present here.”);

Lopez-Campos v. Raycratt, __ F. 4th ____, at *11, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th

Cir. May 11, 2026) (holding that noncitizens without lawful status who

had lived in the United States for years were not “seeking admission” and

thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention scheme).

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is

currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.

Accordingly, the petition will be granted, and the government will be

ordered to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing

within twenty-one days or to release him from custody.

An appropriate order follows,

Dated: May _/3 __, 2026 □□□ F degeoZ fe

JOSEPH F SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge

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