B.H.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

B.H., an individual,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24-8851 (GC) (TJB)

v.

JSK PRINCETON LLC,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendant.

BONGIOVANNI, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant JSK Princeton LLC’s (“Defendant”)

Motion for Leave to File a Third-Party Complaint. (Docket Entry No. 22.) Plaintiff B.H.

(“Plaintiff”) opposes Defendant’s motion. (Docket Entry No. 24, “Opp’n Br.”) The Court has

fully reviewed the arguments made in support of and in opposition to Defendant’s motion. The

Court considers Defendant’s motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“Rule”) 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth more fully below,

Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File a Third-Party Complaint is GRANTED, in part, and

DENIED, in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

On August 29, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this action under the Federal William Wilberforce

Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (“TVPRA” or the

1 As the parties are familiar with the nature and history of this action, the Court only recites

herein the procedural and factual background relevant to Defendant’s pending motion.

“Act”). (Docket Entry No. 1, “Compl.”) In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she is a victim of

sex trafficking and submits that, pursuant to the TVPRA, she may sue her “perpetrators” or

“whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in

a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of [the

TVPRA].” (Id. ¶¶ 4-7.) To this end, Plaintiff sues Defendant under the theory that Defendant

“knowingly benefit[ed], financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a

venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of [the

TVPRA].” (Id. ¶ 31 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).)

On August 15, 2025, Defendant filed its instant motion. (Docket Entry No. 22.) In the

same, Defendant requests leave to file a Third-Party Complaint against Norieaye Essence a/k/a

Ashley Gardener (“Gardener”); Breon Mickens (“Mickens”); High Hotels, LTD d/b/a Courtyard

By Marriot Ewing Princeton (“Courtyard”); SSN Ewing LLC d/b/a Element by Westin

Ewing/Princeton (“Element”); TADCO LLC d/b/a Ramada by Wyndham Bordentown d/b/a Town

Inn (“Ramada”); Newcastle Lodging Corp d/b/a The Howard Johnson by Wyndham

Princeton/Lawrenceville (“Howard Johnson”); and ABC CORPS. #1-5 (collectively, the “Third-

Party Defendants”).2 (Docket Entry No. 22-1 (“Def.’s Br.”) at 1; Docket Entry No. 26.)

2 On November 13, 2025, Defendant filed a supplemental letter to its pending Motion for Leave to

File a Third-Party Complaint. In its letter, Defendant claims that “discovery received pursuant to

subpoenas served by [Defendant] has identified two additional hotels where Plaintiff alleges that

she was trafficked.” (Docket Entry No. 26 at 2.) According to Defendant, “On January 12, 2018,

Plaintiff informed the New Jersey State Police that within the three months prior, Gardener also

‘had’ Plaintiff at (1) the Ramada Inn in Bordentown, and (2) the Howard Johnson’s in

Lawrenceville.” (Id.) Accordingly, Defendant seeks to implead Ramada and Howard Johnson to

this action, relying on the same arguments raised in support of its Motion for Leave to File a Third-

Party Complaint. For the sake of judicial efficiency, and considering the uniformity of Defendant’s

underlying arguments, the Court shall consider Ramada and Howard Johnson under the pending

motion. Courtyard, Element, Ramada, and Howard Johnson are herein collectively referred to as

the “Third-Party Hotel Defendants.”

Specifically, Defendant seeks to assert claims of contribution and common law indemnification

against the proposed Third-Party Defendants. (Def.’s Br. at 2-3.)

On September 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed opposition to Defendant’s motion, to which

Defendant replied on September 19, 2025. (Docket Entry Nos. 24-25.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 14, “[a] defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons

and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). “The purpose of Rule 14(a) is to avoid circuity of action and multiplicity

of litigation.” Spencer v. Cannon Equip. Co., Civ. No. 07-2437, 2009 WL 1883929, at *2 (D.N.J.

June 29, 2009) (citations omitted). “A third-party claim may be asserted under Rule 14(a) only

when the third-party’s liability is in some way dependent on the outcome of the main claim or

when the third-party is secondarily liable to defendant.” F.D.I.C. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 873

(3d Cir. 1994). That is, “[a] third-party plaintiff’s claim must present a theory upon which the

third-party defendant can be liable to the third-party plaintiff under some theory of secondary

liability, i.e., indemnification, contribution, or some other theory of derivative liability recognized

by relevant substantive law.” Meehan v. Bath Auth., LLC, Civ. No. 18-17444, 2021 WL 130483,

at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under Rule 14, when a third-party complaint is not filed within 14 days after a defendant’s

service of its original answer, the third-party plaintiff must, by motion, obtain the court’s leave to

file a third-party complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). “[L]eave to [implead] should be freely given

when justice so requires.” Panchisin v. Torres, Civ. No. 11-5144, 2012 WL 5880346, at *2 (D.N.J.

Nov. 20, 2012) (citing Spencer, 2009 WL 1883929, at *2-3). Yet, “leave to . . . implead a third-

party [is] not automatic.” Id.

To determine whether leave should be granted, courts consider the following factors: “(1)

the timeliness of the motion; (2) the probability of trial delay; (3) the potential for complication of

issues at trial; and (4) prejudice to the original plaintiff.” Spencer, 2009 WL 1883929, at *2

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Igenomix, LLC v. Senergene Sols., LLC, Civ. No.

21-20495, 2023 WL 4744283, at *3 (D.N.J. July 25, 2023) (quoting Meehan, 2021 WL 130483,

at *2). “Superimposed upon these factors are the overarching principles that ‘Rule 14 is [intended]

to reduce multiplicity of litigation,’ and it therefore is entitled to liberal construction.” Hawkins v.

Waynesburg Coll., Civ. No. 07-5, 2007 WL 2119223, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 20, 2007); see also

Hitachi Cap. Am. Corp. v. Nussbaum Sales Corp., Civ. No. 09-731, 2010 WL 1379804, at *7

(D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2010). In addition to the foregoing factors, the Court must also consider whether

the third-party claims are “obviously unmeritorious.” Ernest Bock & Sons, Inc. v. Dean

Enterprises, Inc., Civ. No. 22-4739, 2023 WL 4268250, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2023) (citing Wilson

v. Beekman, 198 F. App’x 239, 241 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted)); see Ryan v. Collucio, 183

F.R.D. 420, 423 (D.N.J. 1998) (analyzing motion for leave to file a Third-Party Complaint under

a futility standard).

“[T]he decision to permit joinder rests with the sound discretion of the trial court.” Spencer,

2009 WL 1883929, at *2 (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Notably, Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s motion on grounds of untimeliness,

probability of trial delay, the potential for complication of issues at trial, or prejudice.

Nevertheless, before turning to the merits of Defendant’s third-party claims, the Court addresses

each factor in turn.

A. Timeliness of Motion

On July 16, 2025, the Court entered an Order granting Defendant’s request to set August

15, 2025, as the deadline to file its Motion for Leave to File a Third-Party Complaint. (Docket

Entry No. 21.) As noted, Defendant filed its motion on August 15, 2025. Defendant’s motion is

timely.

B. The Probability of Trial Delay

“[D]elay is inevitable in most if not all Rule 14 situations[.]” Spencer, 2009 WL 1883929,

at *4. However, “[i]f the inevitable delay and complexity were dispositive considerations . . . few

Rule 14(a) motions would be granted.” Id. Therefore, both factors “must be weighed against the

alternative prospect of two separate trials and the need for attempting to coordinate, and in the end

possibly consolidate, the matter for the sake of judicial economy.” Id.; Hickerson-Cooper v. Dollar

Gen. Corp., Civ. No. 22-5755, 2024 WL 2874035, at *4 (D.N.J. June 7, 2024).

Generally, courts in this jurisdiction have found that trial delay exists where fact discovery

has closed, and impleader would require the discovery process to be reopened. Compare Hercules

Inc. v. Del. Valley Scrap Co., Civ. No. 08-4391, 2009 WL 10690434, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2009)

(“[G]ranting this motion will in no way delay trial as a trial date has not been set and the discovery

deadlines can be extended.”), with Meehan, 2021 WL 130483, at *2 (finding that the potential for

trial delay existed where fact discovery had closed, and impleader would, in essence, “[return] the

parties to the beginning of the discovery process”), and Campbell v. New Jersey Transit Rail

Operations Inc., Civ. No. 17-5250, 2021 WL 5413983, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2021) (finding that

trial delay existed where fact discovery had closed, and the discovery process would have to be

reopened). Here, discovery is ongoing, and no pretrial conference date or trial date has been set.

The Court finds that any potential trial delay is de minimis and does not bar Defendant’s Third-

Party Complaint.

C. The Potential for Complication of Issues at Trial

“[I]mpleading a third party will add some level of complexity to the trial.” Mechin v.

Carquest Corp., Civ. No. 07-5824, 2010 WL 3259808, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2010) (citing Hitachi

Capital Am. Corp., 2010 WL 1379804, at *6). As noted, “[c]onsiderations involving the inevitable

consequences of joinder, including greater trial complexity, ‘must be weighed against the

alternative prospect of two separate trials and the need for attempting to coordinate, and in the end

possibly consolidate, the matter for the sake of judicial economy.’” Id. (citing Spencer, 2009 WL

1883929, at *4).

Defendant seeks to bring third-party claims for contribution and indemnification. As

Defendant’s third-party claims against the Third-Party Defendants involve the same—or similar—

factual circumstances as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint and do not substantially complicate the

legal issues involved in this case, the Court finds that allowing Defendant to file its proposed Third-

Party Complaint would not unnecessarily complicate the issues at trial. This factor therefore

weighs in favor of impleader.

D. Prejudice to Original Plaintiff

Plaintiff fails to articulate any basis for prejudice. Even under its own consideration, the

Court does not find that Plaintiff would suffer prejudice if impleader were granted. “Prejudice

must be ‘undue’ and rise to the level that the non-moving party would be ‘unfairly disadvantaged

or deprived of the opportunity to present facts or evidence[.]’” Panchisin, 2012 WL 5880346, at

*3. This is not the case here, where Defendant’s motion is timely, will not result in a trial delay,

and will not substantially complicate the issues in the action.

Lastly, the Court notes that if Defendant was denied leave to add the Third-Party

Defendants to this action, additional lawsuits may result and arise out of Plaintiff’s alleged

trafficking. As mentioned, “[t]he purpose of Rule 14(a) is to avoid circuity of action and

multiplicity of litigation.” Spencer, 2009 WL 1883929, at *2. Thus, to allow impleader here would

promote the core of Rule 14(a)’s purpose. This fact further militates in favor of impleader.

In considering the four applicable factors, as well Rule 14(a)’s overarching purpose, the

Court finds that all weigh in favor of granting impleader at this juncture.

E. Meritoriousness of Defendant’s Third-Party Claims

In analyzing the merits of third-party claims, courts in this jurisdiction have applied the

same futility standard applied to motions to amend brought pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2). See Apollo

Underwriting Ltd. v. Pats & Sons Gen. Cont. LLC, Civ. No. 21-13723, 2022 WL 3273885, at *2

(D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2022) (“Leave to file a third-party complaint may also be denied on the basis of

futility.”); Panchisin, 2012 WL 5880346, at *2 (“A motion for leave to file a third-party complaint

is treated in the same manner as a motion for leave to amend the original pleadings.”).

“Futility means that the complaint . . . would fail to state a claim upon which relief could

be granted.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “In assessing ‘futility,’ the district court applies

the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.

To determine if a complaint would survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the

Court must accept as true all the facts alleged in the pleading, draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the plaintiff, and determine if “under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff

may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).

“[D]ismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the [pleading] as true, the

p[arty] has failed to plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Duran v. Equifirst Corp., Civ. No. 09-3856, 2010 WL 918444, at *2 (D.N.J. March 12, 2010)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Put simply, the alleged facts must

be sufficient to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the Court must view

the factual allegations contained in the pleading at issue as true, the Court is “not compelled to

accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual

allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007).

The parties discuss at length the congressional intent and purpose, or lack thereof, of the

TVPRA and its relevant provisions. They also discuss whether Defendant’s claims of contribution

and indemnification are federally preempted.

According to Defendant, discovery and investigation in this matter have identified

Plaintiff’s traffickers as Gardener and Mickens, who were arrested and criminally charged for the

sex trafficking of Plaintiff. (Def.’s Br. at 1-2, 6-8.) Gardener is currently serving a fifty-year prison

sentence for her crimes related to the trafficking of Plaintiff; Mickens pled guilty to conspiracy

and was sentenced to five years in prison. (Id. at 1-2, 6.) Courtyard, Element, Ramada, and Howard

Johnson have also been identified as additional hotels where Plaintiff was allegedly trafficked.

(Id. at 2; Docket Entry No. 26 at 2.) Defendant’s proposed Third-Party Complaint specifically

details the proposed Third-Party Defendants’ alleged roles in the sex trafficking of Plaintiff.

(Docket Entry No. 26-1 (“TPC”) ¶¶ 18-37.) Although Plaintiff has not named the foregoing non-

parties as defendants in this action, Defendant argues that under the TVPRA: (1) Gardener and

Mickens qualify as “perpetrators”; and (2) Courtyard, Element, Ramada, and Howard Johnson

may qualify as “perpetrators” and/or “beneficiaries.” (Def.’s Br. at 2; Docket Entry No. 26 at 2-

3.) If and to the extent that Defendant is found liable in this action, Defendant proffers that the

Third-Party Defendants are or may be “joint tortfeasors” under the New Jersey Joint Tortfeasor

Contribution Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 et seq. (“NJTCL”), who should be allocated their respective

percentage of fault and from whom Defendant would be entitled contribution. (Def.’s Br. at 2;

Docket Entry No. 26 at 2.) Moreover, Defendant contends that Plaintiff, in choosing only to sue

Defendant, is essentially “attempting to hold [Defendant] secondarily and/or vicariously liable for

the putative Third-Party Defendants’ conduct or ‘venture,’ potentially entitling [Defendant] to

common law indemnification.” (Def.’s Br. at 2-3; Docket Entry No. 26 at 2-3.) Defendant argues

that to permit its Third-Party Complaint would further the intent and purpose of the TVPRA,

advancing the TVPRA’s aim to “(1) ‘mak[e] trafficking victims whole’ and (2) hold perpetrators

and ‘all those who knowingly financially benefit from human trafficking’ liable.” (Def.’s Br. at 15

(citation omitted).) Defendant further argues that its proposed third-party claims are not federally

preempted. (Def.’s Br. at 11-12; Docket Entry No. 25 (“Def.’s Reply Br.”) at 3-7.)

In rejoinder, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s motion should be denied “as the relief

sought is not consistent with the intent and purpose of the TVPRA.” (Opp’n Br. at 1.) According

to Plaintiff, the TVPRA “does not allow for civil beneficiary defendants to apportion fault to

traffickers or other entities.” (Id.) Plaintiff further argues that the NJTCL does not apply to federal

question cases based solely on federal substantive law. (Id. at 1, 5.) It is Plaintiff’s position that

“[a]llowing civil beneficiary defendants to apportion fault to traffickers, individuals who sexually

assault victims, and other beneficiaries, would drastically undermine the effect of the civil

beneficiary provision.” (Id. at 1, 4.)

