Fleming

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

BILLY JAMES FLEMING, ) CASE NO. 1:26-cv-00160

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

)

v. )

)

TRINITY FOOD SERVICES, et al., ) OPINION AND ORDER

)

Defendants. )

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Billy Fleming’s (“Plaintiff”) Consolidated Amended

Complaint (“Complaint”). (Doc. 14-1.) For the reasons stated herein, the Complaint is

DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

In February 2024, Plaintiff was housed at the Cuyahoga County Jail. (Doc. 14-1 at

PageID #14.)1 While there, Plaintiff was assigned to work in the kitchen. (Id.) In his

Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on February 21, 2024, while working in the kitchen, he slipped

on a wet spot and fell while holding a hot tray. (Id.) As a result, he allegedly suffered first,

second, and third degree burns on his legs and feet. (Id.) Correction officers allegedly forced

Plaintiff to walk to the medical unit. (Id.) He alleged the medical unit refused to transfer him to

an outside hospital for care. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged at the time of the incident, he did not have

proper protective gear, such as slip resistant shoes. (Id.) In contrast, workers from Trinity Food

Services, a contractor for the Cuyahoga County Jail, did have such protective gear. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleged his wounds were not treated by the medical unit, leading to ongoing injuries.

1 For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document

and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.

(Id.)

B. Procedural History

On December 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint. (Docs. 1-1, 2.) Initially, Plaintiff

filed his complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. (Doc. 1-

1 at 7.) The complaint named as defendants Trinity Food Services, Warden Michelle Henry,

“Warden Hill,” and “Metro Medical.” (Id.) The complaint appeared to assert claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1-2 at 13.)

Plaintiff sought $50 million in damages. (Id.) On December 23, 2025, Magistrate Judge

Chelsey Vascura screened Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A

and issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the matter be dismissed

because the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted. (Doc. 3 at 24.)

Magistrate Judge Vascura construed the complaint as asserting claims under the Eighth

Amendment for deliberate indifference. (Id. at 28.) After so construing, Magistrate Judge

Vascura found the complaint failed to state a violation of the Eighth Amendment and

recommended dismissing the action. (Id. at 31.)

Plaintiff filed an Objection to the R&R. (Doc. 7.) Relevant here, in his Objection,

Plaintiff clarified his injuries occurred while he was in custody at the Cuyahoga County Jail, and

not in the Correctional Reception Center. (Id. at 40-41.) Plaintiff then filed a motion to amend

his complaint. (Doc. 8.) Based on the new information in the Objection, Magistrate Judge

Vascura found venue improper in the Southern District of Ohio pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

(Doc. 9 at 49.) As a result, this matter was transferred to the Northern District of Ohio which

encompasses the Cuyahoga County Jail. (Id. at 49-50.)

Once transferred, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend. (Doc. 12.) The Court

ordered Plaintiff to file one consolidated amended complaint. (Id.) On April 30, 2026, Plaintiff

filed a consolidated amended complaint (“Complaint”). (Doc. 14-1.) The Complaint alleged

similar facts as the original complaint. (Id. at 14-15.) Plaintiff named the same defendants as

before. (Id. at 13.) He asserted his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments for deliberate indifference to a pre-trial detainee. (Id. at 15.)

Plaintiff seeks $1 million from each Defendant. (Id.)

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

District courts are expressly required, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), to screen all in forma

pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such complaint that

the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Neitzke

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Hill v. Lappin, 630

F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010).

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S. Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per

curiam); El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the “lenient treatment

generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th

Cir. 1996). Liberal construction does not “abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits.”

Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). A complaint must still contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (explaining the dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and

Twombly for resolving dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) applies to reviews conducted

pursuant to Sections 1915 and 1915A). Thus, the complaint must make out a plausible legal

claim, meaning the complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient for a court “to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127

S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). Plausibility does not require any specific probability of

success, but it does demand “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id.

When courts evaluate whether a complaint makes out a plausible claim, they must accept

all factual allegations as true. Cates v. Crystal Clear Techs., LLC, 874 F.3d 530, 534 (6th Cir.

2017) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2016)). Courts must also

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and they must generally construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. But courts do not accept legal

conclusions or other conclusory allegations as true. D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383

(6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 275-76 (6th Cir. 2010)). And

courts need not make unwarranted factual inferences. Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th

Cir. 2006).

B. Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff asserts his deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. 14-1 at 15.) But Plaintiff avers he was a pre-trial detainee at the time of the

incident. (Id.) The Eighth Amendment applies to convicted prisoners, not pre-trial detainees.

See Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2021). The Fourteenth Amendment

applies to pre-trial detainees, like Plaintiff. Stein v. Gunkel, 43 F.4th 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2022).

The Complaint appears to present two claims: one claim for failing to protect him from

injury, and one for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

Failure to Protect. A defendant violates the Fourteenth Amendment when “(1) he acts

intentionally with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined, (2) those

conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of harm, (3) he does not take reasonable steps to

abate that risk, and (4) by failing to do so he actually causes the plaintiff’s injuries.”

Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail, 53 F.4th 939, 945 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Westmoreland v.

Butler Cnty., 29 F.4th 721, 729 (6th Cir. 2022)).

Plaintiff did not allege any Defendant knew about the conditions in the kitchen.

Moreover, the Complaint fails to allege the conditions in the kitchen put Plaintiff at a substantial

risk of harm. “While a wet floor presents the possibility for an inmate to slip and fall, it does not

pose a substantial or excessive risk of serious harm and therefore fails to trigger Fourteenth

Amendment protections.” Robinson v. Well Path, No. 22-cv-102, 2022 WL 2070887, 2022 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 102312, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. June 8, 2022) (citation omitted). This is consistent with

other cases from district courts that have routinely found a slip and fall on a wet floor is

insufficient to bring constitutional claims. Jackson v. Malloy, No. 25-cv-12307, 2025 WL

2965985, 206132, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2025) (holding that “[s]lip-and-fall accidents, while

unfortunate, do not give rise to constitutional claims”); Miller v. Rutherford Cnty. Adult

Detention Ctr., No. 24-cv-904, 2025 WL 899950, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53716, at *10 (M.D.

Tenn. Mar. 24, 2025) (explaining that “[c]ourts have regularly held that slip and fall accidents do

not give rise to federal causes of action”); Smith v. Winn, No. 21-11263, 2021 WL 2413316,

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110651, at *5-6 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2021) (slip and fall in kitchen

sounded purely in negligence and failed to state a claim under Section 1983); Chamberlain v.

Nielsen, No. 10-cv-10676, 2010 WL 1002666, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25455, at *5-6 (E.D.

Mich. Mar. 18, 2010) (collecting cases where slip and falls in prisons did not amount to

constitutional claims).

At best, Plaintiff alleged a claim of negligence. But that is insufficient to state a claim

under Section 1983. Brawner, 14 F.4th at 596.

Deliberate Indifference. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees have an

established right to medical care. Hodges v. Abram, 138 F.4th 980, 987 (6th Cir. 2025). “An

officer violates that right if they show ‘deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee’s serious

medical needs.’” Id. (quoting Hyman v. Lewis, 27 F.4th 1233, 1237 (6th Cir. 2022)). Deliberate

indifference has two prongs, “one objective and the other subjective, and essentially requires that

an officer ‘knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to [the pretrial detainee’s]

health and safety.’” Id. (quoting Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 2009)). The

objective prong requires a plaintiff to show his medical need was “sufficiently serious.”

Brawner, 14 F.4th at 591 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128

L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994)). The subjective prong requires a plaintiff to show the defendant acted with

“more than negligence but less than subjective intention—something akin to reckless disregard.”

Id. at 596.

Even assuming Plaintiff alleged a sufficiently serious medical need, Plaintiff failed to

allege any facts relating to the subjective prong for deliberate indifference claims against any

particular Defendant. That is, Plaintiff did not allege any named Defendant acted with reckless

disregard to a sufficiently serious injury. In short, he did not allege any deliberate indifference to

his alleged serious medical need. Instead, his Complaint alleged the opposite—that he was

immediately taken to medical and medical placed in line for wound care. (Doc. 14-1 at 14.)

Dismissal is proper where “the allegations in the complaint affirmatively show that the claim is

[deficient or disallowed as a matter of law].” Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th

Cir. 2012).

Further, Plaintiff alleged no facts relating to his treatment by prison medical staff. Courts

“distinguish between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and

those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.” Al/spaugh

v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860

n.5 (6th Cir. 1976)). “Where a prisoner alleges only that the medical care he received was

inadequate, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments.” /d.

“However, it is possible for medical treatment to be “so woefully inadequate as to amount to no

treatment at all.” /d. Here, Plaintiff merely alleged a disagreement about his medical care.

Those allegations are insufficient to present a plausible Fourteenth Amendment constitutional

claim.

I. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, pro se Plaintiff Billy Fleming’s Complaint (Doc. 14-1) is

DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: June 22, 2026 Lay —

BRIDGET MEEHAN-BRENNAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE