The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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MAGDALENA KULISZ, individually and d/b/a
MISS IMMIGRANT USA, and SHAHAR
KENAN, individually and d/b/a MISS
IMMIGRANT USA, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
25-CV-4893 (OEM)(PK)
-against-
STEVEN RAGA, in his individual and official
capacity as New York State Assemblymember, and
JOHN DOE(S) and XYZ ORGANIZATION(S) 1-
10,
Defendants.
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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, District Judge:
On August 18, 2025, Plaintiffs Magdalena Kulisz (“Kulisz”) and Shahar Kenan (“Kenan”)
(Kulisz and Kenan collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a pro se complaint in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. Complaint, Dkt. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”).
Plaintiffs sue Steven Raga (“Raga”), John Doe(s) and XYZ Organization(s) 1-10 (Raga and John
Doe(s) and XYZ Organization(s) 1-10 collectively “Defendant(s)”). Compl. ¶¶ 9-12.
On September 3, 2025, the action was transferred to this Court. Transfer Order, Dkt. 10
(“Transfer Order”). On August 18, 2025, Plaintiffs each filed an application to proceed in forma
pauperis. Application to Proceed In District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Dkt. 2
(“Kulisz IFP Mot.” or “Kulisz IFP Motion”); Application to Proceed In District Court Without
Prepaying Fees or Costs, Dkt. 3 (“Kenan IFP Mot.” or “Kenan IFP Motion”) (Kulisz IFP Motion
and Kenan IFP Motion collectively “IFP Motions”). On September 11, 2025, Plaintiffs moved to
retransfer the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(“SDNY”) and later filed two additional motions seeking re-transfer. See Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Retransfer Case to the Southern District of New York, Dkt. 14 (“Motion to Re-Transfer”); Motion
for Status Conference and to Proceed with Service at 14-18, Dkt. 18 (“Second Motion to Re-
Transfer”)1; Letter Motion/Request To (1) Rule on Plaintiffs’ Retransfer Motion; And (2) Extend
Rule 4(M) And Hold Service In Abeyance Pending That Ruling; or In The Alternative, Direct That
Any Service Proceed Only on the Operative Amended Complaint (No Waiver), Dkt. 20 (“Third
Motion to Re-Transfer”). With their Motion to Re-Transfer, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
See Motion to Re-Transfer at 20-109 (“Amended Complaint” or “Am. Compl.”).2
Plaintiffs’ IFP Motions are granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the following
reasons, the Amended Complaint is dismissed, with leave to file a second amended complaint
within 30 days and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Re-Transfer, Second Motion to Re-Transfer, and Third
Motion to Re-Transfer are denied.
BACKGROUND3
A. Complaint
Plaintiffs state that they co-founded an organization in 2018 called “Miss Immigrant USA,”
“a New York-based civic initiative dedicated to empowering immigrants.” Compl. ¶ 5. They state
that “Miss Immigrant Foundation Inc.” was registered “as a nonprofit corporation” in Delaware in
1 Page citations to the Second Motion to Re-Transfer refer to the automatically generated ECF pagination.
2 Page citations to the Amended Complaint refer to the automatically generated ECF pagination. A plaintiff may
amend its complaint once as a matter of course within 21 days of service or a responsive pleading. FED. R. CIV. P.
15(a). Thus, there having been no service or responsive pleading yet, the Court construes the Amended Complaint as
the operative complaint. Further, in reaching its conclusion, the Court considers the facts as set forth in the Complaint
and Amended Complaint, because a pro se complaint is to be read liberally. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99,
112 (2d Cir. 2000).
3 The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Amended Complaint and are accepted as true for the
purposes of this Memorandum and Order.
2018.4 Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiffs describe the early years of the organization and an early positive
relationship with Raga, a member of the New York State Assembly representing District 30 in
Queens. Id. ¶¶ 9, 21, 32.