As the pending motion pertains to the proposed Third-Party Hotel Defendants, Plaintiff

asserts that said hotels did not participate “with any person or entity related to the sex trafficking

of [Plaintiff] that occurred on the premises owned and operated by [Defendant] and doing business

as The Red Roof Inn located at 3203 US Highway 1 Lawrenceville, NJ 08648-2409.” (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff maintains that these entities “unequivocally did not participate in any venture or enterprise

pertaining to the property located at the aforesaid address.” (Id.) Defendant retorts that Plaintiff’s

argument is (1) premature as discovery has yet to occur in earnest and, in any event, (2)

unsupported by her own underlying allegations, which set forth that “the mere renting or operation

of the rooms where the sex trafficking allegedly occurred is enough to give rise to a knowing

financial benefit” and participation in the sex trafficking venture. (Def.’s Reply Br. at 8-9.)

According to Defendant, the “‘red flags’ that Plaintiff alleges gave rise to [Defendant’s] actual or

constructive knowledge of existence of her sex trafficking . . . would equally apply to hotels where

Plaintiff was trafficked just weeks earlier.” (Id. at 9.)

Ultimately, both parties agree that the TVPRA does not expressly or implicitly create a

statutory right to indemnification or contribution. (Def.’s Br. at 12; Opp’n Br. at 6-7.) In fact, the

TVPRA provides no language directly addressing how to apportion liability. See A.B. v. Marriott

Int’l, Inc., Civ. No. 19-5770, 2020 WL 3642485, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2020) (“We see no

language in the Act directly addressing how to apportion liability.”). In recognizing this fact,

courts in this circuit have found that to permit impleader is not offensive to the purposes and

objectives of the TVPRA where, as here, a defendant seeks to bring third-party claims for

contribution and common law indemnification grounded in state law against third-party defendants

who may qualify as “perpetrators” or “beneficiaries” under the Act.3 See A.B., 2020 WL 3642485,

3 Based on its briefing, Defendant appears to solely bring its third-party claims for contribution

and indemnification under state law. (Def.’s Br. at 3 (“Federal courts have routinely permitted

third party claims for contribution and/or indemnification where grounded in state law[.]

(emphasis added)), and at 12-14 (analyzing preemption, or lack thereof, of state law claims for

contribution and indemnification in actions brought pursuant to the TVPRA); see also Def.’s Reply

at *5 (analyzing Pennsylvania law and finding, “With our focus on Rule 14(a)(1), and because the

damages overlap and many persons and entities may be culpable in plaintiff’s trafficking, we

cannot preclude defendant’s ability to attempt a recovery against the traffickers, or other

businesses who also ‘knew or should have known’ of the trafficking, when the Act contemplates

each may be liable.”); M.G. v. Hari OM LLC, Civ. No. 24-10441, Docket Entry No. 36 (D.N.J.

Mar. 12, 2026) (finding that defendant sufficiently demonstrated that its proposed claims for

contribution and common law indemnification were consistent with the aims of the TVPRA).4 As

Defendant highlights, other sister courts agree with this premise. See, e.g., Doe v. JPMorgan Chase

Bank N.A., 687 F. Supp. 3d 405, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (finding that “the Court cannot simply

presume that Congress intended to preempt all state-law claims for contribution or indemnification

that are based upon federal-law violations,” and holding that “the [TVPRA] does not preempt the

state-law contribution or indemnification claims made here.”); A.W. v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., Civ. No.

21-4934, 2024 WL 1340264, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2024) (permitting third-party claims for

state-law contractual indemnification).

While Plaintiff’s arguments may ultimately prevail, such arguments and their

corresponding questions are better suited to be addressed through dispositive motion practice.

i. Contribution

“Under the New Jersey Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Law, the right of contribution exists

among joint tortfeasors.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-1–2; Walsh Sec., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt.,

Civ. No. 97-3496, 2009 WL 5064757, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2009). “Joint Tortfeasor” is defined

Br. at 3-7 (same).) The Court therefore interprets that Defendant’s third-party claims, as asserted,

are raised under state law and, accordingly, limits its analysis to the same.

4 Defendant has submitted the recent in-district decision of M.G. as supplemental authority in

support of its motion. (Docket Entry No. 27.) The Court accepts Defendant’s submission and,

while not bound by the decision, has taken the same under consideration.

as “two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property,

whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.” N.J. Stat. Ann. §

2A:53A-1–2; Ernest Bock & Sons, Inc., 2023 WL 4268250, at *3 (citations omitted). “The law

provides a ‘cause of action for contribution . . . when two or more persons become liable in tort to

the same person for the same harm.’” Symbiont Sci. Eng’g & Constr., Inc. v. Ground Improvement

Servs., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 3d 363, 384 (D.N.J. 2024) (quoting Lukacs v. Purvi Padia Design LLC,

Civ. No. 21-19599, 2023 WL 6439877, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2023)).

In its proposed Third-Party Complaint, Defendant recites the traffickers’ alleged activity

and the alleged involvement of the other hotels. (TPC ¶¶ 18-37.) Specifically, Defendant details

how Plaintiff’s traffickers, Gardener and Mickens, took her to various hotels, where Mickens

would act as “the muscle man” and Gardener would force Plaintiff to engage in prostitution. (Id.

¶¶ 20-28.) In particular, in regard to Howard Johnson, Defendant claims that a customer witnessed

“[p]eople standing on their patios smoking out of crack and meth pipes.” (Id. ¶ 33.) Defendant

pleads that:

[W]hile the customer was speaking to a clerk at the lobby, a woman

“stumbled[] in, barely able to hold herself up and clearly drugged out of

her mind with makeup running down her face and ratted out clothes barely

clinging onto her body. She told him she had ‘an appointment’ in room 2-

whatever, he handed her a keycard, and she dragged herself outside,

flagged down a car that was pulled off near the entrance, and walked

towards the rooms at the back of the building as the car followed her. To

me, that screamed human trafficking/prostitution.”

(Id.)

According to Defendant, the proposed Third-Party Hotel Defendants “knew or should have

known that Plaintiff was being sex trafficked in violation of the TVPRA based on, inter alia,

Plaintiff’s appearance and age, activities in and around the hotel room(s) rented by the traffickers

or on the traffickers’ behalf, and/or other common indications of sex trafficking.” (Id. ¶ 32.)

Defendant alleges that the proposed Third-Party Hotel Defendants “received a financial benefit

from the sex trafficking in the form of rented hotels rooms and/or other money spent by the

traffickers or on the traffickers’ behalf in connection with the room rentals.” (Id. ¶ 31.) As noted,

this is the same theory of liability asserted by Plaintiff against Defendant in her Complaint.

(Compl. ¶¶ 33-52.)

Accepting all allegations as true at this stage, Plaintiff’s injuries if proven would stem from

a sex trafficking venture that was carried out by her traffickers and enabled by the hotels named in

both her Complaint and Defendant’s Third-Party Complaint. That is, as pled, “each share . . .

involvement or neglect in carrying out or enabling the venture causing harm” to Plaintiff. A.B.,

2020 WL 3642485, at *4. As Defendant argues, the case of A.B. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., Civ. No.

19-5770, 2020 WL 3642485 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2020) is particularly instructive. In A.B., the

defendant moved to file third-party claims of contribution and indemnification against (1) its hotel

franchisees, who it claimed knew or should have known about plaintiff’s trafficking while

financially benefitting from the same, and (2) the persons who personally trafficked plaintiff “in

and out of their franchisee hotels.” Id. at *1. Though the A.B. court looked to Pennsylvania’s law

pertaining to joint tortfeasors, it found that if the defendant were found liable to plaintiff, then the

defendant “may” have the right of contribution from other participants who also may have had a

role in plaintiff A.B.’s injuries. Id. at *4. This finding is germane to the present analysis. While

Plaintiff did not elect to sue these other individuals and entities, if Defendant is found liable, it

appears that Defendant may have the right of contribution from others—potential joint

tortfeasors—that may have had a role in the trafficking of Plaintiff and her injuries. To the extent

that Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed to establish that the hotel entities “participated in a

venture with any person or entity related to the sex trafficking of [Plaintiff],” the Court agrees with

Defendant that such an argument is fact intensive and more appropriate on summary judgment

than on a motion for impleader.

