Sweeting

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

DERRICK SWEETING, : Case No. 1:25-cv-863

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Douglas R. Cole

vs. : Magistrate Judge S. Courter M.

: Shimeall1

CYNTHIA DAVIS, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER AND SUPPLEMENTAL

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, an inmate housed at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (“SOCF”), has filed

a pro se civil rights complaint in this Court against Defendants Warden Cynthia Davis, Inspector

A. Hockett, Unit Manager Brabson, Sgt. Terry, Major Bell, Sgt. Chinn, Roger Steel, and Inspector

Kevin Parker, all with SOCF. (ECF No. 13, PAGEID #: 91.) This matter is before the Court on

Plaintiff’s motion to amend. (ECF No. 16.)

On March 11, 2026, this Court conducted an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint,

understanding Plaintiff to be alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio state law, including:

(1) a retaliation claim against Defendant Brabson for allegedly sending Plaintiff to “the hole” as

retaliation for filing a grievance about his missing television; (2) negligent deprivation of property

claims against Defendants Davis, Hockett, Brabson, Terry, Bell, Chinn, and Parker for allegedly

failing to return Plaintiff’s television; (3) failure to investigate claims against Defendants Parker

1 On March 17, 2026, this case was referred to Magistrate Judge S. Courter M. Shimeall. (ECF No.

15, PAGEID #: 128–29.)

and Davis; and (4) supervisor liability claims against Defendant Davis. (See ECF No. 14, PAGEID

#: 114.) This Court also understood Plaintiff to be raising unrelated fraud claims against Defendant

Steel for allegedly stealing Plaintiff’s government stimulus check, and against Defendant Davis

for allegedly being aware of the fraud but failing to correct it. (Id. at PAGEID #: 115.) This Court

determined that Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on his retaliation claim against Defendant

Brabson but recommended severing and dismissing Plaintiff’s unrelated fraud claims against

Defendants Steel and Davis. (Id. at PAGEID #: 115, 120–22.) This Court also recommended

dismissing Plaintiff’s remaining claims for the failure to state a plausible claim for relief, including

any claims seeking monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. (Id.)

Since this Court’s March 2026 Report and Recommendations, Plaintiff has filed an

amended complaint, seeking to add retaliation claims against three new Defendants. (ECF No. 16,

PAGEID #: 146–50.) Under Rule 15(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff

may amend a complaint “once as a matter of course” within 21 days after service of a responsive

pleading or motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Given the early status of the case, Plaintiff’s

motion to amend is GRANTED. It appears, however, that Plaintiff’s filing is a supplemental

complaint, seeking to add allegations to his original Complaint. (See id. at PAGEID #: 148–49

(“Please grant[] this Amend Complaint to proceed through my screening action.”).) The

Undersigned therefore construes the filing as such and considers Plaintiff’s original Complaint

(ECF No. 13) and supplemental complaint (ECF No. 16) as one “First Amended Complaint.”

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint “supersedes [the] earlier complaint for all purposes.” In re

Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., 731 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 2013).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to file on the docket Plaintiff’s original Complaint (ECF

No. 13) and his supplemental complaint (ECF No. 16) together as one “First Amended Complaint.”

I. SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Because Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 8), the

Undersigned must conduct an initial screen of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint to determine

whether the First Amended Complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995

§ 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A. Screening Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).

To address this concern, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the

Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the

action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See

also § 1915A(b).

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

standards to a review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). A complaint must contain

a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of

complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd. P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir.

2013) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009)).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does

require more than “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks

omitted). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility of an inference

depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing

explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).

A plaintiff’s allegations are “accepted as true.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). But a court need not accept factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional.”

Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28). Further, pro se complaints are held

“to less stringent standards” than a formal pleading drafted by a lawyer. Martin v. Overton, 391

F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996)). A

pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are “to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). This “lenient treatment has limits,”

however, because “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler

v. G.M., 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th

Cir. 1989)) (additional citations omitted).

B. Plaintiff’s Original Allegations

Regarding Plaintiff’s allegations from his original Complaint (ECF No. 13), the

Undersigned incorporates the factual allegations laid out in this Court’s March 11, 2026, Order

and Report and Recommendations:

Plaintiff first alleges that Defendants Davis, Hockett, Brabson, Terry, Bell,

Chinn, and Parker failed to replace his television despite non-defendant Chief

Inspector Morrow affirming Plaintiff’s grievance to replace the television. Plaintiff

alleges that these Defendants were responsible for replacing his television and were

negligent in failing to do so. Plaintiff alleges that he was not on “TV restriction”

and that there is no policy against television use for prisoners on tablet restrictions.

