Fabal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ANDREW FABAL,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:26-cv-266

Judge James L. Graham

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

J. MCGILTON, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Andrew Fabal, sues several correctional officers and the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his constitutional rights.

(Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s

Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to

recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, the

undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state

a claim on which relief may be granted.

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $190.85 in his prison account, which

is insufficient to pay the filing fee.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts

(Inmate ID Number A769646) at the London Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit

to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial

partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust

account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months

immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint.

After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the

inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the

account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks

should be sent to:

Prisoner Accounts Receivable

260 U.S. Courthouse

85 Marconi Boulevard

Columbus, Ohio 43215

The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.

It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute this action without prepayment of

fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs

had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and

the prison cashier’s office.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”).

Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that on May 8, 2024, he was falsely accused of procuring or attempting

to procure drugs; dealing, facilitating, or participating in a transaction; and using a telephone to

further a crime or criminal activity. As a result, Plaintiff had to obtain mental health treatment for

emotional stress, and he suffered physical discomfort. Plaintiff alleges that these actions violated

his constitutional rights to fair and equal protection, his right to be free from deliberate

indifference, and his right to be free from undeserved punishment. Plaintiff filed a grievance

related to these events, which was granted at the appeal level. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.)

Plaintiff names as Defendants J. McGilton (a corrections officer at Noble Correctional

Institution), J. Wilson (the warden’s designee at Lebanon Correctional Institution), Shellie

Branch (program administrator III at Lebanon Correctional Institution), Courtney A. Teague

(unit management chief at Lebanon Correctional Institution), and the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction. As relief, Plaintiff seeks $850,000 in damages.

All of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. First, Plaintiff’s claims against the Ohio

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

The Eleventh Amendment operates as a bar to federal-court jurisdiction when a private citizen

sues a state or its instrumentalities unless the state has given express consent. Pennhurst St. Sch.

& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1983); Lawson v. Shelby Cty., 211 F.3d 331, 334 (6th

Cir. 2000). “There are three exceptions to sovereign immunity: (1) when the state has waived

immunity by consenting to the suit, (2) when Congress has expressly abrogated the states’

sovereign immunity, and (3) when the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28

S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), applies.” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 410 (6th Cir. 2017)

(citation omitted). None of these exceptions apply to Plaintiff’s Complaint. First, “Ohio has not

waived sovereign immunity in federal court.” Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir.

1999). Second, “Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Boler, 865

F.3d at 410 (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66). Third, the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies only when a

plaintiff brings “claims for prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacity

to prevent future federal constitutional or statutory violations.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 412. But

Plaintiff seeks only damages, not prospective relief. Accordingly, no exception to sovereign

immunity applies and Plaintiff’s claims against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and

Correction must be dismissed. Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiff sues any of the Defendants in

their official capacity, those claims must also be dismissed. A suit against a state official in his or

her official capacity is “not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s

office,” and is therefore “no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, any official-capacity claims against the

individual Defendants are also barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

As to Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims against the individual Defendants, Plaintiff’s

Complaint appears to rest primarily on Defendants’ false accusations against him. But “a

prisoner has no constitutional right to be free from false accusations of misconduct.” Jackson v.

Hamlin, 61 F. App’x 131, 132 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d

Cir. 1986)); see also Jones v. McKinney, No. 97-6424, 1998 WL 940242, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 23,

1998) (district court properly dismissed a complaint alleging that prison officials “deliberately

issued a false disciplinary report” against the plaintiff as frivolous because “even if the

disciplinary report was false, . . . a prisoner has no constitutionally protected immunity from

being wrongly accused”); Lee v. Pauldine, No. 1:12-cv-077, 2013 WL 65111, at *8 (S.D. Ohio

Jan. 4, 2013) (“The act of filing false disciplinary charges does not itself violate a prisoner’s

constitutional rights.”) (cleaned up), adopted, 2013 WL 646775 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2013);

Reeves v. Mohr, No. 4:11-cv-2062, 2012 WL 275166, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2012)

(“Erroneous allegations of misconduct by an inmate do not constitute a deprivation of a

constitutional right.”).

Further, to the extent that Plaintiff advances a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection

claim, that claim fails. To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts

to raise a plausible inference “that a state actor intentionally discriminated against [him] because

of membership in a protected class.” Henry v. Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir.

1990) (cleaned up), abrogated in part on other grounds by King v. Harwood, 853 F.3d 568, 580

n. 4 (6th Cir. 2017); see also Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 417 (6th Cir. 2000); Copeland v.

Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 480 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255–56 (1995)). Alternatively, Plaintiff may state a “class-of-one”

equal protection claim by alleging that he “has been intentionally treated differently from others

similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Franks v.

Rubitschun, 312 F. App’x 764, 766 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528

U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). But Plaintiff's allegations make no mention of and raise no plausible

inferences as to differential treatment from those similarly situated. He has therefore failed to

state an equal protection claim.

Plaintiff also makes passing reference to deliberate indifference and undeserved

punishment, presumably advancing claims under the Eighth Amendment, which forbids the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain against inmates and deliberate indifference to an

inmate’s safety. See Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011); Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 932–33 (1994). But he makes no factual allegations on which the undersigned

could rely to conclude that deliberate indifference or undeserved punishment occurred. Indeed,

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that he was punished in any way or that Defendants were

indifferent to anything. He therefore has not stated a claim for deliberate indifference or cruel

and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

Nor has Plaintiff alleged the personal involvement of each individual Defendant. The

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims

against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege,

with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted

constitutional right.” Heyward v. Cooper, 88 F.4th 648, 661 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Heyne v.

Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011) and Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d

673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008)) (emphasis in original). “[C]ategorical references to ‘Defendants’” do

not meet this standard. Marcilis v. Twp. of Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff’s allegations therefore fail to state a claim under § 1983 against the individual

Defendants.

III. DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

In addition, for the reasons above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint

be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e), 1915A(b).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE