The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
SHANNON GIBSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:25-CV-176 HEA
)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants St. Louis County (“the
County”), Rob Brannan, Roger Holmes, and Emir Hadzic’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 66). Plaintiff Shannon
Gibson, who is pursuing this matter pro se without the assistance of counsel, opposes
the motion, which is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons that follow,
the Court grants in part and dismisses in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.1
1Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Notice of
Supplemental Authority and Motion for Hearing. (ECF Nos. 71 and 75). The Court will grant
leave for Plaintiff to file supplemental authority, which was included in his motion for leave, but
denies his motion for a hearing.
I. Background
This case arises out of an arrest that took place on February 10, 2020, at the
United States Post Office in Affton, Missouri. In his Fourth Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff brings the following claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the United States Constitution: First
Amendment retaliation (press/recording) against Defendants Holmes and Hadzic
(Count I); Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure and arrest without probable cause
against Defendants Holmes and Hadzic (Count II); Second Amendment unlawful
firearm confiscation and retention against Defendants Holmes and Hadzic (Count
III); Eighth Amendment excessive and degrading pretrial conditions against
Defendants Holmes, Hadzic, and Brannan (Count IV); Fourteenth Amendment due
process, equal protection, and “bodily autonomy” against Defendants Holmes,
Hadzic, and Brannan (Count V); Fourth Amendment Violations for Unlawful
Seizure of Person and Property, Arrest without Probable Cause, and Warrantless
Retention of Property against Defendants Holmes, Hadzic, Brannan and the County
(Count X); First Amendment – Denial of the Right to Petition the Government for
Redress of Grievances against Defendants Holmes, Hadzic, Brannan and the County
(Count XII); Monell liability for policies, customs, and failure to train/supervise
against the County (Count VI); Damages and Injunctive Relief – “Transforming
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Constitutional Harm into Civic Remedy and Public Education” against Defendants
Holmes, Hadzic, Brannan and the County (Count VII); and Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief – “Framing Public Education and Institutional Remedy as
Constitutional Redress” against Defendants Holmes, Hadzic, Brannan and the
County (Count VIII). Plaintiff also brings the following two common law claims
under Missouri law: Malicious Prosecution against Defendants Holmes, Hadzic,
Brannan and the County (Count IX) and Conversion and Replevin for Wrongful
Detention of Firearm, Mobile Phone, and Vehicle against Defendants Holmes,
Hadzic, Brannan, and the County (Count XI). Defendant Holmes, Hadzic and
Brannan are sued in their individual and official capacities.
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Complaint should be dismissed as to all Defendants, because res judicata applies to
all alleged claims raised against them. They also argue Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on collateral estoppel.
Defendants further argue that even if res judicata or collateral estoppel do not apply,
the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims, and that Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim against the individual
defendants and the County. Finally, Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state claims
under Missouri law, because Plaintiff’s Missouri claims against the County and
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against the officer defendants in their official capacity are barred by sovereign
immunity; the Missouri claims against the officer defendants in their individual
capacity are barred by official immunity and the public duty doctrine; and as to
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, the claim is barred by the applicable
Missouri statute of limitations.
II. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “where
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Blomker v. Jewell,
831 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). The facts alleged must
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A
complaint must offer more than “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action’” to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint, even if it appears that “actual proof of those facts is
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improbable,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, and reviews the complaint to determine
whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 555–56; Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). The principle that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions, however. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (stating “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). Although legal
conclusions can provide the framework for a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. Id.
Finally, a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff should be liberally construed.
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976)). See also Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir.
1995) (holding that in civil rights actions a complaint should be liberally construed
when determining whether it has stated a cause of action sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss). The complaint, however, “still must allege sufficient facts to
support the claims advanced.” Stone, 364 F.3d at 914 (citing Dunn v. White, 880
F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (regarding a pro se plaintiff, “we will not supply
additional facts, nor will we construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts
that have not been pleaded.”); Cunningham v. Ray, 648 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir.
1981) (“[P]ro se litigants must set [a claim] forth in a manner which, taking the
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pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law.”)). The Court is “free to ignore
legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping
legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Wiles v. Capitol Indem.
Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002).
