Jones

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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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6 RAYON JONES, G35669, Case No. 25-cv-09809-CRB (PR)

7 Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE

8 v. TO AMEND

9 KELLY SANTORO, Warden,

10 Defendant(s).

11 Plaintiff, a prisoner at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) and frequent litigant in federal

12 court, has filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that plaintiff was denied due

13 process in connection with a rules violation report (RVR) of possession of a controlled substance

14 for which on April 30, 2025, plaintiff was found guilty and assessed 121 days of good time

15 credits. Plaintiff also alleges that after filing an inmate appeal on May 16, 2025, inmates started

16 making “death threats of force and violence” to plaintiff and telling plaintiff to “stop snitching

17 because rats die by rat poison,” and that prison officials have not taken any measures to protect

18 plaintiff from harm or injury. Plaintiff only names the warden as a defendant without linking the

19 warden in any way to plaintiff’s allegations of wrongdoing. Plaintiff seeks damages and

20 injunctive relief.

21 DISCUSSION

22 A. Standard of Review

23 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

24 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

25 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of

26 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

27 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

1 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a

3 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged

4 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

5 42, 48 (1988).

6 B. Legal Claims

7 Plaintiff raises claims of denial of due process in connection with a disciplinary finding of

8 possession of a controlled substance and of deliberate indifference to threats of force and violence

9 by other inmates. Plaintiff’s allegations of denial of due process will be dismissed without leave

10 to amend but plaintiff’s allegations of deliberate indifference to safety will be dismissed with leave

11 to amend.

12 1. Due Process

13 “‘Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to

14 imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil

15 Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Challenges to the

16 lawfulness of confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas

17 corpus.’” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S.

18 749, 750 (2004)). “An inmate’s challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, however, may

19 be brought under § 1983.” Id.

20 Habeas is the “exclusive remedy” for the prisoner who seeks “‘immediate or speedier

21 release’” from confinement. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533-34 (2011) (quoting Wilkinson

22 v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)). “Where the prisoner’s claim would not ‘necessarily spell

23 speedier release,’ however, suit may be brought under § 1983.’” Skinner, 562 U.S. at 533-34

24 (quoting Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82). In fact, an action under § 1983 is the exclusive remedy for

25 claims by state prisoners that do not “lie at the ‘core of habeas corpus.’” Nettles v. Grounds, 830

26 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973)).

27 A claim that meets the statutory criteria of § 1983 may be asserted unless it is within the core of

1 duration.” Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 841 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500).

2 Here, plaintiff’s challenge to the 2025 RVR guilty finding of possession of a controlled

3 substance that resulted in the assessment of 121 days loss of good time credits must be brought in

4 habeas because reversal of the RVR guilty finding and reinstatement of the 121 days of good time

5 credits would necessarily spell speedier release from state custody. See Skinner, 561 U.S. at 525

6 (challenge to disciplinary finding that resulted in assessment of time credits must be brought in

7 habeas if reinstatement of time credits would necessarily spell speedier release); see also

8 Thornton, 757 F.3d at 841 (claim may not be brought under § 1983 if its success would shorten

9 claimant’s confinement). Plaintiff’s challenge to the 2025 RVR guilty finding also is barred under

10 the rationale of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

11 In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that to recover damages for an allegedly

12 unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

13 unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

14 conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

15 invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a

16 federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 512 U.S. at 486-487. A claim for damages

17 bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

18 cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487.

19 Heck bars a claim of unconstitutional deprivation of time credits because such a claim

20 necessarily calls into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff’s continuing confinement, i.e., it

21 implies the unlawfulness of the duration of the plaintiff’s sentence. See Sheldon v. Hundley, 83

22 F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996). Heck also bars a claim for denial of proper Wolff v. McDonnell,

23 418 U.S. 539 (1974), procedures in connection with a disciplinary hearing that resulted in the

24 deprivation of time credits if, as is the case here, “the nature of the challenge to the procedures [is]

25 such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,

26 645 (1997). Plaintiff’s due process claim accordingly is dismissed without leave to amend.1

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1 2. Deliberate Indifference

2 The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to

3 guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular,

4 prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id.

5 at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015). But the failure of prison officials to

6 protect inmates from attacks by other inmates or from dangerous conditions at the prison only

7 violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is,

8 objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent

9 to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if

10 he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take

11 reasonable steps to abate it. Id. at 837.

12 Plaintiff’s broad allegations of failure to protect will be dismissed with leave to amend to

13 set forth specific facts sufficient to state a viable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to

14 safety claim, if possible. Plaintiff must allege specific facts showing how every named prison

15 official knew of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s safety and disregarded that risk by failing to take

16 reasonable steps to abate it. Id. Plaintiff also must link every named prison official with

17 plaintiff’s allegations of wrongdoing so as to show how each named prison official actually and

18 proximately caused the deprivation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. See Leer v. Murphy,

19 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

20 A prison official can only be liable under § 1983 for his or her own misconduct. See

21 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). Under no circumstances can there be liability under

22 § 1983 solely because a prison official is responsible for the actions or omissions of another. See

23 Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

24 CONCLUSION

25 For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend, as indicated

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under § 1983 after invalidating the 2025 RVR guilty finding of possession of a controlled

] above, within 28 days of this order. The pleading must be simple and concise and must include

2 || the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words FIRST AMENDED

3 COMPLAINT on the first page. Failure to file a proper amended complaint within the designated

4 || time will result in the dismissal of this action.

5 Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint will supersede the original complaint and

6 || all other pleadings. Claims and defendants not included in the amended complaint will not be

7 || considered by the court. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

8 IT ISSO ORDERED.

9 || Dated: February 3, 2026

10

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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