Freeman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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KATHALEEN FREEMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

- against - 18-CV-7359 (PKC) (PCG)

HSBC HOLDINGS PLC, et al.,

Defendants.

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PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

This case involves allegations brought by Plaintiffs under the Antiterrorism Act (the

“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333, as amended by the Justice Against State Sponsors of Terrorism Act

(“JASTA”), Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016). Plaintiffs bring these claims against ten

banking institutions1 and John Does 1–50. Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”),

Dkt. 143; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. MTD (“Mem.”),2 Dkt. 144; TAC, Dkt. 137.) For the reasons set

forth herein, the Court dismisses the First through Ninth Claims as to Defendants for failure to

state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) and the Sixth Claim against

1 The ten banking institutions are HSBC Holdings PLC, HSBC Bank Middle East Ltd., and

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (collectively, “HSBC”); Barclays Bank PLC; Standard Chartered Bank

(“SCB”); Royal Bank of Scotland, N.V. (“RBS”); Credit Suisse AG; Bank Saderat PLC (“Bank

Saderat”); and Commerzbank AG (“Commerzbank”) (collectively, except Bank Saderat,

“Defendants”). Bank Saderat has “failed to appear or otherwise defend this action.” (Entry of

Default, Dkt. 52.) On January 7, 2021, the Court awarded Plaintiffs default judgment against Bank

Saderat on some, but not all, of Plaintiffs’ claims. (Mem. & Order, Dkt. 90.) Default judgment

has been issued as to Bank Saderat, (see id.), and thus all references to “Defendants” in this

Memorandum & Order do not include Bank Saderat.

2 SCB and Commerzbank also filed separate supplemental memoranda of law in support

of Defendants’ Motion. (See SCB Suppl. Mem. Supp. MTD, Dkt. 145; Commerzbank. Suppl.

Mem. Supp. MTD, Dkt. 146.)

Commerzbank for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), but denies

Commerzbank’s motion to dismiss the Tenth Claim.

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the background of this case, see generally

Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC, 413 F. Supp. 3d 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d on other grounds, 57

F.4th 66 (2d Cir. 2023) (“Freeman I Dismissal”); Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC, 465 F. Supp.

3d 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Freeman II Dismissal”), and therefore sets forth only the factual and

procedural background relevant to the instant motion.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are American citizens killed or injured by terrorist attacks in Iraq between 2004

and 2011, and/or their families. (See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 2226–4636 (describing 200 attacks and

their effect on Plaintiffs and/or families).) Plaintiffs allege a wide-ranging conspiracy between

Defendants, Bank Saderat, the Government of Iran, and various designated Foreign Terrorist

Organizations (“FTOs”), namely Hezbollah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”),

and the IRGC Qods Force (“IRGC-QF”). (Id. ¶ 1.)3 Plaintiffs’ central allegations relating to the

conspiracy are that: (1) Defendants and Bank Saderat “worked individually . . . to benefit the

IRGC and Hezbollah by knowingly, actively, and deliberately providing them with: (a) unusual,

illegal, and substantial banking and payment services (including, among others, removing

incriminating content from banking records, exploiting secure financial messaging networks, and

manipulating internal bank audit controls); (b) multi-currency foreign exchange trading,

3 According to the TAC, Hezbollah has been an FTO since 1997, (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 1 n.2),

and the IRGC and IRGC-QF have been designated as FTOs since 2019, (id. ¶ 1 nn. 3–4). The

IRGC-QF was previously designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”) from

2007 to 2019. (Id. at ¶ 1, n.4.)

processing, and settlement; and ([c]) facilitating massive trade-based money laundering (including

helping convert bulk cash from trafficking in conflict diamonds,4 gold, and narcotics) on behalf of

notorious customers publicly linked to terrorism,” (id. ¶ 7); (2) Defendants “knowingly assisted

Hezbollah and the IRGC (including, hereinafter, the IRGC–QF[] . . . ) by converting the proceeds

Hezbollah derived from its various illicit activities, including trafficking in conflict diamonds,

gold, narcotics, weapons (involving sums of bulk-cash, gold, and other precious metals), and

conducting illicit oil sales,” (id. ¶ 9); (3) “Defendants then moved those proceeds around the world,

including through currency exchange houses in the Middle East and Hezbollah’s unofficial bank

in Lebanon, al-Qard al-Hassan (‘AQAH’), at the direction of Hezbollah’s and the IRGC’s agents,”

(id.); and (4) the IRGC and Hezbollah then used that financing to “establish, recruit, train, fund,

arm, and direct Iraqi Shia proxies [(‘Iraqi Proxies’)5], including FTO[s] . . . , to attack U.S. and

other peacekeeping forces that were supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–2008) and

Operation New Dawn (2009–2011),” (see id. ¶¶ 3, 5).

II. Procedural Background

In November 2014, some of the current Plaintiffs filed suit in this District against

Defendants6 alleging claims under the ATA (“Freeman I”). Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC,

350 F.R.D. 210, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (“Freeman I Reconsideration”). The Freeman I plaintiffs

4 The TAC defines “conflict diamonds” as diamonds sourced through “the illegal trade in

diamonds with African countries where violent conflicts have taken place between armed militias

and African government forces.” (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 649 n.86.)

5 Plaintiffs identify the Iraqi Proxies as including “Badr Corps (Badr Organization), Jaysh

al-Mahdi (‘JAM’ or the ‘Mahdi Army’) including the Promised Day Brigades, Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq

(‘AAH’ or the ‘League of the Righteous’), and Kataib Hezbollah (‘KH’) (designated an FTO

in 2009).” (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 1915.)

6 The Freeman I defendants are the same entities that are Defendants in the instant action.

See Freeman I Dismissal, 413 F. Supp. 3d 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).

amended their complaint twice. Id. While Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended

complaint in Freeman I was pending, the Freeman I plaintiffs “filed their omnibus response . . . in

which they pointed to the newly passed JASTA as providing ‘an alternative legal basis for

Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims.’” Id. (citation omitted). Defendants’ motion to dismiss in Freeman I

was referred to the Honorable Cheryl L. Pollak, Magistrate Judge, who issued her report and

recommendation (“R&R”) in July 2018. Id. at 213. In October 2018, over Defendants’ objections

and “while [their] objections to the R&R were pending, [the Freeman I plaintiffs] requested leave

from Judge Pollak to ‘join’ over 400 new plaintiffs who had retained or were expected to retain

Plaintiffs’ counsel since the filing of the [Freeman I second amended complaint] and whose claims

would soon be barred by the statute of limitations.” Id. at 214 (citation omitted). In December

2018, the Freeman I plaintiffs changed course and “notified Judge Pollak that they had ‘decided

to file a related case rather than to amend the [Freeman I second amended complaint].’” Id.

(citation omitted).

On December 26, 2018, Plaintiffs filed the instant action, Freeman II, on behalf of the

additional plaintiffs proposed in Freeman I. (Compl., Dkt. 1.) On April 11, 2019, Plaintiffs’

counsel filed an additional action in this District, Bowman et al. v. HSBC Holdings PLC et al.,

No. 19-CV-2146 (PKC) (CLP) (E.D.N.Y.) (“Bowman”), against the same defendants, though on

behalf of different plaintiffs.7 Compl., Bowman, Dkt. 1; see also Freeman I Reconsideration, 350

7 On January 1, 2019, Plaintiffs filed another action in this district against a different group

of defendants, Compl., Bartlett v. Société Generale de Banque au Liban SAL, No. 19-CV-0007

(CBA) (TAM) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 1, 2019) (“Bartlett”), Dkt. 1, “proceed[ing] on different theories of

liability than the causes of action brought” in the Freeman actions, Mem. & Order at 1–2, Bartlett,

Dkt. 368. “[A]ll but approximately 50 of the 1,212 plaintiffs in the Freeman cases [were] also

Plaintiffs in Bartlett.” Id. at 1.

F.R.D. at 214.8 In addition to reiterating the ATA claims asserted in Freeman I, both Freeman II

and Bowman asserted conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting claims under JASTA. (Compl., Dkt. 1,

at ¶¶ 3683–777); Compl, Bowman, Dkt. 1, at ¶¶ 1291–385.

Plaintiffs first amended their Freeman II Complaint in December 2019. (Am. Compl.,

Dkt. 72.) Defendants sought to dismiss the Freeman II Amended Complaint in January 2020

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Ltr. Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 75.) The Court granted Defendants’ motion,

dismissing ten of Plaintiffs’ twelve claims for failing to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and

dismissing one claim, which was against Defendant Commerzbank only, for lack of personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). Freeman II Dismissal, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 235.9 In January

2021, the Court ruled on Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against Bank Saderat and

scheduled an inquest on Plaintiffs’ damages for April 2021. (Mem. & Order, Dkt. 90.)

In parallel to the Freeman II and Bowman proceedings, on September 16, 2019, the Court

dismissed the second amended complaint in Freeman I. See Freeman I Dismissal, 413 F. Supp.

3d at 99. Because the Freeman I Dismissal preceded the Freeman II Dismissal, and because the

ATA and JASTA conspiracy claims were “materially the same” in both cases, the Court’s

dismissal of the ATA and JASTA conspiracy claims in Freeman I served as the basis for the

Court’s dismissal of the same claims in Freeman II. See Freeman II Dismissal, 465 F. Supp. 3d

at 225. After plaintiffs filed a motion for partial reconsideration in Freeman I, which the Court

8 Although Freeman I and II were originally assigned to the Honorable Dora L. Irizarry, as

of May 18, 2019, both cases, along with Bowman, were assigned to the undersigned. See 5/8/2019

Dkt. Order, Freeman I; 4/16/2019 Dkt. Order, Bowman; (5/8/2019 Dkt. Order).

9 The remaining claim was against Bank Saderat only and thus was not part of Defendants’

motion to dismiss. See Freeman II Dismissal, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 235 n.15.

denied,10 the Freeman I parties and the Court discussed the potential consolidation of Freeman I,

Freeman II, and Bowman “in order to facilitate one Notice of Appeal.” See Freeman I

Reconsideration, 350 F.R.D. at 217. The parties were unable to reach an agreement regarding a

consolidated approach to Freeman I, Freeman II, and Bowman, and the Freeman I plaintiffs

noticed their appeal of the dismissal in that case on November 25, 2019. Id.

In the instant case, on January 28, 2021, “[a]t the request of Plaintiffs, the Court stayed

[Freeman II] pending the Second Circuit’s decision in Freeman I” and adjourned the damages

inquest as to Bank Saderat sine die. (1/28/2021 Min. Entry.) On August 11, 2021, Plaintiffs sought

leave to file a second amended complaint in Freeman II, which the Court deferred ruling on until

the Second Circuit issued a decision in Freeman I. (See Mot. to Amend, Dkt. 95; 8/16/2021 Dkt.

Order.) On January 5, 2023, the Second Circuit affirmed the Freeman I Dismissal. See Freeman

v. HSBC Holdings PLC, 57 F.4th 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2023) (“Freeman I Appeal”). However, the

Freeman II parties once again requested, and the Court granted, a stay “pending the Supreme

Court’s decision in Twitter[, Inc.] v. Taamneh, [598 U.S. 471 (2023)].” (2/16/2023 Dkt. Order.)

On June 27, 2023, while the stay was still in effect, the Court held a status conference at which it

granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaints in Freeman II and Bowman, and gave

Defendants 30 days to object to the consolidation of Freeman II and Bowman. (6/27/2023 Min.

Entry.) The Court simultaneously set a briefing schedule for Defendants’ anticipated motion to

dismiss the second amended complaint in Freeman II. (Id.) On July 13, 2023, Bowman and

Freeman II were consolidated and Freeman II became the lead case. (7/13/2023 Order

Consolidating Cases.)

10 The Freeman I Reconsideration includes a lengthy overview of Freeman I’s procedural

posture, which the Court declines to review here. See 350 F.R.D. at 215–17.

In September 2023, Plaintiffs sought permission to use, in their anticipated second

amended complaint in Freeman II, discovery material that their counsel had received through

discovery in another case their counsel was involved in, Bartlett. (See Ltr. Mot. for Disc.,

Dkt. 113, at 1.) Because Plaintiffs’ counsel already had the materials, Plaintiffs characterized the

request as “[i]n essence, . . . seek[ing] leave to ‘subpoena’ themselves.” (Id.) As Plaintiffs

conceded, however, the material was covered by a protective order in Bartlett that restricted its

use. (Id.) After the Court denied Plaintiffs’ request to use the Bartlett discovery material in their

planned second amended complaint, (see 9/21/2023 Dkt. Order), on December 27, 2023, Plaintiffs

filed a Second Amended Complaint that purportedly referenced, and redacted, the Bartlett

discovery material, (see Dkt. 117, ¶ 8 n.5),11 and twelve days later, renewed their request to use

those materials in the Second Amended Complaint, (see Dkt. 120, at 2 (seeking to renew Plaintiffs’

motion for “[c]onstructive [d]iscovery of [r]ecords in Plaintiffs’ [p]ossession”)). On February 6,

2024, the Court “lifted the stay of discovery in Freeman II/Bowman for the limited purpose of

permitting the Freeman II/Bowman Plaintiffs to subpoena Defendant [SCB] and non-party KBC

Bank for the information obtained in Bartlett.” (2/6/2024 Min. Entry.) On February 29, 2024,

Defendants moved to quash Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, (Mot. to Quash, Dkt. 125), which the

Court granted on February 26, 2025, (Mem. & Order, Dkt. 136).12 Finally, the Court ordered

Plaintiff to file the TAC without the Bartlett discovery material, (id.), which Plaintiffs did on

11 Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on December 27, 2023, (Dkt. 117), and

then filed the same Second Amended Complaint, but “with [a] [f]ull [c]aption listing [a]ll

Plaintiffs,” on December 28, 2023, (Dkt. 118).

12 The Court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion to quash was based in part on the

intervening decision in Bartlett affirming that the protective order in that case precluded discovery

efforts in other cases “based on ‘arguments grounded on’ or ‘gleaned from’ Bartlett Discovery

Material.” (Mem. & Order Granting Motion to Quash, Dkt. 136, at 11 (quoting Appeal Mem. &

Order at 11, Bartlett, Dkt. 453).)

March 28, 2025, (TAC, Dkt. 137). Defendants’ motion to dismiss the TAC was fully briefed on

July 16, 2025.13 (See Dkts. 143–51.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“A complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) when, accepting its non-

conclusory allegations as true, the complaint plausibly supports a claim for relief.” Ashley v.

Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, 144 F.4th 420, 434–35 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting same). “That burden is not met where a pleading offers only

‘labels and conclusions,’ ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’ or ‘naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting same).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs assert eleven claims against various combinations of Defendants in the TAC.

The Court groups and addresses these claims as follows: the primary liability ATA claims pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (Claims (1)–(7)); the JASTA conspiracy claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 2333(d)(2) (Claim (8)); and the JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 2333(d)(2) (Claims (9)–(11)).

I. Plaintiffs’ ATA Claims

As in Freeman I,14 the TAC in this case contains seven ATA claims, all asserting civil

liability against Defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) for allegedly engaging in acts of

13 Thereafter, Plaintiffs and Defendants also filed letters regarding supplemental authority.

(See Dkts. 154–60.)

14 The Amended Complaint in this case also contained seven ATA claims, which the Court

summarily dismissed in the Freeman II Dismissal because they were “materially the same as those

asserted [and dismissed] in Freeman I.” Freeman Dismissal II, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 225. The Court

international terrorism.15 The TAC’s ATA claims allege violations of the same terrorism statutes

as in Freeman I, but the TAC now: (1) directly asserts in several counts that Defendants “provided

material support” to FTOs, as opposed to merely conspiring to do so, (see, e.g., Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 4638,

4661, 4713, 4733); (2) adds allegations that Defendants’ assistance facilitated acts of terrorism in

violation of 18 U.S.C. 844(f),16 (see, e.g., id. ¶ 4667); and (3) adds approximately 200 pages of

factual allegations, (see generally Dkt. 137). As discussed, Plaintiffs’ ATA claims were all

dismissed in both the Freeman I and Freeman II Dismissals.17 There has been no intervening

change in the law—nor do Plaintiffs argue one—and so the Court’s analysis is primarily a factual

therefore only discusses the Freeman I ATA claims in determining whether the TAC’s ATA

claims should be dismissed.

15 Counts 1–7 of the TAC allege civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) based on alleged

violations of various terrorism statutes: (1) against all Defendants for violations of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2339A, (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 4637–57); (2) against all Defendants for violations of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2339B, (id. ¶¶ 4658–74); (3) against HSBC Bank USA, N.A. for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2332d,

(id. ¶¶ 4675–97); (4) against RBS and Commerzbank for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2332d, (id.

¶¶ 4698–710); (5) against Commerzbank for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, (id. ¶¶ 4711–21);

(6) against Commerzbank for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, (id. ¶¶ 4722–31); and (7) against

SCB for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, (id. ¶¶ 4732–51). The Court does not discuss the

elements of the alleged violations of the international terrorism statutes because, as discussed

below, Counts 1–7 all fail to establish a fundamental element of primary liability under

Section 2333(a).

16 Section 844(f) prohibits the malicious destruction or attempted destruction, “by means

of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other personal or real property in whole or in part

owned or possessed by, or leased to, the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 844(f). The Amended

Complaint alleged acts of terrorism in violation of Section 844(f) in the First Claim only. (See

Am. Compl., Dkt. 72, ¶ 3608.)

17 In dismissing Plaintiffs’ ATA claims in the Freeman II Dismissal, the Court “relie[d]

on, and incorporate[d] by reference, its Freeman I decision.” Freeman II Dismissal, 465 F. Supp.

3d. at 225. The Freeman I plaintiffs did not challenge the dismissal of their ATA claims on appeal,

and thus the Court’s Freeman I ATA analysis was left undisturbed by the Second Circuit. See

Freeman I Appeal, 57 F.4th at 74 n.5.

one, that is: do the TAC’s additional factual allegations cure the deficiencies with Plaintiffs’

previous ATA claims? The answer is no.

As the Court explained in Freeman I, “[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or

her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate,

survivors, or heirs,” may bring only primary liability claims against “the principal perpetrators of

acts of international terrorism” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). See Freeman I Dismissal, 413 F.

Supp. 3d at 81–82 (alteration in original) (first quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a); then citing In re

Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2013); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC,

882 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2018); and then quoting Lelchook v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 393 F.

Supp. 3d 261, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)). “To state a claim for primary liability, a plaintiff must allege:

‘(1) an injury to a U.S. national, (2) an act of international terrorism, and (3) causation.’” Id. at 82

(quoting O’Sullivan v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 17-CV-8709 (LTS) (GWG), 2019 WL 1409446,

at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019)). Primary liability does not extend to “secondary actors who

facilitate[] such acts by others.” See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lelchook, 393 F. Supp. 3d

at 265); Siegel v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., 933 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In its original

form, the ATA afforded relief only against the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks, not against

secondary, supporting actors.”). Thus, plaintiffs suing under the ATA must plausibly allege that

“[d]efendants’ actions were, themselves, acts of international terrorism” as defined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 2331(1) (“Section 2331”).18 See Freeman I Dismissal, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 82.19

18 The ATA incorporates Section 2331’s definition of an “act of international terrorism.”

19 Plaintiffs challenge the applicability of Siegel, 933 F.3d 217, and O’Sullivan, 2019

WL 1409446, given developments in the aiding-and-abetting case law since each was decided.

(See Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n MTD, Dkt. 147, at 36–38, 56.) Plaintiffs’ challenges are irrelevant to the

cases’ ATA analysis, which remains good law.

The Court dismissed the Freeman I ATA claims because it found that plaintiffs had not

sufficiently alleged the second and third elements of primary liability, i.e., an act of international

terrorism (as defined by Section 2331) and causation. Id. at 82–85. Regarding the second element,

the Court found that, while “[c]riminal violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2332d, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, and

18 U.S.C. § 2339B can, under some circumstances, satisfy [Section 2331’s] definition of an act of

international terrorism,” id. at 82–83 (first citing Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev.

(“Boim III”), 549 F.3d 685, 689–94 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc); then citing Weiss v. Nat’l

Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2014)), Defendants’ alleged “provision of

banking services to members of a terrorist organization” did not “satisfy that definition standing

alone,” id. at 83 (citing Linde, 882 F.3d at 325–26), because this conduct did not “also involve

violence or endanger human life” nor “appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian

population or to influence or affect a government,” id. (quoting Linde, 882 F.3d at 326).20

Regarding the third element, the Court found that the plaintiffs had not “plausibly allege[d] that

the defendant[s’] actions were a ‘substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation’

20 Recent in-Circuit case law has only reinforced the threshold nature of Section 2331 vis-

à-vis ATA primary liability claims. See Goldman v. Lafarge S.A., No. 24-CV-1043 (NGG) (PK),

--- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2026 WL 451616, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2026) (dismissing ATA claims

where plaintiffs “failed to allege that the payments to ISIS were directed at a specifically

identifiable violent or dangerous act” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Raanan v.

