Lin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

---------------------------------------------------------------

ZHUANGMIN LIN,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

v. 24-CV-8177 (MKB)

PAM BONDI, as Attorney General of the United

States, KRISTI NOEM, as Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security, JOSEPH B.

EDLOW, as Director of the United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services, CARRIE M.

SELBY, as Acting Associate Director for Service

Operations, United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services, and DAVID S. VELEZ, as

Acting District Director, United States Citizenship

and Immigration Services New York District,

Defendants.

---------------------------------------------------------------

MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Zhuangmin Lin commenced the above-captioned action on November 25, 2024,

against Defendants Pam Bondi, Attorney General of the United States, Kristi Noem, Secretary of

the Department of Homeland Security, Joseph B. Edlow, Director of the United States Citizenship

and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Carrie M. Selby, Acting Associate Director for Service

Operations, USCIS, David S. Velez, Acting District Director of the New York District, USCIS,

(Complaint (“Compl.”), Docket Entry No. 1), and filed an Amended Complaint on May 12,

2025,1 (Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), Docket Entry No. 19.) In the Amended

1 Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the caption has been

updated to reflect successor officeholders. U.S. Attorney General Bondi replaces named

defendant Merrick Garland, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Noem replaces

named defendant Alejandro Mayorkas, USCIS Director Edlow replaces named defendant Ur M.

Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.

(the “APA”), the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (the “Mandamus Act”), the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Id. ¶¶ 44–54.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with Defendants’

denial of his Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (“I-485

Application”), as well as attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Id. at 13.)

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative, for

summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Plaintiff filed an

opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgement and

cross-moved for sanctions against Defendants.2 For the reasons discussed below, the Court

grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss and denies Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.

I. Background

a. Plaintiff’s entry into the United States and his Form I-589 Asylum

Application

Plaintiff is a Chinese national who arrived in the United States in 2000 seeking asylum

from religious persecution. (Id. ¶ 11; Record of Sworn Statement, annexed in Am. Compl. as

Jaddou, and USCIS New York District Director Velez replaces named defendant Andrea

Quarantillo.

2 (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alt., for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mot.”), Docket Entry No.

31; Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. (“Defs.’ Mem.”), appended to Defs.’ Mot., Docket

Entry No. 31-1; Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Docket Entry No. 27; Defs.’ Reply in

Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. (“Defs.’ Reply”), Docket Entry No. 32; Pl.’s Cross-Mot. for Sanctions

(“Pl.’s Cross-Mot.”) and Mem. for Sanctions (“Pl.’s Mem.”), Docket Entry No. 28; Defs.’ Opp’n

to Pl.’s Cross-Mot., (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), Docket Enry No. 33.)

Ex. K; Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) 02839–2844).3 When an immigration

inspector at the airport interviewed Plaintiff, Plaintiff admitted that he had presented immigration

authorities a United States passport, in the name of Thung Thai Nguyen, that he had received

from a smuggler. (Record of Sworn Statement; CAR 02840, 02846–50.) Plaintiff was paroled

into the United States. (Form I-94 Departure Record, annexed in Am. Compl. as Ex. H; Form I-

94 Arrival Record CAR 02856.)

On or about October 11, 2000, Plaintiff received a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging

him with removal pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (October 2000

NTA, annexed in the Am. Compl. as Ex. B; CAR 02830; see Am. Compl. ¶ 12.) According to

the NTA, Plaintiff was subject to removal under Section 212 (a)(6)(C)(i) of the INA which

provides “any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure

(or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or entry into the United

States or other benefit provided under the Act is inadmissible.” (October 2000 NTA; CAR

02830.) The NTA also charged Plaintiff with removal under Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(l) of the

INA “as an immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a

valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry

document required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document,

or document of identity and nationality as required under the regulations issued by the Attorney

General under section 211(a) of the Act.” (Id.)

In February of 2001, Plaintiff submitted a Form I-589 Asylum Application (“I-589”),

(CAR 2788–96; see Am. Compl. ¶ 12), seeking asylum from religious persecution. (CAR 2791–

3 The Government filed multiple volumes of the Certified Administrative Record

(“CAR”). Citations to CAR refer to exhibits filed under Docket Entry Nos. 22-1–22-4 and

Docket Entry Nos. 26-1–26-6. (See CAR Index, Docket Entry No. 26.)

93, 2796; see Am. Compl. ¶ 12.) On March 26, 2002, an immigration judge denied Plaintiff’s

asylum application because Plaintiff “failed to establish eligibility for asylum,” (the

“Immigration Judge Decision”). (Immigration Judge Decision 9, annexed in Am. Compl as Ex.

I; see CAR 2774–2784.) The immigration judge did not find “[Plaintiff’s] testimony [about the

alleged religious persecution he faced] to be credible.” (Immigration Judge Decision 7; CAR

2780.) The immigration judge ordered Plaintiff’s removal from the United States (the

“Immigration Judge Removal Order”). (Immigration Judge Removal Order, annexed in Am.

Compl. as Ex. C; CAR 2274–5.) On July 10, 2003, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

affirmed the Immigration Judge Removal Order. (CAR 2724.)

b. I-130 petition for alien relative and I-485 applications to adjust status to

lawful permanent resident

In 2009, Plaintiff’s wife, who is an American citizen, filed a successful Form I-130

Petition for Alien Relative4 (“I-130”), on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13; CAR, 02686–

87.) In March of 2010, the I-130 was approved. (Am. Compl. ¶ 12; Approval Notice, annexed

in Am. Compl. as Ex. D.)

On September 15, 2009, Plaintiff filed an I-485 Application to Register Permanent

Residence or Adjust Status (“I-485”), to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident (“LPR”)

(“First I-485 Application”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 14; CAR 02617–22.) In March of 2010, USCIS

denied Plaintiff’s First I-485 Application due to “false representation” to “gain an immigration

benefit, specifically, admission into the United States.” (CAR 02516–19; USCIS Decision,

annexed in Am. Compl. as Ex. E; see Am. Compl. ¶ 14.)

4 USCIS Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, https://www.uscis.gov/i-130 (last

visited Mar. 23, 2026) (defining Form I-130 as the form used “to establish [a] qualifying

relationship with an eligible alien relative . . . who wishes to come to or stay in the United States

permanently and apply for the Permanent Resident Card.”).

On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff submitted another I-485 Application to readjust his status

to LPR (“Second I-485 Application”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 15; see CAR 0001.) In support, Plaintiff

submitted an affidavit explaining that he did not “commit fraud under the facts and the legal

standard for fraud inadmissibility.” (CAR 00107 ¶ 2.) In the affidavit, Plaintiff stated that he

arrived in the United States with a fake United States passport, (id. at 00107 ¶ 4), but he “never

used” it “to enter the country, only to board the plane that took [him] from Cuba to the [United

States],” (id. at 00108 ¶ 6; see Br. in re Notice of Intent to Deny, annexed in Am. Compl. as Ex.

G.) On November 5, 2024, USCIS denied Plaintiff’s Second I-485 Application, (“November

2024 USCIS I-485 Denial Decision”), finding Plaintiff inadmissible because of his false claim to

United States citizenship. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18; Notice of Decision, annexed in Am. Compl. as Ex.

A; CAR 02077–84.)

c. Current action

Plaintiff commenced this action on November 25, 2024. (See generally Compl.) On

January 16, 2025, USCIS moved to reopen Plaintiff’s Second I-485 Application, issued a Notice

of Intent to Deny, and offered Plaintiff a month to respond. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20–21; CAR 02073–

76, 02065–72.) On February 13, 2025, Plaintiff submitted his response. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22;

Response to Notice of Intent to Deny, annexed to Am. Compl. as Ex. O; CAR 00005–06.)

On March 18, 2025, USCIS issued a denial explaining that their “records establish that . .

. [Plaintiff] falsely claimed that [he was] a [United States] citizen,” (the “March 2025 USCIS I-

485 Denial Decision 3”). (March 2025 USCIS I-485 Denial Decision 3, annexed to Am. Compl.

as Ex. P; see CAR 00001–04; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 23.) USCIS found Plaintiff ineligible for

adjustment of status because Plaintiff failed to meet his burden, under the INA, of demonstrating

that he warranted a “favorable exercise of discretion” since “the adverse factors outweighed

[Plaintiff’s] positive equities.”5 (March 2025 USCIS I-485 Denial Decision 4, 5; CAR 00003a,

3b.)

II. Discussion

a. Standards of review

i. Rule 12(b)(1)

A district court may dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the court “lacks the statutory or

constitutional power to adjudicate it.” AMTAX Holdings 227, LLC v. CohnReznick LLP, 136

F.4th 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.

2000)); Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Vill. of Chestnut Ridge, N.Y., 98 F.4th

386, 391 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Conn. Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker, 8 F.4th 167, 172 (2d

Cir. 2021)); Brokamp v. James, 66 F.4th 374, 386 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Cortlandt St. Recovery

Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms.,S.à.r.l., 790 F.3d 411, 416–17 (2d Cir. 2015)), cert. denied, 144 S.

Ct. 1095 (2024)); Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of New York, 16 F.4th 1070, 1075 (2d Cir.

2021) (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113). Courts must “accept the complaint’s material

allegations as true, and [ ] draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor,” Sunvestment

Energy Grp. NY 64 LLC v. Nat’l Grid USA Servs. Co., 116 F.4th 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2024)

(quoting Raymond Loubier Irrevocable Tr. v. Loubier, 858 F.3d 719, 725 (2d Cir. 2017)), but

5 The positive factors considered by USCIS included Plaintiff’s approved I-130 Petition

for Alien Relative Application, Plaintiff’s American children and spouse, Plaintiff’s parents with

lawful permanent residence status, and Plaintiff’s financial, medical, and emotional support to

his relatives. (March 2025 USCIS I-485 Denial Decision 2; CAR 00002.) The negative factors

considered by USCIS included the Immigration Judge Decision, Plaintiff’s fraudulent use of a

United States passport, Plaintiff’s “presence in the United States contrary to law,” and Plaintiff's

lack of remorse for his violation of the law. (March 2025 USCIS I-485 Denial Decision 2–3;

CAR 00002.)

“[w]here jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to

decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings,” Talarico Bros. Bldg. Corp.

v. Union Carbide Corp., 73 F.4th 126, 136 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d

619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003)). See Harty v. W. Point Realty, Inc., 28 F.4th 435, 441 (2d Cir. 2022)

(“It is only where ‘jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute’ that the court has the ‘obligation to

decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits.’” (first

quoting Tandon v. Captain’s Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014);

and then citing LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1999))); Iacovo v. Magguilli,

No. 24-CV-4372, 2025 WL 1135471, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2025) (“In resolving a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint

. . . as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction.”

(quoting Tandon, 752 F.3d at 243)). Ultimately, “the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction

‘has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.’” Tandon, 752 F.3d

at 243 (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113); AMTAX Holdings, 136 F.4th at 37 (“A plaintiff

asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that it exists.” (quoting Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113)).6

6 Plaintiff requests that the Court convert Defendant’s motion to dismiss to a motion for

summary judgment because Defendants have presented evidence outside the pleadings. (See

Pl.’s Opp’n 10–12.) The Court declines to do so. In deciding a motion for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, a district court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings. See Morrison v.

Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In resolving a motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) a district court may consider evidence

outside the pleadings.” (citing Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000))),

aff’d, 561 U.S. 247 (2010). The Court therefore considers evidence outside of the pleadings in

deciding the motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Cangemi v. United States, 13 F.4th 115, 129 (2d Cir.

2021) (“‘In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule

12(b)(1), a district court . . . may refer to evidence outside the pleadings.’” (quoting Makarova,

201 F.3d at 113)); Gao v. Wolf, No. 19-CV-2447, 2020 WL 6727775, at *1, 5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.

ii. Motion for sanctions

Rule 11 provides that “[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other

paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,

information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the

factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 11(b); see Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole-CNCA, N.Y. Branch v. Valcorp, Inc.,

28 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, sanctions may be imposed on a

person who signs a pleading, motion, or other paper for an improper purpose such as to delay or

needlessly increase the cost of litigation, or [a person who] does so without a belief, formed after

reasonable inquiry, that the position espoused is factually supportable and is warranted by

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of

existing law”); Bergon v. ASCAP!, No. 24-CV-4660, 2024 WL 4955283, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2,

2024) (quoting Caisse, 28 F.3d 259 at 264) (same). A court may impose sanctions where “there

is clear evidence that the conduct at issue is (1) entirely without color and (2) motivated by

improper purposes.” Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir.

2009); see also Huebner v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 897 F.3d 42, 56 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting

Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., 564 F.3d at 114); Orr v. McGinty, No. 17-CV-1280, 2022 WL

2440064, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 5, 2022) (quoting Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., 564 F.3d at 114).

Pursuant to Rule 11, motions for sanctions must be made “separately from any other

motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); Kyros L. P.C. v. World Wrestling Ent., Inc., 78 F.4th 532, 543

16, 2020) (dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s challenge of USCIS’s denial of his I-

485 application and refusing to reach defendants’ motion for summary judgment because of the

dismissal).

(2d Cir. 2023) (“A party must move for sanctions in a filing that is ‘separate[ ] from any other

motion’ and that ‘describe[s] the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).’”)

(alterations in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2))); Rafter v. Fleet Boston Fin. Corp., 523

F. App’x 79, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Rule 11[] require[s] that the motion be ‘made separately

from any other motion.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2))). “Such a motion may not be

presented to the court until the expiration of a twenty-one-day ‘safe harbor’ period, during which

the alleged violator has the chance to withdraw or correct the challenged filing.” Kyros L. P.C.,

78 F.4th at 543 (quoting same). “The safe-harbor provision is a strict procedural requirement.”

Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 175

(2d Cir. 2012); see Behrens v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 16-CV-5508, 2019 WL

1437019, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019) (“A motion that fails to comply with the safe harbor

provision of Rule 11 must be denied.” (citing Fierro v. Gallucci, 423 F. App’x 17, 18–19 (2d

Cir. 2011))), aff’d, No. 21-2603, 2024 WL 1090856 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2024) (summary order).

b. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s “APA suit is barred by two statutes that independently

each preclude judicial review by this [C]ourt: 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) and 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a)(2)(B)(i).” (Defs.’ Mem. 18.) First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request that the

Court review the March 2025 USCIS I-485 Denial Decision is an indirect challenge to a removal

order and Section 1252(a)(5) bars judicial review of such a challenge. (Id. at 18, 20.) Second,

Defendants argue that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) jurisdictionally bars this suit because Congress

has precluded judicial review of adjustments of statutory benefits. (Id. at 21–24.)

Plaintiff argues that Section 1252(a)(5) does not bar the Court’s jurisdiction because he

does not seek to review a removal order as one is not at issue. (Pl.’s Opp’n 15–23.) In addition,

Plaintiff argues that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not bar the Court’s jurisdiction because it does

not apply to nondiscretionary cases. (Id. at 23–33.)

i. Section 1252(a)(5)

Defendants argue that Section 1252(a)(5) precludes district court review of “even indirect

challenges” to removal orders, and if the Court grants Plaintiff’s request to adjust his status to

LPR, it would render the removal order invalid. (Defs.’ Mem 19–20.)

Plaintiff argues that although he is subject to a removal order, (Pl.’s Opp’n 9), adjusting

his status to that of an LPR would not challenge the removal order because reopening the

removal order would only occur after a “multi-step process involving decisionmakers from

different branches of our immigration system, exercising their judgment and applying different

standards,” (id. at 19). In addition, Plaintiff argues that “even though a removal order may be

reopened,” it would only occur “[(]1) after LPR status is granted, [(]2) after the LPR moves to

reopen his case, and [(]3) after the immigration court grants such reopening and rescinds the

removal order.” (Id.)

Pursuant to the INA, as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §

106(b), 119 Stat. 303, 311 (2005) (the “REAL ID Act”), the courts of appeals have exclusive

jurisdiction over review of removal decisions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (“[A] petition for review

filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this [S]ection shall be the sole and

exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal . . . .”); see Santos-Torres v.

Houghton, No. 22-297, 2022 WL 17543154, at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 9, 2022) (summary order) (“The

‘court of appeals,’ not the district court, is the ‘sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an

order of removal.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5))); Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102,

113 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he appropriate Courts of Appeals were to be the ‘sole and exclusive

means for judicial review’ of final orders of removal.” (quoting same)). The Second Circuit has

held that “[S]ection 1252(a)(5) would clearly preclude the district court’s entertaining of a direct

challenge to a removal order . . . [and] [S]ection 1252(a)(5)’s jurisdictional bar applies equally to

preclude . . . indirect challenge[s].” Delgado v. Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011);

Jiang v. Bondi, No. 24-CV-3138, 2025 WL 1503986, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2025) (quoting

Delgado, 643 F.3d at 55). “[F]ollowing Delgado, courts routinely dismiss cases where the

requested relief would lead, or be a prerequisite, to invalidation of a removal order, including

where the requested relief is action involving an adjustment-of-status application.” Melgar v.

Wolf, 590 F. Supp. 3d 472, 476–77 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec., No. 15-CV-5588, 2017 WL 818416, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017)); see Calderon v.

Mayorkas, 20-CV-3164, 2021 WL 5707431, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2021) (“Because ordering

USCIS to assume jurisdiction . . . is a prerequisite to his ultimate goal of adjusting status,

[p]laintiff seeks to effectively nullify the underlying order of deportation and thereby runs afoul

of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)’s prohibition on this [c]ourt’s judicial review of orders of removal”);

Gao v. Wolf, No. 19-CV-2447, 2020 WL 6727775, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2020) (holding that

under Section 1252(a)(5), the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate USCIS’s denial of plaintiff’s I-

485 application and compel the agency to grant plaintiff LPR status because the practical effect

would be to void the removal order); Noor v. Homan, No. 17-CV- 1558, 2018 WL 1313233, at

*4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2018) (finding that the court lacked jurisdiction where plaintiff requested

an adjustment of his status because the “practical effect of changing [p]laintiff’s status . . . would

be to void the removal order”); Hu v. Holder, No. 11-CV-4747, 2012 WL 2619185, at *1

(E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012) (“A challenge to an adjustment of status determination is inextricably

linked to an alien’s removal order, because if the plaintiff were successful in his application this

would render the reinstatement order invalid” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));

Bici v. Napolitano, No. 10-CV-1991, 2012 WL 642781, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2012) (“[T]he

court does not have jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s request for an order directing the

defendants to grant his application to reapply for admission into the United States”); Nieto-Ayala

v. Holder, No. 08-CV-8347, 2011 WL 3918156, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011) (“The Second

Circuit recently held that the REAL ID Act also divests district courts of jurisdiction to review

indirect challenges to removal orders.”). In Nieto-Ayala, for example, the plaintiff had been

ordered removed but sought to compel the government to allow him to remain on parole while

his application for asylum was adjudicated. Nieto-Ayala, 2011 WL 39118156, at *3. The

district court held that if it granted the requested relief, the removal order would be

unenforceable until adjudication of the asylum application was complete, making the requested

relief “inextricably linked” to the removal order and therefore subject to the INA’s jurisdictional

bar. Id.

A court’s analysis of whether a claim is an indirect challenge “turn[s] on the substance of

the relief that a plaintiff is seeking.” Delgado, 643 F.3d at 55; see Fulton v. Mayorkas, No. 25-

CV-63, 2025 WL 296051, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2025) (quoting Delgado, 643 F.3d at 55)

(same); Gao, 2020 WL 6727775, at *4 (quoting same); Barros Anguisaca v. Decker, 393 F.

Supp. 3d 344, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting same). Section 1252(a)(5) “removes jurisdiction

from the district courts . . . if the relief requested [] would invalidate the [removal] order,”

because “such a challenge is in effect an attempt to obtain judicial review of the removal order

indirectly.” Freire v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 711 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2018); Lin,

2017 WL 818416, at *4 (“[C]ourts routinely dismiss cases where the requested relief would lead,

or be a prerequisite, to invalidation of a removal order, including where the requested relief is

action involving an adjustment-of-status application.”).

The Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 1252(a)(5) to adjudicate Plaintiff’s requested

relief because Plaintiff is indirectly challenging his removal order. (See Immigration Judge

Removal Order.) Plaintiff concedes that he is subject to a removal order, (Am. Compl. ¶ 12;

Pl.’s Opp’n 9), and he “seeks to compel Defendants to render a decision on [his] I-485

Application,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 32), in order to adjust his status and grant him LPR status.7 (See

Pl.’s Opp’n 24–26.) The practical effect of changing Plaintiff’s status would be to void the

removal order because USCIS would need to reconsider its decision denying the Second I-485

application. (See March 2025 USCIS I-485 Denial Decision.) This is an indirect challenge that

is precluded under Section 1252(a)(5). See Singh v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 878 F.3d

441, 446 (2d Cir. 2017), as amended (Jan. 9, 2018) (holding that Section 1252(a)(5) stripped the

district court of jurisdiction “to require the USCIS to consider the merits of [plaintiff’s]

adjustment-of-status application” because that was “the first step in adjusting his status to that of

a [LPR]”); Jiang, 2025 WL 1503986, at *2 (holding that Section 1252(a)(5) deprived the court

of jurisdiction where plaintiff “indirectly challenge[d] the order of removal because it would

have the [c]ourt require USCIS to revisit and, presumably, grant [p]laintiff a status adjustment”);

Gao, 2020 WL 6727775, at *4 (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction where the plaintiff

sought an “order vacating the denial of his I-485 application and compelling USCIS to grant his

adjustment to lawful-permanent-resident status”); Noor, 2018 WL 1313233, at *4 (holding that

the court “lack[ed] jurisdiction” because the plaintiff’s “request [for an adjustment of status], in

effect, challenge[d] a removal order”); Singh v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 15-CV-1411,

7 Plaintiff’s argument that he is not challenging the Immigration Judge Removal Order

because of the “multi-step” process is without merit. (See Pl.’s Opp’n 19.) In Jiang v. Bondi,

Plaintiff’s counsel raised similar arguments in a case with substantially similar facts. See No.

24-CV-3138, 2025 WL 1503986, at *2–4 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2025). The plaintiff argued in

Jiang that his request to adjust his LPR status “ha[d] nothing to do with his outstanding order of

removal, and concern[ed] only adjustment of status,” because the plaintiff “would still need to

take further action such as ‘mov[ing] to reopen his removal order.’” Id. at *2 (alteration in

original). The court in Jiang found that the plaintiff’s request was an indirect attack of the order

under Section 1252(a)(5) and “[r]equiring USCIS to reconsider the petition would be a ‘first

step’ toward nullifying the removal order.” (Id.)

2016 WL 1267796, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016), aff’d, 878 F.3d 441 (2d Cir. 2017), as

amended (Jan. 9, 2018) (dismissing a case for lack of jurisdiction where the plaintiff requested a

remand to USCIS to adjudicate his adjustment-of-status application because “the ‘substance of

the relief’ [the plaintiff] seeks necessarily impugns the validity of the underlying order of

removal and is thus ‘inextricably linked’ to it within the meaning of Delgado.”).

Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 1252(a)(5).

ii. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request for a “[Section] 1255(a)-based adjustment

application”8 to adjust his LPR status is solely within USCIS’s discretion and Congress has

barred jurisdictional review of USCIS decisions under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). (Defs.’ Mem.

21.)

Plaintiff argues that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not bar the Court’s jurisdiction

because USCIS denied his I-485 Application on a statutory ground that he committed fraud, and

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) applies to discretionary denials of relief. (Pl.’s Opp’n 26.)

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) “prohibits review of any judgment regarding the granting of

relief under [Section] 1255 and the other enumerated provisions.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S.

328, 338 (2022); see Agard v. Garland, No. 23-6347, 2024 WL 1433337, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 3,

2024) (summary order) (“Under [Section] 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), no court has jurisdiction to review . .

. any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [S]ection 1255” (internal quotation marks

8 Section 1255 “allows the executive to grant an adjustment of status, inter alia, to ‘an

alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.’” Cruz-Miguel v.

Holder, 650 F.3d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a))). “Determinations

regarding [I-485] applications are made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) . . . .” Ruiz v. Mukasey,

552 F.3d 269, 276 n.4 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 85 (2d Cir.

2008) (“Section 1255 governs the process of granting LPR status.”).

omitted)). “The INA specifically strips courts of the ability to review ‘any judgment regarding

the granting of relief under [S]ection . . . 1255.’” Palacios v. Bondi, No. 24-2140, 2025 WL

1983482, at *4 (2d Cir. July 17, 2025) (summary order) (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). “[Section] 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes judicial review of [a] challenge to

USCIS’s denial of [an] application for adjustment of status under [Section] 1255.” Xia v. Bondi,

137 F.4th 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2025). A “USCIS[] denial is unreviewable regardless of whether it

rested on discretionary factors, a determination that [plaintiff] is statutorily ineligible for

adjustment of status, or both,” id. at 93, and “regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or

action is made in removal proceedings,” id. at 90 (quoting Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)); see also

Kamel v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 23-CV-10490, 2025 WL 2198926, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2025) (quoting Xia 137 F.4th at 93). “[A] denial of an application for

adjustment of status under [Section] 1255 is a ‘judgment’ for purposes of [Section]

1252(a)(2)(B)(i) regardless of whether it is issued by an immigration court or USCIS.” Xia, 137

F.4th at 93; Palacios, 2025 WL 1983482, at *4 (quoting Xia, 137 F.4th at 93); see also Abuzeid

v. Mayorkas, 62 F.4th 578, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“The ‘regardless’ clause ‘makes clear that the

jurisdictional limitations imposed by [Section] 1252(a)(2)(B) also apply to review of agency

decisions made outside of the removal context.’”) (quoting Lee v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.

