Medash

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KIETH E. MEDASH and :

DANIELLE MEDASH, Parents

and Guardians of E.M.M., a :

minor,

Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-1732

V. (JUDGE MANNION)

COUNTY OF LUZERNE,

LUZERNE COUNTY CHILDREN, :

YOUTH & FAMILIES, SHERRI

HARTMAN, and JESSICA TIMEK, :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

Defendants County of Luzerne, Luzerne County Children, Youth &

Families, Sherri Hartman, and Jessica Timek (“Defendants”) present the

Court with its motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Kieth E. Medash’s and Danielle

Medash’s, guardians of E.M.M., a minor, (“Plaintiffs”) amended complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and accompanying

brief. (Docs. 16, 17). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion

will be DENIED.

i. BACKGROUND

The underlying cause of action is brought before the Court pursuant to

42 U.S.C. §1983 for the injuries E.M.M., an infant, sustained while in his

natural parents’ custody. (Doc. 15). Plaintiff alleges that Andrew Carter and

Brittany Cooper (collectively, “natural parents”) were known to Defendants

due to their “extensive criminal history, noncompliance with court ordered

services, and their significant involvement with Luzerne County Children

Youth & Families for many years including the termination of parental rights

of their prior children.” (Doc. 15 at 2-3). Andrew Carter, aged twenty-nine,

has a “history of substance abuse and domestic violence as well as an

extensive criminal history.” /d. at 10. Brittany Cooper, aged twenty, has a

history of mental health diagnoses. /d. Both natural parents have been

involved with the Luzerne County Drug Court. /d. According to Plaintiffs, the

natural parents had two prior children removed from their care and parental

rights terminated. Specifically, “[oJn August 31, 2018, the natural parents’

rights to one child were involuntarily terminated .. . On November 14, 2019,

the natural mother . . . relinquished her parental rights to the other child [and]

... the natural father... had his parental rights to the other child involuntarily

terminated.” /d. at 11.

Plaintiffs are the adoptive parents and guardians of E.M.M. and

E.M.M.’s two older siblings, who were removed from the natural parents’

custody after their parental rights were terminated. /d. at 5. Prior to E.M.M.’s

birth, Plaintiff Danielle Medash notified Defendant Hartman that the natural

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parents were expecting a third child. /d. at 7. Danielle Madash was

concerned that the natural parents were incapable of parenting, due in part

to their inability to comply with court-ordered services related to their prior

termination of parental rights. /d. at 7-8.

On May 6, 2020, E.M.M. was born at Geisinger-GMC hospital. /d. at 3.

Two days later, Defendants Hartman and Timek completed a preliminary

assessment and scored the overall risk to E.M.M. as “high.” /d. At the time

of the assessment, the natural parents had not completed court-ordered

services “including parenting education, mental health evaluations,

substance abuse services, and batterer’s intervention[,]’ which was allegedly

Known to Defendants. /d. at 3-4. Plaintiffs allege that despite such

knowledge, “Defendants affirmatively chose to forego an emergency shelter

care hearing and file a dependency petition.” /d. at 4. Nonetheless,

Defendants determined that E.M.M. was “safe,” meaning that E.M.M. could

“safely remain in the current living arrangement or with the caregiver(s) of

origin.” /d. at 13.

On May 13, 2020, Defendants created an initial service plan. /d. at 15.

The next day, Defendant Timek filed a dependency petition. /d. The court

scheduled an adjudicatory hearing for June 5, 2020. /d. On June 4, 2020,

one day before the hearing, E.M.M. was brought to the Wilkes-Barre

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emergency department and subsequently transferred to Geisinger Wyoming

Valley because he was listless. /d. at 16. “E.M.M. had severe and significant

brain damage with decreasing levels of consciousness, at least three skull

fractures, suspected seizures, and a healing jaw fracture . . . [t]he cause of

these injuries was determined to be abusive brain trauma.” /d. at 16. Andrew

Carter was arrested for physical abuse of E.M.M. and pleaded guilty to

related charges. /d. at 17. He was sentenced to serve 60-120 months of

incarceration followed by a period of probation. /d.

Plaintiffs commenced the underlying action on September 16, 2025.

(Doc. 1). After Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, Plaintiffs

filed an amended complaint with jury demand. (Docs. 12, 15). On December

12, 2025, Defendants filed the immediate “motion to dismiss the amended

complaint” and brief in support. (Docs. 16, 17). Plaintiffs filed their brief in

opposition to Defendants’ motion on December 29, 2025. (Doc. 18).

Defendant filed a reply brief on January 12, 2026. (Doc. 20). This matter is

now ripe for disposition.

ll. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not require detailed

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factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotations omitted). A complaint that contains only “labels

and conclusions,” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action” does not comply with Rule 8. /d.

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The moving

party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated, and

dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all the facts alleged in the

complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d

744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007) (abrogating “no set of facts” language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts alleged must be sufficient to “raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. This

requirement “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence of’ necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause

of action. /d.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

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its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Facial plausibility is achieved “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d.

Plausibility does not require probability but “more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” /d. Facts “merely consistent with” liability

do not satisfy this standard. /d.

As noted above, the Court at this stage accepts the complaint’s factual

allegations as true. This tenet “is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” /d.

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). “Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief’ is “a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” /d. at

679. The federal pleading standard requires that district courts conduct a

two-part analysis:

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be

separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s

well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal

conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine

whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to

show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. In other

words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's

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entitiement to relief. A complaint has to show such an

entitlement with its facts.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

lll. DISCUSSION

By itself, §1983 does not create any rights, “but provides a remedy for

violations of those rights created by the Constitution or federal law.” Mofse

v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Baker

v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144. n. 3 (1979)) (“In order to state a claim, plaintiff

must show that defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of

a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.”).

Plaintiffs base their 42 U.S.C. §1983 complaint upon two theories: (1) state-

created danger, and (2) a Monell claim for unlawful customs, practices, and

policies. (Doc. 15 at 20, 25). Defendants argue that both grounds of Plaintiffs’

complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 72(b)(6). (Doc. 17 at 5). The

Court addresses each theory in turn.

A. §1983 and State-Created Danger

The state-created danger theory originates from the case DeShaney

v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989):

The petitioner in that case was a young boy who was

chronically abused by his father. The county department of

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social services, after receiving many complaints about the

boy's mistreatment, took several steps to ensure his safety.

But despite these efforts, the boy remained in his father's

custody, and was eventually beaten so savagely that he

suffered severe brain damage. The boy and his mother sued

the department of social services under the “special

relationship” theory of 42 U.S.C. §1983 for their failure to

protect the boy from his father.

Morse, 132 F.3d at 907 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-96). Although the

DeShaney Court ultimately rejected the claim, it stated that “[w]hile the State

may have been aware of the dangers that [the young boy] faced in the free

world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him

any more vulnerable to them.” /d. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201).

Based on that language, several courts have allowed claims under the state-

created danger theory. /d.

The state-created danger theory was adopted in this circuit by Kneipp

v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996). The Kneipp Court held that a state

actor could be liable if:

(1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly

direct; (2) the state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety

of the plaintiff; (3) there existed some relationship between the

state and the plaintiff; (4) the state actors used their authority

to create an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed

for the third party's crime to occur.

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ld. at 1208. The question then becomes whether Plaintiffs’ complaint

contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,” to plausibly support

each element of the Kneipp test. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court holds that

it does. Upon discovery’s completion, Plaintiffs “may well be able to prove

facts that would satisfy the four elements of the state-created danger

analysis” with respect to Defendants. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515

F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).

1. Foreseeable and Fairly Direct Harm

“The first element of the Kneipp test requires that the harm ultimately

caused was a foreseeable and a fairly direct result of the state's actions.”

Morse, 132 F. 3d at 908. In Morse, a teacher was shot and killed by a local

resident with a history of mental illness. See id. at 904. Leading up to the

shooting, several contractors propped open the back entrance of the school

building, through which the shooter entered. See id. The teacher's estate

brought a complaint alleging that the school was liable under the state-

created danger theory of §1983. See id. at 905.

After an appeal from a granted motion to dismiss, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the school “could not have

foreseen that allowing construction workers to use an unlocked back

entrance for access to the school building would result in the murderous act

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of a mentally unstable third party[.]” /d. at 908. The court noted that the

complaint did not allege that the defendants were aware of the shooter's

violent propensities, nor that the defendants were aware of anyone posing a

threat to anyone at the school. See id. Additionally, the court stated that “it

was not [the] defendants’ decision to allow the rear entrance to the school to

remain open that precipitated or was the catalyst for the attack on [the

teacher].” /d.

Here, the facts are distinguishable from those set forth in Morse. In

Plaintiffs’ complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were aware of the

natural parents’ history with drug addiction and domestic violence. (Doc. 15

at 10-12). Additionally, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants knew and advocated

that the natural parents had their parental rights terminated with respect to

their two other children. /d. at 8. Plaintiff Danielle Medash allegedly contacted

Defendants (at least three times) about her concerns with E.M.M.’s safety in

the natural parents’ care. /d. Moreover, Defendants determined that E.M.M.

was at a “high risk” two days after he was born. /d. at 12. Unlike the

defendants in Morse, who had no awareness of the assailant’s violent

propensity, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were keenly aware of Andrew

Carter’s history of violence and inability to parent his children. Therefore,

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Plaintiffs have presented plausible evidence that the Defendants could have

foreseen that E.M.M. would be injured by his father’s hand.

In Morse, the causal chain between the defendants leaving the school

door open and the homicide by a mentally unstable third party was “too

attenuated.” Morse, 132 F. 3d at 909. However, here, the causal chain is

much more direct. In this case, Defendants visited the hospital to determine

whether it was safe for E.M.M. to remain with the natural parents. (Doc. 15

at 12). Plaintiffs allege that although Defendants found E.M.M. to be at “high-

risk,” they determined that E.M.M. could safely remain in the natural parents’

custody. /d. at 13. These facts are parallel to those set forth in Wood v.

Ostrander.

The plaintiff in Wood was the female passenger of a drunk

driver who was pulled over late one evening by police. The

driver was arrested and the car impounded, leaving Ms. Wood

stranded on the road in a notoriously high crime area. After

beginning the five mile walk to her home, Ms. Wood accepted

a ride from an unknown man who subsequently took her to a

secluded area and raped her. Addressing the issue of

foreseeable harm, the court noted that the “inherent danger

facing a woman left alone at night in an unsafe area is a matter

of common sense.”

Morse, 132 F. 3d at 909 (citing 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal

citations omitted). Here, like in Wood, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knew

a vulnerable person was in an unsafe situation, yet affirmatively chose to

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leave them there. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants marked E.M.M. as

“high-risk,” yet allowed the natural, historically violent parents to maintain

custody. This choice is comparable to a police officer leaving a woman

stranded in a high crime area. Thus, Plaintiffs have presented plausible

evidence that the Defendants’ decision to initiate dependency proceedings,

but not to remove E.M.M. from the custody of parents with a known, recent

history of violence “fairly direct[ly]” caused E.M.M.’s injuries. Morse, 132 F.

3d at 908.

Plaintiffs’ complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to state a [plausible] claim” that E.M.M.’s injuries were foreseeable and

directly resulted from Defendants’ acts. /qba/, 556 U.S. at 678.

2. Willful Disregard for Plaintiff's Safety

“The second prong of the Kneipp test asks whether the state actor

acted with willful disregard for or deliberate indifference to plaintiffs safety.”

Morse, 132 F.3d at 910 (citing Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208, n. 2). “[T]he

environment created by the state actors must be dangerous; they must know

it to be dangerous; and ... [they] must have been at least deliberately

indifferent.” Morse, 132 F.3d at 910 (quoting Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch.

Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir.1994)). The state’s actions must “evince a

willingness to ignore a foreseeable danger or risk.” Morse, 132 F.3d at 910.

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The “notion of deliberate indifference contemplates a danger that must at

least be foreseeable.” /d; see also Leffall v. Dalias Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d

521, 531 (5th Cir.1994) (“[I]t is not enough to show that the state increased

the danger of harm from third persons; the . . . plaintiff must also show that

the state acted with the requisite degree of culpability in failing to protect the

plaintiff.”).

Here, this Court has already determined that, accepting Plaintiffs’ facts

as true, there is a plausible claim that the danger to E.M.M. was foreseeable.

Therefore, the inquiry becomes whether Plaintiffs’ facts establish a plausible

claim that Defendants acted with a deliberate indifference to &.M.M.’s safety.

Morse, 132 F.3d at 910. In Kneipp, the court found that “police officers’

decision to send. . . [a drunk woman] home alone, despite their awareness

of her intoxicated and incapacitated state, [w]as evidence of their deliberate

indifference.” /d. (citing Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208). The facts here are

comparable—Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants were aware of

E.M.M.’s risk (enough to document a “high-risk” situation two days after

E.M.M.’s birth) while being in the natural parents’ custody, yet sent him home

with them. (Doc. 15 at 12).

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The Court finds that, accepting Plaintiffs’ facts as true, there is a

plausible claim that Defendants willfully or deliberately disregarded a

foreseeable danger to E.M.M. /qbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

3. Relationship Between the State and Plaintiffs

The next inquiry of the Kneipp test is whether there existed a

relationship between the state and the plaintiff, such that the plaintiff was

foreseeable. A plaintiff may “bring a state-created danger claim if the plaintiff

was a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm

brought about by the state's actions .. . The primary focus when making this

determination is foreseeability.” Morse, 132 F.3d at 912-13. In other words,

a plaintiff must “allege they faced a particular threat of harm which set them

apart from the general public.” /d. ((citing Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co.

v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that prison officials were not

liable for a murder committed by an escaped prisoner on the grounds that

they could not have known that the victims faced any threat greater than the

“public at large’”)).

The issue here is whether Plaintiffs’ facts, if true, support a plausible

claim that E.M.M. belongs to “a sufficiently discrete group of persons who

could have been foreseeable victims.” Morse, 132 F.3d at 914. Plaintiffs

allege that not only were Defendants aware that the natural parents

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previously lost their parental rights for other children, but also that they have

a dangerous history of drug use and domestic abuse. (Doc. 15 at 10-12).

The natural parents had been refusing to undergo court-ordered

assessments related to their ability to safely care for a child. /d. at 14.

Moreover, Defendants initiated dependency proceedings after identifying

E.M.M.’s situation as “high-risk.” /d. at 15. These allegations, taken as true,

support a plausible claim that E.M.M. was faced with a “particular threat of

harm ... apart from the general public.” Morse, 132 F.3d at 912-13 (internal

citations omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

4. Creating Opportunity for Harm

The final element of the Kneipp test is whether the state actor “used its

authority to create an opportunity which otherwise would not have existed for

the specific harm to occur.” Morse, 132 F.3d at 914. According to the Morse

Court, “[t]he case law addressing the question whether an affirmative act is

required under the state-created danger theory, and if so[,] what constitutes

an affirmative act for purposes of liability, is less than clear.” /d. However,

“the dispositive factor appears to be whether the state has in some way

placed the plaintiff in a dangerous position that was foreseeable, and not

whether the act was more appropriately characterized as an affirmative act

or an omission.” /d. at 915 ((citing Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137,

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1152 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding that state actors “used their authority to create

an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for the third party's

crime to occur.”)).

However, more recent caselaw supports the notion that Plaintiffs must

allege that the state acted affirmatively. In Phillips, the Third Circuit stated

that “the line between action and inaction may not always be clear. However,

we have never found a state-created danger claim to be meritorious without

an allegation and subsequent showing that state authority was affirmatively

exercised in some fashion.” 515 F.3d at 236. “Our jurisprudence requires

that [plaintiffs] allege an affirmative action, rather than inaction or omission.”

Id. (citing Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2006)).

The Court adopts the apparent requirement that Plaintiffs must allege that

the state acted affirmatively—Plaintiffs nonetheless meet such a burden.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that by coming to the hospital to perform a risk

assessment, Defendants made the natural parents “reportedly unhappy.”

(Doc. 15 at 8). Thereafter, Defendants determined that E.M.M. was “high-

risk,” and filed a standard dependency petition, rather than an emergency

petition. /d. “Defendants knew a standard dependency petition is handled on

a non-emergency basis and E.M.M. would remain in the custody of the

natural parents until the petition proceeded to adjudication and disposition.”

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Id. Plaintiffs allege that after E.M.M.’s hospital discharge and before the

injury, Defendants knew that the natural parents remained non-compliant

with court-ordered assessments, nonetheless, Defendants took no action

after initiating dependency proceedings against them. /d. at 14.

Plaintiffs’ facts, taken as true, support a plausible claim that

Defendants “placed [E.M.M.] in a dangerous position that was foreseeable.”

Morse, 132 F.3d at 915 (internal citations omitted). Specifically, if Defendants

were aware that (1) the natural parents were upset with Defendants’

intervention; (2) the natural parents had violent tendencies; and (3) without

an emergency status, E.M.M. would remain in his parents’ custody; it is

plausible that Defendants’ actions placed E.M.M. in a dangerous position

that ultimately resulted in his injury. /qgba/, 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, the

alleged act of intervening at the hospital, infuriating the natural parents with

a “high-risk” assessment, and leaving E.M.M. in their custody while waiting

for a hearing approximately one month later, if true, constitutes an

“affirmative act.” Phillips, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).

However, an affirmative act is not enough: the complaint must also

plead a direct causal relationship between the affirmative act and E.M.M.’s

harm. /d. (internal citations omitted). For example, in Phillips, there was a

causal connection when the defendants provided requested confidential

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information about Phillips, and the assailant used such information to hunt

down and kill Phillips. See id. at 237. The court stated that although Phillips

was not killed at the location that the defendants provided, “at [the]

preliminary pleading stage, it is reasonable to infer that [the assailant] could

have gained relevant information at... Phillips’ house as to his whereabouts,

which could have directly assisted [the assailant] in stalking and killing him.”

Id.

The Phillips Court considered the pleaded facts and the reasonable

inferences therefrom. See id. The Court applies the same logic here. At the

preliminary pleading stage, it is reasonable to infer that the natural parents

with a history of violence, maltreatment of children, and drug abuse, would

respond poorly to a hospital intervention at E.M.M.’s expense. Defendants’

alleged choice to notify the natural parents that E.M.M. was “high-risk,” yet

file a standard dependency petition rather than an emergency one, if true,

could be found to cause E.M.M.’s injuries.

In sum, under this element, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that

Defendants undertook affirmative actions which worked to E.M.M.’s

detriment by exposing him to danger, and that there is a direct causal

relationship between Defendants’ actions and E.M.M.’s injuries. Therefore,

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the Court holds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged their §1983 claim

under a state-created danger theory. /qbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

B. §1983 and Monell

Finding that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a state-created danger

theory of §1983, /qgba/, 556 U.S. at 678, we turn now to whether Plaintiffs

have sufficiently alleged their §1983 claim under a Monell theory. Plaintiffs

allege that Defendants County of Luzerne and Luzerne County Children,

Youth & Families acted “recklessly, willfully, and deliberately indifferent to

the health, safety, and well-being of E.M.M.” by having “no policy to guide its

employees on how to handle/respond or take the necessary action to take

under these circumstances.” (Doc. 15 at 26). Plaintiffs state that the

“customs, practices, and policies” violated E.M.M.’s rights to, inter alia,

remain free from abuse. /d. at 27. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that

Defendants County of Luzerne and Luzerne County Children, Youth &

Families had “no training for its employees on how to handle/respond or the

necessary action to take under these circumstances.” /d. at 25.

Municipalities and their agents are directly liable when the alleged

§1983 violation occurs through the execution of official government policies

or customs. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A

policy is a decision of a municipality's “duly constituted legislative body” or of

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“officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.” B.S.

v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d 250, 276 (3rd Cir. 2013) (quoting Bd. Of the

Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 528 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). Acustom

is a practice that, although “not . . . formally approved by an appropriate

decisionmaker ... is so widespread as to have the force of law.” /d.

“In limited circumstances, a local government's decision not to train

certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may

rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of §1983.”

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). To satisfy the statute, a

municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount

to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained

employees] come into contact.” Johnson v. Cty. of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d

394 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 222

(3d Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted)).

In order for a failure to train claim to support Monell liability, a plaintiff

must show “that in light of the duties assigned to [the relevant employees, ]

the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so

likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of

the [municipality] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately

indifferent to the need.” Robinson v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 722 Fed. Appx.

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194, 199 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Cty. of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390,

(1989)). However, “in a narrow range of circumstances,’ a pattern of similar

violations might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference” when “the

unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious

that a city could be liable under §1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern

of violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 63 (citing Bryan Cnty., 528 U.S. at 409

(internal citations omitted); see also Evans v. Columbia Cty., 711 F. Supp.

2d 256 (M.D.Pa. 2025).

Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to meet these standards.

Although Plaintiffs alleged only generally that training was inadequate, the

inadequacy of training can plausibly be inferred from Plaintiffs’ allegations

and the severity of this incident. It is therefore plausible that the incident was

“so patently obvious” that Defendants acted “deliberately different to the

need.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 63; Robinson, 722 Fed. Appx. at 199. Therefore,

the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged their §1983 claim under

a Monell theory at this stage of the proceedings. /qbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim upon

which relief can be granted. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be

DENIED. An appropriate order will be issued.

he E. MANNION

United tes District Judge

DATE: off’ 26

25-1732-01

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