III. Facts Alleged in Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that on February 10, 2020, he went to the United States Post
Office in Affton, Missouri, to mail packages and while waiting in line in the lobby,
he began filming. According to Plaintiff, the manager placed a 911 call in which he
complained that Plaintiff was “acting up” and would not stop recording. (ECF No.
58 at 9).
Within minutes, St. Louis County Officers, Defendants Hadzic and Holmes,
arrived on the scene. Defendant Hadzic asked the Postal Supervisor if he had asked
Plaintiff to leave, and the supervisor responded that he had not, but he was now.
(ECF No. 58 at 9). Defendants Hadzic and Holmes told Plaintiff that he had to leave
the post office, and Plaintiff questioned their authority to do so. Defendant Holmes
told Plaintiff that they were “suspecting” him of trespassing, and Defendant Hadzic
asked to see Plaintiff’s ID. Plaintiff refused, and he was handcuffed. The officers
found a firearm on Plaintiff’s person after he was handcuffed.
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Plaintiff alleges that his phone, identification, car, and firearm were seized.
Plaintiff was released after several hours of detention, and no state criminal charges
were filed related to the incident at the post office.
Plaintiff alleges that on April 20, 2020, he participated in a recorded telephone
call with a St. Louis County Police Detective, Defendant Brannan. Plaintiff further
alleges that Defendant Brannan claimed that a decades-old Illinois burglary
conviction barred Plaintiff from possessing firearms, that Plaintiff was being
charged federally for illegal possession of a firearm, and that Plaintiff had been
charged with trespassing. (ECF No. 58 at 11). Defendant Brannan also told Plaintiff
that he was not getting his gun back “whether you even beat this case or not” and
that Plaintiff was “not allowed to have firearms.” (ECF No. 58 at 12).
Plaintiff also alleges the following in his Fourth Amended Complaint:
On September 24, 2020, federal agents executed an arrest warrant for
alleged felony ammunition possession at Plaintiff’s residence,
deploying a SWAT team consisting of approximately five armed agents
with long guns and a large breaching tool. Plaintiff was taken into
custody and transported to a detention facility in Jennings, Missouri,
and on September 25, 2020, to the Thomas F. Eagleton U.S.
Courthouse.
[ ] Following release, Plaintiff was placed on pretrial supervision for
approximately twelve months under conditions that included:
prohibition on possessing firearms; random drug testing conducted
under observation requiring full disrobing; weekly in-person check-ins
and home visits by federal agents; travel restrictions that impeded
employment opportunities in Illinois; and prohibition on alcohol
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consumption. Plaintiff alleges these conditions and the arrest resulted
from [Defendant] Brannan’s referral to federal authorities absent
admissible evidence of a crime.
(ECF No. 58 at 12-13).
IV. Judicial Notice
Ordinarily, only facts alleged in the complaint are considered in ruling on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.
1986). But a court may consider “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the
claim, items subject to judicial notice, [and] matters of public record.” Miller v.
Redwood Toxicology Lab'y, Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012). The Court
takes judicial notice of the fact that on July 1, 2020, Plaintiff was indicted in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on the charge of
felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See United
States v. Gibson, No. 4:20-CR-309 RLW. The government moved to dismiss the
indictment, which was granted on May 19, 2021. Id.
The Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that on February 10, 2022,
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Hadzic, Holmes, and the County in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. See Gibson v. Hadzic, et
al., 4:22-CV-163 SPM (“Gibson I”). In this suit, Plaintiff alleged that on February
10, 2020, St. Louis County police officers Emir Hadzic and Roger Holmes arrested
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him for trespassing at the U.S. Post Office in Afton, Missouri for refusing to leave
after being directed to do so. Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
claimed the following: he was unlawfully prevented from recording in a post office
lobby in violation of the First Amendment; he was unlawfully detained in retaliation
for exercising his First Amendment rights; his ID and phone were seized in
retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights; his ID and phone were seized
and his car was impounded in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; he was
arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment; he was
unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment; he was unlawfully
detained and excess force was used against him in violation of the Fourth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff further alleged the County was liable for
maintaining a custom or policy that violated individuals’ constitutional rights and
for failing to train or supervise. See 4:22-CV-163 SPM, ECF No. 15.
In his Third Amended Complaint in Gibson I, Plaintiff also made the
following factual allegations:
As a result of the illegal arrest Mr. Gibson was punished, a walking due
Process violation, subjected to 5 Military police who came to kidnap
him at his home with machine guns, and a 10-foot crowbar to tear down
his door…
[ ] Jailed in Federal Holding overnight In Jennings Missouri where Mr.
Gibson was given “Vegetarian Chicken?” being a vegetarian…forced
to sign a release, conditional upon compliance Mr. Gibson was subject
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to cruel punishment, was not convicted of a crime, under threat of
violence, forced under duress in lieu of a rape cage, Mr. Gibson was
forced to agree to unreasonable supervision for 12 months or be put in
a rape cage:
[ ] No Alcohol, Random Drug tests,
[ ] Mr. Gibson could not leave the state (On two occasions Mr. Gibson
was Prohibited to go to Illinois for jobs) Mr. Gibson was to report to
Federal Agents weekly, and they (federal agents) can do home
visits…the Defendants punished Mr. Gibson because of the false arrest,
issued a federal indictment when no crime had been committed, Mr.
Gibson was subjected to unreasonable supervision, when he was not
convicted of a crime.
4:22-CV-163 SPM, ECF No. 15 at 47-48.
In a Memorandum and Opinion dated September 25, 2023, the Honorable
Shirley Padmore Mensah dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Hadzic, Holmes, and the County. Judge Mensah found Plaintiff had
failed to state claims against Defendants Hadzic and Holmes in their individual or
official capacity. She found the official capacity claims were redundant to Plaintiff’s
claims against the County. She also found that Plaintiff’s First and Fourth
Amendment claims related to his arrest should be dismissed because based on the
facts alleged, “under the totality of the circumstances known to the officers, the
officers had probable cause to believe Plaintiff was engaged in the crime of
trespass.” (4:22-CV-163 SPM, ECF No. 68 at 13). She also found Plaintiff had failed
to allege claims of excessive force. Judge Mensah further found Defendants Hadzic
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and Holmes were entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, Judge Mensah ruled that
Plaintiff had failed to state a claim against the County in that he failed to allege a
constitutional violation and, moreover, there were insufficient allegations from
which one could infer that the County maintained customs or policies that resulted
in the deprivation of individuals’ constitutional rights or that it failed to adequately
train or supervise its officers in violation of Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which Judge Mensah denied. (4:22-CV-163 SPM, ECF
Nos. 70 and 74). Plaintiff did not appeal the final judgment against him in Gibson I.
V. Discussion
A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants Hadzic, Holmes, and the
County Are Barred by Res Judicata.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint should be
dismissed in its entirety because res judicata applies to all alleged claims raised
therein. Defendants assert that all the claims in Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Complaint are related directly to his arrest in the U.S. Post Office in Afton, Missouri
on February 10, 2020, as well as his subsequent federal prosecution. Therefore,
according to Defendants, Plaintiff raises the same incident and issues in this lawsuit
that he had raised against Defendants Hadzic, Holmes, and the County in Gibson I.
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Defendants argue that Plaintiff could have raised all of the claims in Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amended Complaint in Gibson I, and he is precluded from bringing the
above-captioned caused of action under the doctrine of res judicata.
In his response memorandum, Plaintiff argues that the application of res
judicata cannot be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has rejected Plaintiff’s argument and has held that res judicata
may be adjudicated on a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, if the affirmative defense is
based upon items that are subject to judicial notice and matters of public record. C.H.
Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano, 695 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 2012). See also
Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (“In reviewing a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court is not precluded in its
review of the complaint from taking notice of items in the public record.”) (cleaned
up). As Defendants’ motion is based on matters of public record, the Court now turns
to the merits of the affirmative defense.
Under res judicata “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in
that action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). When a final judgment is
entered on the merits, res judicata bars the parties or one in privity with the parties
from litigating a claim in a second lawsuit that was or could have been raised in the
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first lawsuit. Saylor v. Jeffreys, 131 F.4th 864, 866 (8th Cir. 2025). To establish
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, Defendants must show:
“(1) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was
based on proper jurisdiction; (3) both suits involve the same parties (or those in
privity with them); and (4) both suits are based upon the same claims or causes of
action.” Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 533 F.3d 634,
639 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation and citation omitted). The Court will examine each
of the four requirements of re judicata.
As to the first requirement, the Court finds that Gibson I resulted in a final
judgment. Judge Mensah dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The
dismissal, which was contested, was with prejudice and constitutes a final judgment
on the merits. Ruple v. City of Vermillion, S.D., 714 F.2d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 1983).
“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a ‘judgment on the merits’ for res judicata purposes
unless the plaintiff is granted leave to amend or the dismissal is reversed on appeal.”
United States v. Maull, 855 F.2d 514, 516 n.3 (8th Cir. 1988). See also Federated
Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (stating that a “dismissal
for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil of Procedure 12(b)(6) is a
judgment on the merits”) (quotation omitted).
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The second requirement of res judicata is also met. Gibson I was decided in
this District. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri is
a court of competent jurisdiction and had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
claims, which he brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Grable & Sons Metal Prod.,
Inc., v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005); Rutherford v. Kessel, 560
F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 2009).
The third res judicata requirement is that both suits must involve the same
parties or those in privity with them. Defendants Hadzic, Holmes, and the County
were all parties to Gibson I, but Defendant Brannan was not. The third factor is met
with regard to Defendants Hadzic, Holmes and the County, but “[t]he doctrine of res
judicata does not bar claims even arising out of the same facts against defendants
who were not parties to the first action.” Headley v. Bacon, 828 F.2d 1272, 1275
(8th Cir. 1987). “An exception exists, however, for those who stand in privity to the
defendants in the prior suit.” Id. The Court will address whether Defendant Brannan
was in privity with any of the defendants in Gibson I.
Defendant Brannan is employed as a detective with the County, but “[n]ot all
government employees and officials are in privity with the government, [ ] just as
not every employee is in privity with his or her employer.” Id. at 1276. Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant Brannan in his official capacity are precluded by the
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doctrine of res judicata because an official capacity claim against a governmental
official is the same as a claim against the government entity. Id. at 1279.
(“Litigation involving the government is generally binding with respect to
governmental officials who are sued in their official capacities in later actions.”).
See also Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999)
(finding an official capacity claim against a governmental official is the same as a
claim against the government entity itself and, thus, a “suit against a public employee
in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer.”). As for
individual capacity claims against Defendant Brannan, “a judgment against a
government does not bind its officials sued in their personal capacities.” Id.
Defendant Brannan is not in privity with the County with respect to claims against
him in his individual capacity.
Defendant Brannan is also not in privity with Defendants Hadzic and Holmes.
While Defendant Brannan could have been joined as a defendant in Gibson I, and
his interests are likely the same as those of Defendants Holmes and Hadzic, he is not
in privity with them. Id. at 1277 n. 4 (“Privity does not exist merely because parties
happen to be interested in the same question, or in proving or disproving the same
state of facts.”). Because Defendant Brannan does not meet the third requirement,
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the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Brannan are not barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
The fourth requirement of res judicata is that “both suits are based upon the
same claims or causes of action.” Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667,
673 (8th Cir. 1998). Under Eighth Circuit law, “a claim is barred by res judicata if
it arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior claim.” Lane v.
Peterson, 899 F.2d 737, 742 (8th Cir. 1990). The Eighth Circuit has adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments for determining whether two causes of action
are the same for purposes of res judicata, Banks v. Int’l Union Elec., Elec., Tech.,
Salaried & Mach. Workers, 390 F.3d 1049, 1052 (8th Cir. 2004), which provides as
follows:
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the
plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar[,] ... the claim
extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
connected transactions, out of which the action arose.
What factual grouping constitutes a “transaction,” and what groupings
constitute a “series,” are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight
to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space,
origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations
or business understanding or usage.
16
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982). See also First Nat. Bank in Sioux
Falls v. First Nat. Bank S. Dakota, 679 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying
Restatement (Second) of Judgments).
The fact that a plaintiff raises new claims in the second suit does not preclude
the application of res judicata. Brown v. Kansas City Live, LLC, 931 F.3d 712, 715
(8th Cir. 2019) (“for the purposes of res judicata a court looks to the factual bases
for the claims, not the legal theories.”) (quotation omitted); Lane v. Peterson, 899
F.2d 737, 744 (8th Cir. 1990) (“reliance in this suit on different substantive law and
new legal theories does not preclude the operation of res judicata.”). “Where a
plaintiff fashions a new theory of recovery or cites a new body of law that was
arguably violated by a defendant’s conduct, res judicata will still bar the second
claim if it is based on the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior claim.” Banks
v. Int’l Union Elec., Elec., Tech., Salaried & Mach. Workers, 390 F.3d 1049, 1052–
53 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). The doctrine of “‘res judicata bars
relitigation not only of those matters that were actually litigated, but also those which
could have been litigated in the earlier proceeding.’” Id. (quoting King v. Hoover
Grp., Inc., 958 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1992)).
Examining the record, the Court finds that the claims in the case at bar are
based on the same nucleus of operative facts that was alleged in Gibson I. Both
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started with the incident at the post office in Affton, Missouri on February 10, 2020,
and the two suits involve the same alleged facts, which include the following:
Plaintiff’s interactions with Defendants Hadzic and Holmes; the seizure of Plaintiff’s
person and property; Plaintiff’s subsequent arrest and detention; the referral to
federal prosecution; his pretrial supervision; and the eventual dismissal of the federal
charges against him. While not all of the claims in the case at bar are the same as
those in Gibson I – for example, in the present suit, Plaintiff added claims for
equitable relief and Missouri common law claims – the allegations in both lawsuits
arise from the same nucleus of operative facts. Further, Plaintiff filed Gibson I on
February 10, 2022, nine months after the federal charges against him had been
dismissed, and all the claims in the case at bar arose before Gibson I was filed. None
of the claims at bar are “based on subsequent legal or factual events that produce a
different nucleus of operative facts.” Saylor, 131 F.4th at 867. In other words, all the
claims alleged in this suit could have been brought in Gibson I.2 Cf. Lundquist v.
2There are facts alleged in the present suit that occurred after Plaintiff filed suit in Gibson
I, but this does not preclude the application of res judicata. In Count XII, Plaintiff brings a First
Amendment claim against the County for “Denial of the Right to Petition the Government for
Redress of Grievances.” (ECF No. 58 at 32). In this claim, Plaintiff alleges that he filed internal
affairs complaints that the County has refused to investigate, and he refers to a February 16, 2022
letter from County’s Police Department’s Internal Affairs Division that “closed Plaintiff’s
misconduct complaint without interviewing or addressing the full evidentiary record.” (Id. at 33).
In relation to this claim, he also alleges facts concerning a recorded telephone conversation on
February 19, 2024, and a “notarized affidavit and certified intent to sue letter” he sent on May 14,
2024. While the letter, affidavit, and phone call took place after Plaintiff filed suit in Gibson I, they
do not create a new cause of action. First, Plaintiff referred to the February 16, 2022 letter in his
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Rice Mem'l Hosp., 238 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2001) (“it is well settled that claim
preclusion does not apply to claims that did not arise until after the first suit was
filed.”). The Court finds that Plaintiff's claim against Defendants Hadzic, Holmes,
and the County are based upon the same claims or causes of action as his earlier
lawsuit.
In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hadzic, Holmes,
and the County in this suit are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff
litigated his claims against these three defendants to final judgment in Gibson I.
Defendant Brannan, however, was neither a party to Gibson I, nor is he in privity
with those who were. But as stated above, an official capacity claim against a
governmental official is the same as a claim against the government entity itself and,
thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Brannan in his official capacity are claims
against his employer, the County, which are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
The Court now turns to whether Plaintiff has stated a claim against him in his
individual capacity.
Second and Third Amended Complaints in Gibson I. (4:22-CV-163 SPM, ECF Nos. 12 at 15;15
at 20). Second, the telephone call and affidavit both relate to and stem from Plaintiff’s arrest at the
post office on February 10, 2020, and they do not create a new claim. Instead, they would be
evidence to support a claim Plaintiff could have raised in Gibson I. See Saylor, 131 F.4th at 867
(finding subsequent events amounted to evidence not a different nucleus of operative events).
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B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Federal Claim Against Defendant Brannan
in his Individual Capacity.
In Counts IV, V, VII, VIII, X and XII, Plaintiff brings claims against
Defendant Brannan in his individual capacity for violations under the U.S.
Constitution. Section 1983 is the enforcement mechanism for individuals to bring
constitutional claims against persons acting under the authority of state law. 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
In order to state a claim in an individual capacity against a governmental
official under § 1983, a plaintiff is required to plead direct, personal involvement in
the constitutional misconduct: “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to …
§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 677. Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for,
the alleged deprivation of rights. Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.
1990). Liability for damages under § 1983 is personal, and “each defendant’s
conduct must be independently assessed. Section 1983 does not sanction tort by
association.” Smith v. City of Minneapolis, 754 F.3d 541, 547–48 (8th Cir. 2014)
(citing Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 595 F.3d 798, 805–06 (8th Cir.
2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also S.M. v. Krigbaum,
808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). The Court, therefore, must examine Defendant
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Brannan’s alleged conduct to determine whether Plaintiff has stated a § 1983 claim
against him.
Defendant Brannan was not involved in the events that took place at or near
the U.S. Post Office in Afton, Missouri on February 10, 2020. Plaintiff’s only alleged
interaction with Defendant Brannan was a telephone call. According to the Fourth
Amended Complaint, on April 2, 2020, Plaintiff had a telephone conversation with
Defendant Brannan that lasted approximately seven and half minutes. Plaintiff
alleges that during this conversation, Defendant Brannan told him that there was a
pending federal indictment against him for a firearm violation, that Plaintiff had been
charged with trespassing, and that “a decades-old Illinois burglary conviction barred
Plaintiff from possessing firearms.” (ECF No. 58 at 11). Plaintiff also alleges that
Defendant Brannan told him that he was not allowed to have firearms, and that he
was not getting his gun back. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he call reflects that Detective
Brannan lacked personal knowledge of the February 10, 2020 incident.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also alleges that on September 24, 2020, federal agents executed an
arrest warrant for the charge of felon in possession of ammunition. The Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff was arrested and subject to pretrial
supervision, because he was indicted in this District on the charge of being a felon
in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See United States
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v. Gibson, No. 4:20-CR-309 RLW. Plaintiff alleges that he was taken into custody
and detained overnight in Jennings, Missouri. During pretrial release, he was subject
to terms of supervision, which included drug testing, in-person check-ins and home
visits, travel restrictions, and prohibitions on alcohol consumption and firearms
possession. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Brannan was personally
involved in these events, but he does allege that “these conditions and the arrest
resulted from Detective Brannan’s referral to federal authorities absent admissible
evidence of a crime.” (ECF No. 58 at 13).
The Court will first address factual allegations concerning the phone call.
The alleged statements Defendant Brannan made to Plaintiff on that call do not
amount to claims under the Fourth Amendment for unlawful seizure of person and
property without probable cause, under the Eighth Amendment for excessive and
degrading pretrial conditions, under the Fourteenth Amendment for violations of
Plaintiff’s right to equal protection, substantive, and/or procedural due process, or
under the First Amendment for denial of right to petition the government, because
they do not establish personal involvement in the claimed constitutional violations.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.”); Jones v. City of St. Louis, 104 F.4th 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 2024) (to
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state a claim under § 1983, there must be allegations that the individual defendant
was “personally involved” in the violation).
Plaintiff does allege that Defendant Brannan lied during the telephone
conversation in that he told him that there was a pending federal indictment against
him for a firearm violation, that Plaintiff had been charged with trespassing, and that
a burglary conviction barred him from possessing a firearm. To the extent these
statements were untrue, lying by the police is not in itself a constitutional violation.
See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 174 F.4th 1092, 1100 (8th Cir. 2026) (finding false
promises during questioning do not render subsequent admissions involuntary);
Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1133 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that police
officers engage in deceptive tactics that do not necessarily render a confession
involuntary). Plaintiff fails to connect Defendant Brannan’s alleged false statements
to misconduct that rises to the level of a constitutional violation.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Brannan told him he could not have his
gun back. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a Fourteenth Amendment
claim for deprivation of property without due process of law against Defendant
Brannan, Plaintiff has failed to do so. The Eighth Circuit has recognized that
continued refusal to surrender a gun that was seized in an arrest or during a search
can amount to a deprivation of property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Walters
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v. Wolf, 660 F.3d 307, 315 (8th Cir. 2011). However, retention of a firearm during
an investigation where there is a reasonable basis to believe the gun is potential
evidence does not violate clearly established law. Rodgers v. Knight, 781 F.3d 932,
945 (8th Cir. 2015) (affirming district court's decision that the guns were properly
retained as potential evidence in future court proceedings). “Where retention of
evidence is justified by pending charges or an arrest warrant, no further process is
required.” Id. at 941. “Likewise, if evidence is ‘needed for an ongoing or proposed
specific investigation,’ law enforcement authorities are entitled to retain it.” Id.
(citing Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 1982)).
Here, Defendant Brannan had reason to believe Plaintiff was a convicted felon, see
discussion supra, and Plaintiff was charged on July 1, 2020, as being a felon in
possession of ammunition – a charge that was based on the loaded gun that was taken
from him during his arrest at the post office on February 10, 2020. See United States
v. Gibson, 4:20-CR-309 RLW. Plaintiff fails to state a due process violation against
Defendant Brannan.
The Court now turns to the other factual allegation against Defendant Brannan
in the Fourth Amended Complaint – that he referred Plaintiff’s case to federal
prosecutors “absent admissible evidence of a crime.” (ECF No. 58 at 13). A claim
for malicious prosecution without probable cause is cognizable under the Fourth
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Amendment, Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022), but to the extent Plaintiff is
attempting to state a constitutional claim of malicious prosecution against Defendant
Brannan, he has failed to do so. To state the claim of malicious prosecution under
the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege facts such that the Court reasonably
can infer the following: (1) the criminal proceeding was “instituted without probable
cause,” (2) the defendant's motive in instituting the proceeding “was malicious,” and
(3) the prosecution “terminated in acquittal or discharge of the accused.” Id. at 44.
See also Klein v. Steinkamp, 44 F.4th 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 2022).
Plaintiff makes no specific factual allegations with respect to Defendant
Brannan’s own conduct, aside from the general allegation that Defendant Brannan
made the referral to federal authorities absent admissible evidence of a crime. “A
pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff’s allegation, here, regarding the referral is a “[t]hreadbare recital[ ] of the
elements of a cause of action” that is insufficient to state a claim. Id. at 662.
Further, “the absence of probable cause [ ] is an essential element” of a claim
alleging malicious prosecution under federal law, Klein, 44 F.4th at 1115, and
without this element, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Probable cause exists under the
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Fourth Amendment “when a police officer has reasonably trustworthy information
that is sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect has
committed or is committing a crime.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d
1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff was referred to federal authorities and was charged with the federal
crime of possession of ammunition by a felon, which has the following four
elements:
(1) the defendant had been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year;
(2) after that conviction, the defendant knowingly possessed
ammunition;
(3) at the time the defendant knowingly possessed the ammunition, he
knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year; and
(4) the ammunition was transported across a state line at some time
during or before the defendant’s possession of it.
6.18.922A FELON IN POSSESSION OF FIREARM OR AMMUNITION (18
U.S.C. § 922(G)(1).
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts such that the Court can infer that
Defendant Brannan made the referral to federal authorities without probable cause
to support the crime for which he was charged. Significantly, Plaintiff does not allege
that there was no evidence to support the elements of the crime of felon in possession
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of a firearm or ammunition. For example, Plaintiff does not refute in his allegations
that he possessed a gun and ammunition when he was arrested at the post office.
Further, in his “Corrected Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts,” which Plaintiff
incorporates in his Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following:
“Plaintiff’s criminal history reflects a 1982 burglary conviction.” (ECF Nos. 43 at 3
and 58 at 8). The Court also takes judicial notice that on April 1, 1982, Plaintiff
pleaded guilty to burglary in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Illinois and
was sentenced to three years imprisonment on April 1, 1982. People v. Gibson, No.
81CF94 (Apr. 1, 1982).
Plaintiff does allege that his arrest on a federal charge “resulted from
Detective Brannan’s referral to federal authorities absent admissible evidence of a
crime.” (ECF No. 58 at 13) (emphasis added). To the extent Plaintiff is arguing that
evidence of the gun and ammunition would be suppressed because his arrest was
unlawful, the argument is without merit because “the existence of probable cause in
a civil action [ ] is measured based on all evidence known to the [ ] officer, whether
or not it would have been admissible at trial.” Klein, 44 F.4th at 1116.
The Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff was indicted by a
grand jury on the charge of felon in possession of ammunition. United States v.
Gibson, No. 4:20-CR-309 RLW (ECF No. 1). “An indictment, fair upon its face,
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returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence
of probable cause ….” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975) (citing Ex
parte U.S., 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932)). See also Kingdom Holdings, LLC v. Foss,
No. CV 5:23-5060-LLP, 2024 WL 4266755, at *6 (D.S.D. Sept. 23, 2024)
(indictment creates presumption of probable cause); Hassan v. Weyker, No.
16CV1911 (JNE/TNL), 2017 WL 3425687, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2017) (stating
that grand jury's indictment establishes the existence of probable cause absent any
plausible allegations that the indictments were tainted by fabrication of evidence).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Brannan withheld information or
supplied the federal prosecutors with fraudulent, false, or misleading information
related to the felon in possession of ammunition charge. White v. Frank, 855 F.2d
956, 961 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating “though an indictment by a grand jury is generally
considered prima facie evidence of probable cause in a subsequent civil action for
malicious prosecution, this presumption may be rebutted by proof that the defendant
misrepresented, withheld, or falsified evidence.”). Here, the federal indictment raises
the presumption that there was probable cause Plaintiff committed the crime of being
a felon in possession of ammunition.
Based on the allegation in Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint and
information contained in public records, of which the Court takes judicial notice, the
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Court finds Defendant Brannan had probable cause to refer Plaintiff to federal
authorities for an ammunition violation. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to adequately
assert a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant Brannan for malicious
prosecution.
Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against Defendant Brannan for a violation
of the United States Constitution. The claims in Counts IV, V, VII, VIII, X, and XII
brought against Defendant Brannan in his individual capacity are dismissed.
C. The Court Declines to Exercise Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s State Law
Claims.
No federal claims remain in this case. It is within the discretionary authority
of this Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
once the Court has dismissed “all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966) (if federal claims are dismissed before trial, remaining state claims should
also be dismissed). The Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all
remaining state law claims in this case and they are dismissed without prejudice.
VI. Conclusion
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Holmes, Hadzic,
and the County are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Court further finds
that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Brannan in his official capacity are the
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equivalent of claims against the County, and they also are barred by the doctrine of
res judicata. As to claims against Defendant Brannan in his individual capacity, the
Court dismisses with prejudice Counts IV, V, VII, VIII, X, and XII against
Defendant Brannan in his individual capacity. Finally, as no federal claims remain
in this case, the Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff’s Missouri state law
claims against Defendant Brannan in Counts IX and XI.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Shannon Gibson’s Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Authority is GRANTED. [ECF No. 71]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Shannon Gibson’s Motion for a
Hearing is DENIED. [ECF No. 75]
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Rob Brannan, Emir Hadzic,
Roger Holmes, and St. Louis County’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amended Complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Consistent with
the terms of this Opinion, Memorandum, and Order, Plaintiff’s claims against Emir
Hadzic, Roger Holmes, and St. Louis County are DISMISSED with prejudice
under the doctrine of res judicata; Plaintiff’s claims against Rob Brannan in his
official capacity are DISMISSED with prejudice under the doctrine of res judicata;
and Plaintiff’s claims against Rob Brannan in his individual capacity in Counts IV,
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V, VII, VIII, X, and XII are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED without prejudice. [ECF No. 66].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff Shannon Gibson’s state law claims against
Defendant Rob Brannan in Counts IX and XI, and these claims are DISMISSED
without prejudice.
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The Court will issue a separate Order of Dismissal.
Dated this 29" day of June, 2026.
HENRY EDWARD dp
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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