The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROLAND SCOTT ARGOT, JR. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-cv-02157
Plaintiff,
v. (Judge Mehalchick)
TROOPER PAUL C. BEARD, et al., (Magistrate Judge Latella)
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Roland Scott Argot, Jr. raises livestock, including sheep,
on a rural property located in Lycoming County. He resides there too.
A tenant on the neighboring property has a Blue Heeler/Australian
Shepherd mix named Ranger. The Plaintiff alleges that his neighbor
allowed Ranger to roam unrestrained and the dog, who is unlicensed,
has a history of entering Plaintiff’s property and attacking his sheep.
August 31, 2022, was one such occasion. On that date, Plaintiff says
that the dog entered his property “[r]ecklessly out of [c]ontrol and
aggressively attacked Plaintiff’s sheep.” (Doc. 22, p. 2, ¶ 8). Plaintiff
further alleges that “[w]hile attempting to protect his livestock and
secure the animals, Plaintiff lawfully restrained the dog and placed it in
a stall in his barn to await authorities.” (Id. at ¶¶ 8–9). During this
process, Plaintiff was bitten by the dog. Plaintiff contacted the
Pennsylvania State Police and the Defendant, Paul C. Beard, was one of
the troopers who responded. As a result of the incident, several months
later, Trooper Beard filed criminal charges against the Plaintiff for theft
by unlawful taking (for confining the dog) and cruelty to animals (for
allegedly grabbing him and “whipping” him around). Those charges
were dismissed by the District Attorney.
This action followed. In Plaintiff’s first Amended Complaint, he
alleged that Trooper Beard was deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs by failing to render assistance after Plaintiff suffered a bite from
a potentially unvaccinated dog, minimizing his injuries and
discouraging him from seeking medical treatment. (See Doc. 5). He
also brought claims for retaliation and malicious prosecution. In a
Report and Recommendation filed on October 29, 2025, it was
recommended that the Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim be
dismissed with prejudice because it was brought outside of the statute
of limitations and, because the Plaintiff did not allege a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, that the malicious prosecution claim be
dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff be given the opportunity to
file a second amended complaint.1 (Doc. 18). The Report and
Recommendation was adopted by Order dated January 5, 2026, and
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim was dismissed with prejudice
and the malicious prosecution claim dismissed without prejudice with
leave to amend. (Doc. 21). Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint
and pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss that
Complaint. (Docs. 22 and 23). Because Plaintiff has again failed to
allege a seizure as required to state a claim for malicious prosecution, it
will be recommended that the Second Amended Complaint be dismissed
with prejudice.
II. Procedural History
This action was originally initiated by the filing of a pro se civil
rights Complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Plaintiff, Roland
1 The Report and Recommendation contained a robust discussion
regarding what constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the context of a
malicious prosecution claim and Plaintiff was invited to supplement his
Complaint with more facts supporting the claim consistent with the law
in this Circuit.
Scott Argot, Jr., on December 13, 2024, along with a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis (IFP). (Docs. 1 and 2). The Complaint named
Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Trooper Paul C. Beard, the Borough of
Montoursville Pennsylvania, and PSP Barracks F as Defendants. The
IFP Motion was granted by Order dated December 19, 2024. (Doc. 4).
On January 24, 2025, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming
only PSP Trooper Beard as a Defendant. (Doc. 5). Service of the
Amended Complaint was ordered on March 11, 2025. (Doc. 6). On May
8, 2025, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a
claim. (Doc. 10). After the matter was fully briefed, on October 29,
2025, a Report and Recommendation was issued recommending that the
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be granted, in part, and that the
Plaintiff be permitted to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. 22).
The Report and Recommendation was adopted by Order dated January
6, 2026. (Doc. 21). Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on
January 21, 2026. The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and
supporting brief on February 4, 2026. (Docs. 23 and 24). Plaintiff filed
a Brief in Opposition to the Motion and a Motion to Strike on February
12, 2026.2 (Docs. 25 and 26). No reply was filed by the Defendant. The
Motion is ripe for consideration.
III. Background
This case involves Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Paul C.
Beard’s response to a dispute between two neighbors over an
unrestrained dog. Plaintiff alleges in his Second Amended Complaint,
as he did in his preceding two Complaints, that starting in 2022, his
neighbors allowed their dog to “roam at large in violation of
Pennsylvania law.” (Doc. 22, p. 2, ¶ 6). Plaintiff is the owner of a rural
property where he both resides and raises livestock, including sheep.
(Id. at ¶ 5). Plaintiff alleges that the neighbors’ dog has a history of
2 In a document entitled “Motion to Strike Improper Exhibits and
Arguments,” (Doc. 26), Plaintiff argues that Defendant submitted
documents and made arguments that are not proper in the context of a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff’s
Motion is more properly considered as a brief in opposition than a
motion to strike. Nothing in Defendant’s Motion or brief contains
material subject to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The exhibits to which Plaintiff
refers were not filed by Defendant but rather attached as exhibits to the
Second Amended Complaint. In any event, the analysis herein
considers only the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and
matters properly considered in deciding a motion to dismiss, not
Defendant’s factual assertions made in his brief. Because the Motion to
strike is in substance a brief in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, it
should be denied.
entering his property and menacing his sheep. He avers that on August
31, 2022, the dog entered Plaintiff’s property “[r]ecklessly out of
[c]ontrol and aggressively attacked Plaintiff’s sheep.” (Id. at ¶ 8).
Plaintiff alleges that he “lawfully restrained the dog and placed it in a
stall in his barn to await authorities.” (Id. at ¶ 9). He states that he
did this in an effort to protect his animals. (Id.). Plaintiff was bitten by
the dog on his left arm during this incident. (Id. at ¶ 10). The State
Police were called, and Defendant Beard was one of the responding
troopers. (Id. at ¶ 11). Plaintiff avers that “[o]n January 27, 2023, the
Defendant initiated criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff…
charging [him] with Theft by Unlawful Taking – Movable Property (18
Pa.C.S.§ 3921); and Cruelty to Animals (18 Pa.C.S. § 5533).” (Doc. 22,
p. 3, ¶17). Argot further alleges that the Defendant “omitted material
and exculpatory facts known to him” in the police report. (Id. at p. 2, ¶¶
12–14). The criminal charges were dismissed by the Lycoming County
District Attorney’s Office on July 10, 2023. (Id. at p. 3, ¶ 23).
The Second Amended Complaint brings claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 based on false arrest and malicious prosecution as well as
state law claims for malicious prosecution and defamation/false light.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for medical expenses, lost
livestock,3 pain, suffering, anxiety, emotional distress and public
humiliation.
IV. Discussion
A. Standard Applicable in Deciding a 12(b)(6) Motion
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a claim
must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This requires the
Plaintiff to put forth evidence that, “when taken as true, suggest[s] the
required elements of a particular legal theory.” McNeilly v. City of
Pittsburgh, 40 F. Supp. 3d 643, 650 (W.D. Pa. 2014). The Plaintiff must
state “sufficient factual allegations which ‘nudge’ its claims ‘across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 680, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). The
3 It is unclear why Plaintiff seeks to hold Trooper Beard responsible for
the damage caused by his neighbors’ dog. The Second Amended
Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was bitten by the dog, and his sheep
were attacked before the Trooper arrived. Plaintiff alleges that when
the Trooper arrived, the dog was secured, yet he seeks to hold the
Trooper responsible for an event that he did not participate in or have
the ability to prevent.
purpose is to ensure “fair notice of the factual basis of a claim while
raising a ‘reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
the necessary element.’” Id. at 651.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a
defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This means
that a complaint may be dismissed if it does not present sufficient facts
to support a plausible claim: “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss
may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”
Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)).
The court must accept both the Plaintiff’s allegations and any
reasonable inferences that can be drawn as true and construe them in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Monroe v. Beard, 536
F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). However, it need not accept “‘unsupported
conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.’” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir.
2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Reciting the elements that make up a cause of action and supporting
them with “mere conclusory statements” is insufficient to give those
statements the presumption of truth. McNeilly v. City of Pittsburgh, 40
F. Supp. 3d 643, 650 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129
S. Ct. 1937).
When faced with a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), a court
should conduct a two-part analysis: 1) separate the factual and legal
elements of a claim; and 2) “determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim
for relief.” Id. (internal citation removed). The court may consider facts
alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated
into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice.” Tellab, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 322 (2007). This analysis requires the court to look at the claims
on a case-by-case basis and rely both “on its judicial experience and
common sense.” McNeilly, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 650. The court will not be
reaching legal conclusions, but instead is merely determining “whether
the plaintiff should be permitted to offer evidence in support of the
allegations.” Id. (citing Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.
2000)).
B. The Federal Claims
Count I of the Second Amended Complaint brings claims pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations under the Fourth
Fourteenth Amendments, specifically, the “right to be free from False
Arrest and Malicious Prosecution.” (Doc. 22, p. 5–6, ¶¶ 33–37). The
operative facts in Second Amended Complaint relating to this claim are,
in essence, the same as those alleged in the first Amended Complaint
which was the subject of the October 29, 2025, Report and
Recommendation. (Doc. 18). Plaintiff alleges that nearly five months
after the Defendant responded to August 31, 2022, incident involving
Ranger, he filed criminal charges against Plaintiff including Theft by
Unlawful Taking – Movable Property in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.§ 3921
and Cruelty to Animals violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §5533. Plaintiff avers
that those charges were later dismissed by the District Attorney.
Plaintiff further maintains that he was subjected to a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. He asserts that the Defendant’s
“false statements and actions are willful, intentional and malicious and
in reckless disregard of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, entitling
Plaintiff to punitive damages.” (Doc. 22, p. 6, ¶ 37). The malicious
prosecution and false arrest claims will be addressed separately.
1) Malicious Prosecution
As discussed in the October 29, 2025, Report and
Recommendation, (doc. 18),
[t]o prove malicious prosecution under section 1983 when
the claim is under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal
proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his
favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without
probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for
a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and
(5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent
with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal
proceeding.
Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81–82 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Estate of
Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).
As in his Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, the
Defendant does not challenge the first two elements but argues that
Plaintiff’s claim fails on the third, fourth, and fifth elements. (Brief in
Support, Doc. 24, p. 24). Defendant asserts that there was probable
cause to charge Plaintiff with both Theft and Animal Cruelty, that he
did not act maliciously and that Plaintiff never suffered a loss of liberty
that would constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (Id. pp.
12–16). Plaintiff counters that Defendant relies on documents outside
of the complaint which should not be considered on a motion to dismiss
and that he did indeed suffer a loss of liberty because he was court
ordered to be fingerprinted, he had mandatory court appearances and
was under threat of arrest for noncompliance. (Doc. 22, p. 6, ¶ 34).
Plaintiff argues that “a court-ordered fingerprinting mandate;
compelled biometric processing; ongoing criminal prosecution; threat of
arrest for noncompliance” are allegations sufficient at the pleading
stage to “plausibly establish a deprivation of liberty consistent with a
Fourth Amendment seizure.” (Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition, Doc. 25-2,
p. 4). Each offense will be discussed separately.
i) Theft of Movable Property
Under Pennsylvania law, theft of movable property occurs when a
person “unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable
property of another with intent to deprive him thereof.” 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 3921(a). The Second Amended Complaint alleges that it
was his neighbor’s dog that entered Plaintiff’s property, (Doc., 22, p. 2, ¶
6), and that on August 31, 2022, “[w]hile attempting to protect his
livestock and secure the animals, Plaintiff lawfully retained the dog and
placed it in a stall in his barn to await authorities.” (Id. at ¶¶8-9).
While the Court “must accept as true all allegations in the complaint
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom... a court
need not credit either bald assertions or legal conclusions in a complaint
when deciding a motion to dismiss.” DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch &
Co., 492 F.3d 209, 215 (3d Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). See also James v.
City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2012) (“At the motion to
dismiss stage, we accept as true all factual assertions, but we disregard
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal
conclusions, and conclusory statements.”).
The Second Amended Complaint’s factual allegations are that
Plaintiff “restrained” his neighbor’s dog and “placed it in a stall in barn
to await authorities.” (Doc. 22, p. 2). His assertion that the action was
“lawful” and thus precludes a finding of probable cause is a legal
conclusion that need not be credited. In addressing these same
allegations in the First Amended Complaint, it was concluded in the
October 29, 2025, Report and Recommendation, which was adopted on
January 5, 2026, that “[t]he statements that Plaintiff himself made in
his Amended Complaint that he ‘retained’ Ranger in a stall are enough
to support a probable cause finding on the theft charge.” (Doc. 18, pp.
17–18, quoting Doc. 21). The same applies to the allegations in the
Second Amended Complaint. Similarly, whether or not Plaintiff may
have been able to assert an affirmative defense to the Theft charge at
trial – that he held the dog to protect his livestock – does not appear to
negate the officer’s finding of probable cause. As explained by the
United States District Court of the District of New Jersey:
The Third Circuit has not set out a precise rule for when
an officer should consider the possibility of an affirmative
defense in making a probable cause determination. Most
recently in Holman v. City of York, PA, the Third Circuit
rejected the district court’s categorical holding as a
matter of law that “affirmative defenses are not a
relevant consideration” in determining probable cause.
564 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2009). The Court concluded
that an officer need not consider whether the “necessity”
affirmative defense justified the arrestee’s trespass
offense, because determining the defense would “require
[ ] an analysis of legal considerations that should not
concern an arresting officer,” including “countless factual
permutations to determine the ‘necessity’ of specific
conduct at a given moment in time.” Id.; see also Sands v.
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding
that an officer need not consider a statute of limitations
affirmative defense in determining probable cause in part
because the “application of the limitations period is not a
clear cut matter in criminal prosecutions”).
St. Martin v. W. Windsor Twp. Police Dep’t, 753 F. Supp. 3d 369, 388–89
(D.N.J. 2024)
Setting aside whether probable cause existed or not for the Theft
of Movable Property charge, however, as fully discussed below, Plaintiff
does not allege facts to support his contention that he was subject to a
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment so his claim fails
as a matter of law regardless of whether there was probable cause.
ii) Animal Cruelty
The statute under which Plaintiff was charged reads: “A person
commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
illtreats, overloads, beats, abandons or abuses an animal.” 18 Pa. Stat.
§ 5533. Defendant points to matters outside the Second Amended
Complaint to support the argument that there was probable cause to
support the Animal Cruelty charge. However, as indicated in the
previous Report and Recommendation, considering only the allegations
in the Second Amended Complaint and matters subject to judicial
notice, it cannot be said that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege lack of
probable cause with regard to the Animal Cruelty charge.
Nevertheless, as discussed below, this claim must fail as a matter of law
because the Plaintiff was never subject to a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.
iii) The Plaintiff Did Not Allege Facts to Support a
Conclusion That He Suffered a Deprivation of Liberty
Consistent with the Concept of a Seizure
In recommending dismissal of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution
claim as alleged in the First Amended Complaint, it was noted that
Plaintiff only alleged that he was subject to fingerprinting and required
to attend court proceedings which was insufficient to plead a
deprivation of liberty so as to constitute a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. (See Doc. 18, p. 22). It was recommended that
Plaintiff’s claim be dismissed without prejudice so that Plaintiff could
replead in more detail the restrictions that he believed that he was
under to support his claim that he suffered a deprivation of liberty.
(Id.). That recommendation was adopted and Plaintiff was given an
opportunity to replead his claim. (See Doc. 21). In the Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges: “As a direct result of De[]fendant’s actions,
Plaintiff suffered a deprivation of Liberty consistent with a Fourth
Amendment seizure, including: court ordered requirement to submit to
finger printing and criminal processing[;] Mandatory court
appearances[;] Ongoing restraint on Liberty and Threat of arrest for
noncompliance.” (Doc. 22, p. 6, ¶ 34). Earlier in the Second Amended
Complaint the Plaintiff made similar allegations:
18. As a direct result of these charges, Plaintiff was
issued a court order compelling him to report for
fingerprinting pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 9112.
19. The finger printing order required Plaintiff to report
to the Lycoming County Central Processing Center and
submit to biometric processing.
20. Failure to comply with the fingerprint order would
have subjected Plaintiff to arrest and additional criminal
penalties.
21. Plaintiff complied under compulsion of law and was
fingerprinted and processed as a criminal defendant,
despite having no prior criminal record.
22. Plaintiff was further required to appear in court and
remained subject to ongoing criminal prosecution and the
threat of arrest for noncompliance.
(Doc. 22, p. 3). In his Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,
Plaintiff argues: “a court-ordered fingerprinting mandate; compelled
biometric processing; ongoing criminal prosecution; threat of arrest for
noncompliance” are allegations sufficient at the pleading stage to
“plausibly establish a deprivation of liberty consistent with a Fourth
Amendment seizure.” (Doc. 25-2, p. 4). This assertion is inconsistent
with the case law in this Circuit, much of which was cited in the
October 29, 2025, Report and Recommendation. That analysis will be
repeated here.
“A claim for malicious prosecution permits damages for
confinement imposed pursuant to legal process. Further, a claim for
malicious prosecution seeks to remedy the deprivation of liberty
accompanying prosecution, not prosecution itself.” McCormack v.
Livergood, 353 F. Supp. 3d 357, 365 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (cleaned up). In
DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005), a
case relied on by the Defendant, the Plaintiffs had their convictions in a
New Jersey municipal court overturned by an appellate court which
held that their conduct as a matter of law did not constitute the crime
charged. Id. at 600. Plaintiffs then brought suit for malicious
prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey and prevailed at trial. The Third Circuit
reversed, holding that the Plaintiffs were never subjected to a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned: “DiBella and
McLaughlin were only issued a summons; they were never arrested;
they never posted bail; they were free to travel; and they did not have to
report to Pretrial Services. Their liberty was restricted only during the
Municipal Court trials and the Fourth Amendment does not extend
beyond the period of pretrial restrictions.” Id. at 603. In so holding, the
Court of Appeals distinguished its previous holding in Gallo v. City of
Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217 (3rd Cir. 1998) where the plaintiff “was
arrested for arson and posted a $10,000 bond; he was prohibited from
traveling outside Pennsylvania and New Jersey, required to contact
Pretrial Services on a weekly basis, and required to attend all court
hearings including his trial and arraignment.” Id. at 602.
The Second Amended Complaint does not allege a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff relies on the fact that he was
fingerprinted, required to provide biometrics, required to report to court
and under threat of arrest if he failed to comply. Yet those very things
have been held not to constitute a seizure. Korman v. Scochin, No.
3:21-CV-01516, 2026 WL 93832, at *18 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2026)
(requirement to attend hearings insufficient to constitute a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment); Krajkovich v. Borough, No. 3:22-CV-
1912, 2023 WL 6849047, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2023) (“Compulsory
attendance at a hearing or trial without more does not rise to the level
of an onerous restriction on one's liberty.”); McCormack, 353 F. Supp. 3d
at 365 (rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that he “was subject to a seizure
because he was subject to bail, had to undergo fingerprinting and
processing, forced to take temporary lodging and accommodation so he
could attend all court proceedings” and holding that Plaintiff could not
“prove that he suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the
concept of seizure” as a result of the foregoing); Bristow v. Clevenger, 80
F. Supp. 2d 421, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (being fingerprinted and
photographed and required to attend hearings does not amount to a
seizure).