Binance Holdings Ltd., No. 24-CV-0697 (JGK), 2025 WL 605594, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,

2025) (dismissing ATA claims where plaintiffs’ allegations that “defendants enabled customers

associated with [FTOs] to engage in cryptocurrency transactions” failed to support conclusion that

defendants committed a terrorist attack and collecting cases); King v. Habib Bank Ltd.,

No. 20-CV-4322 (LGS), 2022 WL 4537849, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2022) (dismissing ATA

claims where plaintiffs failed to allege the “kind of direct connection to violence or endangerment

of human life that would render such financial services ‘acts of international terrorism’

themselves”); Bartlett v. Société Générale de Banque Au Liban SAL, No. 19-CV-0007 (CBA)

(VMS), 2020 WL 7089448, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2020) (“[A]lleging that defendants provided

financial services is different than alleging ‘[d]efendant’s own actions . . . involved violence or

endangered human life.’” (citation omitted)).

leading to the plaintiff[s’] injur[ies] and that the plaintiff[s’] injuries were ‘reasonably foreseeable’

or ‘anticipated as a natural consequence’ of those actions.” Id. at 84 (quoting Rothstein v. UBS

AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)).

Here, despite Plaintiffs bulking up the TAC with 200 pages of additional factual allegations

and despite Plaintiffs directly accusing Defendants of providing material support to FTOs (rather

than simply agreeing to do so), the TAC still fails to sufficiently plead the second and third

elements of primary liability under Section 2333(a). In their opposition, Plaintiffs argue only that

“Defendants’ knowing provision of material support to Iran’s terror apparatus and their vast efforts

to assist it qualify as acts of international terrorism.” (Opp’n, Dkt. 147, at 58; see also TAC,

Dkt. 137, ¶ 1134 (describing SCB as “committed to assisting Iran’s terror apparatus”); id. ¶ 1544

(alleging HSBC was aware of risk of payments being “connected to terrorism”); id. ¶ 1700 (“Credit

Suisse eventually became a central player in the IRGC’s scheme to finance terrorism.”); id. ¶ 1767

(alleging RBS saw its sanctions-evading business with Iran as an “opportunity”); id. ¶ 1872

(“Barclays knew . . . that Barclays was facilitating unlawful payments on behalf of Iran to assist

its terror apparatus”).) 21 Though more rhetorically pointed than their predecessors, these claims

remain conclusory and thus insufficient. See Ashley, 144 F.4th at 434–35 (reiterating that

plaintiff’s burden to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” “is not met where a pleading offers only

21 Plaintiffs devote only two paragraphs of their 59-page opposition to Defendants’ MTD

to their ATA claims and make no effort to identify factual allegations in the TAC that establish

primary liability. (Opp’n, Dkt. 147, at 56–58.) Though the Court has attempted to identify

allegations in the TAC that might support Plaintiffs’ ATA claims, it is not the Court’s

responsibility to scour the 689-page TAC to find them.

‘labels and conclusions,’ ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’ or ‘naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).22

Thus, because Plaintiffs have again failed to allege sufficient facts from which to infer that

Defendants were the “principal perpetrators” of the terrorist acts detailed in the TAC, their ATA

claims must be dismissed. See Freeman I Dismissal, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 82; see also id. (“In order

to state a primary liability claim under the ATA, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that Defendants’

actions were, themselves, acts of international terrorism in order to give rise to primary liability

under § 2333(a).”); Siegel, 933 F.3d at 222 (“[T]he ATA afforded relief only against the

perpetrators of the terrorist attacks, not against secondary, supporting actors.”); cf. Twitter, 598

U.S. at 483 (“[T]hose injured by an act of international terrorism can sue the relevant terrorists

directly under § 2333(a).”).

* * *

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ First through Seventh Claims of the TAC are dismissed for failure

to state a claim.23

22 Plaintiffs’ primary legal support for their ATA claims is Schansman v. Sberbank of

Russia PJSC, 565 F. Supp. 3d 405, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). (See Opp’n, Dkt. 147, at 58.) But

Schansman is an outlier in this Circuit and “relied on ‘outdated [and out of Circuit] law from [Boim

III, 549 F.3d at 691].’” See Goldman, 2026 WL 451616, at *4 n.5 (citation omitted). Indeed,

“[t]he Second Circuit explicitly stated . . . that [Boim III]’s holding regarding ‘primary liability

under the ATA’ was ‘inapposite.’” Id. (quoting Honickman, 6 F.4th at 499 n.14).

23 Commerzbank also seeks to dismiss the Sixth Claim for lack of personal jurisdiction.

(See Commerzbank Suppl. Mem. Supp. MTD, Dkt. 145, at 2 (“[T]he Sixth . . . Claim[] should also

be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction because the TAC alleges no nexus between [it] and

the United States.”).) The Court grants Commerzbank’s motion as to Sixth Claim as an additional

basis for dismissing that claim.

II. JASTA Conspiracy Claims

Plaintiffs’ Eighth Claim alleges that “Defendants agreed to enter into [a] conspiracy, which

included the IRGC (FTO) and Hezbollah (FTO) and their agents and proxies” to commit acts of

international terrorism, in violation of JASTA. (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 4752–70.) The Amended

Complaint in this case also included a JASTA conspiracy claim, which the Court dismissed based

on the Freeman I Dismissal. Freeman II Dismissal, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 226 (“Because all but the

aiding and abetting claims in Freeman II and Bowman are materially the same as those asserted in

Freeman I, the Court relies on, and incorporates by reference, its Freeman I decision.”). That

dismissal, however, preceded the Second Circuit’s decision in Freeman I, in which the Second

Circuit disagreed with the Court’s “primary reason for dismissing the [p]laintiffs’ JASTA

conspiracy claims,”24 while still affirming the dismissal based on the Circuit’s own finding that

the plaintiffs had “failed to adequately allege that the Banks25 conspired – either directly or

indirectly – with the terrorist groups, or that the terrorist attacks that killed or injured the service

members were in furtherance of the conspiracy to circumvent U.S. sanctions.” Freeman I Appeal,

57 F.4th at 72. The Court now applies the Circuit’s analysis from the Freeman I Appeal to the

TAC, and for the same reasons explained in that decision, finds that the TAC fails to allege that

Defendants entered into a criminal conspiracy with any FTO to commit international acts of

terrorism in violation of JASTA.

As the Circuit explained in the Freeman I Appeal, in 2016, Congress added secondary

liability provisions to the ATA through JASTA, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). Id. at 75.

24 The Circuit found that the Court erred in interpretating the JASTA conspiracy statute as

“requiring [p]laintiffs to allege a ‘direct’ connection between the Banks and the [FTOs] that

perpetrated the acts of violence in question.” Freeman I Appeal, 57 F. 4th at 79.

25 The defendant “Banks” in Freeman I are the same defendants as here. See supra n.1.

Section 2333(d)(2) provides that, where there has been “an injury arising from an act of

international terrorism, . . . liability may be asserted as to any person26 who . . . conspires with the

person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” Id. at 75–76 (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 2333(d)(2)). Thus, in contrast to an ATA primary liability claim, a plaintiff alleging a JASTA

conspiracy claim need not show that the defendant committed an act of international terrorism as

defined in Section 2331, i.e., that the defendant’s actions “involve[d] violence or endanger[ed]

human life” and “appear[ed] to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to

influence or affect a government.” Freeman I Dismissal, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 83 (quoting Linde,

882 F.3d at 326). Rather, “to assert a conspiracy claim under JASTA, a plaintiff must plead an

agreement between two or more persons” to “pursu[e] the same object” and an “injury caused by

an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the agreement.” Freeman I Appeal, 57

F.4th at 79 (quoting Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477). The overt act causing injury “must further the

objects of [the] conspiracy for another coconspirator to be held civilly liable for that act.” Id. at 82

(citing same).

Here, as in Freeman I, and despite the infusion of hundreds of pages of factual allegations,

Plaintiffs fail to plead both a common object between Defendants and their terrorist-affiliated

clients and an overt act in furtherance of that common object. Like the second amended complaint

in Freeman I, “the [T]AC only alleges, albeit in significant and compelling detail, a conspiracy to

help Iranian financial and commercial entities evade American [financial] sanctions.” Freeman I

Dismissal, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 88. Near the end of the TAC, Plaintiffs assert, in a single conclusory

26 The definition of “person” under Section 2333(d)(2) “include[s] corporations,

companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as

individuals.” Freeman I Appeal, 57 F.4th at 76 (first citing 1 U.S.C. § 1; then citing 18 U.S.C.

§ 2333(d)(1)).

sentence, that “Defendants joined the IRGC and Hezbollah’s conspiracy, whose objective was to

wage terror a [sic] campaign U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq.” (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 4759.) But

across the preceding almost 700 pages of the TAC, Plaintiffs uniformly allege only a “sanctions

evasion conspiracy.” (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1314, 1321 (discussing SCB facilitation of transactions that

involved monetary payments to a procurement company for Hezbollah); id. ¶¶ 1526, 1529–34

(discussing HBSC’s awareness of the “IRGC sanctions evasion conspiracy” and HSBC’s

participation in this conspiracy to “remove, omit, or falsify essential information” to evade

“sanctions screening filters”); id. ¶¶ 1599–1621 (discussing Commerzbank’s “procedures for

facilitating the IRGC’s sanctions evasion conspiracy”); id. ¶¶ 1760–1831 (discussing RBS’s

involvement in helping “the IRGC evade U.S. counterterror financing sanctions”).) As in

Freeman I, “[n]owhere in the [TAC] . . . do Plaintiffs plead that the Banks intended to kill or injure

U.S. service members in Iraq.” Freeman I Appeal, 57 F.4th at 80. Nor, for that matter, do Plaintiffs

allege that “the terrorist groups agreed to help the Banks and Iranian entities evade U.S. sanctions.”

Id.

To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to equate Defendants’ agreement to evade sanctions to

agreeing to finance terrorism and connect Defendants to the terrorist groups at issue, Plaintiffs’

allegations are conclusory and misleading. For example, Plaintiffs assert that

“Defendants . . . knew they were joining a conspiracy (the financing component) and actively

assisting the IRGC to wage its terror campaigns.” (See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 4763 (emphasis added).)

Plaintiffs thus deploy ambiguous grammar to suggest Defendants “knew” that they were “actively

assisting the IRGC to wage its terror campaigns.” (See id.) Yet the TAC is devoid of factual

allegations to support that inferential leap.

Using a similar sleight of hand, Plaintiffs also attempt to suggest that Defendants agreed to

finance terrorism by alleging that Defendants “facilitated” letters of credit (“LCs”)27 for entities

“controlled by, and an agent of, the IRGC,” (see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1192, 1198). These LCs allegedly

were used to purchase “materials used, inter alia, to effectuate arms shipments, transport weapons,

personnel and technology to the IRGC–QF and Hezbollah,” (id. ¶ 4740; see also id. ¶ 1193

(alleging that LCs were “issued for the benefit of Iran’s military/terror apparatus, facilitating and

financing the IRGC’s, MODAFL’s and Hezbollah’s illegal acquisitions of materials and

technologies, including materials unlawfully obtained from the United States and components for

IEDs and EFPs used against Coalition Forces in Iraq”).) But Plaintiffs never allege that Defendants

issued these LCs, or that when Defendants “facilitated” these LCs, they were aware of the nature

of the underlying transactions or that the goods sought to be purchased via these LCs could or

would be used to carry out of acts of terrorism in Iraq. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants

stripped country- and applicant-information from the LCs so that these LCs could be processed

through the U.S. banking system and avoid U.S. sanctions against Iran.28

27 “A Letter of Credit is a contractual commitment by the foreign buyer’s bank to pay once

the exporter ships the goods and presents the required documentation to the exporter’s bank as

proof.” Dep’t of Com. Int’l Trade Admin., Letters of Credit, https://www.trade.gov/letter-credit

(last visited March 31, 2026); (see TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 250, 252 (generally describing LCs as forms

issued by a bank to a purchaser of goods, which are often used to guarantee payment “in

international transactions” where goods sometimes must travel significant distances, the goods’

provider and receiver are located in countries with different laws, and the parties are operating at

arms’ length).)

28 The TAC alleges various forms of “facilitation” by Defendants. (See, e.g., TAC,

Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 1201 (“SCB–Dubai processed, cleared, and settled dozens of transactions . . . .”); id.

¶ 1212 (“SCB–New York served as the clearing bank for these LCs.”); id. 1215 (“Credit Suisse in

Zurich facilitated the payment on the LC [on behalf of Mahan Air] . . . .”); id. ¶ 1231 (“SCB

illegally facilitated . . . transactions on behalf of . . . MODAFL sub-agencies . . . .”); id. ¶¶ 1236,

1257, 1282 (noting SCB entities serving as negotiating and clearing banks for LCs); id. ¶ 1688

(alleging Credit Suisse acted as “clearing and settlement bank[]”).) The closest Plaintiffs come to

alleging more than “facilitation” is an allegation that RBS “reissued” a letter of credit originally

issued by Bank Melli by removing references to Iran, (see id. ¶ 1813), and that “SCB–Dubai acted

Thus, “[i]n the absence of any allegation that [Defendants] and the terrorist groups

‘engaged in a common pursuit,’ . . . [the Court] cannot identify ‘an[y] agreement’ that could form

the basis of a JASTA conspiracy between [Defendants] and the terrorist groups.” Freeman I

Appeal, 57 F.4th at 80 (second alteration in original) (quoting Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477, 481);

see also Bernhardt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 47 F.4th 856, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (holding that

plaintiff’s “conspiracy claim [against HSBC] is inadequate” because “[t]he complaint states that

HSBC was trying to make substantial profits by evading sanctions, whereas al-Qaeda sought to

terrorize the U.S. into retreating from the world stage” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Even if Plaintiffs had alleged the existence of an agreement between Defendants and the

terrorist organizations regarding “the evasion of U.S. sanctions against Iran,” Plaintiffs have also

not adequately alleged, nor can the Court discern, “how the terrorist attacks ‘advance[d] the overall

object of [this sanctions evasion] conspiracy.’” Freeman I Appeal, 57 F.4th at 80 (quoting

Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487). As in Freeman I, the TAC frames the attacks as overt acts of the

conspiracy based on the attacks’ alleged foreseeability to Defendants. (See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 2218

(alleging that the terrorist attacks were “financed and facilitated, in substantial part, by illicit funds

transfers initiated at the IRGC’s direction as part of the conspiracy set forth in detail herein and

with the knowing, culpable and substantial assistance of Defendants”); id. ¶ 33 (“Each act of

international terrorism at issue here was a foreseeable consequence of Defendants’ pervasive and

systemic assistance to the IRGC and Hezbollah, particularly by assisting their terror financing and

procurement of dual-use items.”); see also id. ¶ 4769 (“The reasonably foreseeable consequences,

and foreseeable risk, of entering into the conspiracy to launder billions of dollars on behalf of and

as the Advising Bank” for its customer, MAPNA International, which had ties to sanctioned

individuals and entities, (see id. ¶ 1307–13 (describing 2010/2011 sanctions designations of

MAPNA affiliates)).

for the benefit of the IRGC and Hezbollah, . . . included the IRGC and Hezbollah carrying

out . . . numerous terrorist attacks against U.S. nationals in Iraq.”).) But, as the Circuit made clear

in Freeman I, foreseeability is “not enough to meet the in-furtherance-of requirement at the heart

of a conspiracy claim.” Freeman I Appeal, 57 F.4th at 82 (citing Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488).29

In the absence of allegations that the attacks themselves were specifically done in pursuance of the

sanctions conspiracy—or plausible allegations that Defendants intended to kill or injure service

members in Iraq and thus join a terrorism conspiracy—Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claim fails.

See Bernhardt, 47 F.4th at 873 (holding that Bernhardt “fail[ed] to allege an overt act in furtherance

of a conspiracy,” as “HSBC’s sanctions evasion . . . is not . . . an overt act of international

terrorism or the source of Bernhardt’s injury”).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Eighth Claim is dismissed.

III. JASTA Aiding and Abetting Claims

Finally, Plaintiffs allege three JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims: their Ninth, Tenth, and

Eleventh claims in the TAC. (See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 4771–815.) In addition to conspiracy

liability, Section 2333(d)(2) also provides for aiding-and-abetting liability as to “anyone ‘who aids

and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, . . . [to] the person who

committed . . . an act of international terrorism.’” Twitter, 598 U.S. at 483 (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 2333(d)(2)). The act of terrorism must be “committed, planned, or authorized by an organization

that had been designated as a foreign terrorist organization.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). While the

Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ ATA and JASTA conspiracy claims in this case by

“rel[ying] on, and incorporat[ing] by reference, its Freeman I decision,” the Court fully analyzed

29 Notably, Plaintiffs devote only a page-and-a-half of the 59-page opposition to their

JASTA conspiracy claim, and fail to acknowledge the inadequacy of foreseeability allegations to

meet the overt-acts element in light of the Circuit’s decision in Freeman I.

and dismissed Plaintiffs’ JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims. See Freeman II Dismissal, 465 F.

Supp. 3d at 225–26 (“The Court . . . addresses Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the

only claims not alleged in Freeman I, Plaintiffs’ JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims.”) The aiding-

and-abetting case law has been refined in the nearly seven years since the Freeman II Dismissal,

see, e.g., Twitter, 598 U.S. 471, and thus the Court does not rely on its prior analysis but instead

begins anew.

A. Plaintiffs’ Ninth Claim Against All Defendants

In the Ninth Count of the TAC, Plaintiffs broadly allege that Defendants worked “hand in

glove” with “IRGC-directed or controlled Iranian counterparties”30 (“Iranian Counterparties”),

and that the IRGC in turn directed a “terror campaign” in Iraq through its Iraqi Proxies31 that

resulted in the attacks that injured Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 1681, 1914.) More

specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants aided and abetted the IRGC and its Lebanese proxy,

Hezbollah, in the commission of their acts of terrorism by knowingly and systemically providing

vast amounts of funds and materials to them (and their agents and proxies acting in concert with

them and at their direction), who were the persons . . . that committed the acts of international

terrorism set forth herein.” (Id. ¶ 4779; see also id. ¶ 204, 243, 358–59 (documenting “the IRGC’s

efforts to finance Hezbollah and its other Shi’a proxies in Iraq”); id. ¶ 368 (discussing “the

symbiotic relationship between Hezbollah and the IRGC and their deep coordination in both

financial and operational matters”).) Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants knowingly provided

substantial assistance, directly or indirectly, to the IRGC and its agents (including NIOC, NITC,

30 According to Plaintiffs, these “counterparties” are “agents” of the IRGC, (TAC,

Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 18, 224, 4670), and include NIOC, NITC, IRISL, and Mahan Air, (see id. ¶ 4648).

31 As noted, Plaintiffs identify the Iraqi Proxies as including Badr Corps, JAM, AAH, and

KH. (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 1915.)

IRISL, Mahan Air and MODAFL[]) and Hezbollah[,] . . . [and] did so in thousands upon

thousands of illegal transactions.” (Id. ¶ 4780.)32

To properly plead aiding and abetting under JASTA, Plaintiffs must adequately allege that:

(1) Defendants aided an FTO that “committed, planned, or authorized” an act of international

terrorism; (2) “[Defendants were] generally aware of [their] role as part of an overall illegal or

tortious activity at the time that [they] provide[d] the assistance”; and (3) Defendants “knowingly

and substantially assist[ed]” the act of terrorism. See Twitter, 598 U.S. at 484, 486 (citation

omitted) (discussing aiding-and-abetting secondary liability for “an act of international

terrorism”); Ashley, 144 F.4th at 437 (quoting Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477) (applying these

standards where alleged wrongful act was act of international terrorism). Ultimately, the question

is whether Defendants “consciously and culpably ‘participate[d]’ in a wrongful act so as to help

‘make [it] succeed.’” Id. at 439 (first alteration in original) (quoting Twitter, 598 U.S. at 493).

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Defendants “consciously and culpably”

participated in the alleged acts of international terrorism, and thus their JASTA aiding-and-abetting

claim must be dismissed.

1. FTO Performed a Wrongful Act that Caused Injury

Under JASTA, the principal that “committed, planned, or authorized” the act of

international terrorism must have “been designated as [an FTO] under [8 U.S.C. § 1189] as of the

date on which such act of international terrorism was committed, planned, or authorized.” Twitter,

598 U.S. at 484 (last alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2)). Plaintiffs can satisfy

32 Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants aided and abetted the violation of any specific

terrorism statute, instead claiming that Defendants aided and abetted each of the attacks detailed

in the TAC and that these acts constitute acts of international terrorism as defined by Section 2331.

(See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 4771–72.)

this first element by alleging that defendants aided the FTO performing the act of international

terrorism either “directly or indirectly.” See Honickman, 6 F.4th at 495–96 (finding element

satisfied “‘where [Defendants’] relevant substantial assistance was given to an intermediary’ of

the principal” rather than the principal themselves (quoting Kaplan v. Lebanese Canadian Bank,

SAL, 999 F.3d 842, 856 (2d Cir. 2021)); cf. Freeman I Dismissal, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (“Where

Congress has expressed an intent to create a broad form of liability through JASTA and provided

an expansive definition of the term ‘person,’ it would make little sense to relieve a financial

institution of liability for conspiring with an FTO that happened to use agents or an alter ego to

engage in acts of terrorism.”)

In so far as Plaintiffs allege that Defendants aided and abetted “the IRGC’s terror

campaign,” (see, e.g., TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 4781), such allegations would fail to state a JASTA aiding-

and-abetting claim. The IRGC was not designated an FTO until 2019, as Plaintiffs concede, (see

id. at ¶ 1 n.3), which was nearly a decade after the attacks that injured Plaintiffs had subsided, (see

id. ¶ 1 n.1).33 And Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the IRGC’s Iranian Counterparties are, as

Defendants argue, “conclusory” at best. (See Mem., Dkt. 144, at 28). For example, NIOC was

found to be “‘an agent or affiliate of the’ IRGC” in 2012, (see id. ¶ 370), which is after the attacks

at issue in the TAC, (see id. at ¶ 1 n.1 (defining relevant period as 2001 to 2011)). While the other

entities were designated at some point as Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”34) (IRISL

33 Plaintiffs seem to suggest that the timing of the IRGC’s FTO designation is legally

irrelevant, given it was designated “in part for engag[ing] in terrorist activity since its inception 40

years ago.” (See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 4774 (internal quotation marks omitted).) But the statute clearly

requires a contemporary FTO designation. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). The IRGC’s alleged

reputation for terrorism is more relevant to the Halberstam general awareness discussion, infra.

34 SDNs are “individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf

of, targeted countries.” Off. of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs)

in 2008, (id. ¶ 508)) or SDGTs (Mahan Air in 2011, (id. ¶ 532), NITC and NIOC in 2020, (id.

¶ 365)), they were not FTOs, nor were they agents or affiliates of an FTO. Contra King, 2022

WL 4537849, at *6 (finding allegations that FTO and non-FTO “function[ed] more or less as a

single entity” sufficient). Plaintiffs’ allegations with regard to entities located in Dubai are even

more vague and would seemingly seek to indict the entire global financial industry. (See, e.g.,

TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 797 (alleging that Dubai serves as a major conduit for terrorist money).) Had

Plaintiffs’ aiding-and-abetting allegations ended here, they would have failed.

But Plaintiffs also allege the participation of other FTOs, including Hezbollah and at least

one Iraqi proxy militia, in the terrorist attacks that allegedly injured Plaintiffs and their relatives.

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Hezbollah was designated as an FTO in 1997, (id. ¶ 4773), and

that it, alongside the IRGC, “committed, planned and authorized each attack”; “provided the

Hezbollah-designed EFPs, IRAMs, and other explosive devices used in the attacks against

Coalition Forces that injured Plaintiffs and killed their decedents”; and “funded, trained, equipped,

guided, directed and controlled the cells and individuals who emplaced and activated the EFPs,

IRAMs and other explosive devices and/or, shot, kidnapped and/or tortured Plaintiffs and their

decedents.” (See id. ¶¶ 4773–77; see also id. ¶ 3 (“[T]he IRGC–QF and Hezbollah, under the

IRGC’s direction, worked together to establish, recruit, train, fund, arm, and direct Iraqi Shia

proxies, including [KH] and [AAH], to attack U.S. and other peacekeeping forces that were

supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–2008) and Operation New Dawn (2009–2011).”

(emphasis added)).) As the Court also found in Freeman I, “Plaintiffs’ allegations, . . . taken as a

whole, describe Hezbollah as deeply involved in supporting and coordinating an extensive

and the SDN List, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, https://perma.cc/X63M-NLDT (last accessed Mar. 29,

2026).

campaign of terrorist activity against American citizens in Iraq.” Freeman I Dismissal, 413 F.

Supp. 3d at 96–97. Again, here, “[d]rawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court

may reasonably infer that a designated FTO, namely Hezbollah, was responsible for committing,

planning, or, at the very least, authorizing the attacks that injured Plaintiffs.” Freeman I Dismissal,

413 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (citing Chase Grp. Alliance LLC v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Fin., 620 F.3d 146, 150

(2d Cir. 2010)).35

Thus, because Plaintiffs have adequately alleged FTO Hezbollah’s involvement in the

alleged acts of international terrorism, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the first element of their

aiding-and-abetting claim. Despite Plaintiffs’ efforts to conflate the IRGC, Iranian Counterparties,

and Hezbollah, the Court only construes allegations regarding the IRGC and the Iranian

Counterparties to be allegations of their role as intermediaries for Hezbollah since, as discussed,

none were designated as FTOs at the time of the attacks.

2. General Awareness

Second, the Court must determine whether Defendants were generally aware, at the time

they were providing the financial services in question, that the entities to which they were

providing these services were “so closely intertwined” with the attacks such that Hezbollah’s acts

of international terrorism were foreseeable. See Ashley, 144 F.4th at 437 (noting in “cases

involving banks,” “the general awareness inquiry focuses on (1) whether the bank was aware of

the customers’ connections with the terrorist organization before the relevant attacks; and (2)

35 The Court also finds that the TAC sufficiently alleges that at least one other FTO, KH,

committed at least one of the attacks that injured Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 4015–

22 (describing KH attack that injured Plaintiff Jeffrey C. Mann); id. ¶ 1915 (alleging that KH was

designated as an FTO in 2009).) Plaintiffs also allege that AAH is an FTO, (see id. ¶ 3), but do

not include any allegations regarding when AAH was designated. Given this and the fact that KH

is only alleged to have orchestrated one attack, the Court focuses its analysis on Hezbollah.

whether the customers ‘were so closely intertwined with’ the terrorist organization’s ‘violent

terrorist activities that one can reasonably infer’ that the bank ‘was generally aware of its role in

unlawful activities from which the attacks were foreseeable while it was providing financial

services’ to those customers.” (quoting Honickman, 6 F.4th at 501)); Troell v. Binance Holdings

Ltd., No. 24-CV-7136 (JAV), 2026 WL 636849, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2026) (“As applied in

the JASTA context, a defendant must be generally aware that it was playing a role in international

terrorism, . . . even if it is unaware of its role in the specific terrorist attack that caused the

plaintiff’s injury.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Bartlett, 2024 WL 5497906,

at *3 (“The general awareness element of aiding-and-abetting liability requires ‘the secondary

actor to be aware that, by assisting the principal, it is itself assuming a role in terrorist activities.’”

(quoting Linde, 882 F.3d at 329)). The standard is not an exacting one. See Twitter, 598 U.S.

at 497 (stating that the plaintiffs satisfied this requirement by alleging that the defendants “knew

they were playing some sort of role in ISIS’[s] enterprise”); Raanan, 2025 WL 605594, at *19

(“General awareness denotes ‘something less than full, or fully focused, recognition,’ and does not

require showing that the defendant ‘knowingly and intentionally supported’ the FTO in carrying

out an attack.” (quoting Kaplan, 999 F.3d at 863)); cf Kaplan, 999 F.3d at 863 (“JASTA aiding-

and-abetting liability, using Halberstam’s general awareness standard, does not require proof that

the defendant had a specific intent.”).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were “generally aware” that they were providing

“unusual and unlawful banking services” to Iranian Counterparties36 and other banks allegedly

working with the IRGC and Hezbollah in support of a “terror campaign” that included the attacks

36 As previously noted, according to Plaintiffs, these “counterparties” are “agents” of the

IRGC, (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 18, 224, 4670), and include NIOC, NITC, IRISL, and Mahan Air, (see

id. ¶ 4648).

on Plaintiffs. (See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 4781, 4784–86; see also, e.g., id. ¶¶ 427–77 (citing to news

reports, diplomatic cables, congressional activity, and press releases documenting the ties of

Defendants’ customers CBI and Bank Saderat37 to terrorist activity, particularly Hezbollah); id.

¶¶ 1575–80 (excerpting HSBC communications regarding Bank Saderat’s ties to Hezbollah).)

Plaintiffs attempt to show Defendants’ “general awareness” that the Iranian Counterparties

Defendants were dealing with were linked to terrorism by alleging that Defendants “were aware

of the strict economic sanctions programs imposed by the United States on Iran and its terror

proxies and that the U.S. Sanctions Regime is and was intended to prevent Hezbollah and the

IRGC (among other terrorist organizations) from conducting banking activities, including

electronic funds transfers, and thereby limit their ability to operate and to carry out terrorist

attacks.”38 (Id. ¶¶ 59, 95, 115, 127, 147, 162 (alleging awareness of same for HSBC, SCB,

Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, RBS, Barclays); id. ¶ 4768 (“Each Defendant was aware of the role

of IRGC-controlled and/or entities in the conspiracy that sought to evade U.S. sanctions intended

to prevent IRGC terror financing and weapons proliferation.”); id. ¶ 4784 (“Each Defendant was

generally aware that the IRGC and Hezbollah were committ[ing] terrorist attacks against

37 Plaintiffs allege numerous dealings between Defendants, on the one hand, and CBI and

Bank Saderat, on the other. (See, e.g., TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 787 (“Barclays–Dubai’s DIFC branch

and its other branches in the UAE processed [UAE dirham-denominated] checks . . . for . . . Bank

Saderat . . . .”); id. ¶ 1127 (“[SCB] served as the primary banker of the CBI . . . .”); id. ¶¶ 1487,

1489 (alleging that “[i]n February 2000, HSBC–Middle East signed several trade finance and

project development agreements with the CBI” and “entered into a ten-year, $500 million project

finance agreement with six Iranian commercial banks [including] Bank Saderat Iran”); id. ¶ 1608

(“Since 2002, Commerzbank also appears to have engaged in various illegal gold transactions on

behalf of the CBI, including trading orders through its New York branch while disguising the

Iranian source of the trades.”); id. ¶ 1763 (“[RBS] held accounts for and worked directly with the

CBI to evade U.S. counterterrorism sanctions . . . .”).)

38 The Court again notes that the IRGC was not designated as an FTO at the time of the

attacks, and thus cannot be the principal for purposes of Plaintiffs’ aiding-and-abetting claim. See

supra Section III.A(1).

Americans in Iraq.”).)39 But the most that Plaintiffs have alleged with regard to Defendants’

specific knowledge of terrorism is that “the HSBC Defendants were aware that some of the

transactions they were illegally processing may be ‘connected to terrorism.’” (See id. ¶ 1474

(emphasis added).)40

Plaintiffs’ allegations fall somewhere between “the detailed, numerous sources that

sufficed in Kaplan” and other recent cases, see Honickman, 6 F.4th at 502 (citing Kaplan, 999

F.3d at 864), and those dismissed in Siegel, 933 F.3d at 220, 225–26 (affirming district court’s

dismissal of aiding-and-abetting claim). The Kaplan complaint alleged that defendant Lebanese

Canadian Bank, SAL had provided financial services directly to three identified customers whom

the bank knew “were integral constituent parts of [Hezbollah].” Kaplan, 999 F.3d at 849–50. The

bank allegedly knew this because Hezbollah had “openly, publicly, and repeatedly acknowledged

the fact that [the bank’s customers] were integral constituent parts of [Hezbollah]” through

specific, public statements made by senior Hezbollah officials. Id. at 864 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). The Kaplan court also considered the fact that both the bank and Hezbollah

were headquartered in Lebanon in finding that there was a plausible “inference that LCB had

knowledge of the [Hezbollah]-acknowledged relationships on the ground.” Id. at 864–65.

39 Plaintiffs seek to extrapolate general knowledge from the various enforcement actions

against Defendants. (See, e.g., Pls.’s Letter of Suppl. Authority, Dkt. 156, at 3 (discussing

enforcement actions against HSBC and SCB).) But such an argument “misapprehends the purpose

of the general awareness test.” See Troell, 2026 WL 636849, at *7, *16 (finding defendants’ guilty

pleas to, inter alia, Bank Secrecy Act and U.S. sanctions violations not dispositive of whether

defendants were generally aware “that [they were] playing a role in international terrorism”).

40 The Court has not identified any similarly direct allegations with regard to the other

Defendants across the nearly 700 pages of the TAC. However, it is not the Court’s responsibility

to do so. To quote the Honorable Jeannette A. Vargas, “[w]hile the allegations in this case are

weighty, and the subject matter complex, . . . . [r]equiring the Court to parse through hundreds of

paragraphs to find specific allegations regarding the key issues . . . did not [necessarily] serve

[p]laintiffs.” Troell, 2026 WL 636849, at *11.

Similarly, in Raanan, defendant Binance “knew that it was providing services to terrorist groups

such as Hamas and [Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”)],” both of which had “executed thousands of

transactions on Binance” and had “publicized [their] use of Binance” to solicit donations. Raanan,

2025 WL 605594, at *20.41

In contrast, in Siegel, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ aiding-and-abetting claim

where defendant HSBC-US provided banking services to “Saudi Arabia’s largest private bank,”

ARB, which in turn “was believed . . . to have links to [al-Qaeda] and other terrorist

organizations.” 933 F.3d at 220, 224. While “the plaintiffs did allege that HSBC provided

hundreds of millions of dollars to ARB, . . . they did not advance any non-conclusory allegation

that [al-Qaeda] received any of those funds or that HSBC knew or intended that [al-Qaeda] would

receive the funds.” Id. at 225. Ultimately, HSBC was found to have “only provided routine

banking services,” id. at 223, to customers that appeared to have “legitimate business purposes and

without any direct link to terrorist organizations beyond the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations.”

Moses v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 802 F. Supp. 3d 567, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (compiling cases).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that “[e]ach Defendant understood its role in helping fuel

Hezbollah’s . . . terrorist and criminal activities, including terrorist attacks, and nonetheless

continually assisted Hezbollah in its efforts.” (See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 4792 (emphasis added).) The

TAC alleges, at length and in detail, the IRGC’s, Hezbollah’s, and their various intermediaries’

diverse and widespread criminality. (See, e.g., TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 687 (discussing “Hezbollah’s

integration of several different criminal networks[,] ranging from conflict diamond dealers,

41 Similarly, the plaintiffs in Troell, King, and Finan alleged accounts held by, or payments

made directly to, FTOs or their founders. See Troell, 2026 WL 636849, at *16; King, 2022

WL 4537849, at *7; Finan v. Lafarge S.A., No. 22-CV-7831 (NGG) (PK), 2025 WL 2504317,

at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2025), mot. to certify appeal denied, 2025 WL 2961469 (E.D.N.Y.

Oct. 20, 2025), recons. denied, 2025 WL 3017793 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2025).

counterfeiters, gold traders, narcotics traffickers, weapons traffickers, and trade-based money

launderers”); id. ¶¶ 980, 1460–70, 1594–98 (discussing entity Tajco’s role as Hezbollah’s conduit

for purchasing land, and for which SCB and HSBC maintained accounts).)42 Plaintiffs have also

effectively alleged Defendants’ general understanding of their role in these “criminal schemes.”

(See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 877–881, 1593 (discussing SCB, Credit Suisse, HSBC, and RBS engagement with

Kaloti Jewelry Group, which allegedly laundered money for Hezbollah).) Further, Plaintiffs allege

public reports and government warnings connecting Defendants’ customers to terrorism-related

entities. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 427–48 (citing to public reports documenting CBI’s connection to the

IRGC and Hezbollah); see also id. Sections VI.A(3) and VI.B(3) (detailing SCB and HSBC

dealings with known Hezbollah affiliates).) Finally, Defendants are “sophisticated business[es]

with corporate security groups doing due diligence” and thus “underst[and] the nature of the

market[s]” they operate in. See Zobay v. MTN Grp. Ltd., 695 F. Supp. 3d 301, 343 (E.D.N.Y.

2023) (finding general awareness alleged where plaintiffs alleged defendant was a sophisticated

entity who would have been generally aware of the nature of its partners, and where plaintiffs

alleged publicly available information that would lead defendant to be aware of FTO’s

“commercial fronts to support” its proxies). Based on these allegations, it can be plausibly inferred

that Defendants were “aware of the[ir] customers’ connections with the terrorist organization

before the relevant attacks” such that the attacks were reasonably foreseeable to Defendants, see

Ashley, 144 F.4th at 438.

42 Indeed, the TAC paints a comprehensive picture of Hezbollah’s highly diversified

criminal enterprise across nearly 100 pages. (See TAC, Dkt. 137, at 115–203 (alleging, inter alia,

Hezbollah money laundering, arms dealing, and trade in conflict diamonds and other

commodities).)

3. Knowing and Substantial Assistance

The final element—and the one upon which much of the recent case law has expounded—

is whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that “[D]efendants gave such knowing and

substantial assistance43 to [the FTOs] that they culpably participated in the [attacks].” See Twitter,

598 U.S. at 497. More specifically, Plaintiffs must allege that “defendants culpably ‘associated

themselves with’ the [attacks], ‘participated in [them] as something that they wished to bring

about,’ or sought ‘by their action to make [these] succeed.’” Id. at 498 (citation omitted) (cleaned

up). “[T]his determination involves a balancing act, considering ‘the nature and amount of

assistance on the one hand, and the defendant’s scienter on the other.’” Bartlett, 2024

WL 5497906, at *4 (quoting Twitter, 598 U.S. at 492–93). “That is, ‘less substantial assistance

require[s] more scienter before a court could infer conscious and culpable assistance,’ whereas ‘if

the assistance were direct and extraordinary, then a court might more readily infer conscious

participation in the underlying tort.’” Id. (quoting Twitter, 598 U.S. at 492).

As with many of its sister courts, the Court begins its “analysis of culpability . . . by

‘recall[ing] the basic ways’ that Defendants allegedly assisted Hezbollah.” Bartlett, 2024

WL 5497906, at *4 (alteration in original) (quoting Twitter, 598 U.S. at 498). Here, Plaintiffs

allege that Defendants provided financial services that, through at least two intermediaries,

facilitated the terrorist attacks. (See, e.g., TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 1129.) “Each Defendant knew, or

43 The six Halberstam substantiality factors are: “(1) the nature of the act encouraged, (2)

the amount of assistance given by defendant, (3) defendant’s presence or absence at the time of

the tort, (4) defendant’s relation to the principal, (5) defendant’s state of mind, and (6) the period

of defendant’s assistance.” Linde, 882 F.3d at 329 (citing Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483–84); see

Twitter, 598 U.S. at 497 (directing that the Halberstam substantiality factors “be understood in

light of the common law and applied as a framework designed to hold defendants liable when they

consciously and culpably ‘participate[d] in’ a tortious act in such a way as to help ‘make it

succeed.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619

(1949))).

knew of the substantial certainty, that some of the funds it disguised and concealed from

counterterrorism officials would be used by the IRGC, and Hezbollah, and their agents and proxies

to support and commit acts of international terrorism, and yet continued to provide that assistance.”

(Id. ¶ 4787.) And each Defendant allegedly knew that the “terrorist attacks that [the IRGC and

Hezbollah] and their agents and proxies committed,” which injured Plaintiffs, “were the natural

and foreseeable consequences, and foreseeable risk” of Defendants’ financial services. (See id.

¶ 4796.)

The Court next considers the “nexus between the alleged assistance and the terrorist act.”

Bartlett, 2024 WL 5497906, at *5 (quoting Twitter, 598 U.S. at 497). “[I]t is not enough . . . that

a defendant ha[s] given substantial assistance to a transcendent ‘enterprise’ separate from and

floating above all the actionable wrongs that constitute it. Rather, a defendant must have aided

and abetted (by knowingly providing substantial assistance) another person in the commission

of . . . an act of international terrorism.” Twitter, 598 U.S. at 495; see also Ashley, 144 F.4th at 444

(“[I]t is not enough to say that [Defendants] assisted the terrorist organization’s ‘activities in

general.’” (quoting Twitter, 598 U.S. at 503)).

Notably, Plaintiffs here have not “link[ed] Defendants’ payments directly to” the alleged

attacks. Compare Murad v. Lafarge S.A., No. 23-CV-9186 (NGG) (PK), 2026 WL 270651, at *9

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2026) (explaining that providing FTOs with instruments to circumvent

regulatory controls was not a direct nexus (citing Raanan, 2025 WL 605594, at *23)), with Atchley

v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 165 F.4th 592, 596, 605–08 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (identifying a “plainly

discernable nexus” where defendants “paid illegal cash bribes directly to [Hezbollah affiliate] and

supplied extra, off-the-books batches of valuable medical goods that [Hezbollah affiliate]

monetized on the black market to fund its terrorist operations against Americans”). Nor have

Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants procured specific goods used by the FTOs in their commission

of the wrongful acts. See Zobay, 695 F. Supp. 3d at 346–47 (finding a sufficiently concrete nexus

where defendant was a “business partner” of alleged IRGC fronts “directing procurement of

specific goods”). While the “amount” of Defendants’ aid to the wider Iranian network here is

significantly more than the amount at issue in Bartlett, compare (Opp’n, Dkt. 147, at 33

(“Defendants worked with components of the IRGC and Hezbollah, including several SDGTs, to

launder billions of dollars through New York by evading sanctions explicitly designed to curb

Iranian-sponsored terrorism.”)), with Bartlett, 2024 WL 5497906, at *5 (“Plaintiffs allege that

Defendants were facilitating millions of dollars in transactions to organizations whose only

objectives were to support terrorism.”), Defendants’ alleged assistance to Hezbollah—the FTO at

issue here—is equally less direct.

The Court recognizes that “[l]iability is not limited only to defendants who ‘directly’ aid

and abet, with a ‘strict nexus’ between the assistance and the specific attack.” See Bonacasa v.

Standard Chartered PLC, No. 22-CV-3320 (ER), 2023 WL 7110774, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27,

2023). “But, the more attenuated the nexus, the more courts should demand that plaintiffs show

culpable participation through intentional aid that substantially furthered the tort.” Twitter, 598

U.S. at 506. And if, as here, “a plaintiff’s theory would hold a defendant liable for all the torts of

an enterprise, then a showing of pervasive and systemic aid is required to ensure that defendants

actually aided and abetted each tort of that enterprise.” Id.; accord Bonacasa, 2023 WL 7110774,

at *7; Finan, 2025 WL 2504317, at *20. Otherwise, “mostly passive actors like banks [may]

become liable for all of their customers’ crimes by virtue of carrying out routine transactions.”

Twitter, 598 U.S. at 491. The Court thus turns next to whether Defendants provided “pervasive

and systemic aid” such that, despite the significant attenuation between Defendants’ provision of

financial services to the Iranian Counterparties and banks and the attacks that injured Plaintiffs,

Defendants may be found sufficiently culpable under JASTA.

While the relevant case law on this issue points in different directions, the provision of

“routine services . . . in an unusual way” might “justify holding a secondary defendant liable for

all of the [terrorist] group’s actions or perhaps some definable subset of terrorist acts.” Twitter,

598 U.S. at 502.44 For example, in Bartlett, the Honorable Carol B. Amon found that the plaintiffs’

allegations that the defendant bank, who “opened and serviced accounts for individuals and

organizations known to be linked to Hezbollah,” employed managers who served as facilitators

for Hezbollah, and “made efforts to help Hezbollah hide funds from American sanctions,” was a

sufficiently unusual provision of services to plead “systemic and pervasive assistance.” See

Bartlett, 2024 WL 5497906, at *5. In Zobay, Judge Amon similarly found that the defendant

telecommunications operator engaged in “intentional evasion of U.S. sanctions” to “procure

embargoed American technology for an IRGC front” such that it had provided “pervasive and

systemic aid.” Zobay, 695 F. Supp. 3d at 347–48. Finally, in Raanan, the Honorable John G.

Koeltl held that “defendants’ alleged widespread, intentional circumvention of anti-terror

financing regulations, considered with [d]efendants’ purported knowledge that Hamas and PIJ

were transacting on the Binance platform, support[ed] the inference that [d]efendants’ assistance

was knowing.” Raanan, 2025 WL 605594, at *23.

44 Twitter involved allegations that social media operators, through their platforms, had

aided and abetted someone affiliated with the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (“ISIS”), an FTO,

who perpetrated a terrorist attack in Istanbul, Turkey. See Twitter, 598 U.S. at 478–79. Justice

Thomas, writing for the majority, based much of his analysis on the finding that Plaintiffs’ claim

rested “on an alleged failure to stop ISIS from using [defendants’] platforms,” i.e., “passive

nonfeasance.” See id. at 500–03.

Here, Defendants clearly provided non-routine banking services to Iranian entities that

were allegedly connected to or controlled by the IRGC, including, inter alia, manual workarounds

to ensure that the entities’ financial transactions would not be flagged under U.S. sanctions

regulations. (See, e.g., TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 1492–95 (detailing HSBC’s process to remove “all

references to Iranian-sanctioned entities from the SWIFT messages associated with each

transaction”).) Defendants also “allegedly had an independent duty to act that was not present in

Twitter.” Raanan, 2025 WL 605594, at *21. “[B]anking regulations require banks”—like

Defendants—“to know their customers.” Kaplan, 999 F.3d at 865. Plaintiffs allege that each

Defendant bank used know-your-customer (“KYC”) services, which were intended to identify and

profile high risk individuals and companies. (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 65 (alleging HSCB “used the

services of World-Check, a compliance service that purported to identify and profile ‘High risk

individuals, companies and organizations’45 and provide ‘[KYC ] and [Politically-Exposed-

Persons]46 Checking before account opening.’”); id. ¶¶ 105–08 (describing SCB’s KYC program);

id. ¶¶ 132–38 (detailing Credit Suisse’s use of World-Check and other KYC programs); id. ¶ 154

(alleging RBS used World-Check); id. ¶ 165 (alleging Barclays used World-Check).) Such duties

can support a finding of sufficient knowledge of a connection to an FTO or terrorist activity.

Compare Est. of Henkin v. Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S., No. 19-CV-5394 (BMC), 2025

WL 622546, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2025) (finding sufficient knowledge given defendant bank’s

due diligence and reporting duties), and Raanan, 2025 WL 605594, at *21 (noting defendants’

“independent duty” to, inter alia, perform due diligence on its customers), with Twitter, 598 U.S.

45 The TAC notes that “World-Check described ‘High Risk’ as ‘money launderers, arms

dealers, terrorists, drug, fraud[, w]ar crimes etc.’” (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 65 n.20.)

46 These are defined by World-Check as “Politicians, their families, companies linked &

business associates.” (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 65 n.21.)

at 501 (“[P]laintiffs identify no duty that would require defendants or other communication-

providing services to terminate customers after discovering that the customers were using the

service for illicit ends.”)

But Plaintiffs’ allegations here differ from the case law in two key respects. First,

Defendants’ actual connections with Hezbollah are significantly more attenuated than in the

aforementioned cases. In Bartlett, defendants were alleged to have (1) “Hezbollah liaisons within

their institutions who facilitated the transactions for those terrorist affiliates,” Bartlett, 2024

WL 5497906, at *4 (emphasis added); (2) facilitated “millions of dollars in transactions to

organizations whose only objectives were to support terrorism,” id. (emphasis added); and (3)

“opened and serviced accounts for individuals and organizations known to be linked to Hezbollah,”

id. at 4 (emphasis added). In Zobay, “the second floor of [defendant’s] Iran offices was allegedly

populated by military intelligence officials,” and defendant “allegedly invested in a venture with

two shareholder entities with significant connections to the IRGC47 and provided embargoed U.S.

goods important to the IRGC’s aims to the venture to help make it succeed.” Zobay, 695 F. Supp.

3d at 346–47. The Raanan court credited allegations that “defendants knew in real-time that

terrorists were transacting on the platform.” Raanan, 2025 WL 605594 at *21. And in Henkin,

the court emphasized the defendant bank’s “close relationship” with known Hamas affiliates,

which encompassed effectuating transfers “at the direction of a Hamas minister.” Henkin, 2025

WL 622546, at *4 (citation omitted). There are no such insider allegations in the TAC, nor

allegations that the funds Defendants provided were used solely for terrorist activities.

47 At the time of at least one of the attacks alleged in Zobay, the IRGC had been designated

as an FTO. See Zobay, 695 F. Supp. 3d at 315, 320.

Second, Defendants’ provision of financial services is too widespread to impart the

requisite intent to aid the specific terrorist acts at issue. In Kaplan, the defendant granted “its

known [Hezbollah]-affiliated Customers ‘special exceptions’” that allowed deposits far and

beyond the bank’s limits. See Kaplan, 999 F.3d at 858. In Raanan, “defendants intentionally

engaged in a scheme to evade anti-terror financing regulations in order to retain illicit actors on

the platform, . . . launched a customer due diligence program that ‘by design still contained

massive gaps to allow criminal activity to take place,’ . . . [a]nd on one occasion, . . . allegedly

went out of its way to protect a user associated with Hamas.” Raanan, 2025 WL 605594, at *21.

And in Bonacasa, defendants “carefully tailored financial instruments to fund production of a

known IED ingredient known to be sold to terrorist groups known to be attacking U.S. service

members.” Bonacasa, 2023 WL 7110774, at *11. In contrast, the financial services Defendants

provided suggest a general desire to obtain the business of any sanctioned entity, Iranian or

otherwise, rather than the desire to “form a near-common enterprise” with Hezbollah-affiliated

entities, such as the IRGC. See Ashley, 144 F.4th at 445; (see, e.g., TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 1805–06

(exhibiting broader RBS effort to find a “solution” for range of (non-Iranian) clients who may find

themselves subject to sanctions); id. ¶¶ 1841–45, 1850 (detailing Bank Melli-triggered instructions

“on how to process payments for both sanctioned and non-sanctioned banks with which Barclays

had correspondent relationships” (emphasis added)); id. ¶¶ 1705, 1708, 1730–31 (noting SCB’s

non-routine banking practices for all Iranian banks, as far back as 1990s); id. ¶¶ 1535, 1552

(discussing HSBC’s interest in “business opportunities” in Iran despite risks); id. ¶ 1549

(discussing payments originating from financial institutions “domiciled in . . . an [Office of

Foreign Assets Control-sanctioned] country,” e.g. “Cuba[], Iran[]”).)

Ultimately, even construing all allegations as true, Plaintiffs’ “allegations here at most

indicate that Defendants generally permitted and solicited illicit actors of all ilks to use [their]

platforms.” See Troell, 2026 WL 636849, at *22; see also Ashley, 144 F.4th at 445 (“The Banks

are alleged to have culpably executed financially suspect transactions writ large, not in a manner

that actively sought to ‘associate[ ] themselves’ with the Syndicate’s ‘operations’ or to form ‘a

near-common enterprise’ with the Syndicate.” (alteration in original) (citing Twitter, 598 U.S.

at 502)); cf. Twitter, 598 U.S. at 500 (“[D]efendants’ relationship with ISIS and its supporters

appears to have been the same as their relationship with their billion-plus other users.”). Thus,

“[e]ven assuming [Defendants’] aid was pervasive and systemic, the [TAC] does not support the

inference that [their] money laundering operations were designed or performed with the intent to

aid [Hezbollah].” See Ashley, 144 F.4th at 445 (emphasis added); see also Troell, 2026

WL 636849, at *17–19 (rejecting aiding-and-abetting claims “premised on the allegation that

individuals and entities with terrorist affiliations were permitted to transact on” defendant’s

exchange platform, where plaintiffs failed to plead that the defendants “intended to assist IRGC in

committing terrorist attacks” (emphasis added)). This is all the more so given Defendants’

workarounds were designed for sanctioned customers, rather than Hezbollah or even other Iranian

customers. Without more, Defendants cannot be culpable under JASTA “for engaging in money

laundering on behalf of an individual or entity with connections to terrorists.” Troell, 2026

WL 636849, at *20 (citing Ashley, 144 F.4th at 443–44); id. at *18 (“Courts have routinely found

allegations that financial institutions intentionally and knowingly facilitated transactions by

sanctioned entities insufficient to establish the nexus required to render a defendant secondarily

liable for specific terrorist attacks.”).

Ultimately, Plaintiffs “posit a theory based on money’s fungibility: because Defendants

engaged in widespread money laundering for individuals and entities with an apparent or possible

connection to terrorists, some of the money must have gone to the terrorists’ violent activities.”

Ashley, 144 F.4th at 444. But the Circuit has already rejected this type of “fungibility theory.” See

id. at 444–46 (compiling cases); see also Honickman, 6 F.4th at 498–99 (finding that plaintiffs’

“fungibility argument” would “evade Halberstam’s foreseeability standard”); Troell, 2026

WL 636849, at *20 (explaining that the Second Circuit “rejected the notion that a defendant bank

could be culpable under JASTA for engaging in money laundering on behalf of an individual or

entity with connections to terrorists, without more, as such a theory of liability depends upon

money’s fungibility” (citing Ashley, 144 F.4th at 443–44)).

While Defendants’ sanctions-evading conduct might be “reprehensible from moral and

policy perspectives,” (see Pls.’ Letter, Dkt. 160, at 5), it does not satisfy the intent requirement for

an aiding-and-abetting claim under JASTA. Because Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege

that Defendants had the requisite “intent to further [an FTO’s] terrorist activities,”48 see Ashley,

144 F.4th at 444 (quoting Linde, 882 F.3d at 330); see id. at 437 (noting “Twitter’s command that

aiding-and-abetting liability [be] reserved ‘to cases of truly culpable conduct’” (citing Twitter, 598

U.S. at 489)), the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ Ninth Claim.

B. Plaintiffs’ Tenth Claim Against Commerzbank49

Plaintiffs separately allege that Commerzbank aided and abetted Hezbollah’s commission

of terrorist activities by providing “material support to Hezbollah through [its proxy,] the Martyrs

48 Having determined that Plaintiffs’ Ninth Claim must be dismissed on this basis, the Court

declines to assess the Halberstam substantiality factors.

49 Whereas Plaintiffs’ Ninth Claim against all Defendants, including Commerzbank, is

based on Defendants’ alleged collaboration with Iranian Counterparties, their links to the IRGC,

and the IRGC’s links to Hezbollah, (see TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 4771–97), Plaintiffs’ Tenth Claim

Foundation,” in Lebanon. (TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 4799–800.) The TAC more specifically alleges that

the Waisenkinderprojekt Libanon e.V., or the “Orphans Project Lebanon,” “was, until its closure

in 2014, the German branch of Hezbollah’s Martyrs Foundation and [was] responsible for

collecting donations in Germany and transferring those funds to Hezbollah in Lebanon.” (Id.

¶ 1649.) Plaintiffs allege that during the relevant period, the Orphans Project Lebanon “transferred

several million dollars to Hezbollah’s Martyrs Foundation in Lebanon through Commerzbank.”

(Id. ¶ 1650.)

Commerzbank seeks to dismiss this claim for failure to state a claim and for lack of

personal jurisdiction. (See Commerzbank Suppl. Mem. Supp. MTD, Dkt. 145, at 4 (arguing that

Tenth Claim fails to state a claim); id. at 9 (“The Court should also dismiss [the Tenth Claim] for

the independent reason that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Commerzbank to adjudicate

[this claim].”).) The Court finds that this claim should not be dismissed for either reason.

1. Personal Jurisdiction

Commerzbank’s personal jurisdiction argument is raised for the first time in this action.

See Freeman II Dismissal, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 226 n.8 (noting that “the Court had dismissed the

[JASTA] conspiracy claim against Commerzbank for lack of personal jurisdiction” in Freeman I,

and that “Commerzbank [did] not move[] to dismiss the Tenth Claim [alleging aiding and abetting]

for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(2)” in Freeman II). “[L]ongstanding Second

Circuit precedent hold[s] that ‘the Rule 12 defense[ ] of lack of personal jurisdiction, . . . if waived

by defendant’s failure to raise [that] objection[ ] in response to the original complaint, may not be

resurrected merely because a plaintiff has amended the complaint.” Perez v. Escobar Constr., Inc.,

against Commerzbank is based on Commerzbank’s separate and direct dealings with a Hezbollah

affiliate, (see id. ¶¶ 4799–805).

No. 20-CV-8010 (LTS) (GWG), 2025 WL 2732861, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2025) (quoting

Gilmore v. Shearson/Am. Exp. Inc., 811 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Shields v. Citytrust

Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that failure to raise personal jurisdiction

in the first responsive pleading results in “irrevocabl[e]” waiver). Commerzbank argues that it

would be “manifest injustice” to find that it waived this defense, because the Tenth Claim was

previously “dismissed ‘with prejudice’” and the Court “previously noted that Commerzbank did

not face prejudice from not having the Tenth Claim dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.”

(Commerzbank Suppl. Reply Supp. MTD, Dkt. 150, at 6 (citation omitted).) But in the Court’s

prior dismissal, it “deem[ed] Commerzbank as having consented to the Court’s jurisdiction for the

purposes of the Tenth Claim” because “Commerzbank has appeared and not moved to dismiss the

Tenth Claim of the Complaints for lack of personal jurisdiction.” See Freeman II Dismissal, 465

F. Supp. 3d at 226 n.8; see also Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC, No. 18-CV-7359 (PKC) (CLP),

2020 WL 4481944, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2020) (denying Commerzbank’s motion for

reconsideration of its personal jurisdiction finding for the Tenth Claim). The subsequent dismissal

with prejudice has no bearing on the fact that Commerzbank had consented to jurisdiction. The

Court thus assesses the merits of Commerzbank’s motion to dismiss the Tenth Claim in the TAC.

2. The Orphans Project Lebanon

Plaintiffs allege that, through its provision of financial services to the Orphans Project

Lebanon, Commerzbank aided and abetted Hezbollah’s terrorist attacks, including those that

injured Plaintiffs. (See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 4798–4805.) Plaintiffs allege that the Orphans Project

Lebanon’s association with Hezbollah was widely known, including in Germany. (See id. ¶ 1673

(“In January 2008, the German newspaper Die Welt reported that Orphans Project Lebanon e.V.

collected donations in Germany and belonged to the Lebanese ‘Al-Shahid (The Martyr)

Association,’ which in turn is affiliated with Hezbollah.”); id. ¶ 1676 (“[T]he 2003 report publicly

issued by the Baden–Württemberg State Office for Protection of the Constitution (one of the

security services for the German states) found: ‘Hezbollah’ has an extensive network of charitable

institutions in which not only Shiites find support . . . . Funding is also done through donations

made by certain organizations who collect funds from abroad. This includes, for example, the

‘Orphans Project Lebanon e.V.’ which is active in Baden–Württemberg.”).) This association was

also publicly announced by the Orphan Project Lebanon on its website. (See id. ¶ 1654 (“[A]s

of 2002, Orphans Project Lebanon’s website stated its affiliation with the Martyrs Foundation,

declaring: ‘[W]e work closely with the Aschahid [i.e., al-Shahid or Martyrs] Association in

Beirut.’”).) “Commerzbank maintained account number ending in 168850 for the Orphans Project

Lebanon and transferred millions of dollars on its behalf, knowing that it was Hezbollah’s

fundraising organization in Germany,” despite these public notices “identifying [the Orphans

Project Lebanon] as a Hezbollah fundraising organization,” and “despite the fact that the primary

recipient of funds donated from the account—Hezbollah’s Martyrs Foundation—was designated

by the United States as an SDGT on July 24, 2007.” (See id. ¶¶ 1674–75.)

As previously discussed, the three elements of an aiding-and-abetting claim under JASTA

are: (1) the party whom the defendant aided performed a wrongful act that caused injury; (2) the

defendant was generally aware of its role as part of the illegal or tortious activity when it provided

the assistance; and (3) the defendant knowingly and substantially assisted the principal violation.

Ashley, 144 F.4th at 437. The aiding-and-abetting claim against Commerzbank differs materially

50 Plaintiffs do not identify specific years during which Commerzbank allegedly

“maintained account number ending in 1688 for the Orphans Project Lebanon and transferred

millions of dollars on its behalf, knowing that it was Hezbollah’s fundraising organization in

Germany,” alleging only that these financial services occurred “[d]uring this same time period

when Orphans Project Lebanon was proudly proclaiming its affiliation with the Martyrs

Foundation on its website,” which appears to be around 2008. (See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 1672–74.)

from the one against Defendants in the Ninth Claim, which the Court is dismissing for failure to

state a claim.

a) FTO’s Performance of a Wrongful Act that Caused Injury

The Court finds that the TAC adequately alleges that Hezbollah, an FTO, was both a

recipient of Commerzbank’s assistance and a principal in the attacks that allegedly injured

Plaintiffs. (See TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶¶ 1649–80, 1959–79.) In contrast to Plaintiffs’ aiding-and-

abetting claim against all Defendants in the Ninth Claim, here there was no chain of intermediaries,

such as the IRGC or its purported proxies or agents, between Commerzbank and Hezbollah.

Rather, Commerzbank dealt directly with a well-known fundraising arm of Hezbollah. Thus, the

connection between Commerzbank and the relevant FTO is far less attenuated than the one

between Defendants and any FTO in the Ninth Claim.

b) General Awareness

Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Commerzbank’s general awareness of its role in the illegal

or tortious activity are also stronger here than in Plaintiffs’ Ninth Claim. Commerzbank argues

that Plaintiffs’ failure to adequately plead Commerzbank’s specific knowledge of the public

material tying Commerzbank’s client to an FTO dooms this claim. (See Commerzbank Suppl.

Mem. Supp. MTD, Dkt. 145, at 5–6.) But Commerzbank misreads the applicable case law.

Plaintiffs need not specifically allege that Commerzbank had “read or was aware of [public]

sources” tying its customers to Hezbollah. See Kaplan, 999 F.3d at 864–65 (overturning district

court’s “reject[ion of plaintiffs’] allegations as insufficient to permit an inference that [defendant]

had knowledge of the [Hezbollah]-acknowledged relationships [because] the SAC ‘nowhere

allege[d] . . . that [defendant] read or was aware of such sources”); Raanan, 2025 WL 605594,

at *20 (“A plaintiff may rely on media articles and publications, for example, and need not allege

at the pleading stage that the defendant ‘knew or should have known of the public sources.’”

(quoting Honickman, 6 F.4th at 501)). As previously discussed, the general awareness standard is

“permissive.” See King, 2022 WL 4537849, at *7 (finding general awareness when defendant

provided extensive banking services to “well-known ‘al-Qaeda front’” and associated individuals,

“despite their being placed on the U.S. government’s [SDN] and Blocked Persons list or designated

as [SDGT]s”). Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged Commerzbank’s general awareness here.

c) Knowing and Substantial Assistance

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the transfers facilitated by Commerzbank enabled “terrorism-

incentive payments to Hezbollah operatives or their families upon their deaths.” (Opp’n, Dkt. 147,

at 25 (citing TAC, Dkt. 137, ¶ 1660).) The nexus between Commerzbank’s assistance and the

terrorist attacks at issue is thus significantly stronger than in the Ninth Claim. Overall, the facts

alleged by Plaintiffs most closely mirror those in Bartlett, in which Judge Amon found this element

sufficiently pled based plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendant bank had “provided Hezbollah with

pervasive, substantial assistance constituting hundreds of millions of dollars of funding and crucial

access to Lebanese and international financial networks through Hezbollah’s proxies.” Bartlett,

2024 WL 5497906, at *5. So too here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that

Commerzbank provided knowing and substantial assistance to Hezbollah.

Accordingly, the Court denies Commerzbank’s motion to dismiss the TAC’s Ninth Claim,

which alleges aiding-and-abetting under JASTA, for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court dismisses the First through Ninth Claims as to the

Defendants51 for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court also dismisses the Sixth

51 As previously discussed, Bank Saderat has defaulted in this case.

Claim against Commerzbank for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). The Court

denies Commerzbank’s motion to dismiss the Tenth Claim. Lastly, the Court directs Plaintiffs to

file a letter indicating whether they plan to seek damages against Bank Saderat, in accordance with

the Court’s Memorandum & Order granting default judgment against Bank Saderat for the Ninth

and Eleventh Claims,52 (see Mem. & Order, Dkt. 90), within fourteen (14) days of this

Memorandum & Order.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

Pamela K. Chen

United States District Judge

Dated: March 31, 2026

Brooklyn, New York

52 The Eleventh Claim is against Bank Saderat only.