Rhodes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DERRICK CORNELIUS RHODES, )

AIS # 219646, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 1:25-CV-1033-WKW

) [WO]

VENCINI SMITH, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

In September 2025, Petitioner Derrick Cornelius Rhodes filed the instant 28

U.S.C. § 2254 petition, his first petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc.

# 1.1) Rhodes challenges the constitutionality of his convictions for two counts of

first-degree rape under Alabama Code § 13A-6-61 and two counts of first-degree

sodomy under Alabama Code § 13A-6-63. (See Doc. # 1.) He was convicted in

2022 after a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, on charges

for raping and sodomizing his then-ten-year-old stepdaughter in July 2012 and

received a concurrent, life sentence for each conviction. (Doc. # 9-1 at 2; 9-3 at 1–

1 References to “Doc(s).” are to the document numbers of the pleadings and other materials in the

court’s electronic record, as compiled and designated on the docket sheet by the Clerk of Court.

Pinpoint citations are to the page of the electronically filed document in the court’s CM/ECF filing

system.

2; Doc. # 14-7 at 156–57, 200; Doc. # 14-8 at 1–2.) His § 2254 petition asserts a

claim alleging the denial of effective assistance of trial counsel. Rhodes argues that

his trial counsel failed to discover and present evidence to the jury that he was in the

custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) in July 2012 and “thus

was actually innocent of raping and sodomizing the victim.” (Doc. # 1 at 6.) On

direct appeal and in Rule 32 post-conviction proceedings,2 the state courts denied

Rhodes relief. (Docs. # 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 9-5, 9-7.)

Respondent Vencini Smith, the warden of Donaldson Correctional Facility,

answered the petition, contending that Rhodes asserts the same ineffective-

assistance claim he raised in his Rule 32 proceedings and that the claim fails under

the deferential review established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Doc. # 9 at 1, 5–8.)

Based upon a review of the parties’ submissions and for the reasons explained

below, Rhodes is not entitled to relief, and his § 2254 petition will be dismissed with

prejudice. Additionally, no evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the petition.

See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District

Courts. Rhodes also will be denied a certificate of appealability.

2 “Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure governs available post-conviction

remedies under Alabama law.” Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 799 n.16 (11th Cir. 2011).

2

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), federal district courts have the authority to

consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of an individual in state

custody pursuant to a state-court judgment but “only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”

This provision limits authority, rather than conferring it, with habeas jurisdiction

established by 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 787 (11th

Cir. 2004). Under § 2241, federal district courts have the power to grant writs of

habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions,” § 2241(a), when a state-

convicted prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution, ” § 2241(c)(3).

The “in-custody” requirement mandates that the habeas petitioner must “be ‘in

custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is

filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1989) (per curiam). Furthermore,

§ 2241(d), referred to as a “venue provision,” “gives the petitioner ‘the option of

seeking habeas corpus either in the district where he is confined or the district where

the sentencing court is located.’” Dobard v. Johnson, 749 F.2d 1503, 1509–10 (11th

Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

Rhodes was in custody under a state-court judgment when he filed this

petition. Additionally, Rhodes was convicted and sentenced in the Circuit Court of

Houston County, Alabama, and was serving his sentence in a state prison located in

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the Middle District of Alabama. Accordingly, this court has subject matter

jurisdiction to consider the petition, and venue is proper.

III. BACKGROUND

A. State Court Trial Proceedings and Direct Appeal

In November 2020, a grand jury convened in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in

Houston County, Alabama, and indicted Rhodes on multiple counts, including two

counts for first-degree rape under Alabama Code § 13A-6-61 and two counts for

first-degree sodomy under Alabama Code § 13A-6-63. The indictments charged that

between July 1, 2012, and July 31, 2012, Rhodes, who was an adult, raped and

sodomized a minor who was younger than 12 years of age. (Doc. # 9-8 at 32–39.)

The minor was Rhodes’s stepdaughter, who was ten years old at the time. (Doc. # 9-

1 at 2, 6–7.)

In March 2022, a jury convicted Rhodes on two counts of first-degree rape

and two counts for first-degree sodomy. He received a sentence of life for each

conviction, to be served concurrently. (Doc. # 14-7 at 156–57, 200; Doc. # 14-8

at 1–2.) Rhodes timely appealed. In a memorandum decision dated February 3,

2023, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) affirmed the circuit court’s

judgment and rejected Rhodes’s “sole contention . . . that the circuit court erred in

denying his motion for new trial on the basis that the verdicts [were] against the great

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weight of the evidence.” (Doc. # 9-1, at 4–8.) A certificate of judgment was entered

on June 14, 2023. (Doc. # 9-2.)

B. Alabama Rule 32 Proceedings

In December 2023, Rhodes, proceeding pro se, filed a timely post-conviction

petition pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure in the

Circuit Court of Houston County (“Rule 32 petition”). (Doc. # 9-8 at 43; Doc. # 9-

3 at 2.) In March 2024, the Houston County Circuit Court summarily dismissed the

Rule 32 petition. (Doc. # 9-3 at 3; see also Doc. # 9-8 at 55 (circuit court order

granting the State of Alabama’s motion for summary dismissal of the Rule 32

petition).)

Rhodes appealed to the ACCA, which affirmed the circuit court’s summary-

dismissal judgment. In a memorandum decision dated March 21, 2025, the ACCA

summarized Rhodes’s Rule 32 petition and the State’s position as follows3:

In his petition, D.C.R. alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective

because he failed to meet with D.C.R. an adequate number of times to

prepare for trial and develop trial strategy. He claimed that counsel’s

failure to meet with him resulted in counsel’s failure to learn that

D.C.R. was incarcerated in July 2012, the time period in which the

victim alleged D.C.R. assaulted her, and that counsel’s failure to learn

this information and present this “viable defense” at trial “undermined”

the outcome of his trial. (C. 15.) D.C.R. maintained in his petition that,

if counsel had learned of D.C.R.’s incarceration in 2012, counsel could

have presented this “viable – and likely successful – defense.” (C. 16.)

D.C.R. attached several exhibits to his petition.

3 References to “D.C.R.” are to Rhodes.

5

On March 12, 2024, the State filed a motion to dismiss. In its

motion to dismiss, the State claimed that D.C.R.’s ineffective-

assistance-of counsel claim was meritless because, although D.C.R.

correctly stated that he was an Alabama Department of Corrections

(“DOC”) inmate, D.C.R. failed to disclose that he was an inmate at

Houston County Community Corrections during the time in which the

crimes were alleged to have occurred. The State also argued that

D.C.R.’s petition was precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(1)–(5), Ala. R.

Crim. P., and was insufficiently pleaded. In support of its motion, the

State attached an exhibit showing notes from Houston County

Community Corrections officers indicating that D.C.R. was oriented

into the work release program facility in 2011, which apparently

continued until at least June 2014, and that D.C.R. was approved for a

“shopping pass” multiple times during July 2012. (C. 51-54.)

(Doc. # 9-3 at 2–3.) The ACCA explained that on appeal Rhodes asserted the same

claim as in his Rule 32 petition. Rejecting the claim, the ACCA opined:

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a petitioner

must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. See Brown v. State,

663 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). To prove prejudice, “[t]he

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

In the present case, D.C.R.’s claim is clearly refuted by the

record. D.C.R.’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is premised

on the assertion that counsel did not learn of his incarceration at all, but

the record refutes this claim. Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a

“Notice of Alibi Defense,” in which counsel argued that D.C.R. was an

inmate with DOC at the time the crimes were alleged to have been

committed and, thus, he could not have committed the alleged crimes

in Houston County when he was incarcerated elsewhere. (Record from

D.C.R.’s direct appeal, C. 279-86.) That motion also notified the court

and the State that D.C.R. intended to subpoena the custodian of records

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for the DOC. At trial, counsel again discussed with the court its

intention to put on an alibi defense. (Record from D.C.R.’s direct

appeal, R. 84-86.) Further, the record from the trial indicates that

D.C.R.’s trial counsel did, in fact, attempt to present an alibi defense

throughout the trial. Thus, D.C.R[.]’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim was clearly refuted by the record and meritless. Accordingly, the

circuit court’s summary dismissal of D.C.R.’s petition was proper.

(Doc. # 9-3 at 4–6 (footnote omitted); see also Doc. # 14-9 at 1–11 (exhibits the

ACCA relied upon in its memorandum decision, C. 279-86, R. 84-86).)

Rhodes filed an application for rehearing, which the ACCA overruled without

opinion on April 25, 2025. (Docs. # 9-4, 9-5.) He then filed a petition for a writ of

certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court, which was denied without opinion on July

11, 2025. (Docs. # 9-6, 9-7.) In both his application for rehearing and his petition

for a writ of certiorari, Rhodes repeated his claim that his trial attorney was

ineffective for failing to properly investigate and present evidence at trial that he was

an ADOC inmate in July 2012, when the multiple, felonious acts of rape and sodomy

for which he was convicted occurred. (Docs. # 9-4, 9-6.)

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C. The Instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and

Respondent’s Answer

On September 3, 2025, Rhodes filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.4

He asserts a single claim for the denial of effective assistance of trial counsel: “[H]ad

his trial counsel properly represented him, he would have learned that he was

incarcerated with the [Alabama] Department of Corrections in July of 2012 and thus

was actually innocent of raping and sodomizing the victim.” (Doc. # 1 at 6.) He

seeks any “relief to which he may be entitled in this proceeding.” (Doc. # 1 at 12.)

Respondent contends that the state courts’ adjudication of this ineffective-

assistance claim did not result in a decision that was contrary to clearly established

federal law. (Doc. # 9 at 4–8 (citing § 2254(d)(1)–(2) and Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 405–08 (2000)).) Respondent argues that the record of the Rule 32

proceedings clearly demonstrates the lack of merit in Rhodes’s claim. That record

shows that Rhodes was serving his state sentence in a community corrections

program where he received “shopping passes” in July 2012, providing him ample

opportunity to rape and sodomize the victim while not in a prison setting. (Doc. # 9

4 “Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is

delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2009). Absent evidence to the contrary, the court “assume[s] that a prisoner delivered a filing

to prison authorities on the date that he signed it.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314

(11th Cir. 2014). Rhodes dated his petition “September 3, 2025.” (Doc. # 1 at 12.) Respondent

concedes that Petitioner timely filed this petition within the one-year period of limitation under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (Doc. # 9 at 4.)

8

at 3, 7; see also Doc. # 9-8 at 48–50 (State of Alabama’s motion to dismiss the Rule

32 petition, arguing that Rhodes “failed to disclose he was an inmate at the Houston

County Community Corrections” during July 2012 as “proven by the attached

exhibit showing notes made by employees of the Houston County Community

Corrections Office made during his time from 2011 to 2014”).) Respondent further

contends that Rhodes failed to meet both parts of the two-pronged test in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which was his burden to satisfy in the Rule 32

proceedings. In his reply brief, Rhodes expounds that his trial counsel’s failure to

present evidence that he was incarcerated in July 2012 prejudiced his defense and

“undermine[d] confidence in the jury’s verdict.” (Doc. # 12 at 2.) He contends that

it should have been for the jury to decide whether Rhodes “may have left the custody

of the [ADOC].” (Doc. # 12 at 2.)

IV. DISCUSSION

In his § 2254 petition, Rhodes alleges that his trial attorney provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate the facts and

present an alibi defense at trial. According to Rhodes, a proper investigation would

have revealed that he was incarcerated in July 2012 in an ADOC facility, thus

proving that he could not have committed the charged crimes of rape and sodomy,

and that his attorney’s failure to present this evidence at his trial prejudiced his

defense. Where, as here, a federal habeas court reviews the merits of a claim that

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was adjudicated in state court, it applies the “highly deferential” standard of review

mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Rhode v. Hall, 582 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam). Under § 2254(d), a federal habeas court’s review of a state-court judgment

is narrowly focused, and relief is contingent upon the petitioner showing that the

state court’s decision adjudicating a claim on the merits was “contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” or was “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” § 2254(d)(1)–(2); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–08 (2000)

(discussing the standards under § 2254(d)(1) for when a state-court decision is

“contrary to” or involves an “unreasonable application of” clearly established federal

law).

Here, the state courts rejected Rhodes’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim in the Rule 32 proceedings. To succeed on such a claim, a petitioner must

satisfy the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). See Freeman v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 46 F.4th 1193, 1221 (11th

Cir. 2022). Under Strickland, a petitioner “must show (1) that his trial counsel’s

performance was deficient and (2) that it prejudiced his defense.” Id. (cleaned up).

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“Under Strickland’s performance prong, review of counsel’s actions is ‘highly

deferential’ and ‘a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Davis v.

Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 120 F.4th 768, 789 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). The reasonableness inquiry focuses on “whether

counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 688. This is an objective standard, as the measure of performance

“remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. The

Strickland standard applies to claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate and introduce evidence to support a defense theory. However, Strickland

cautions that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts

relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices

made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent

that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id.

at 690–91. Thus, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every

effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

Strickland’s prejudice prong asks whether “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

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been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

However, when a federal habeas court reviews the state courts’ resolution of

an ineffective-assistance claim, it must consider an additional layer of review. The

federal habeas court does not apply the Strickland standard de novo but instead

applies the standard “through the additional prism of AEDPA deference.” Bishop v.

Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1254 (11th Cir. 2013). “The standards created by

Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in

tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011)

(citations omitted). As the Supreme Court further explained, “[f]ederal habeas

courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland

with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not

whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.

“If there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential

standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state court decision denying the

claim. Mendoza v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 761 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2014). In

other words, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the

Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Lawrence v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 700

12

F.3d 464, 477, 480 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,

101 (2011)).

In the Rule 32 proceedings, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected Rhodes’s

ineffective-assistance claim. However, because the ACCA rendered the “last

reasoned decision” on the ineffective-assistance claim, the discussion focuses on the

ACCA’s decision. McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1261 n.12 (11th

Cir. 2009) (observing that in the context of AEDPA review, the court “look[s]

through” a summary decision to the “last reasoned decision” on the issue).

Rejecting Rhodes’s ineffective-assistance claim, the ACCA identified

Strickland as setting out the applicable clearly established federal law for reviewing

such claims, see § 2254(d)(1). (Doc. # 9-3 at 4–5.) Therefore, the standard used by

the ACCA was not “contrary to” clearly established federal law as set out in Supreme

Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 405 (2000) (“A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to our clearly

established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing

law set forth in our cases.”). The ACCA then reviewed Rhodes’s claim that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to discover that he was incarcerated in an ADOC

facility during the period when the charged offenses purportedly occurred and,

consequently, failed to present evidence of that continuous incarceration at trial.

(Doc. # 9-3 at 2.) Rejecting that claim, the ACCA held that the trial record “clearly

13

refuted” Rhodes’s ineffective-assistance claim and was “meritless.” (Doc. # 9-3

at 4–6.) It necessarily follows that the ACCA concluded that trial counsel’s

performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial to Rhodes’s case. The issue is

whether the ACCA unreasonably applied Strickland. It did not.

Under Strickland’s performance prong, when a petitioner claims “that his

trial counsel should have done something more, [the court] first look[s] at what the

lawyer did in fact.” Mendoza v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 761 F.3d 1213, 1237

(11th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The ACCA made

the following factual findings pertaining to trial counsel’s actions. First, the record

demonstrated that, prior to the trial, Rhodes’s attorney filed a Notice of Alibi

Defense, in which he argued that Rhodes was incarcerated and in ADOC’s custody

at the time the charged crimes occurred, thus, rendering it impossible for him to have

committed the offenses. (Doc. # 9-3 at 5; see also Doc. # 14-9 at 1–8 (Notices of

Alibi Defense).) Second, the notice set forth Rhodes’s intention to subpoena the

custodian of records for the ADOC. (Doc. # 9-3 at 5–6; Doc. # 14-9 at 1–8.) Third,

during the trial, counsel reiterated to the court Rhodes’s intention to present an alibi

defense. (Doc. # 9-3 at 6.) Fourth, the trial record showed that Rhodes’s counsel

“did, in fact, attempt to present an alibi defense throughout the trial.” (Doc. # 9-3

at 6; see also Doc. # 14-9 at 9–11 (trial transcript).)

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A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct,” and the habeas

petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear

and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Rhodes has not pointed to

anything in the state-court record that rebuts by clear and convincing evidence the

presumption of correctness that attached to the ACCA’s factual findings.

Moreover, independent review of the trial record confirms that the ACCA’s

factual findings are based on a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the

trial evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). While trial counsel tried to develop an

alibi defense based on Rhodes’s custodial status prior to and during the trial, the trial

evidence simply did not support that defense. The trial testimony established that,

in July 2012, Rhodes was assigned to the Houston County Community Corrections

& Work Release (CCO),5 where he retained sufficient freedom that would have

allowed him to visit the victim and the victim’s home.6 The victim testified that, in

the CCO, Rhodes sometimes had at least an hour of free time during the work-release

day and received shopping passes. (Doc. # 14-5 at 173–74, 185.) The victim’s older

sister testified that, when Rhodes was in the CCO, he “wasn’t really gone” because

he was “there constantly” and “drove my momma’s car constantly.” (Doc. # 14-6

at 41.) She further testified that Rhodes would visit their home “on his breaks” or

5 “CCO” is the abbreviation used during the trial. (See, e.g., Doc. # 14-6 at 110.)

6 The victim lived in Houston County during this time period. (Doc. # 14-6 at 30.)

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“after work a lot of the times” (Doc. # 14-6 at 42), and that between 2009 and 2014,

when he intermittently was in the CCO and not in an ADOC facility, “he was never

just fully gone,” and “[w]e seen [sic] him every day” (Doc. # 14-6 at 43–44; see also

Doc. # 14-6 at 48–49 (reiterating that, when Rhodes was in the CCO, “[h]e was there

constantly,” meaning their home).)

Additionally, the CCO’s custodian of records confirmed that Rhodes was in

the Houston County CCO during multiple periods, including from December 2011

through August 2012. (Doc. # 14-6 at 66–67.) He testified that CCO offenders who

go out to work “are not followed” and “are not supervised” because the program is

designed to transition them back into the community. (Doc. # 14-6 at 59.) He further

testified that, in phase one, the CCO permits offenders to obtain shopping passes

with family members or an eight-hour family pass and that phase two allows

offenders to go home over the weekend. (Doc. # 14-6 at 64–65.) Relevant to the

timeframe of the charged offenses, Rhodes went on a shopping pass on July 2, 2012

(Doc. # 14-6 at 73) and an eight-hour shopping pass on July 11, 2012 (Doc. # 14-6

at 90–91), and both times the victim’s mother was listed as the contact.

Finally, notwithstanding the foregoing trial evidence, Rhodes’s trial counsel

sought to demonstrate Rhodes’s inability to leave the CCO by eliciting on cross-

examination that Rhodes had received a disciplinary infraction and was in restrictive

custody for 60 days beginning May 31, 2012, but the testimony showed he still was

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permitted to leave the CCO facility for work.7 (Doc. # 14-6 at 100–01.) Also, on

redirect, the prosecution elicited testimony clarifying that Rhodes was taken off

restrictive custody “after about 30 days,” meaning that he was not in restrictive

custody at the CCO in July 2012. (Doc. # 14-6 at 107.) Furthermore, the ACCA

cited the State’s Rule 32 motion to dismiss and exhibit, which included

computerized notes from Houston County Community Corrections officers. These

notes indicated that Rhodes was in the Houston County CCO work release program

facility from 2011 until at least June 2014, and that he was granted a “shopping pass”

multiple times in July 2012. This court has examined the State’s motion and exhibit,

which Respondent has provided (see Doc. # 9-8 at 48–55), and finds that the

ACCA’s description of the exhibit is accurate.

In sum, the trial evidence refutes an alibi theory premised on Rhodes’s

allegedly continuous confinement in an ADOC facility. Although Rhodes’s counsel

made reasonable efforts to pursue an alibi defense, the evidence at trial showed that

Rhodes was not continuously confined in a prison setting in July 2012 and could

have been present at the victim’s home or with the victim during July 2012. An alibi

defense based on uninterrupted incarceration in an ADOC facility was therefore

inconsistent with the trial record and unlikely to succeed. Because the state-court

7 Rhodes did not testify at his trial. (Doc. # 14-7 at 58, 63.)

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record lacks a sufficient factual basis to support Rhodes’s claim that trial counsel

failed to discover he was in an ADOC prison during the timeframe of the charged

offenses, counsel’s investigation was not deficient on that ground. Furthermore,

Rhodes cannot “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for” counsel’s

alleged error in advancing an alibi theory (impossibility due to incarceration), “the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Therefore, Rhodes has not shown that “the state court’s

application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Lawrence v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 700 F.3d 464, 477, 480 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). At a

minimum, there is a “reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard,” thus, supporting the ACCA’s rejection of the ineffective-

assistance claim predicated on an inadequate investigation. Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).

V. CONCLUSION

Given the state-court record and the doubly deferential Strickland–AEDPA

standard of review, Rhodes’s ineffective-assistance claim, which was denied on the

merits in state court, does not warrant relief in this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding.

Moreover, the record establishes that Rhodes misrepresented the trial evidence and

the actions of his counsel. He has wasted the time and resources of this court and

Respondent. Rhodes’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition will be dismissed with prejudice.

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Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts, “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A prisoner who

seeks a certificate of appealability must make “a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district

court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues

presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000)). Having made a wholly frivolous claim, Rhodes has not met § 2253(c)(2)’s

standard and, thus, will be denied a certificate of appealability.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Petitioner Derrick Cornelius Rhodes’s 28

U.S.C. § 2254 petition is DISMISSED with prejudice and that he is DENIED a

certificate of appealability.

Final judgment will be entered separately.

DONE this 24th day of June, 2026.

/s/ W. Keith Watkins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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