Servs., 592 F.3d 612, 619 (4th Cir. 2010))).

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) provides an exception to its jurisdictional bar with regard to

“judicial review of constitutional claims or questions of law only by an appropriate court of

appeals, and only upon a petition for review.” Xia, 137 F.4th at 93 (internal quotation omitted);

see Toalombo Yanez v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2025) (noting that under Section

1252(a)(2)(B)(i), an appellate court has jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions

of law raised upon a petition for review”); Quammie v. Garland, No. 23-6698, 2024 WL

2828412, at *1 (2d Cir. June 4, 2024) (noting that the Second Circuit’s “jurisdiction to review

the denial of adjustment of status under [Section] 1255(a) is limited to constitutional claims and

questions of law”); Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that the

Second Circuit “retain[s] jurisdiction, however, to review ‘constitutional claims or questions of

law raised upon a petition for review’”) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)); Ambati v. U.S.

Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 24-CV-5712, 2025 WL 1906093, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10,

2025) (“[J]udicial review of a decision to deny an application for adjustment of status is limited

to constitutional claims and questions of law, which must be brought through a petition for

review of a removal order in the Court of Appeals.”).

Plaintiff’s argument that the statute only applies to discretionary denials of relief and that

Xia leaves open judicial review in nondiscretionary cases, (see Pl.’s Opp’n 23, 26), is

contradicted by Second Circuit case law. The Second Circuit has held that under Section

1252(a)(2)(B)(i), “USCIS’s denial is unreviewable regardless of whether it rested on

discretionary factors, a determination that [plaintiff] is statutorily ineligible for adjustment of

status, or both.” Xia, 137 F.4th at 94; Srimarayat v. Bondi, No. 24-CV-6737, 2026 WL 575506,

at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2026) (holding that “even if USCIS’s decision [to deny the petitioner’s

I-485 application] was procedural, as the petitioner claims, the [c]ourt does not have subject

matter jurisdiction to review it.”).

Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to adjudicate

Plaintiff’s challenge to USCIS’s denial of his I-485 Application seeking to adjust his status to

LPR. See Palacios, 2025 WL 1983482, at *4 (affirming the district court’s dismissal under

Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) of a plaintiff’s challenge to USCIS’s denial of Section 1255(a)-based

adjustment); Jiang, 2025 WL 1503986, at *4 (holding that the district court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) where the plaintiff sought to adjust his I-485 status

which had been denied based on fraud); Yang v. Nolan, No. 24-CV-3668, 2025 WL 240966, at

*8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2025) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the plaintiff’s

request that the court review USCIS’s adjudication of the plaintiff’s adjustment of status

application and further holding that “[a]ny legal error in such determination may be raised

through a petition to the Court of Appeals on review of a final order of removal.”).9

9 In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff references the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361,

the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., the Due Process Clause, and

the Equal Protection Clause, (see generally Am. Compl.), but he cannot obtain relief under any

of these provisions. First, The Mandamus Act does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on

district courts to review a USCIS denial because the INA bars jurisdiction. See Delgado v.

Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir.2011) (per curium) (holding that the court may not “allow

[the plaintiff] to evade the restrictions of section 1252(a)(5) by styling her challenge as a

mandamus action in order to claim jurisdiction”); see Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 403 (2d

Cir. 2025) (noting that there is a “general rule that appellate courts should avoid determining

jurisdictional issues on a petition for mandamus”); Ansah v. Napolitano, No. 12-CV-5205, 2013

WL 247984, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2013) (holding that the Mandamus Act does not “confer[]

jurisdiction over a case before a district court where such review is prohibited by the INA as

amended by the REAL ID Act”). Second, Plaintiff cannot rely on the DJA as it is not a source of

substantive rights. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 2012) (collecting

cases) (“[W]here [a statute] does not provide that legal predicate, the DJA cannot expand the

statute’s authority by doing so.”); Ferdous v. Johnson, No. 15-CV-0122, 2015 WL 9581815, at

