REGISTRE

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BERNADETTE REGISTRE,

Civil Action No. 25-11990 (SDW) (JRA)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

April 2, 2026

TRANE TECHNOLOGIES PLC et al,

Defendants.

WIGENTON, District Judge.

Before this Court is Defendants Trane U.S. Inc. (“Trane”), initially improperly pled as

“Trane Technologies PLC,” Nathaniel Kiazolu (“Kiazolu”), Amber Yates (“Yates”), and Dameon

Haynes’s (“Haynes”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 14 (“Motion”))

Plaintiff Bernadette Registre’s (“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint (D.E. 10 (“Am. Compl.”)) for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Jurisdiction

is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to

Rule 78. For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July 2021, Plaintiff, a Black Haitian immigrant, commenced employment with

Defendant Trane as a line worker. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10.) Throughout her employment with Trane,

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered with a disability, urgent urinary incontinence (UUI), which is

characterized by a sudden, uncontrollable need to urinate. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff informed her initial

supervisor, “Marlon,” and her subsequent supervisor, Kiazolu, about her need for restroom related

accommodations due to her medical condition. (Id. ¶ 21.) Initially, Marlon allowed Plaintiff to

take unscheduled restroom breaks as needed. (Id. ¶ 22.)

In February 2022, Kiazolu became Plaintiff’s supervisor and began making sexually

suggestive remarks toward Plaintiff, including offensive phrases in Haitian Creole. (Id. ¶¶ 12–

19.) After Plaintiff repeatedly rebuffed Kiazolu’s sexual advances, Kiazolu denied Plaintiff access

to restroom breaks. (Id. ¶ 24.) On or about June 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with

Trane’s Human Resource Department (“HR”) and her union, reporting sexual harassment and the

refusal to accommodate her urgent urinary incontinence. (Id. ¶ 41.) During her meeting with HR,

Plaintiff, who has limited English proficiency, was not provided a qualified Haitian Creole

interpreter. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff further alleges that after her June 7, 2022 complaint, she

experienced harassing conduct from other coworkers as well. On or about November 25, 2022,

Plaintiff’s coworker sent her unsolicited pornographic videos. (Id. ¶ 123.) On or about May 2023,

a male coworker shoved hot metal against Plaintiff’s skin causing burns. (Id. ¶ 310.) Between

June 15-30, 2023, a male coworker cornered Plaintiff in the breakroom and attempted to grope

her. (Id. ¶ 309.) On or about July 31, 2023, another male coworker made sexual comments about

Plaintiff’s body. (Id. ¶ 310.)

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that she received several disciplinary actions due to her

medical condition. On or about April 3, 2023, Plaintiff requested time off to attend a scheduled

pelvic floor therapy session for her incontinence. (Id. ¶ 143.) Haynes, Plaintiff’s manager, denied

Plaintiff’s request for time off. (Id. ¶ 147.) On or about April 13, 2023, Plaintiff attended her

pelvic floor therapy and was issued a written warning for her absence. (Id. ¶¶ 154–55.) Then, on

or about June 23, 2023, Plaintiff was suspended and issued a formal warning for “excessive

bathroom use.” (Id. ¶ 173.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff also received a second disciplinary

warning on June 30, 2023. (Id. ¶ 182.) On October 6, 2023, HR issued Plaintiff a written warning

for poor performance and not being at her workstation at designated times. (Id. ¶¶ 204–05.)

Following this warning, on October 9, 2023, Plaintiff resigned from her position with Trane. (Id.

¶ 220.) Plaintiff’s resignation was effectuated on October 13, 2023. (Id. ¶ 221.)

Plaintiff initially filed the instant lawsuit on April 24, 2025 in the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Morris County, Law Division, which Defendants removed to this Court on June 20, 2025.

(D.E. 1-1.) Plaintiff then filed her Amended Complaint on September 5, 2025 asserting claims

for: (1) disability discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”),

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a); (2) failure to accommodate under the NJLAD; (3) failure to engage

in the interactive process in violation of the NJLAD; (4) retaliation under the NJLAD; (5)

interference with rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §

2615(a)(1); (6) FMLA retaliation; (7) hostile work environment under the NJLAD; (8) national

origin discrimination under the NJLAD; (9) constructive discharge in violation of the NJLAD;

(10) aiding and abetting discrimination and retaliation under the NJLAD; and (11) common law

battery.1 (D.E. 10.) Defendants subsequently filed the present Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiff’s

claims with the exception of Count V. (D.E. 14.) All briefing was timely completed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

1 With the exception of Plaintiff’s FMLA claims, Plaintiff’s claims are all state law claims. This Court reserves its

right to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims at a later date. See Ass'n of New Jersey Rifle

& Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Christie, 850 F. Supp. 2d 455, 462 (D.N.J. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Ass'n New Jersey Rifle & Pistol

Clubs v. Governor of New Jersey, 707 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court has

discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over

which it had original jurisdiction”).

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id.

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, federal courts “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as

true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff,” and determine “whether [the]

plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer, 605 F.3d

at 229. Determining whether a complaint’s allegations are “plausible” is “a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679. If the “well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct,” the complaint should be dismissed for failing to show “that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[L]abels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Counts I and VIII — Disability and National Origin Discrimination

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s disability and national origin discrimination claims

under the NJLAD must be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged an adverse action or facts

sufficient to allow this Court to draw a reasonable inference of discrimination. Plaintiff counters

that she suffered multiple adverse actions such as discipline for her disability symptoms, including

multiple warnings and a suspension.

The NJLAD specifically prohibits employment discrimination based on disability and

national origin. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5–12(a). New Jersey courts have adopted the framework of

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), as the starting point in actions brought

under the NJLAD. See Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly and Co., 636 F. App'x. 831, 841 (3d Cir. 2016)

(“This Court's discrimination inquiry is the same for claims filed under Title VII and the NJLAD

as the New Jersey statute borrows the federal standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas.”) While

the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the

existence of a prima facie case of discrimination, the Third Circuit has explained that, at the motion

to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is not required to establish a prima facie case. Connelly v. Lane Const.

Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[A] complaint need not establish a prima facie case in

order to survive a motion to dismiss.”) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510

(2002)). Instead, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements.” Id. (citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny,

515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008)). Nonetheless, the McDonnell Douglas elements provide

guidance in assessing whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim under the pleading standards

of Twombly and Iqbal. See Spence v. New Jersey, No. 19-21490, 2021 WL 1345872, at *3 (D.N.J.

Apr. 12, 2021).

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the NJLAD, a plaintiff

must demonstrate:

(1) plaintiff was handicapped or disabled within the meaning of the

statute; (2) plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions

of the position of employment, with or without accommodation; (3)

plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of the

handicap or disability; and (4) the employer sought another to

perform the same work after plaintiff had been removed from the

position.

Rich v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 266, 278 (D.N.J. 2018) (citing Victor v. State, 952 A.2d 493,

501 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2008), aff'd as modified, 4 A.3d 126 (N.J. 2010)). To state a prima

facie claim for national origin discrimination, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she belongs to a

protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse

employment action despite being qualified; and (4) that adverse action occurred under

circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Prass v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr.,

651 F. Supp. 3d 764, 769 (D.N.J. 2023). Notably, to establish the fourth element, a plaintiff may

either: “(1) introduce evidence of comparators (i.e., similarly situated employees who (a) were not

members of the same protected class and (b) were treated more favorably under similar

circumstances); or (2) rely on circumstantial evidence that otherwise shows a causal nexus between

his membership in a protected class and the adverse employment action.” Greene v. Virgin Islands

Water & Power Auth., 557 F. App'x 189, 195 (3d Cir. 2014).

Here, Defendants do not dispute the first two elements, rather Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s discrimination claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse

employment action. Plaintiff counters that she suffered adverse employment actions in the form

of written disciplinary warnings, her suspension, and ultimately her constructive discharge. An

adverse employment action means that the employee suffered “some harm” with respect to a term

or condition of employment. Peifer v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 106 F.4th 270, 277 (3d Cir. 2024)

(citing Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024)). An employee is not required to

demonstrate that the purported adverse employment action was a “serious and tangible”

employment-related harm. Id.

Although Muldrow lowered the bar for establishing an adverse employment action, a

written reprimand that fails to “effect a material change in the terms or conditions of ...

employment” does not constitute an adverse employment action. Day v. New Jersey Dep't of

Corr., No. 21-9986, 2024 WL 4407005, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2024), aff'd, No. 24-2803, 2025

WL 3206676 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2025); see also Acciavatti v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, No.

CV 20-1327, 2022 WL 22896869, at *9 (D.N.J. June 28, 2022). Conversely, a suspension may

constitute an adverse employment action.2 See Freeman v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 24-

8181, 2026 WL 496630, at *8 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2026). However, Plaintiff does not allege whether

her suspension was paid or unpaid nor does Plaintiff state the length of the suspension. As such,

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts for this Court to conclude that her suspension constituted

an adverse employment action.