Laws v. Borough of Lansdale, No. 24-1562, 2025 WL 1218186 (3d
Cir. Apr. 28, 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 198 (2025) is particularly
instructive in this matter. In Laws, the Plaintiff and her neighbor
endured “more than a decade of acrimony.” Id. at * 1. In February of
2021, Laws posted a sign in the rear window of her car stating, inter
alia, that her neighbor was a “convicted, violent drug offender [that]
lurks and stalks on Shaw Ave” and made numerous inflammatory
statements against him. Id. The neighbor summoned the police who
filed two counts of harassment against Laws. Like the Plaintiff here,
Laws was not arrested but required to be fingerprinted, photographed,
and required to attend a preliminary hearing. Id. at *3. The charges
against her were ultimately dismissed. Laws brought suit under § 1983
alleging, inter alia, malicious prosecution. The district court dismissed
the claim. In affirming the dismissal of her malicious prosecution
claim, that Court of Appeals stated:
Turning to the fifth element of a malicious prosecution
claim, Laws fails to show that she suffered deprivation of
liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a
consequence of a legal proceeding. We have held that
pretrial custody and some onerous types of pretrial, non-
custodial restrictions constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure. Laws, in contrast, was never in custody nor was
she subject to any other burdensome pre-trial restrictions
on her liberty. Pursuant to a criminal summons, Laws
was required to have her fingerprints and photo taken
and appear at her preliminary hearing, but these actions
do not rise to the level of an unreasonable seizure by the
government under the Fourth Amendment. Under these
facts, Laws fails as a matter of law to state a claim for
malicious prosecution.
Id. at *3 (cleaned up).
Here, Plaintiff alleges – again – only that he was court-ordered to
be fingerprinted, undergo biometric processing, attend court hearing
and was under a “threat of arrest for noncompliance.” The numerous
cases cited above resoundingly reject the argument that these
allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to plausibly establish a
deprivation of liberty consistent with a Fourth Amendment seizure.
Plaintiff was fully instructed on the pleading requirements necessary to
sufficiently state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983.4
Because the Second Amended Complaint, in substance, sets forth the
same claim as in the First Amended Complaint, it too should be
dismissed. However, because Plaintiff was already given an
opportunity to amend, instructed on the relevant law, and invited to
add facts to support his claim, the malicious prosecution claim should
be dismissed with prejudice.
4 The October 29, 2025, Report and Recommendation concluded by
stating: “Whether Plaintiff was under restrictions similar to those in
Gallo, or any restrictions at all that would allow his claim to proceed,
cannot be properly determined on the record before the Court. Perhaps
Plaintiff was only subjected to fingerprinting and required to attend
hearings, or perhaps his pro se Complaint failed to allege relevant facts.
Given our Circuit’s preference for allowance to amend, Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed without prejudice with
leave to amend.” Although Plaintiff added the legal conclusion that he
was subjected to a liberty deprivation, and the assertion that he faced
arrest if he failed to comply with the minimal requirements imposed on
him, he did not support his claim by alleging additional relevant facts.
2. False Arrest
Count I of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint brings a claim
pursuant to § 1983 for not only malicious prosecution but also for false
arrest. This claim fails for the simple reason that Plaintiff, according to
his own Complaint, was never arrested. Plaintiff alleges that the
incident involving the dog occurred on August 31, 2022. (Doc. 22, p. 2, ¶
8). He further alleges that “[o]n January 27, 2023, Defendant initiated
criminal proceedings against Plaintiff at Docket No. MJ-29303-CR-
0000015-2023” charging Theft by Unlawful Taking and Cruelty to
Animals. (Id. at p. 3, ¶ 17). Plaintiff does not allege that he was
arrested or taken into custody of otherwise detained by the Defendant
on the date of the incident or anytime thereafter. He simply alleges –
as he did in his first two complaints – that as a result of the filing of
charges, he was required to be fingerprinted and attend court
proceedings.
“Malicious prosecution differs from false arrest inasmuch as ‘[a]
claim for false arrest, unlike a claim for malicious prosecution, covers
damages only for the time of detention until the issuance of process or
arraignment, and not more.’” Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir.
2007) (quoting Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir.
1998)). A Plaintiff “must plausibly allege [he was] arrested without
probable cause to state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth
Amendment. False arrest claims cover the time of detention until the
issuance of process or arraignment at which point a claim for malicious
prosecution would be the appropriate cause of action. An assertion of
detention without legal process is therefore essential to maintaining a
charge of false arrest.” Krajkovich v. Borough, No. 3:22-CV-1912, 2023
WL 6849047, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2023) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff alleges that process was initiated against him months
after the incident.5 Accordingly, his claim, while not viable, is one for
malicious prosecution, not false arrest. He makes no allegations
5 Plaintiff attached the Fingerprint Order that he refers to multiple
times in his Second Amended Complaint, as well as the actual
Summons for Criminal Case, which clearly indicates his prosecution
was initiated by way of summons. (Doc. 22-3). These documents, relied
on by Plaintiff and attached to his Second Amended Complaint, support
his narrative that prosecution was not initiated until months after his
encounter with the Defendant and that he was never arrested. “When
considering a motion to dismiss, courts ordinarily consider the
complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily
examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular,
documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of
which a court may take judicial notice.” Spry v. Wayne Mem'l Hosp., No.
3:24-CV-00988, 2025 WL 1710240, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 18, 2025).
supporting detention or any loss of liberty prior to the charges against
him being filed. Accordingly, a claim for false arrest fails as a matter of
law.
C. The State Law Claims
Plaintiff also brings state law claims for Malicious Prosecution
(Count II) and Defamation/False Light (Count III). (Doc. 22, pp. 6–7).
Where a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had
original jurisdiction, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Whether the
Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within its discretion.
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). “That decision should
be based on the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity. In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial, the balance of factors will point toward declining to exercise
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” KL by & through
Locker v. Dunmore Sch. Dist., No. 3:24-CV-01461, 2025 WL 2723547, at
*13 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2025) (cleaned up); see also United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding that “if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a
jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”);
Brown v. Patel, No. 3:18-CV-01242, 2019 WL 2502337, at *6 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 13, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3562656
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2019) (recommending that federal claims be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and that remaining state law claims be
dismissed without prejudice).
“Finding nothing in the record to distinguish this case from the
ordinary one, the balance of factors in this case points toward declining
to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Patel,
2019 WL 2502337, at *6. Accordingly, it is recommended that the state
law claims be dismissed without prejudice.
V. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. The Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 23), be GRANTED with
prejudice as to Count I of the Second Amended Complaint raising
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
2. The Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 23), be GRANTED
without prejudice as to Counts II and III of the Second Amended
Complaint bringing state law claims;
3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, (Doc. 26), be DENIED, and;
4. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
Dated: April 1, 2026 /s/ Leo A. Latella
Leo A. Latella
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROLAND SCOTT ARGOT, JR. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-cv-02157
Plaintiff,
v. (Judge Mehalchick)
TROOPER PAUL C. BEARD, et al., (Magistrate Judge Latella)
Defendants.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered
the forgoing Report and Recommendation dated April 1, 2026.
Any party may obtain review of the Report and Recommendation
pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter
described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation
for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the
magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall
specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings,
recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis
for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local
Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion
or where required by law, and may consider the record developed
before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination
on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further
evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate
judge with instructions.
Dated: April 1, 2026 /s/ Leo A. Latella
Leo A. Latella
United States Magistrate Judge