Plaintiff alleges that he submitted an informal grievance to Defendant

Brabson, who determined that Plaintiff had signed his property sheet and denied

the grievance. Plaintiff alleges that he was then sent to the “hole” for submitting a

false ticket. Plaintiff alleges that he appealed the denial, which resulted in

Defendant Parker affirming Brabson’s decision for the same reasoning.

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendant Steel stole Plaintiff’s $3,200

government stimulus check from the IRS, resulting in fraud. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Davis was aware of the issue but failed to fix it and that she enforces

broken policies.

Plaintiff alleges in sum that Defendants deprived him of his television; that

when he tried to get his television replaced, Defendant Brabson posted false

sanctions against him as retaliation for submitting a grievance; that Defendant Steel

stole government money from him; and that Defendant Davis failed to correct these

issues.

(ECF No. 14, PAGEID #: 113–14 (internal citations omitted).)

C. Plaintiff’s New Allegations

Plaintiff’s newly added factual allegations raise claims against three new named

Defendants, J. McAllister, B. Crabtree, and J. Leasure. (ECF No. 16, PAGEID #: 146.) Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Leasure retaliated against Plaintiff by filing a conduct report against him

that listed personal information about Plaintiff’s family member, including the family member’s

name and phone number. (Id. at PAGEID #: 147.) Plaintiff alleges that this conduct could harm

his loved one. (Id.) He alleges that Leasure did this after Plaintiff’s family member called

Defendants about Plaintiff being harassed. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he received a 90-day phone

restriction because of Leasure’s conduct report, which happened at the same time that Defendant

Davis responded to Plaintiff’s kite about other issues. (Id.)

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendant B. Crabtree is liable for retaliation because Crabtree

knew Plaintiff should not have been given a conduct report for speaking his mind and telling his

family about the issues at SOCF. (Id. at PAGEID #: 148.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant J.

McAllister is liable for including the family member’s personal information in the conduct report

and for giving Plaintiff a ticket because Plaintiff had his family call SOCF about the other issues.

(Id. at PAGEID #: 149.)

Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (ECF No. 13, PAGEID #: 93; ECF No. 16,

PAGEID #: 150.)

D. Discussion

The Court has already dealt with many of the claims in Plaintiff’s (now) Amended

Complaint. That said, the Court intends to now conduct a full screening of all of Plaintiff’s now-

pending claims. Though some of this Order will be duplicative of the Court’s prior screening

Order (see generally ECF No. 14), the Court nevertheless proceeds accordingly for the sake of

addressing all claims clearly. To that end, for the sake of clarity, the Undersigned understands

Plaintiff to be raising the following claims:

1. A retaliation claim against Defendant Brabson for allegedly sending Plaintiff to “the

hole” as retaliation for filing a grievance about his missing television;

2. Negligent deprivation of property claims against Defendants Davis, Hockett, Brabson,

Terry, Bell, Chinn, and Parker for allegedly failing to return Plaintiff’s television,

despite Chief Inspector Morrow’s decision otherwise;

3. Failure to investigate claims against Defendants Parker and Davis;

4. Supervisor liability claims against Defendant Davis for allegedly being aware of and

then failing to correct the other Defendants’ actions;

5. Unrelated fraud claims against Defendant Steel for allegedly stealing Plaintiff’s

government stimulus check and against Defendant Davis for being aware of the fraud

but failing to correct it; and

6. Unrelated retaliation claims against Defendants Leasure, Crabtree, and McAllister for

allegedly revealing a family member’s personal information and placing Plaintiff on a

90-day phone restriction as retaliation for Plaintiff contacting Defendant Davis about

SOCF employee behavior.

Upon review, and without the benefit of further briefing by the parties, the Undersigned

concludes, as previously determined by this Court, that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against

Defendant Brabson MAY PROCEED in an abundance of caution. As noted in the previous Order

and Report and Recommendations, although Plaintiff does not allege exact dates for these

incidents, his exhibits show that he started the grievance process to get back his television in July

2025. (Complaint, ECF No. 13, PAGEID #: 94–100.)2 The Undersigned ADVISES Plaintiff that

this is only a preliminary determination. The Court has not made a determination as to the merits

of the claims or potential defenses thereto, nor is Defendant Brabson precluded from filing a

2 Plaintiff attaches copies of exhibits to his Complaint. These exhibits are considered a part of the

Complaint “for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). See Fishman v. Williams, No. 14-cv-4823, 2016 WL

11484591, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2016) (“When screening a pro se plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court may consider facts drawn from the complaint and supporting exhibits attached

thereto.”); Johnson v. Buffalo Pub. Schs.: Adult Educ. Div., No. 19-cv-1484, 2021 WL 9455714, at *3

(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2021) (“The Court deems the attachments and exhibits attached to [the plaintiff’s]

Complaint part of the pleading and considers them, to the extent they are relevant, in its screening

decision.”). However, the Court declines to comb through the exhibits to raise new claims or make legal

arguments for Plaintiff. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998)

(“Furthermore, although this court has discretion to more broadly review the record on appeal, we, like the

district courts, have a limited and neutral role in the adversarial process, and are wary of becoming

advocates who comb the record of previously available evidence and make a party’s case for it.”).

motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement, or other appropriate motion under the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wiley v. Austin, No. 8:20-cv-220, 2020 WL 6204382,

at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2020).

Plaintiff’s remaining claims, however, should be DISMISSED. First, the Undersigned

RECOMMENDS the following: that the Court ADOPT the prior recommendations to DISMISS

Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for monetary damages, his negligent deprivation of property

claims, his failure to investigate claims, and his supervisor liability claims; ADOPT the prior

recommendation to DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s state-law negligence and emotional

distress claims; and ADOPT the prior recommendations to SEVER and DISMISS without

prejudice Plaintiff’s unrelated fraud claims against Defendants Steel and Davis.

Further, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s new retaliation claims raised

in his supplemental complaint against Defendants Leasure, Crabtree, and McAllister (ECF No. 16)

be SEVERED and DISMISSED without prejudice because these claims are misjoined in this

proceeding, as explained in more detail below.

E. Misjoinder of Unrelated Retaliation Claims Against Defendants Leasure, Crabtree,

and McAllister

In his amended allegations, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Leasure, Crabtree, and

McAllister retaliated against Plaintiff by filing a conduct report about Plaintiff that included his

family member’s personal information and then by placing Plaintiff on a 90-day phone restriction.

(ECF No. 16, PAGEID #: 147–49.) Plaintiff alleges that this retaliation happened after he

informed his family about the issues at SOCF, and his family attempted to contact Defendant

Davis. (Id.) As with his misjoined fraud claims against Defendants Steel and Davis, Plaintiff’s

retaliation claims against Leasure, Crabtree, and McAllister are misjoined in this lawsuit and

should be DISMISSED.

A plaintiff may not join unrelated claims and various defendants unless the claims arise

“out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and . . . any

question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

20(a)(2)(A)–(B). See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated claims

against defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple

claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s] but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing

fees—for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that

any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees.”).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, courts have “broad discretion ‘to order a

severance to avoid causing unreasonable prejudice and expense to the defendant . . . and to avoid

great inconvenience in the administration of justice.’” Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743,

781 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (citation omitted).

For misjoined claims or defendants, “a court has two options: it may (1) drop misjoined

parties ‘on just terms’; or (2) sever any claim against a party.” Harris v. Erdos, No. 1:21-cv-104,

2022 WL 3053496, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2022) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; Roberts v. Doe, No.

16-2082, 2017 WL 3224655, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 28, 2017)). A court may exercise discretion to

select the parties to drop or the claims to sever. Id. (citations omitted); Cage v. Michigan, No. 16-

cv-11679, 2018 WL 3729062, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2018) (“[T]he proper remedy

for . . . misjoinder is to sever the claims against the unrelated parties and dismiss those claims

without prejudice.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21) (additional citation omitted)).

Like with his unrelated fraud claims, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to tie this retaliation

claim against Leasure, Crabtree, and McAllister to the basis of this lawsuit—that the other

Defendants refused to return Plaintiff’s television and that Defendant Brabson retaliated against

him for filing grievances about the issue. (See Complaint, ECF No. 13, PAGEID #: 90–93.) While

Plaintiff makes a general assertion that the SOCF employees are harassing him (see generally ECF

No. 16), Plaintiff has not shown that the new retaliation allegations arise from the same transaction

or occurrence as the television claims or that these claims rely on the same material facts to warrant

joinder. In other words, Plaintiff has not made a sufficient connection between the claim against

Defendant Brabson and his new allegations against three new Defendants. And Plaintiff has failed

to state any other plausible claims for relief against Defendants Leasure, Crabtree, and McAllister

to permit joinder. (See generally ECF Nos. 13, 16.)

Plaintiff’s unrelated retaliation claims against Leasure, Crabtree, and McAllister for

allegedly filing a conduct report that reveals personal information about Plaintiff’s family member

and for allegedly placing him on a 90-day phone restriction therefore should be SEVERED from

this action. Proctor, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21). The Undersigned

RECOMMENDS that these claims further be DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff re-

filing a separate action including such claims if he so wishes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2), 21; Harris,

2022 WL 3053496, at *6. Additionally, because Plaintiff fails to state a related plausible claim

for relief against any of these Defendants, they should be DISMISSED as defendants here.

II. CONCLUSION

Based on the above, Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED. As noted,

the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to file on the docket Plaintiff’s original Complaint (ECF No.

13) and his supplemental complaint (ECF No. 16) together as one “First Amended Complaint.”

Upon screening his supplemental allegations, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim MAY

PROCEED for further development against Defendant Brabson in his individual capacity, and in

his official capacity to the extent that Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. As explained

in the prior screening Order, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s unrelated fraud

claims against Defendants Steel and Davis; and, as explained here, the Undersigned

RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s unrelated retaliation claims against Defendants Leasure, Crabtree,

and McAllister be SEVERED from this action and DISMISSED without prejudice. Because

Plaintiff’s other allegations fail to state a plausible claim for relief, the Undersigned

RECOMMENDS that the Court ADOPT the prior recommendation to DISMISS Plaintiff’s

remaining claims.

Further, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court ADOPT the prior

recommendation (ECF No. 14, PAGEID #: 122–23) to DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaration

(ECF No. 5), construed as a motion for preliminary injunction and request for a temporary

restraining order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff MAY PROCEED with his retaliation claim against Defendant Brabson at this

juncture, except to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from Brabson in his

official capacity.

2. As noted previously, if Plaintiff wishes the United States Marshals to effectuate service,

he must submit a complete copy of the First Amended Complaint together with copies

of the exhibits for Defendant Brabson. Plaintiff must also submit a completed

individual service form and United States Marshals summons form (USM-285 form)

for Defendant Brabson. To proceed, Plaintiff must submit a service copy of the First

Amended Complaint and attached exhibits and submit the service and summons forms

for Defendant Brabson WITHIN 30 days of the date of this Order with a motion to

issue service.

3. Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant Brabson or, if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon Defendant Brabson’s attorney(s), a copy of every further pleading or

other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with

the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date that a

true and correct copy of any document was mailed to Defendant Brabson or Defendant

Brabson’s counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which

has not been filed with the Clerk, or which fails to include a certificate of service will

be disregarded by the Court.

4. Plaintiff is reminded that he must keep this Court informed of his current address and

promptly file a Notice of New Address if he is released or transferred.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The Court ADOPT the prior recommendations (ECF No. 14, PAGEID #: 116–20) that

Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for monetary damages, deprivation of property

claims against all Defendants, failure to investigate claims against Defendants Davis

and Parker, and supervisor liability claims against Defendant Davis be DISMISSED

with prejudice. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

2. The Court ADOPT the prior recommendations (ECF No. 14, PAGEID #: 120) that

Plaintiff’s state-law negligence and emotional distress claims be DISMISSED without

prejudice. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

3. The Court ADOPT the prior recommendations (ECF No. 14, PAGEID #: 120–22) to

SEVER and DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s unrelated fraud claims against

Defendants Steel and Davis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

4. The Court ADOPT the prior recommendation (ECF No. 14, PAGEID #: 126) that

because Plaintiff has failed to state a related, plausible claim for relief against

Defendants Davis, Hockett, Terry, Bell, Chinn, Steel, and Parker, they should all be

DISMISSED as defendants here.

5. The Court should also SEVER and DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s unrelated

retaliation claims against Defendants Leasure, Crabtree, and McAllister, and should

DISMISS these Defendants from this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A(b)(1).

6. The Court should ADOPT the prior recommendation (ECF No. 14, PAGEID #: 122–

23) to DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaration (ECF No. 5).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed

findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and

shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and

Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

Date: April 6, 2026 s/ S. Courter M. Shimeall

S. Courter M. Shimeall

United States Magistrate Judge