Sedano-Mahecha

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRISTIAN CAMILO SEDANO-

MAHECHA

Petitioner, : 3:26-cv-1010

: (JUDGE MARIANI)

V. :

WARDEN, CLINTON COUNTY

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Respondent. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

On April 20, 2026, Petitioner Christian Camilo Sedano-Mahecha (“Petitioner”), a

citizen of Colombia residing in the United States since April 2023, with no criminal record

and a pending asylum application, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Petitioner is detained at the Clinton County Correctional

Facility within the Middle District of Pennsylvania and names as Respondent Warden,

Clinton County Correctional Facility. (/d., at 1).

Petitioner entered the United States without inspection on or about April 22, 2023.

(Doc. 7-3 at 1). Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear and charged as inadmissible

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) because he entered the United States without being

admitted or paroled. (/d. at 2). Shortly thereafter, Petitioner was released into the United

States on his own recognizance. (/d. at 1).

On January 16, 2026, Petitioner was arrested by the Department of Homeland

Security (‘DHS’) in New York City, “while reporting pursuant to a release on Order of

Recognizance.” (Doc. 7-5 at 3). He has been detained without bond since. A review of the

automated case information contained on the Executive Office of Immigration Review's

website reveals that Petitioner has a Master Hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) on

May 13, 2026. As such, Petitioner does not a final order of removal."

Petitioner claims he is being unlawfully detained by Respondent without a bond

hearing under the mandatory detention provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), instead of the discretionary detention provision of the INA,

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This distinction matters because noncitizens detained pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) are not entitled to a bond hearing, whereas noncitizens detained

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing before an IJ. Patel v. O'Neil,

2025 WL 3516865, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (citations omitted).

As directed by the Court, the Respondent filed a response to the petition on April 29,

2026. (Doc. 7). The Respondent does not dispute the factual allegations contained in the

: Respondent notes that on April 10, 2023, “Petitioner was detained by the Mobile Tactical Interdiction

Unit at a tactical checkpoint near Guatemala City, Guatemala as a suspected member of the Tren de Aragua

Gang in Colombia.” (Doc. 7 at 4). The only evidence submitted to the Court regarding Petitioner's alleged

status a member of Tren de Aragua is the DHS’s own statements in its own records. (Doc. 7-5 at 2) (“Multiple

tattoos on chest indicative of TDA.”); /d. at 3 (“Subject has been identified as Member/Active of Tren de

Aragua.”); Id. at 4 (“On October 30, 2025, NYC ERO received notifications from USBP that subject is a

suspected TdA member.”); /d. at 5 (‘SEDANO Macecha has been identified as a Tren de Aragua gang

member by reasonable suspicion by his tattoos and the subject of a TECS Record ID [REDACTED]

identifying him as such.”). The Court also notes that during Petitioner's detention he was disciplined for

“fighting.” (Doc. 1-1).

petition. Rather, the Respondent sets forth legal arguments as to why Petitioner's detention

is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (/d.). But, as discussed more fully below,

Respondent's interpretation of the INA—the same one they advance here—has already

been rejected by this Court and the overwhelming majority of federal judges to address this

issue. See Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025 (collecting cases).

Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently rejected the

same interpretation advanced by the Respondent. Seé Cunha v. Freden,__F.4" _, 2026

WL 1146044, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026) (“Today, although we part ways with two other

circuits that have addressed this question, we join the overwhelming majority of federal

judges across the Nation to consider it and conclude that the government’s novel

interpretation of the immigration statutes defies their plain text. That text makes clear that

Section 1226(a) governs detention of noncitizens like Petitioner. Section 1225(b)(2)(A)

does not apply to such noncitizens, who are present in the United States after entering the

country without inspection and admission, and who were not apprehended while entering

the country or shortly thereafter.”). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit has also recently rejected the Respondent's interpretation of the statutory provision

at issue here. See Hernandez Alvarsz v. Warden Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, __ F.4t” 2026

WL 1243395, at *1 (11 Cir. May 6, 2026) (“We are snpersuadeci by the Gover mert’s re-

interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A).”).

ll. |§ STANDARD OF REVIEW

Absent suspension, the Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas

corpus “to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.

507, 525 (2004 (Citing U.S. Const., Art|, § 9, cl. 2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal

district court may grant a habeas petition where a petitioner's immigration detention is “in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of

Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” /.N.S.

v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Claims brought by immigration detainees seeking

relief from their confinement “fall within the core of the writ of habeas corpus.” Trump v.

J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025). It is well established that a federal habeas corpus

petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a discharge from

custody. Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations omitted).

lll. ANALYSIS

Although not raised by either party, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the

petition.2

Turning to the merits of the Petition, the Court will first consider the two statutory

provisions of the INA issue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) is a statute entitled “Inspection by

2 The Court incorporates by reference its prior jurisdictional analyses set forth in similar habeas

petitions filed by civil immigration detainees. See Pate/, 2025 WL 3516865, at *3-4; see also Diallo v. Warden,

2026 WL 1081502, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2026). Furthermore, Petitioner is not required to exhaust his

administrative remedies. /d.

immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.”

It provides, in relevant part:

(b) Inspection of applicants for admissions

(2) Inspection of other aliens

(A) In General

Subject to subparagraph (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines

that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt

entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding

under section 1229a [removal proceedings] of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1226, in contrast, is entitled “Apprehension and

detention of aliens.” It provides, in relevant part:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained

pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.

Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney

General—

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on—

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing

conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or

(B) conditional parole; but

(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an ‘employment

authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien

is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without

regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization.

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Respondent is currently detaining Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1225(b)(2)(A). It is undisputed that Petitioner has not been charged with or convicted of a

criminal offense and does not have a final order of removal.

As the Court previously found, “the overwhelming majority of federal district courts

that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find that

persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously entered the United

States and are currently residing in the United States—are not subject to the mandatory

detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary

detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.”

Patel, 2025 WL 3519895, at *4 (collecting cases). “These courts have further found that the

statutory provisions of the INA that Respondents’ claim divest this Court of jurisdiction do

not apply to persons similarly situated to Petitioner and that there is no need to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to filing a habeas petition.” /d.

As before, “the Court finds that the near universal rejection of Respondents’

interpretation of the INA by federal district courts to be highly persuasive and will adopt the

same approach.” /d. at *5. Petitioner's detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful

under the INA because the plain language of this provision and the statutory framework of

the INA compels a finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are

affirmatively seeking admission to the United States, not noncitizens like Petitioner who

have resided in the United States for years. See Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp.

3 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “generally governs the process of

arresting and detaining ... aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.”

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018) (emphasis added); /d. at 303 (“As noted, § 1226 applies

to aliens already present in the United States.”). In addition, despite the Board of Immigration Appeals holding

in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 |. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to

noncitizens like Petitioner, “[t]his Court owes no deference to an agency's interpretation that conflicts with

3d. 397, 408 (D.N.J, 2025) (“For all these reasons, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A)

applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.¢., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the

United States. Accordingly, it does not apply to individuals like Petitioner, who has been

residing in the United States ‘for over seven years.””); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at

(same).

Like other Courts to address this issue, the Court finds that Respondent's

interpretation of the phrase “seeking admission” violates the rule against surplusage, would

negate the plain meaning of the text, and make redundant Section 1226(c) mandatory

detention of noncitizens who have committed or are charged with certain specified crimes.*

See Centeno Ibbara, 2025 WL 3294726, at *5-6 (“The government's interpretation of §

1225(b)(2) violates the rule against surplusage. If ‘an applicant seeking admission’ is the

same as ‘an applicant for admission,’ then ‘seeking admission’ is surplusage. Congress has

also recently adopted provisions in § 1226 that would be made superfluous under the

government's interpretation. If a noncitizen enters the country illegally and is subsequently

convicted or charged with certain crimes, these new provisions require that noncitizeris be

detained without a bond hearing. Under the government's interpretation, § 1225 would

the statute’s unambiguous text.” Bethancourt Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 4018 (citing Lover Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400-01 (2024)).

4 “If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt

accipienda). None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to

duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (Thomson/West eds., 1st Ed. 2012).

require such mandatory detention regardless of criminal charges or conviction. If this was

the case, Congress would have no need to create additional requirements for mandatory

detention.”).

Here, although Petitioner is an “applicant for admission,” he is not “seeking

admission” into the United States. Because Petitioner is not “seeking admission’ into the

United States, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him.5 See Cunha, __ F.4'"__, 2026

WL 1146044, at *6 (Here, although Petitioner is an applicant for admission under the

statutory definition because he Is present in the country and has never been admitted, it

simply cannot be said that he is ‘seeking admission,’ as he is not requesting lawful entry into

the United States.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s habeas petition will be granted in part

because his mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing is

unlawful. Accordingly, Respondent will be directed to provide Petitioner with an

individualized bond hearing before an IJ within seven (7) days of the date of this Order. A

separate Order follows

5 The Court acknowledges that Respondent cite to the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Buenrosto-

Mendez v. Bondi, __ F.4"___, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. 2026), in which the Fifth Circuit—in a 2-1 decision—

held that noncitizens like Petitioner were “applicants for admission” to the United States who were “seeking

admission” and were thus subject to the INA’s mandatory detention provision. The Fifth Circuit’s ruling is not

binding on this Court. Similarly, the Court is aware of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Avila v. Bondi, holding

that noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention as an “applicant for admission” who was “seeking

admission.” Avila v. Bondi, F.4? __, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026). The Eighth Circuit’s

holding is not binding on this Court.

= □□

[TP

er Yi td MAU

Robert BWMariani

United States District Judge