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, to the extent it seeks to assert a third-party claim for

contribution against the proposed Third-Party Defendants.

ii. Common Law Indemnification

“New Jersey recognizes a common law right to indemnity.” Lukacs, 2023 WL 6439877, at

*3. “This is an ‘equitable remedy that shifts the entire responsibility for damages from a party

who, without any fault, has been required to pay because of a legal relationship to the party at

fault.’” Symbiont Sci. Eng’g & Constr., 723 F. Supp. at 385 (quoting Lukacs, 2023 WL 6439877,

at *3). “In New Jersey, a claim for indemnification arises in two circumstances: when a contract

explicitly provides for indemnification or when a special legal relationship between the parties

creates an implied right to indemnification.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

“These ‘special legal relationships’ include ‘principal-agent, employer-employee, lessor-lessee,

and bailor-bailee.’” Id. (quoting SGS U.S. Testing Co., Inc. v. Takata Corp., Civ. No. 09-6007,

2012 WL 3018262, at *5 (D.N.J. July 24, 2012) aff’d, 547 F. App’x 147 (3d Cir. 2013)); see also

Katz v. Holzberg, Civ. No. 13-1726, 2013 WL 5946502, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2013) (“Examples

of the special relationship that will support a third party’s claim for indemnification include that

of principal and agent, bailor and bailee, and lessor and lessee.” (citation omitted)). “[I]mplied

indemnification by way of a special relationship is a ‘narrow doctrine’ that is not frequently

stretched beyond the examples of principal-agent, employer-employee, lessor-lessee, and bailor-

bailee.” SGS U.S. Testing Co., Inc., 2012 WL 3018262, at *5 (citation omitted); cf. Symbiont Sci.

Eng’g & Constr., 723 F. Supp. at 385 n.17 (discussing very narrow exception related to

“allegations premised on absolute or strict liability”). “A ‘longstanding business relationship’ is

not enough to show that a special legal relationship exists for indemnification purposes.” Calabria

Ristorante, Inc. v. Ruggiero Seafood, Inc., Civ. No. 21-3712, 2025 WL 2778535, at *3 (D.N.J.

Sept. 30, 2025) (citing Katz, 2013 WL 5946502, at *3 n.4).

In its proposed pleading, Defendant offers no basis for asserting an indemnification claim.

Defendant does not allege that the proposed Third-Party Defendants had a contractual obligation

to indemnify it. Nor does Defendant allege any cognizable special relationship between itself and

the proposed Third-Party Defendants. Defendant has made no effort to explain how its alleged

relationship with the any of the Third-Party Defendants amounts to a special relationship as

defined under the doctrine of implied indemnification.5 As it pertains to the merits of Defendant’s

proposed third-party claim for common law indemnification, both parties provide a dearth of

briefing on the issue. Without more, the Court will not presume that a contractual right or special

relationship exists. Therefore, to the extent Defendant seeks to assert a third-party claim of

common law indemnification against the proposed Third-Party Defendants, Defendant’s motion

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

5 The Court notes that the cases cited by Defendant in support of its motion are inapposite, to the

extent that they pertain to its proposed third-party claim of common law indemnification. Notably,

most, if not all, of the cases cited by Defendant are out of jurisdiction and/or out of circuit, many

of which apply a different standard for common law indemnity based on the particular state in

question or explicitly implicate contractual indemnification. See A.B., 2020 WL 3642485 at *4

n.24 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2020) (applying Pennsylvania law); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 687 F.

Supp. 3d at 418 (applying New York law); L.H. v. Red Roof Inn, Inc., Civ. No. 22-625, 2025 WL

714385, at *10-13 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 5, 2025) (applying Kentucky law and analyzing state law

contract-based indemnification); A.W., 2024 WL 1340264, at *3 (analyzing state law contract-

based indemnification).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File a Third-Party

Complaint (Docket Entry No. 22) is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. An appropriate

Order follows.

Dated: March 31, 2026

s/ Tonianne J. Bongiovanni

HONORABLE TONIANNE J. BONGIOVANNI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE