Olarewaju

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

OLAWOYIN PETER OLAREWAJU,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-00631

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

CRAIG A. LOWE, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is Petitioner Olawoyin Peter Olarewaju’s (“Olarewaju”) petition for

writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). Following a bond hearing before the Court on April 23, 2026,

the Court will grant the petition.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following background is derived from Olarewaju’s petition, the government’s

response, and the exhibits thereto. (Doc. 1; Doc. 4). Olarewaju is a citizen of Nigeria, who

entered the United States in 2016 on a B-2 visitor visa. (Doc. 1, at 2). On May 23, 2023,

Olarewaju plead guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud in the Southern District of New

York. (Doc. 1, at 2). On March 3, 2025, following Olarewaju’s sentence in federal custody,

ICE arrested Olarewaju pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and transferred him to custody at the

Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains detained. (Doc. 1, at 2). On May 21,

2025, an immigration judge ordered Olarewaju’s removal. (Doc. 4, at 4). The Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Olarewaju’s appeal of the immigration judge’s

decision on March 19, 2026. (Doc. 4, at 5). Since filing the instant petition, Olarewaju filed a

petition for review of the immigration judge’s order and the BIA’s dismissal with the Third

Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. 6, at 2).

On March 13, 2026, Olarewaju filed the instant petition, requesting that the Court

order his release from custody at the Pike County Correctional Facility in Lords Valley,

Pennsylvania or that Respondent Craig A. Lowe (“Lowe”) provide a bond hearing pursuant

to German Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020). (Doc.

1, at 3). The government filed a timely response to Olarewaju’s petition on March 23, 2026

(Doc. 4), and on March 30, 2026, Olarewaju filed a traverse. On April 17, 2026, the Court

ordered a bond hearing to be held before the undersigned, which took place on Thursday

April 23, 2026. (Doc. 7).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Lowe detained Olarewaju in immigration custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

(Doc. 1). The Due Process Clause requires a hearing “when detention becomes unreasonable”

and, at the hearing, “the Government bears the burden of proving that continued detention is

necessary to fulfill the purposes of the detention statute.” Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, 656

F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2011). The government must prove that continued detention is

necessary by clear and convincing evidence. German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility,

965 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2020).

A court cannot rely on “mechanistic factors” common to all Section 1226(c) detainees.

Instead, a court must find evidence specific to the individual that demonstrates either danger

to the community or flight risk. Santos v. Lowe, No. 18-cv-1553, 2020 WL 4530728, at *3

(M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2020); Chiguano v. Lowe, No. 1:24-cv-02210, 2025 WL 3280946, at *2

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025). The court must look at “an individualized analysis of the alien’s

eligibility for parole, present danger to society and willingness to comply with the removal

order.” Chi Thon Ngo v. I.N.S., 192 F.3d 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, a court must carefully

weigh evidence from a petitioner that tends to show “reform, rehabilitation, good character,

education, employment history and prospects, familial ties to United States citizens, potential

for relief from removal, and any other evidence that contravenes danger to the community or

risk of flight must be considered, as such evidence is highly relevant to ascertaining the

detainee’s current risk level.” Guerrero Sanchez v. Sabol, No. 15-cv-2423, 2016 WL 7426129, at

*5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2016); Chiguano v. Lowe, No. 1:24-cv-02210, 2025 WL 3280946, at *2

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025). “[W]hen assessing danger to the community, the extensiveness,

recency, and severity of a detainee’s past criminal activity must be considered.” Guerrero

Sanchez, 2016 WL 7426129, at *5. “[W]hen assessing risk of flight, common-sense

considerations include whether the imposition of conditions of release could mitigate flight

risk, and whether the detainee has strong family ties to the United States.” Guerrero Sanchez,

2016 WL 7426129, at *5. The determination of flight risk or danger must not be focused solely

on past conduct and should be “made on a current basis.” Guerrero Sanchez, 2016 WL

7426129, at *5; Chiguano v. Lowe, No. 1:24-cv-02210, 2025 WL 3280946, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov.

25, 2025).

III. DISCUSSION

The Government avers that Olarewaju’s continued detention is justified for the

purpose of preventing danger to the community and preventing flight. The Government

contends that, given the nature and circumstance of Olarewaju’s previous criminal conduct,

conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13491, Olarewaju could pose a

risk to the community, although the Government also acknowledges that this is a crime of

deceit and fraud and not a crime of violence. The Government also avers that the denial of

1 On December 27, 2021, Olarewaju pled guilty to this offense. (Doc. 12-3).

relief and affirmance of Olarewaju’s removal order by the Board of Immigration Appeals,

now on appeal with the Third Circuit, provides an incentive for Olarewaju to abscond,

making him a risk of flight, and that his family ties in the United States provide even more

incentive to not cooperate with a removal order.

Olarewaju contends that the Government fails to meet their burden of showing by

clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is necessary to fulfill the purposes of

the detention statute. Olarewaju provides that he is not a flight risk because he has a fixed

address with a current and renewable lease, extensive community ties and family support, a

history of attending court proceedings for both his criminal and immigration matters, a job

lined up, a capable and willing third-party custodian, and even a path to adjustment of

immigration status with eligibility for a humanitarian visa. Olarewaju also submits that he is

not a danger to the community because, while acknowledging the seriousness of his previous

conduct, his conviction is five years old and he has served his sentence, which was reduced

for good behavior, and he continues to pay restitution. Olarewaju avers that he will be in a

better position to pay the remaining restitution if he is released from custody because he will

be able to earn a paycheck at the job he has lined up.

The Third Circuit has cautioned that “[d]ue process is not satisfied, . . . , by

rubberstamp denials based on temporally distant offenses. The process due even to excludable

aliens requires an opportunity for an evaluation of the individual’s current threat to the

community and his risk of flight.” Chi Thon Ngo, 192 F. 3d at 398; Chiguano v. Lowe, No. 1:24-

cv-02210, 2025 WL 3280946, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025). “To presume dangerousness

to the community and risk of flight based solely on his past record does not satisfy due

process.” Chi Thon Ngo, 192 F. 3d at 398–99. Accordingly, reliance on Olarewaju’s past

conviction of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, which is not recent and does not involve any

violent activity, falls short of the due process owed to Olarewaju. See Luciano-Jimenez v. Doll,

547 F. Supp. 3d 462, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (“Criminal activity occurring over four years ago

cannot be the sole reason for a conclusion that petitioner is a current danger to the

community.”); see Guerrero Sanchez, 2016 WL 7426129 at *8 (finding that one prior conspiracy

conviction was insufficient to prove threat to the community). Olarewaju has no past record

of flight, and Olarewaju’s community ties mitigate risk of flight, especially with his United

States citizen brother and proposed third-party custodian indicating that he is willing and able

to ensure Olarewaju complies with the conditions of his release. See Leslie v. Holder, 856 F.

Supp. 2d 627, 640-41 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citing United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 162 (3d

Cir. 1986); United States v. Carbone, 793 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that petitioner’s

strong family ties mitigate the risk of flight). The Court is able to fashion conditions of release

are sufficient to ensure the safety of the community and the absence of flight.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Government has not met its

burden, and the Court will grant Olarewaju’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: April 24, 2026 /s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge