Hetherington

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

KEON HETHERINGTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 25 C 3758

)

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF )

COMMUNITY COLLEGE )

DISTRICT NO. 508 and )

LUVIA MORENO, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Keon Hetherington has sued City Colleges of Chicago and Luvia Moreno, its

Dean of Student Services, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education

Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681. The defendants have moved to dismiss

Hetherington's amended complaint. In doing so, the defendants point out that the

correct institutional defendant is the Board of Trustees of Community College District

No. 508, so the Court will order the substitution of that defendant for City Colleges.

Background

Hetherington was a student at Harold Washington College. His claims arise from

the aftermath of a complaint that a female student made about him in August 2024. The

female student made a complaint that Hetherington had sexually harassed and

assaulted her and had stalked her. Hetherington says the female student's allegations

are untrue.

In his amended complaint in the present case, Hetherington alleges that on the

same day the female student made the complaint—August 29, 2024—Moreno, City

Colleges' Dean of Student Services, issued a mutual no-contact order involving

Hetherington and the other student. This was done, Hetherington says, without giving

him notice of the charges against him or a chance to respond. Hetherington also

alleges that about three and one-half months later, on December 12, 2024, he

requested "academic accommodations" (he does not specify what) "due to the mental

and emotional toll of defending against the allegations," but Moreno denied his request,

stating that "Title IX does not offer those protections to alleged perpetrators" and leaving

any accommodations to the discretion of individual professors. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14.

Hetherington further alleges that in June 2025—about two months after he filed

the present lawsuit—he made a cross-complaint against the other student and against

Moreno, alleging retaliation, procedural misconduct, and unequal treatment.

Hetherington says that City Colleges has taken no action on his complaint, and he cites

this as evidence of selective or discriminatory enforcement.

Documents attached to Hetherington's amended complaint reflect that as part of

City Colleges' inquiry regarding the female student's complaint, both she and

Hetherington were interviewed, as were several witnesses apparently identified by the

complainant. An investigative report was prepared and was provided to both the

complainant and Hetherington, and they were each given a chance to respond in

writing, which both of them did. After a final report was prepared and provided to both

the complainant and Hetherington, a virtual hearing before a three-member panel was

held in July 2025 (after the present lawsuit had been filed), and Hetherington and the

complainant were each given the opportunity to submit cross-examination questions in

advance. Both did so; these were reviewed by the hearing panel for relevance; and a

list of approved questions was provided in advance of the hearing.

Following the hearing, on September 15, 2025, a twelve-page, single-spaced

written ruling was provided. See Compl., Ex. C. In the ruling (called a "Title IX Written

Determination of Responsibility"), the hearing panel found the complainant "generally . .

. credible" and said that Hetherington's "credibility was not as sound" for reasons the

hearing officer described in the ruling. The hearing panel found "per the preponderance

of the evidence" standard that Hetherington had "violated the [City Colleges] Title IX

Policy by sexually harassing" the complainant. Among other things, the hearing panel

concluded that the evidence showed that Hetherington "demonstrated a pattern of

inserting himself into the same spaces as Complainant" at the college, "despite being

aware of the no-contact order . . ." and had also enlisted a friend to approach the

complainant "to probe into their past relationship." Written Determination, p. 6 of 12.

The hearing panel concluded based on these and other findings that "there is sufficient

evidence per the preponderance of the evidence standard that [Hetherington] violated

the [City Colleges] Title IX Policy by sexually harassing Complainant," Id., p. 8 of 12.

The hearing panel further found that the same conduct "constitute[s] stalking in violation

of [City Colleges'] EEO and Title IX Policy." Id., p. 10 of 12.

The complainant also alleged that Hetherington had engaged in dating violence

and sexual assault. The hearing panel found that these allegations were outside City

Colleges' jurisdiction because they were alleged to have occurred off campus. The

hearing panel also concluded that allegations by the complainant of citizenship-based,

pregnancy-based, and gender-based discrimination by Hetherington were either outside

of City Colleges' jurisdiction or had not been established. Id., p. 11 of 12.

The hearing panel recommended imposing a one-year suspension upon

Hetherington, precluding him from returning until the fall of 2026; suspending his access

to his student e-mail address; and suspending his student ID card. Id., p. 12 or 12.

Hetherington alleges that the hearing panel's determination was arbitrary,

capricious, discriminatory, and in violation of due process. Among other things, he

alleges that a suspension "imposed after both parties are no longer enrolled . . . serves

no protective or educational purpose. It is purely punitive and symbolic . . . " Am.

Compl. ¶ 29.

In count 1 of Hetherington's amended complaint, asserted against City Colleges,

he alleges that City Colleges engaged in selective enforcement and denied him equal

educational access on the basis of sex, in violation of Title IX. In count 2, asserted

against Moreno, Hetherington alleges that Moreno violated his due process rights by

issuing a no-contact order without an opportunity to respond or a hearing and violated

his right to equal protection by selectively denying him protections and accommodations

on the basis of his gender. The defendants have moved to dismiss Hetherington's

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Discussion

1. Due process / equal protection claim (Count 2)

a. Due process

The Court begins with Count 2, which as noted is asserted against Moreno.

Hetherington has not stated a viable claim for denial of due process. A viable due

process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that he was

deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419

U.S. 565, 572 (1975). Protected interests in property "are normally ‘not created by the

Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined’ by an

independent source such as state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain

benefits." Id. at 572-73. A college education "is not ‘property’ in the usual sense of the

word. Instead, we ask whether the student as shown that he has a legally protected

entitlement to his continued education at the university." Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d

652, 659 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up; emphasis in original). "In the context of higher

education, any property interest is a matter of contract between the student and the

university." Id. In this regard,

a university student must do more than show that he has a contract with

the university; he must establish that the contract entitled him to the

specific right that the university allegedly took, such as the right to a

continuing education or the right not to be suspended without good cause.

Generalities won't do; the student's complaint must be specific about the

source of this implied contract, the exact promises the university

made to the student, and the promises the student made in return.

Id. (cleaned up).

Hetherington's amended complaint includes no such allegations. Under the

circumstances, he has failed to allege that he had a property interest in continued

education at City Colleges. His due process claim fails on this basis alone.

Even if Hetherington had adequately alleged a property interest in continued

education, his due process would fail on the second requirement. The basic

requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g.,

Goss, 419 U.S. at 577-79. The materials attached to Hetherington's complaint in this

case reflect that before a decision was made on the complaint by the female student,

Hetherington was advised what the charges against him were, and he was given a

hearing, at which he testified on his own behalf and was allowed to propose questions

for the complainant. No facts are alleged that, under the circumstances, would support

a contention that Hetherington was denied due process in connection with his

suspension.

As for the no-contact order, Hetherington has not identified any protectible liberty

or property interest in being able to have contact with the person who made the

complaint against him. The Court also notes that Hetherington's complaint describes

the no-contact order as mutual, meaning that it applied to the complainant too. For

these reasons, he has asserted no viable due process claim against Moreno.

b. Equal protection

Count 2 also includes an equal protection component; Hetherington alleges that

he was treated in a discriminatory manner based on his gender. Count 2, however, is

asserted against Moreno. Hetherington does not allege that Moreno played any role in

the decision on the complaint made by the female student. To sustain a claim against

Moreno in his personal capacity for denial of Hetherington's equal protection rights,

Hetherington has to plausibly allege that Moreno had personal involvement in violating

his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Williams v. Shah, 927 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 2019).

Hetherington does not allege in his amended complaint that Moreno was involved in

determining the merits of the female student's complaint—that was done by a hearing

panel. Moreno is alleged to have been directly involved in imposing the no-contact

order, but because the order was mutual—it applied both to Hetherington and to his

female accuser—it cannot serve as a basis for a claim of denial of equal protection.

Hetherington also sues Moreno in her "official" capacity. An official capacity

lawsuit against a governmental official amounts to a lawsuit against the governmental

entity of which the official is an agent, in this case the Board of Trustees. See Kentucky

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1984). A claim under section 1983 against a local

governmental entity can succeed only if the constitutional deprivation resulted from a

custom, policy, or practice of the governmental entity. See generally Monell v. N.Y. City

Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But Hetherington's complaint includes no

allegations along these lines, and thus no plausible allegations supporting an official

capacity claim.

For these reasons, the Court dismisses count 2 of Hetherington's amended

complaint for failure to state a claim.

2. Title IX claim (Count 1)

Count 1 of Hetherington's complaint is a claim against City Colleges (actually,

against the Board of Trustees) for violation of Title IX. Title IX provides that "[n]o person

in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be

denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or

activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); see also Gebser v.

Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998) (Title IX is enforceable through

an implied private right of action).

The Court will assume for purposes of discussion that Hetherington's suspension

excluded him from participation in an educational program, even though it's not entirely

clear: as noted earlier, Hetherington's amended complaint appears to suggest that the

suspension had no actual effect on him because it was "imposed after [he was] no

longer enrolled" at the school. Am. Compl. ¶ 29.

The key question in assessing whether Hetherington has stated a viable Title IX

claim is: "do the alleged facts, if true, raise a plausible inference that the university

discriminated against John 'on the basis of sex?'" Doe, 928 F.3d at 667-68. To support

this proposition, Hetherington cites three points. The first involves the fact that Moreno

imposed a no-contact order, which appears to have effectively barred Hetherington from

the college campus. But there is no basis to infer that the no-contact order was

discriminatory: Hetherington describes it as a "mutual" order that applied both to him

and his female accuser.

The second point Hetherington cites is the fact that he was not provided an

accommodation to be able to be on campus, and when he challenged this he was told

by Moreno that such accommodations are not given to accused persons. The Court

notes that Hetherington does not allege that his accuser got accommodations, but even

if so, favoring accusers over accused persons does not equate to gender discrimination,

at least without more.

The third point Hetherington cites in support of his claim of gender discrimination

is that the hearing came out adversely to him. This appears to boil down to the

proposition that the hearing panel believed the accuser and not him. But no caselaw

supports the proposition that an adverse outcome alone is enough to give rise to a

discrimination claim. And Hetherington does not allege any surrounding circumstances

relevant to the hearing that would rise to an inference of gender-based discrimination.

Moreno's alleged comment that accommodations for a no-contact order would be

available to an accuser and not an accused does not assist Hetherington in this regard:

there is no allegation that Moreno was involved in making the findings against

Hetherington in connection with the hearing.

For these reasons, the Court dismisses count 1 of Hetherington’s amended

complaint.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiffs amended complaint [dkt. no. 42]. Unless plaintiff files by June 10, 2026 a

motion for leave to amend attaching a proposed second amended complaint that

includes at least one viable claim over which the Court has jurisdiction, the Court will

enter judgment against him. A telephonic status hearing is set for June 16, 2026 at 8:55

a.m., using call-in number 650-479-3207, access code 2305-915-8729.

Date: May 27, 2026

United States District Judge