Woodworth

SUONUITTEHDE RSTNA DTIESST RDIICSTT ROIFC TFL COORUIDRAT

Case No. 25-cv-14351-Cannon/McCabe

TONYA WOODWORTH,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD DEL TORO

SAINT LUCIE COUNTY SHERIFF,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, V,

and VI of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, which was referred to the undersigned by United States

District Judge Aileen M. Cannon. (DE 15, DE 18, DE 19). For the reasons set forth below, the

undersigned RECOMMENDS that the motion be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART.

I. BACKGROUND

This is an employment discrimination case brought by Plaintiff Tonya Woodworth against

Richard Del Toro in his official capacity as Sheriff of Saint Lucie County (the “Sheriff”). The

Court accepts the following facts as true, taken from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (DE 11).

Plaintiff is a female over the age of forty. (DE 11 ¶¶ 14, 18). She began working for the

Sheriff, under a prior administration, on or about December 13, 2021 as a Public Information

Officer. (DE 11 ¶¶ 4, 13). In that role, Plaintiff managed social media accounts, handled public

relations, and created content for the agency. (DE 11 ¶ 15). Plaintiff alleges that she performed

her job duties in a satisfactory or above-satisfactory manner throughout her employment. (DE 11

¶¶ 15, 33).

During Plaintiff’s tenure of employment, she went through a change of administrations

from one elected Sheriff to another. Plaintiff alleges that, in August 2024 and again in November

2024, Terissa Aronson, the President and CEO of the Saint Lucie County Chamber of Commerce,

informed Plaintiff that the new, incoming Sheriff had longstanding plans to remove Plaintiff from

her position and replace her with his political supporters. (DE 11 ¶ 19). In November 2024,

Aronson allegedly refused to accept Plaintiff’s board membership payment, stating that she could

not in good conscience take Plaintiff’s money because Plaintiff would soon be unemployed after

the new Sheriff took office. (DE 11 ¶ 20). Plaintiff also alleges that she learned from multiple

law enforcement officers that Defendant intended to remove certain older, tenured, and female

command staff members, including Plaintiff. (DE 11 ¶ 21).

Once the new Sheriff assumed office, Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to discrimination

and retaliation based on her sex, age, and employment. (DE 11 ¶¶ 18, 30). On January 9, 2025,

the Sheriff placed Plaintiff on paid administrative leave for the stated reason of “inefficiencies.”

(DE 11 ¶¶ 22, 25). The Sheriff also sent an agency-wide email stating that Plaintiff was not

allowed on the premises, which Plaintiff contends created the false impression that she had

engaged in criminal or unethical conduct. (DE 11 ¶ 23).

Plaintiff also alleges she was threatened with an internal investigation if she refused to

resign voluntarily, as disclosed to her by HR supervisor Denedia Kelly. (DE 11 ¶ 22). Plaintiff

viewed this as an intimidation tactic used to force out older, tenured, and female employees. (DE

11 ¶ 22). At the time Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave, her access to email and agency

accounts had been revoked. (DE 11 ¶ 23).

After placing Plaintiff on administrative leave, the Sheriff filled her position with Andrew

Bolonka, a male deputy whom Plaintiff claims lacked the experience or qualifications for the role.

(DE 11 ¶ 24). Plaintiff alleges that Bolonka and his family provided significant financial support

to the Sheriff’s campaign. (DE 11 ¶ 24). Plaintiff further alleges that the Sheriff offered Jesse

Ryan, a male contractor in his early thirties, a role on the public information team at

approximately double his prior pay rate, despite the fact that Ryan had less public relations

experience than Plaintiff. (DE 11 ¶ 26). Plaintiff alleges that, notwithstanding her experience,

she was neither offered nor transferred to that role. (DE 11 ¶ 26).

Ultimately, the Sheriff terminated Plaintiff from her position and replaced her with

Bolonka. (DE 11 ¶ 29). According to Plaintiff, the Sheriff had no legal basis to terminate her.

(DE 11 ¶ 28). Plaintiff alleges she held career service status and was a protected combat veteran

with a service-connected disability. (DE 11 ¶ 28). She further alleges that she had a protected

property interest in her continued employment and retirement benefits. (DE 11 ¶¶ 31, 92, 94).

The Sheriff “did not permit Plaintiff to exercise her due process rights under the Saint Lucie

County Sheriff’s Office Career Service Act” (the “Career Service Act”), thereby denying her “an

adequate post-termination remedy and appeal” of her termination. (DE 11 ¶ 98).

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings the following claims:

Count Claim

I Discrimination Based on Age in Violation of the

Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq.

(“FCRA”)

II Discrimination Based on Age in Violation of the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.

III Discrimination Based on Sex in Violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

IV Discrimination Based on Sex in Violation of the

FCRA

V Due Process Violation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

VI Equal Protection Violation Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(DE 11).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

By way of this motion, the Sheriff seeks dismissal of Counts I, II, and V, as well as the

age-based portion of Count VI, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516

F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” a mere “formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). Instead, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned

up). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

As stated, the Sheriff does not seek dismissal of the entire Amended Complaint and limits

this motion solely to the age-based claims (Counts I, II, and part of VI) and the procedural due

process claim (Count V). (DE 15). The Court will address the age-based claims first, followed

by the procedural due process claim.

A. Age Discrimination Claims

The Sheriff moves to dismiss the age discrimination claims alleged in Counts I, II, and

part of VI. (DE 15 at 3-5). Counts I and II assert statutory age discrimination claims under the

FCRA and ADEA, while Count VI asserts an equal protection claim under § 1983 based, in part,

on age discrimination. (DE 11 at 6-10, 17-20). The Court will address the statutory age

discrimination claims first, followed by the age-based § 1983 claim.

1. Counts I & II – FCRA and ADEA

Counts I and II assert statutory age discrimination claims under the FCRA and ADEA.

(DE 11 at 6-10). The ADEA prohibits an employer from terminating an employee aged 40 or

older because of the employee’s age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a). The FCRA similarly

prohibits discharging an employee based on age. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). Courts analyze ADEA

and FCRA claims in tandem under the same analytical framework. Rainey v. United Parcel Serv.,

Inc., 816 F. App’x 397, 400 (11th Cir. 2020). Both statutes require proof that age was the “but-

for” cause of the termination decision. Perry v. City of Avon Park, Florida, 662 F. App’x 831,

834, 836 (11th Cir. 2016).

The Sheriff urges the Court to dismiss Counts I and II based on Plaintiff’s failure to plead

facts that satisfy the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under the burden-shifting

framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). (DE 15 at 3-4). To

demonstrate a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must

show the following: (1) that he or she is a member of the protected group; (2) that he or she

suffered an adverse employment action, e.g., discharge, demotion, or failure to hire; (3) that he

or she was replaced by a person outside the protected group; and (4) that he or she was qualified

for the position at issue. See Castle v. Sangamo Weston, 837 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir.1988).

Applying that standard here, the Sheriff urges the Court to dismiss Counts I and II because

Plaintiff failed to allege facts to satisfy element (3), namely, that she was replaced by a person

outside the protected group. (DE 15 at 3-4). Courts commonly refer to such persons as a

“comparator.” Here, the Sheriff points out that, although the Amended Complaint identifies the

person who replaced Plaintiff, i.e., Bolonka, the Amended Complaint never discloses Bolonka’s

age. Thus, according to the Sheriff, Counts I and II fail to satisfy the elements of a prima facie

case under McDonnell Douglas.

The Court disagrees that Counts I and II should be dismissed on this basis. The Eleventh

Circuit has repeatedly instructed district courts not to apply the McDonnell Douglas standard at

the pleadings stage. See Hernandez v. CareerSource Palm Beach Cnty., Inc., No. 23-12285, 2025

WL 1541367, at *1-4 (11th Cir. May 30, 2025) (reversing where district court dismissed case for

lack of a similarly situated comparator); Buchanan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 727 F. App’x 639,

641 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A complaint asserting employment discrimination under the ADEA need

not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case.”). As the Eleventh Circuit has noted,

the Supreme Court devised the McDonnell Douglas test as a tool to be applied at summary

judgment; it was never meant to test the sufficiency of a complaint. See Davis v. Miami-Dade

Cnty., No. 23-12480, 2024 WL 4051215, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2024) (“[W]e’ve squarely held

that McDonnell Douglas is the wrong legal standard to apply at the pleading stage and have

reversed district court dismissals for using it to assess the sufficiency of a complaint.”) (cleaned

up).

To survive dismissal in an age discrimination case, a complaint need not satisfy the

elements of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. Instead, a complaint need only “provide

enough factual matter to plausibly suggest intentional discrimination.” Buchanan, 727 F. App’x

at 641 (11th Cir. 2018); see also Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th

Cir. 2015) (noting, in a Title VII case, that a plaintiff must allege “enough factual matter (taken

as true) to suggest intentional … discrimination”).

Applying this standard here, the Court finds that Counts I and II allege sufficient factual

matter, taken as true, to suggest intentional age discrimination. Plaintiff’s allegations include the

following:

• Plaintiff is over the age of forty. (DE 11 ¶¶ 14, 18).

• Prior to the new Sheriff taking office, Plaintiff learned from multiple law

enforcement officers that the new Sheriff “intended to remove certain older,

tenured, and female command staff members, including Plaintiff.” (DE 11 ¶ 21)

(emphasis added).

• Once the new Sheriff assumed office, he placed Plaintiff on administrative leave

and filled her position with another employee, Bolonka. (DE 11 ¶¶ 18, 30).

• Once the new Sheriff assumed office, he also added another person to the public

information team, Jesse Ryan, who was in his early thirties. (DE 11 ¶ 26).

The Court finds these allegations sufficient to survive dismissal. The Court acknowledges

the Sheriff’s argument that the Amended Complaint alleges multiple, perhaps conflicting, theories

of discrimination based on Plaintiff’s (1) age, (2) sex, and (3) the fact that she had worked for the

prior Sheriff who campaigned against the new Sheriff. (DE 17 at 3-4). Nevertheless, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure allow parties to plead inconsistent claims and defenses. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(d)(3). These issues should be reserved and sorted out at summary judgment or later stages

of the litigation.

2. Count VI – Equal Protection Violation Under § 1983

Count VI asserts an equal protection claim under § 1983 based on sex and age

discrimination. (DE 11 ¶¶ 104-18). The Sheriff moves to dismiss the age-based portion of this

claim. (DE 15 at 3-5). The Court agrees this portion of the claim should be dismissed. Although

the Eleventh Circuit has not decided the issue, “the majority of Circuit Courts of Appeal to address

the issue have ruled that the ADEA precludes the filing of age discrimination claims under [§]

1983.” Duva v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 654 F. App’x 451, 454 (11th Cir.

2016) (cleaned up).

Likewise, district courts in this Circuit have repeatedly recognized that the ADEA

provides the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims and therefore precludes age-based §

1983 claims. See Williams v. Fla. Atl. Univ., No. 15-60621-CIV, 2016 WL 1089423, at *3 (S.D.

Fla. Mar. 21, 2016) (dismissing the § 1983 age discrimination claim because “[t]he ADEA is the

exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims”); Ray v. City of Opa-Locka, Fla., No. 12-CV-

21769, 2012 WL 4896162, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2012) (dismissing a § 1983 age discrimination

claim because “[t]he ADEA’s comprehensive scheme for resolution of age discrimination

complaints against employers is the exclusive remedy for such claims”); Committe v. Bd. of

Trustees of the Florida State Univ., No. 4:15-CV-228-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 4942044, at *2–4

(N.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2016), R. & R. adopted, 2016 WL 4942015 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2016)

(dismissing the § 1983 age discrimination claim and agreeing with the “majority view” that the

ADEA provides the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims).

This Court agrees with the majority view. As such, the age-based portion of Count VI

should be dismissed with prejudice.

B. Count V – Due Process Violation Under § 1983

Count V alleges a procedural due process claim under § 1983. (DE 11 ¶¶ 88-103).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges (1) that she had a protected property interest in her continued

employment and retirement benefits, and (2) that the Sheriff violated her procedural due process

rights by terminating her without cause or notice and without permitting her to exercise her post-

termination appeal rights under the Career Service Act. (DE 11 ¶¶ 92-94, 98).

As a general matter, procedural due process entitles individuals to “notice and the

opportunity to be heard incident to the deprivation of life, liberty or property at the hands of the

government.” Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633

F.3d 1297, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011). “It is therefore not the act of deprivation itself that is

unconstitutional—rather, what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without

due process of law.” Ratlieff v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 748 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1240 (S.D. Fla.

2024) (cleaned up). To state a § 1983 procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege facts

that show (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, (2) state

action, and (3) constitutionally inadequate process. Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th

Cir. 1994).

The Court has reviewed the allegations of Count V and finds them sufficient to survive

dismissal. The Court has considered the cases cited by the Sheriff, both of which were decided

in a different procedural posture than this case. See McGirt v. Broward Coll., No. 15-CV-62324,

2017 WL 1153849, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2017) (decided at summary judgment); Lewis v.

Hillsborough Transit Auth., 726 F.2d 664, 666 (11th Cir. 1983) (appeal from bench trial). Both

cases stand for the general proposition that a procedural due process claim cannot succeed where

the state courts and laws provide adequate means to redress the plaintiff’s alleged harm. McGirt,

2017 WL 1153849, at *6; Lewis, 726 F.2d at 666.

The Court questions Plaintiff’s ultimate ability to prevail on Count V. Nevertheless, given

the procedural posture of this case, the Court declines, at this stage, to examine the full panoply

of remedies Plaintiff had available to her under state law in connection with her termination. In

the Court’s view, the better course of action is to deny the motion and revisit the issue at summary

judgment with the benefit of the full factual record.

IV. RECOMMENDATION & NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the motion (DE 15)

be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. The motion should be DENIED as to Counts I, II, and V.

2. The motion should be GRANTED as to the age-based portion of Count VI, which

should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

4. The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy

of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any,

with United States District Judge Aileen M. Cannon. Failure to file objections

timely shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of

an issue covered in the Report and Recommendation and shall bar the parties from

attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this

Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

5. IF A PARTY DOES NOT INTEND TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION, THE PARTY SHALL FILE A NOTICE TO THAT

EFFECT WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers at West Palm Beach in the Southern

District of Florida, this 1st day of June 2026.

RYONM.MCCABE.

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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