*6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2015) (“DJA is remedial, not jurisdictional.” (internal quotation and

citation omitted)). Finally, the Court cannot review Plaintiff’s constitutional claims because the

INA requires that they be raised in the court of appeals. See Palacios v. Bondi, No. 24-2140,

2025 WL 1983482, at *4 (2d Cir. July 17, 2025) (summary order) (“‘[C]onstitutional claims or

questions of law’ arising out of USCIS’s denial of discretionary relief ‘must be raised upon a

petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals’” (quoting Shabaj v. Holder, 718

F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2013))); Singh v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 135, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Although

Congress barred judicial review of a decision to grant discretionary relief such as . . . adjustment

of status, it partially restored jurisdiction by not “precluding review of constitutional claims or

questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.’”

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(d))); Ambati v. . U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 24-CV-

5712, 2025 WL 1906093, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2025) (“[J]udicial review of a decision to

deny an application for adjustment of status is limited to constitutional claims and questions of

law, which must be brought through a petition for review of a removal order in the Court of

Appeals.”).

c. Motion for sanctions

Plaintiff argues that Defendants should be sanctioned under Rule 11(c), because they

“have engaged [in] a pattern of bad faith and abuse of discretion conduct,” (Pl.’s Mem. 4), as

well as “gamesmanship,” (id. at 8), intended “to cause undue delay of this instant lawsuit and

preclude judicial review,” (id. at 4.) In support, Plaintiff argues that USCIS reopened the Second

I-485 Application to adjust his status to LPR “in name only,” (id. at 13), and the Court should

impose sanctions because Defendants have “engaged in behavior and have presented filings that

are motivated by ‘improper purposes,’” (id. at 16.)

Defendants argue, first, that Plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 11(c)(2) because

“Plaintiff did not serve his cross-motion on Defendants before filing it” and did not provide the

required twenty-one-day safe-harbor period. (Defs.’ Opp’n 18–19.) Second, Defendants argue

that Plaintiff has failed to show “unnecessary delay.” (Id. at 16.) In support, Defendants contend

that USCIS moved efficiently “short-circuiting any need for briefing,” which is the “exact

opposite of the supposed ‘unnecessary delay.’” (Id. at 16.) Third, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s sanctions motion concerns a “stale issue,” because USCIS had already reopened

Plaintiff’s application and issued a final agency action approximately six months earlier. (Id.)

Plaintiff has not alleged or argued that he has complied with the relevant procedural

requirements of Rule 11 by serving his cross-motion on Defendants before filing it and providing

the required twenty-one-day safe-harbor period. According to the docket, Plaintiff filed the

motion on August 21, 2025, (Pl.’s Cross-Mot.), but has not submitted any facts alleging that he

served the motion on Defendants’ twenty-one days before filing it. (See Defs.’ Opp’n 18.)

Moreover, Defendants argue in their opposition that Plaintiff did not serve them prior to filing

the motion. (Id. at 18–19.) The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions pursuant

to Rule 11(c)(2) for failure to comply with the procedural requirements. See Gallucci, 423 F.

App’x at 18–19 (affirming denial of Rule 11 sanctions where the movant failed to comply with

the Rule 11(c)(2) twenty-one-day safe-harbor requirement); see also Bryant v. Britt, 420 F.3d

161, 163 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that, because movant “failed to comply” with Rule 11’s

procedural requirements, there was “no error in the district court’s decision” to deny sanctions);

Coker v. Goldberg & Assocs., P.C., 21-CV-1803, 2024 WL 263121, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24,

2024) (“A motion that fails to comply with the safe harbor provision of Rule 11 must be denied.”

(quoting Castro v. Mitchell, 727 F. Supp. 2d 302, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2010))); Behrens, 2019 WL

1437019, at *14 (“Because ‘[c]ompliance with Rule 11’s safe harbor provision is mandatory . . .

failure to do so will result in a denial of the sanctions motion.’” (quoting Libaire v. Kaplan, 06-

CV-1500, 2008 WL 794973, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2008))).

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss and

denies Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions.

Dated: March 25, 2026

Brooklyn, New York

SO ORDERED:

/s/ MKB

MARGO K. BRODIE

United States District Judge