According to the Complaint, problems arose at a December 8, 2024, event, the World Fair
and Fest in Queens. Id. ¶¶ 30, 34-39. That same day, Miss Immigrant USA introduced on-stage
“Angela Aquino [(“Aquino”)], a candidate for New York City Public Advocate, as one of its
delegates.” Id. ¶ 34. After this introduction, Raga approached Kulisz and asked her to step outside
for a private conversation. Id. ¶¶ 36-37. “He attempted to show her a social media post related to
Miss Immigrant USA delegate Angela Aquino” and “demanded that Miss Immigrant USA
‘immediately disassociate from Angela’ and take public action.” Id. ¶¶ 38-39. Kulisz stated that
Raga was “angry” and that she felt “scared” and “shaken” during this conversation. Id. ¶¶ 37, 39.
The next day, Raga sent a text message to Kulisz that included a screenshot of the social
media post and a question: “Was she at the event last night as a political candidate?” Id. ¶ 41; id.
at 85-86 (“Exhibit A”). Raga requested a Zoom meeting with Plaintiffs, which was held on
December 11, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 44-68; id. at 88-101 (“Exhibit B”). During this meeting, Raga stated:
“It looks like you guys are a 501(c)(3) organization, right?”; “So you have somebody affiliated
with your organization wearing your sash, who is actively campaigning”; “She should not be
campaigning while she is with you as Miss Immigrant”; and “If you’re a nonprofit, you can’t have
a person on your time represent you and also run for public office.” Id. ¶¶ 54-55, 105. Plaintiffs
4 The Court takes judicial notice of the Delaware Department of State Division of Corporations website entry for Miss
Immigrant Foundation” incorporated July 19, 2019, under File Number 7531506. It states that it was filed as an
“Exempt” corporation. See https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/ecorp/entitysearch/NameSearch.aspx (last visited 3/9/26).
The website’s Glossary of Terms defines “Exempt”: “This description type refers to a corporation that meets
requirements of section 501 of the Internal Revenue code and is exempt from taxation pursuant to Title 8 of the
Delaware Code.” See https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/ecorp/FieldDesc.aspx#ENTITY%20TYPE (last visited 3/9/26).
describe these statements as an intent “to frame Miss Immigrant USA as noncompliant with
nonprofit rules.” Id. ¶ 56.
Raga also criticized Aquino for using a racial slur and suggested that Miss Immigrant USA
could be sued as a result. Id. ¶¶ 63, 65. Raga stated that other organizations were “going to make
a public statement against Miss Immigrant,” and that “[o]ther people will write a press release
about this.” Id. ¶¶ 57-58. Plaintiffs characterize Raga’s statements as a “campaign of
intimidation”; “an organized effort to pressure and control the leadership of Miss Immigrant
USA”; “a calculated campaign of interference”; and “political overreach and abuse of power.” Id.
¶¶ 43-46.
Plaintiffs state that in the days after this meeting, they were targeted by “NYPD officers
and medical personnel [who] trespassed onto Plaintiffs’ private terrace and attempted the unlawful
seizure of [Kulisz] under a medical pretense”; that they received a letter dated March 7, 2025 and
addressed to Miss Immigrant USA from the New York State Attorney General’s office about
“nonprofit compliance”; and received a New York State sales tax demand dated February 28, 2025,
for “‘Miss Immigrant Foundation,’ an entity Plaintiffs never registered or operated in New York
State.” Id. ¶¶ 74-76; id. at 102-03 (“Exhibit C”); id. at 104-07 (“Exhibit D”). Plaintiffs claim that
they began receiving calls and messages from “individuals connected to Defendant Raga’s
networks.” Id. ¶ 78.
As a result of these actions, Plaintiffs felt “extreme pressure” and developed physical and
psychiatric symptoms. Id. ¶¶ 82-86. Speaking with their landlord about their conditions led to
eviction proceedings. Id. ¶ 86. Other individuals and organizations shunned them; for example,
Assemblymember Lester Chang “refused Miss Immigrant USA participation in community events
due to social media posts critical of elected officials.” Id. ¶ 87. “Miss Immigrant USA was forced
to cease all activities.” Id. ¶ 88. “Plaintiffs lost all campaign management contracts, coaching
fees, sponsorships, and partnerships as a direct result of Defendant’s actions.” Id. ¶ 90.
Plaintiffs purport to bring this action on their own behalf as individuals and “d/b/a Miss
Immigrant USA.” Id. ¶ 1. They also propose a class action on behalf of “current and prospective
Miss Immigrant USA delegates” and all individuals who seek to participate in Miss Immigrant
USA and engage in electoral campaigns for any public office.” Id. ¶¶ 8, 15, 21.
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants “John Doe(s) and XYZ Organization(s) 1-10, . . .
participated in or facilitated the acts and omissions described herein.” Id. ¶ 12. They do not ascribe
any specific acts or omissions to these unidentified defendants.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts 30 causes of action, including claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (“Section 1983”) for violations of their constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and the New York constitution and of New York law. Id. at 37-79. They seek
injunctive and declaratory relief and unspecified damages. Id. ¶ 91; id. at 80-82.
B. Motion to Re-Transfer and Amended Complaint
By Order dated August 22, 2025, the SDNY transferred this action to this Court because
Raga resides in Queens County and the initial event giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in
Queens County. Transfer Order at 2-3. Plaintiffs opposed this transfer in their Motion to Re-
Transfer, Second Motion to Re-Transfer, and Third Motion to Re-Transfer. Plaintiffs argue that
this action should be heard in SDNY and not this Court because Plaintiffs reside in Manhattan;
they were located in Manhattan when they participated in a Zoom meeting and felt the alleged
harm arising from the meeting; and they chose that forum. Motion to Re-Transfer at 1-2. Plaintiffs
also request that summons be issued and served by the United States Marshals Service. Second
Motion to Re-Transfer at 3; Third Motion to Re-Transfer at 2. They also request a status
conference. Second Motion to Re-Transfer at 3, ECF. Additionally, they request accommodations
based on disability, including a renewed request to make filings through CM/ECF. See Notice of
Submission of Requests for Reasonable Accommodation, Dkt. 19 (“Motion for Leave to File
Electronically”). On March 17, 2026, Plaintiffs submitted an additional letter motion renewing
their request for accommodation and “related case-management relief” by way of a court order on
their pending Motion to Re-Transfer, scheduling of a status conference, issuance of a scheduling
order, direction of service, and extension of the time for service. Letter-Motion and declaration in
Support of Renewed Request for Disability-Related Accommodation (Disability Access) and for
Ancillary Case-Management Relief at 2, Dkt. 22.
In their Third Motion to Re-Transfer, Plaintiffs renewed their request that the action be
transferred back to SDNY and asked the Court to consider as the operative pleading an amended
complaint dated September 3, 2025, that they had previously submitted as an attachment to their
Motion to Re-Transfer. See Third Motion to Re-Transfer at 2 (requesting that the attachment to
the Motion to Re-Transfer be considered the operative amended pleading); see generally Am.
Compl.
The Amended Complaint reframes the issue as “the constitutional right of citizens and
immigrants alike to participate in democracy while openly expressing their identity and dignity
through the Miss Immigrant USA sash.” Amended Complaint ¶ 2. It describes the “Miss
Immigrant sash” as “a form of symbolic expression entitled to the strongest First Amendment
protection.” Id. ¶ 25. It also alleges that Defendant’s actions “chilled not only Plaintiffs but a
broader class of civic participants who sought to engage in political and civic life while wearing
the Miss Immigrant USA sash.” Id. ¶ 4. It states: “By attacking the sash as a civic identity marker,
his actions chilled not just one person but every immigrant, volunteer, and supporter who seeks to
wear it in joy and unity.” Id. ¶ 20. “Suppressing the sash is therefore not merely organizational
regulation – it is suppression of immigrant identity itself, symbolic expression squarely within the
protection of the First Amendment.” Id. ¶ 37.
The Amended Complaint introduces additional statements from the December 11, 2025,
Zoom meeting. For example, when Raga asked “It looks like you are a 501(c)(3) organization,
right?” Plaintiffs explained, as summarized in the pleading, “Miss Immigrant USA is not a
501(c)(3), but a nonprofit incorporated in Delaware, and not in New York.” Id. ¶ 53. Or, as set
forth in the transcription of the Zoom meeting, filed with the Complaint:
24. [Steven Raga:] It looks like you guys are a 501(c)(3) organization, right?
25: Sha Kenan: No.
26. Steven Raga: Oh. What are you? You’re a business? It’s a business?
27. Sha Kenan: We have a nonprofit organization in Delaware, but we didn’t file 501.
28. 501 is to take donations, right? We didn’t file it yet.
29. Steven Raga: But you’re still a nonprofit?
30. Sha Kenan: Yes.
31. Steven Raga: You’re a nonprofit?
32. Sha Kenan: Yes
Exhibit B at 89.
Without clarifying whether their organization was registered as or held itself out to be a
tax-exempt non-profit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
Plaintiffs assert that they “engaged in constitutionally protected electoral activities, including . . .
maintaining policies permitting campaigning while wearing the Miss Immigrant USA sash.” Am.
Compl. ¶ 135. The Amended Complaint makes 39 additional references to the “Miss Immigrant
USA sash,” id. ¶¶ 3, 10, 14, 17, 18, 21, 75, 105, 113, 128, 130, 153, 159, 202, 255, 259, or the sash
as a symbol of political expression or immigrant identity, id. ¶¶ 12, 19, 32, 37, 53, 79, 104-05,
108-09, 114, 116, 130, 136, 145, 155, 159-60, 162-64.
The Amended Complaint also provides partial names for individuals, including Poteri,
Rachel, Sagir, and Soma, whom Plaintiffs say attempted to contact them after Raga’s December
11, 2024, Zoom call by sending text messages, a Facebook message, or “attempting to arrange a
phone call” or Zoom meeting. Id. ¶ 69. Plaintiffs state that they cut off communications “in order
to protect themselves.” Id. ¶ 70. Plaintiffs claim that Soma then “stopped communication
altogether.” Id. ¶ 71. Plaintiffs characterize both the efforts to contact them and the failure to
communicate with them as “community pressure and informal retaliation.” Id. ¶¶ 69-75.
The Amended Complaint asserts 15 causes of action under constitutional and New York
State law. In addition to the First Amendment claims, the Amended Complaint also asserts claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment for “class-of-one and identity-based discrimination” because
Raga alleged “targeted immigrant identity . . . as expressed through the Miss Immigrant USA sash
and name,” id. ¶¶ 125-30; election interference, id. ¶ 134; abuse of government authority through
transmission of notices from New York State agencies, id. ¶¶ 165-69, 192-95; and reputational
injury related to Raga’s statements during the December 11, 2024, Zoom meeting that were
subsequently posted on-line by a third party, id. ¶¶ 216-30. The Amended Complaint also alleges
a civil rights conspiracy involving Raga and “John Does(s) and XYZ Organization(s) 1-10, who
allegedly “entered into an agreement and/or understanding with other individuals and
organizations . . . to take coordinated action against Plaintiffs and Miss Immigrant USA in
retaliation for protected political activities.” Id. ¶¶ 197, 201. Plaintiffs present no additional
evidence of such a conspiracy. Plaintiffs also assert claims under New York State law. Id. ¶¶ 231-
58.
Further, the Amended Complaint references new Exhibits A-E, but no exhibits are
attached. Id. at 109.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Courts are required to give special consideration to pro se litigants, those individuals who
represent themselves in court. This means that pro se litigants are not expected to meet the same
standards required for formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), allows poor plaintiffs to file lawsuits without paying the usual
filing fee. This statute requires a district court to dismiss a case if the complaint “is frivolous or
malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” To avoid dismissal, a complaint must include facts
that show that the defendants may be responsible for the harm to the plaintiff. See Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although
“detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must include more than only “labels
and conclusions” or a list of the elements of a cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A
complaint fails to state a claim if it includes only bare assertions with no factual details. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
A plaintiff seeking to bring a lawsuit in federal court must also establish that the court has
subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. If the Court “determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); accord,
Yong Qin Luo v. Mikel, 625 F.3d 772, 775 (2d Cir. 2010). “[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction
is not waivable and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject
matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000). Federal subject-matter jurisdiction is available
only when a “federal question” is presented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or when plaintiff and
defendant are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332. “Simply raising a federal issue in a complaint will not automatically confer
federal question jurisdiction.” Perpetual Sec., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2002).
There is no subject-matter jurisdiction if “the purported federal claim is clearly ‘immaterial and
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction’ or is ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’”
Southern New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Carlson v. Principal Fin. Grp., 320 F.3d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 2003)).
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Re-Transfer
Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of SDNY’s Transfer Order transferring venue to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York (“EDNY”). Motion to Re-Transfer at 3-4.
Pursuant to the general venue provision governing actions filed in district courts of the United
States, a civil action must be filed in the judicial district in which any defendant resides or where
a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b). In this case, the only identified Defendant, Raga, resides in Queens County. Plaintiffs
argue that Raga violated their constitutional rights on two specific occasions: on December 8,
2024, when Raga confronted Kulisz at an event in Queens, Compl. ¶¶ 30, 34-39; and on December
11, 2024, when Raga, whose location was not specified, initiated a Zoom meeting with Plaintiffs,
who were then located in Manhattan, id. ¶¶ 44-68. Under these circumstances, where the
Defendant resides in this District and the alleged harm occurred in both Queens and Manhattan,
this Court finds that EDNY is a proper venue for this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Re-Transfer, Second Motion to Re-Transfer, and Third
Motion to Re-Transfer, including reconsideration of the Transfer Order, are denied.
B. Plaintiffs’ Purported Class Action Representation
Plaintiffs purport to bring a class action on behalf of “current and prospective Miss
Immigrant USA delegates” and all individuals who seek to participate in Miss Immigrant USA
and engage in electoral campaigns for any public office.” Compl. ¶¶ 8, 15, 21; see also Am.
Compl. at ¶ 12. Pro se Plaintiffs may not represent any other persons or entities, either individually
or as a class representative. “[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not
appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.” Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558
(2d Cir. 1998). “It is well settled in this circuit that pro se plaintiffs cannot proceed as class
representatives.” McLeod v. Crosson, 89 Civ. 1952, 1989 WL 28416, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21,
1989); see also In re Purdue Pharma L.P., 25-CV-484 (CS), 2025 WL 2092262, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
July 25, 2025) (“The law is clear in this Circuit and elsewhere that ‘[b]ecause a nonlawyer cannot
bring suit on behalf of others, a plaintiff proceeding pro se cannot act as a class representative.’”
(quoting Wallace v. All Pers. Liab. Carriers-Underwriters of Land, 22-CV-8022, 2024 WL
1195120, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2024))). Moreover, “a layperson may not represent a
corporation.” Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek to bring claims on behalf of Miss Immigrant
USA or any other individuals, these claims are dismissed.
C. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims
The Complaint invokes Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, claims which may be cognizable
under Section 1983. To maintain a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege two essential
elements. First, “the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994). Second, “the conduct
complained of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id. To bring a claim pursuant to Section 1983, a
plaintiff must show that each of the named individuals is personally liable for the alleged harm.
Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006).
Plaintiffs assert that Raga violated their First Amendment rights, but the only factual
allegations against him arise from the two incidents on December 8, 2024, and December 11, 2024,
as follows. At the December 8, 2024, event in Queens, Raga: (1) said derogatory things about
non-party Aquino to Kulisz, see Am. Compl. ¶ 44, and (2) “insisted that Miss Immigrant USA
immediately disassociate” from Aquino, see id. During the December 11, 2024, Zoom meeting,
Raga: (1) advised Plaintiffs that nonprofit organizations could not engage in political campaigning
and asked if their organization was registered under 501(c)(3), see id. ¶ 53; (2) warned Plaintiffs
that political campaigning by a nonprofit organization and association with an individual who
posted a racial slur could expose them to negative publicity, see id. at ¶ 89-91; and (3) warned
Plaintiffs that the use of a racial slur by an associate could lead to lawsuits against Miss Immigrant
USA, see id.
None of these statements, in themselves, suggest a violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights. Plaintiffs suffered no constitutional harm from the angry denunciation of a third party.
Indeed, “verbal harassment, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.” Cole
v. Fischer, 379 F. App’x 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d
Cir. 1986)). Further, Defendant correctly advised that 501(c)(3) organizations are restricted from
certain political activities. Although Plaintiffs construe Raga’s advice about negative publicity
and the possibility of lawsuits as a threat, they present no evidence that Raga initiated or
coordinated any negative actions against them, such that they suffered an appreciable injury and
thus, the alleged violations are not actionable under Section 1983. See Kravitz v. Fischer, 9:12–
CV–1011 (LEK/TWD), 2014 WL 4199245, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2014).
Plaintiffs also attempt to weave Raga’s statements – together with unspecified messages
from third parties and the receipt two months later of official communications from New York
State agencies about their organization – into a civil rights conspiracy. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 200-
04. “In order to survive a motion to dismiss on [a] § 1983 conspiracy claim, [plaintiff] must allege
(1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an
unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”
Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Pangburn v. Culbertson,
200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs present no evidence of such a conspiracy. The letter
from the New York State Attorney General’s Office merely reminds Miss Immigrant USA of the
requirement for charitable organizations with activities in New York State to register or seek
exemption from registration. See Exhibit C at 103.5 The tax statement from the New York State
Department of Taxation and Finance reminds Miss Immigrant Foundation to file a sales tax return.
See Exhibit D. If Plaintiffs have failed to comply with state requirements for nonprofit or for-
profit organizations operating in New York, reminders of these failures do not constitute
harassment by state agencies. In any case, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Raga was
responsible for these letters and fail to allege facts showing an agreement between two or more
state actors.
Plaintiffs also fail to assert any constitutional claims against “John Does” and “XYZ
Organizations.” Plaintiffs allege that certain individuals sent messages trying to get in contact
and/or stopped communicating with them after the December 2024 events. Plaintiffs do not
5 Page numbers refer to the automatically generated ECF pagination.
identify any harmful actions taken by these individuals or organizations, let alone allege that they
were state actors who violated their constitutional rights.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims against Defendants are dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
D. Plaintiffs’ New York State Law Claims
Federal district courts have discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law
claims “that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court may “decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), (c)(3). Here, having dismissed Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims,
which are based on a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ purported state-law claims. See Levy v. BASF Metals
Ltd., 1:15-cv-7317-GHW, 2017 WL 2533501, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2017) (declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after federal claims were dismissed); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ New York State law claims against Defendants are
dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). However, the Second Circuit has repeatedly stated that “[a] pro se
complaint should not be dismissed without the Court’s granting leave to amend at least once when
a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Grullon
v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks, citation, and
alterations omitted). There is a possibility, though unlikely, that Plaintiffs could add facts that
would support a valid constitutional claim. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs 30 days from
the date of this Memorandum and Order to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiffs are advised
that, should they elect to file an amended complaint, they must plead sufficient facts to allege a
violation of federal rights or statutes and identify the specific acts by specific defendants that
violated their own individual rights. An amended pleading completely replaces the prior
complaint, so Plaintiffs are advised to include all relevant claims and any supporting
documentation, with the caveat that the inclusion of lengthy and repetitive material impedes the
Court’s ability to manage its caseload and decide cases before it. If filed, the amended complaint
should be captioned “Second Amended Complaint” and bear the same docket number as this
Order. If Plaintiffs fail to file a second amended complaint within the time allowed, the Clerk of
Court shall be directed to enter judgment and close this case.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Re-Transfer, Second Motion to Re-Transfer, and Third Motion to Re-
Transfer, including request for reconsideration of the Transfer Order, are denied.
To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to bring claims on behalf of Miss Immigrant USA or any
other individuals, these claims are dismissed.
Because the Court is dismissing Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Leave to File Electronically is dismissed. Should Plaintiffs file a second amended complaint that
survives review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court will consider a renewed motion for
leave to file electronically.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken
in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to send a copy of this order to Plaintiffs at the
mailing address and email addresses provided, including the email address provided in Notice of
Change of Address/Contact Information (Pro Se), Dkt. 21, and to note the mailing on the docket.
Plaintiffs may contact the City Bar Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance Project
at 212-382-4729 or online at https://www.citybarjusticecenter.org/projects/federal-pro-se-legal-
assistance-project to make an appointment for free, confidential, limited-scope legal assistance at
the Brooklyn Federal Courthouse. The Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance Project is not a part of,
or affiliated with, the Court.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
ORELIA E. MERCHANT
United States District Judge
March 19, 2026
Brooklyn, New York