Next, the Third Circuit has held that a constructive discharge may constitute an adverse

employment action. See Mieczkowski v. York City Sch. Dist., 414 F. App'x 441, 445 (3d Cir. 2011)

(“[A] constructive discharge, if it occurred, constitutes an adverse employment action.”). To

properly plead a constructive discharge, a plaintiff must set forth facts showing that “the employer

knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable

person subject to them would resign.” Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc, 221 F. Supp. 3d 596, 604

(D.N.J. 2016) (citing Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1084 (3d Cir. 1996));

see also Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 803 A.2d 611, 627 (N.J. 2002). This is an objective

test and thus an employee's subjective perceptions of unfairness or harshness do not govern a claim

of constructive discharge. Nuness, 221 F. Supp. At 604. However, determining whether an

employee was constructively discharged is a fact-specific inquiry that is not appropriate at this

2 Before Muldrow, whether a suspension constituted an adverse employment action depended on if the suspension was

paid or unpaid. See Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 2015) (stating that a paid suspension is

not an adverse employment action). Plaintiff does not state whether her suspension was paid or unpaid. However,

post-Muldrow, the Third Circuit noted that a suspension with pay, might under some circumstances, constitute an

adverse employment action. Russo v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., No. 22-3235, 2024 WL 3738643, at *4, n.3 (3d Cir. Aug. 9,

2024)

stage of the pleadings. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006) (“It

would have been inappropriate for the District Court to decide that fact-intensive question [of

constructive discharge] in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion.”); see also Thompson-Lyons v. Cmty.

Dental of Hamilton, P.C., No. 21-20671, 2022 WL 3354729, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2022) (finding

that constructive discharge is inappropriate on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was constructively discharged because she experienced

disciplinary actions for her disability symptoms.3 Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not suffer a

constructive discharge because Plaintiff fails to allege facts demonstrating objectively intolerable

conditions that would force a reasonable person to resign. At this early stage, this Court cannot

conclude, as a matter of law, that a reasonable person would find it necessary to resign. Although

Plaintiff’s allegations supporting her claims of constructive discharge are sparse, dismissal would

not be appropriate on this basis.4

Nevertheless, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to allege any facts whatsoever in support

of the final element of the prima facie case of disability and national origin discrimination under

the NJLAD. Plaintiff makes no allegations at all regarding whether Defendants sought to hire

anyone to replace her, let alone that it sought similarly qualified individuals who were not disabled.

Nor has Plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts suggesting an inference of discrimination based on her

national origin. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that Defendants’ denial of her request for a Haitian

Creole interpreter was discriminatory is insufficient. Plaintiff does not allege that similarly

situated non-Haitian employees were treated more favorably under similar circumstances or any

3 This Court notes that the Amended Complaint does not clearly distinguish whether Plaintiff alleges she was

constructively discharged because of her disability or because of the purported sexual harassment.

4 For this reason, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count IX is denied.

other causal nexus between her being Haitian and the alleged adverse employment actions.

Accordingly, Counts I and VIII are dismissed.

B. Counts II and III — Failure to Accommodate and Engage in the Interactive

Process5

“To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must first present the prima facie

elements required in any disability discrimination claim.” Fitzgerald v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 92 F.

Supp. 3d 214, 237 (D.N.J. 2015); see also Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App'x 831, 849

(3d Cir. 2016). Additionally, a plaintiff must then allege that: (1) she was disabled and her

employer knew it; (2) she requested an accommodation or assistance; (3) her employer did not

make a good faith effort to assist; and (4) she could have been reasonably accommodated.

Bertolotti v. AutoZone, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 590, 602 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing Armstrong v. Burdette

Tomlin Mem. Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006)).

A plaintiff must make it clear that she wants assistance for her disability. See Fitzgerald,

92 F. Supp. at 238 (citing Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir.1999)); see

also Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 247 (noting that employee requested accommodation when she “made

her handicap known and announced her desire for assistance”). The request must provide “enough

information that, under the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of both the

disability and desire for an accommodation.” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 313. When an employee requests

an accommodation for a disability, the employer has a responsibility “to engage the employee in

the interactive process of finding accommodations.” Bertolotti, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 602 (citing

Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 246).

5 Courts in this district have analyzed claims for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process

as a single count. See e.g., Minegar v. Amazon.com Servs. Inc., No. 22-02162, 2023 WL 2244997, at *3, n.7 (D.N.J.

Feb. 27, 2023); Ferren v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., No. 15-3721, 2017 WL 634511, at *2 , n. 3 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2017).

Here, considering that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a claim for disability

discrimination, Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim also fails. See Guarneri v. Buckeye Pipe

Line Servs. Co., 205 F. Supp. 3d 606, 618 (D.N.J. 2016) (dismissing failure to accommodate claim

because plaintiff failed to establish disability discrimination claim); Olcott v. Win Waste

Innovations, No. 23-21551, 2026 WL 686496, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2026) (same); Fowler v.

AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 18-667, 2020 WL 2839461, at *9 (D.N.J. May 31, 2020), aff'd sub nom.

Fowler v. AT&T, Inc., 19 F.4th 292 (3d Cir. 2021) (same). Notwithstanding, Plaintiff also fails to

adequately allege that Trane knew that she was disabled. Although Plaintiff alleges that her direct

supervisors were aware of her medical condition, there are no facts in the Amended Complaint to

indicate that Plaintiff explicitly informed Trane of her specific disability or that her medical

condition was a disability. Likewise, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead that she requested an

accommodation for her disability. Again, Plaintiff makes multiple references to her requests for

restroom accommodations, but the Amended Complaint lacks clear factual allegations detailing

that such requests were for her disability. Accordingly, Counts II and III are dismissed.

C. Counts IV and VI — Retaliation

i. NJLAD Retaliation

The prima facie elements of a retaliation claim under the NJLAD require a plaintiff to

demonstrate that: (1) plaintiff engaged in protected activity known to the employer; (2) plaintiff

was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment consequence; and (3) that there is a causal link

between the protected activity and the adverse employment consequence. Sgro v. Bloomberg L.P.,

331 F. App'x 932, 939 (3d Cir. 2009); Victor v. State, 4 A.3d 126, 141 (N.J. 2010). Defendants

contend that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to plead any of the elements to establish a

retaliation claim under the NJLAD.

First, a person engages in a “protected activity” under the NJLAD when that person

opposes any practice rendered unlawful under the NJLAD. Cohen v. BH Media Grp., Inc., 419 F.

Supp. 3d 831, 861 (D.N.J. 2019) (citing Young v. Hobart W. Grp., 897 A.2d 1063 (N.J. Super.

App. Div. 2005)). Filing a complaint may constitute “protected activity.” See Bradley v. Atl. City

Bd. of Educ., 736 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900 (D.N.J. 2010). However, not every complaint or letter

entitles its author to protection from retaliation under the NJLAD. Ogunbayo v. Hertz Corp., 542

F. App'x 105, 106–07 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Roa v. Roa, 985 A.2d 1225, 1236 (N.J. 2010). Rather,

only challenges to discrimination prohibited by the NJLAD, such as discrimination on the basis of

race, age, or gender, constitute “protected activity.” Id. Moreover, a complaint must also be more

than a mere general complaint of unfair treatment. Cohen, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 861.

Here, the purported protected activity relevant to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims is the June

7, 2022 complaint of sexual harassment and the denial of disability accommodations.6 A sexual

harassment complaint constitutes a protected activity. See Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 870

F.3d 206, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that the parties conceded that a sexual harassment complaint

constituted a protected activity); see also Hargrave v. Cnty. of Atl., 262 F. Supp. 2d 393, 424 (D.N.J.

2003). A complaint of disability discrimination also constitutes a protected activity. See

Ogunbayo, 542 F. App'x at 106–07 (stating that challenges to discrimination prohibited by the

NJLAD constitutes protected activity). Accordingly, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded that she

engaged in a protected activity under the NJLAD.

6 At the pleading stage, this Court must accept Plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

alleges that Plaintiff’s June 7, 2022 complaint to HR encompassed her complaints of sexual harassment and denial of

disability accommodations. When accepting this allegation as true, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that she

complained of disability discrimination. Thus, in this context, “protected activity” includes Plaintiff’s attempt to

vindicate her right under the NJLAD to be free from disability discrimination.

Next, to establish a retaliation claim under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must properly plead that

he or she suffered an adverse employment action. The standard for adverse action that applies to

retaliation claims is less stringent than the one that applies in the discrimination context. For

retaliation claims, an adverse action must be “materially adverse, such that it is harmful to the point

that it could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” Smith v. City of Atl. City, 138 F.4th 759, 775 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing Burlington N.

& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to support

an adverse employment action for retaliation purposes. As previously stated, written warnings and

suspensions that fail to effect a material change in the terms or conditions of employment do not

constitute adverse employment actions. Moreover, although a constructive discharge constitutes

an adverse employment action, this Court cannot conclude whether Plaintiff was constructively

discharged at this stage.

Regardless, even if the pleaded retaliatory events would have deterred a reasonable person

from filing a complaint, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a causal nexus between the protected

activity and the alleged retaliatory actions. A plaintiff may demonstrate causation by showing:

“(1) a close temporal relationship between her report and discharge, or (2) that the proffered

evidence, looked at as a whole, raises the inference of causation.” Nuness v. Simon & Schuster,

Inc, 221 F. Supp. 3d 596, 606 (D.N.J. 2016) (citing LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n,

503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007)). Without close temporal proximity, courts consider the

“circumstances as a whole, including any intervening antagonism by the employer, inconsistencies

in the reasons the employer gives for its adverse action, and any other evidence suggesting that the

employer had a retaliatory animus when taking the adverse action.” Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.,

776 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2015). Here, Plaintiff fails to plead a close temporal relationship

between her protected activity and the alleged constructive discharge as she resigned more than a

year after her June 7, 2022 complaint. See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 198 (stating that the plaintiff failed

to show an “unusually suggestive” temporal proximity because ten months passed between the

protected activity and adverse action). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of unfair

treatment are insufficient to create an inference of causality. Accordingly, Count IV is dismissed.

ii. FMLA Retaliation

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA, a plaintiff must prove that:

(1) he or she invoked his right to FMLA benefits; (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment

action; and (3) adverse employment action was causally related to his or her invocation of FMLA

rights. Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 691 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2012).

Here, Plaintiff fails to plead a claim for retaliation under the FMLA because she does not

demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered an

adverse employment action because she received a written disciplinary warning for attending her

medical appointment and was suspended weeks later. However, a writing warning does not

constitute an adverse employment action. Although a suspension may constitute an adverse

employment action, Plaintiff alleges that she was suspended for frequent restroom use and not

because of her request for leave or the invocation of her right to FMLA benefits. As such, Plaintiff

also fails to adequately plead a causal connection between her suspension and her request for leave.

Accordingly, Count VI is dismissed.

D. Count VII — Hostile Work Environment

i. Continuing Violation Doctrine

Plaintiff contends that from February 2022 through October 2023, she was subjected to a

hostile work environment under the NJLAD based on sexual harassment, national origin, and

disability. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred as to events that took place prior to

April 24, 2023 (two years prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s initial complaint). Plaintiff asserts that

her pre-April 24, 2023 allegations are not time-barred because of the continuing violation doctrine.

Generally, NJLAD claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Montells v.

Haynes, 627 A.2d 654, 655 (N.J. 1993). However, New Jersey courts recognize that “[w]hen an

individual is subject to a continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct,” as is the case when a

plaintiff is subject to a hostile work environment, “the statute of limitations does not begin to run

until the wrongful action ceases.” Sgro v. Bloomberg L.P., 331 F. App'x 932, 938 (3d Cir. 2009)

(citing Wilson v. Wal–Mart Stores, 729 A.2d 1006, 1010 (N.J. 1999). To qualify for the continuing

violations doctrine, “the plaintiff must establish that the harassment is more than the occurrence

of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional discrimination.” Id. “[D]iscrete acts—such as the

demotions, transfers, failures to promote, and other adverse employment actions that plaintiffs

allege they experienced due to their [protected class]—do not fall under the continuing violations

doctrine and are subject to the NJLAD's two-year statute of limitations.” Id. Therefore, “[t]o

allege a continuing violation, the plaintiff must show that all acts which constitute the claim are

part of the same unlawful employment practice and that at least one act falls within the applicable

limitations period.” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2013).

To establish whether an act is “continual,” courts consider: “(1) whether the violations are

part of the same subject matter; and (2) whether the violations occurred frequently.” Cibula v.

Fox, 570 F. App'x 129, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing to Mandel, 706 F.3d at 165-67). The first

factor concerns “whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to

connect them in a continuing violation.” Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).

The second factor assesses “whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated

incidents.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are rife with isolated incidents of sexual harassment by various

actors that Plaintiff fails to connect to one another. Specifically, beyond conclusory allegations,

Plaintiff does not demonstrate how Kiazolu’s conduct, which occurred from February 2022 to June

2022, connects to her post-April 24, 2023 allegations.7 Such allegations are insufficient to

adequately plead a continuing violation. Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations

preceding April 24, 2023 are time-barred.

ii. Hostile Work Environment

To establish a hostile work environment claim under the NJLAD, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination because of her protected class; (2) the

discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff;

(4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances; and

(5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. Mandel v. M& Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d

157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also Sgro

v. Bloomberg L.P., 331 F. App'x 932, 941 (3d Cir. 2009) (“New Jersey courts treat hostile work

environment claims under the NJLAD the same as the Supreme Court treats hostile work

environment actions under Title VII”). The first four elements establish a hostile work

environment, while the fifth element focuses on employer liability. Hudson v. Procter & Gamble

Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009).

Here, even if Plaintiff could establish the four elements of a hostile work environment,

Plaintiff's post-April 24, 2023 allegations are insufficiently pled to establish respondeat superior

7 To this extent, Plaintiff’s claims against Kiazolu are time-barred as Plaintiff only alleges conduct that took place

prior to April 24, 2023.

liability. Under the NJLAD, an employer is liable for a co-worker's harassing conduct only if

“management-level employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known,

about the campaign of harassment.” Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc, 221 F. Supp. 3d 596, 604

(D.N.J. 2016) (citing Herman v. Coastal Corp., 791 A.2d 238, 252 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

2002)). Plaintiff’s post-April 24, 2023 allegations consist of various allegations of harassing

conduct by her coworkers. However, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not plausibly plead that

any supervisors or management level employees were aware or informed of the alleged harassing

conduct to establish respondeat superior liability. Accordingly, Count VII is dismissed.

E. Count X — Aiding and Abetting

The NJLAD prohibits “any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid,

abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the] act[.]” N.J. Stat.

Ann. § 10:5–12(e). To establish an aiding and abetting claim under the NJLAD, a plaintiff “must

demonstrate that the defendants: (1) aided another in performing a wrongful act that caused an

injury; (2) were aware of their role in the illegal activity at the time it was committed; and (3)

knowingly and substantially assisted with the main violation.” K.J. v. Greater Egg Harbor Reg'l

High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 431 F. Supp. 3d 488, 514 (D.N.J. 2019); see also Cicchetti v. Morris

Cty. Sheriff's Office, 947 A.2d 626, 645 (N.J. 2008). However, the NJLAD “does not impose

individual liability upon non-supervisory employees.” Id. To determine whether a supervisor has

provided “substantial assistance” to the principal violator, the court looks to several factors: “(1)

the nature of the act encouraged, (2) the amount of assistance given by the supervisor, (3) whether

the supervisor was present at the time of the asserted harassment, (4) the supervisor's relations to

the others, and (5) the state of mind of the supervisor.” Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 929 (N.J.

2004)

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible claim for aiding and abetting against

Defendants Kiazolu, Yates, and Haynes. First, as stated above, Plaintiff’s claims against Kiazolu

fail as they are time-barred. As to Defendant Yates, the Amended Complaint does not contain any

facts to suggest that Yates ever acted as Plaintiff's supervisor, such that she could be liable for

aiding and abetting violations of the NJLAD. Moreover, Plaintiff has not pled any facts to support

her conclusory allegation that Hayne’s “knowingly and substantially” assisted in discriminating

against Plaintiff. As such, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting

against Kiazolu, Yates, and Haynes. Therefore, Count X is dismissed.

F. Count XI — Common Law Battery

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Trane is liable for battery under the doctrine of respondeat

superior. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior an employer is liable for the torts of his

employees which are committed within the scope of their employment. Brijall v. Harrah's Atl.

City, 905 F. Supp. 2d 617, 622 (D.N.J. 2012). Generally, intentional torts do not fall within the

scope of employment. Id. However, New Jersey courts “have found employees acts to be within

the scope of their employment when their attempts to enforce their employer's rules instigated

violence.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Devereux Found., 37 A.3d 469, 490 (N.J. 2012)). Here, Plaintiff

fails to plead a claim for common law battery against Defendant Trane because Plaintiff does not

allege that its employees committed the tort of battery within the scope of their employment.

Plaintiff does not allege that the employees acted to enforce Trane’s rules or to further serve Trane.

Therefore, Count XI is dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days to file an amended complaint. An

appropriate order follows.

/s/ Susan D. Wigenton x

SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk

cc: José R. Almonte, U.S.M.J.

Parties