The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
AARON J. SCHATZINGER, CASE NO. 3:22-CV-00002-CEF
Petitioner, JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
vs. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DARRELL A. CLAY
WARDEN ANTHONY DAVIS,1 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Respondent.
Representing himself, Petitioner Aaron J. Schatzinger filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. (ECF #1). The District Court has jurisdiction over the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
On June 1, 2022, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2, this matter was referred to me to prepare a
Report and Recommendation. (Non-document entry of June 1, 2022). Respondent Warden
Anthony Davis (hereinafter, the State) filed the Return of Writ (including the state court record)
on October 27, 2022. (ECF #10). Mr. Schatzinger filed a Traverse to Return of Writ on March 29,
2023 (ECF #13), and the State filed a Sur-Reply to the Traverse on March 31, 2023. (ECF #14).
1 Mr. Schatzinger’s petition named Leon Hill, Warden, as the Respondent. “[T]he
default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being
held . . . .” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 427 (2004); see also Orick v. Palmer, No. 2:06-CV-
13287, 2014 WL 4265775, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2014) (“The only proper respondent in a
habeas case is the habeas petitioner’s custodian, which in the case of an incarcerated habeas
petitioner would be the warden of the facility where the petitioner is incarcerated.”) (citation
omitted). According to the Ohio Inmate Locator, Mr. Schatzinger is housed at the Trumbull
Correctional Institution. Anthony Davis is the warden of that facility, making him the proper
party to respond to Mr. Schatzinger’s petition. Accordingly, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d),
Warden Davis is automatically substituted in place of former Warden Hill.
For the reasons discussed below, I recommend the District Court DENY any relief
pursuant to the petition. I further recommend the District Court DENY a certificate of
appealability for all grounds for relief.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals
The Ohio Court of Appeals, Third Appellate District, set forth the facts of this case on
direct appeal. These factual findings are presumed correct unless Mr. Schatzinger rebuts this
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The Third District
determined:
{¶2} On December 20, 2017, Sergeant Kevin Robison (“Sergeant Robison”) of the
Wyandot County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched to Schatzinger’s residence. When
Sergeant Robison arrived, Schatzinger indicated that his girlfriend, Candace
Schatzinger (“Candace”) was nonresponsive. Sergeant Robison entered the residence
and found Candace in her bedroom. He then determined that she was deceased and
had “been gone for awhile [sic].” Sergeant Robison then secured the scene.
{¶3} Sergeant Edwin G. Gottfried (“Sergeant Gottfried”), who works in the detective
bureau at the Wyandot County Sheriff’s Office, was notified of Candace’s death at
5:45 A.M. Once at Schatzinger’s residence, he noted that Candace “appeared to
[have] be[en] in relatively good health” and suspected that she may have died of an
overdose. Sergeant Gottfried “sat down with [Schatzinger] * * * to try to get some
basic information.” Sergeant Gottfried testified that Schatzinger was “crying,
emotional,” and “distraught * * *.” Schatzinger told Sergeant Gottfried that Candace
“was not a [drug] user, that she would not use drugs, [and] that he did not use drugs.”
{¶4} During their sweep of the bedroom, the police discovered a pill that appeared
to be “Xanax or Alprazolam.” The police also discovered a part of a green pill on the
dresser in the bedroom. Because Candace had what appeared to be a Xanax pill next
to her bed, the police initially believed that a local drug dealer, Mark Powers
(“Powers”), may have been connected to this case. Powers was known to have been
“using a pill press to stamp fentanyl and/or heroin to look identical to a Xanax
Alprazolam pill.” Powers had also been linked to several overdose deaths in the area
and was Schatzinger’s first cousin.
{¶5} During the course of their investigation, the police also found Candace and
Schatzinger’s cellular phones in their bedroom. After Schatzinger consented to a
search of his cell phone, Sergeant Gottfried downloaded and examined its contents.
While Schatzinger had previously stated that he and Candace were not drug users,
his text messages indicated that he was not only using drugs but that he was also
procuring various drugs for Candace and a number of other people. Further,
Schatzinger’s phone contained multiple pictures of a white powdery substance in a
bag on a scale. When examining the content of Candace’s phone, Sergeant Gottfried
noted that Schatzinger was the only person who Candace “was having conversations
with relevant to drugs or supplying her with pills, marijuana, and other stronger stuff,
heroin * * *.”
{¶6} On December 21, 2017, Sergeant Gottfried sat down for an interview (“the
December 21 interview”) with Schatzinger. During this interview, Sergeant Gottfried
presented Schatzinger with copies of the pictures and text messages from his cell
phone that indicated he was involved in drug trafficking. Schatzinger admitted that
he had a drug addiction and indicated that he was using a gram to a gram and a half
of heroin every couple of days. When presented with the pictures from his phone of
heroin on scales, he stated that he was trafficking in drugs to support his addiction
and travelled out of town around two or three days a week to obtain drugs from his
supplier. He also admitted that he had been a “little” worried about getting some bad
heroin.
{¶7} During this interview, Schatzinger stated that Candace’s “habit” was “not that
bad.” He also indicated that Candace would do “a point or two at the most” of heroin
periodically and that she began using heroin “only a couple of months” before her
death. He admitted to supplying Candace with drugs but stated that he was “not sure
if she got anything else from anybody else or not.” Sergeant Gottfried then told
Schatzinger that, based on the text messages in Candace’s phone, “[s]he didn’t act
like she did [get drugs from another person]. I looked through her phone. Um, * * *
anytime she needed something as simple as marijuana, she was looking to you.” In
response, Schatzinger said that he “d[id]n’t know for sure” whether she got drugs
from another dealer.
{¶8} Since the police suspected that Powers had perhaps supplied Schatzinger with a
Xanax pill that was actually made of heroin and fentanyl, Sergeant Gottfried asked a
number of questions about Powers. Schatzinger admitted that Powers supplied him
with drugs on several occasions and was the source of the Xanax pills that he had
obtained for Candace. He also admitted that he was aware that the product that
Powers was selling had some issues. Powers had indicated that he was cutting his
drugs with other substances because of several overdoses that had happened.
Concerned by this information, Schatzinger indicated that he sought another source
for some of his drugs.
{¶9} After discussing Powers, Schatzinger expressed remorse for his role in Candace’s
death and eventually stated that he felt responsible. Schatzinger then wrote a
statement the reads as follows:
I’m not sure if this [the Xanax pills] is what killed my girl that I love
so much. I wish I knew if your pills killed my girl. I will hate you
[Powers] forever.
I would buy those off you for 5 dollars. And now my girl is gone! I
know now if I could take everything back, I would. I feel absolutely
horrible. And for the rest of my life I’ll be hurting.
Sergeant Gottfried noted that, if the Xanax pills were not the cause of Candace’s
death, the heroin likely was. Schatzinger then stated that he did not think that
Candace was becoming an addict and thought that he was “helping her out.”
{¶10} While a large portion of this interview related to Schatzinger’s relationship with
Powers, the pills that were found in Candace’s bedroom were subsequently
submitted to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigations (“BCI”) for testing on
January 9, 2018 and were found not to contain fentanyl. Instead, BCI determined
that these pills were “just prescription Xanax * * *.” For this reason, the police came
to believe that these Xanax pills were not the cause of Candace’s death. At trial,
Sergeant Gottfried stated that Powers “was eliminated in this particular incident.”
{¶11} Subsequently at trial, Schatzinger testified that he expressed remorse during his
interview with Sergeant Gottfried because he thought, at that time, that the Xanax
pills he obtained from Powers were the cause of Candace’s death. He further testified
that he no longer felt responsible for her death because the Xanax pills found in their
bedroom were not found to contain fentanyl. However, Sergeant Gottfried noted at
trial that, in his written statement, Schatzinger wrote that he “wish [he] knew if
[Powers’s] pills killed [Candace].” While he admitted that there appeared to be no
connection between Powers and Candace’s death, Sergeant Gottfried further noted
that he discussed a wide range of illegal drugs during his interview with Schatzinger.
{¶12} Further, an autopsy was performed on Candace. The coroner concluded that
Candace “died of acute combined drug intoxication, fentanyl, heroin, and
alprazolam.” The coroner further determined that the cause of death was “Accident—
substance abuse.” The coroner’s report also indicated that Candace died within
minutes to hours after the administration of the drugs, though the precise time of
death could not be pinpointed with certainty.
{¶13} On April 11, 2018, Schatzinger was indicted on one count of involuntary
manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), a felony of the first degree; one count
of corrupting another with drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), a felony of the
second degree; one count of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a
felony of the fifth degree; and one count of permitting drug abuse in violation of
R.C. 2925.13(B), a felony of the fifth degree. On September 30, 2019, the State filed
a motion to dismiss the charge of possession of heroin in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A).
{¶14} On October 2 and 3, 2019, Schatzinger was tried on these charges. The State
called Sergeant Robison, Sergeant Gottfried, and Candace’s stepmother, Angela M.
Bricely (“Bricely”), as witnesses. Dr. Robert B. Forney (“Dr. Forney”) also testified
about the results of Candace’s autopsy. A recording of the December 21 interview
between Sergeant Gottfried and Schatzinger was played for the jury. Copies of
various text messages and photos from Candace and Schatzinger’s phones were also
introduced into evidence.
{¶15} At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the Defense made Crim.R. 29 motions
for each of the charges against Schatzinger. The trial court denied these Crim.R. 29
motions. Schatzinger then testified in his own defense. On October 3, 2019, the jury
found Schatzinger guilty of the offense of corrupting another with drugs and the
offense of permitting drug abuse. However, the jury could not reach a verdict on the
charge of involuntary manslaughter. On October 22, 2019, the trial court issued a
judgment entry of sentencing.
(ECF #10-1 at PageID 302-08 (citations omitted); see also State v. Schatzinger, No. 16-20-04, 2021
WL 237217 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2021), appeal not allowed, 166 N.E.3d 1263 (Ohio 2021)
(table)).
B. Trial court proceedings
In April 2018, a Wyandot County Grand Jury returned a four-count indictment against
Mr. Schatzinger, charging him with involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Ohio Revised Code
§ 2903.04(A); corrupting another with drugs, in violation of Revised Code § 2925.02(A)(3);
possession of heroin, in violation of Revised Code § 2925.11(A); and permitting drug abuse, in
violation of Revised Code § 2925.02. (ECF #10-1 at PageID 72-74, 406). He was arraigned the
same day, pled not guilty, and was released on bond. (Id. at PageID 75-76).
On September 30, 2019, the State moved to dismiss the possession-of-heroin charge. (Id. at
PageID 79-80). The trial court granted the motion on October 1, 2019. (Id. at PageID 82).
A jury trial began on October 2, 2019 and concluded the next day. (See ECF #10-2, 10-3).
The jury convicted Mr. Schatzinger of corrupting another with drugs and permitting drug abuse
but could not return a unanimous verdict on the involuntary-manslaughter charge. (ECF #10-1 at
PageID 93-94).
On October 21, 2019, Mr. Schatzinger appeared for sentencing. (Id. at PageID 96-102). His
Criminal Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. (Id.). The trial court imposed a
sentence of eight years’ imprisonment on the corrupting-another-with-drugs charge and nine
months’ imprisonment on the permitting-drug-abuse charge, to be served concurrently. (Id.). On
October 24, 2019, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc entry correcting a clerical error in the
original sentencing order. (Id. at PageID 104-09).
C. Direct appeal
On October 22, 2019, Mr. Schatzinger filed a Notice of Appeal (Id. at PageID 111),
followed by an Amended Notice of Appeal on October 31, 2019 through new defense counsel (Id.
at PageID 112). After briefing by both parties (Id. at PageID 127-68, 169-94), on May 21, 2020, the
Third District dismissed Mr. Schatzinger’s appeal. (Id. at PageID 196-201). It held the trial court’s
judgment entry was not a final appealable order because it did not “reflect final determination of
the involuntary-manslaughter charge.” (Id. at PageID 200). The Third District remanded the
matter to the trial court “for execution of the judgment for costs.” (Id. at PageID 201).
On May 20, 2020, the State moved to dismiss the involuntary-manslaughter charge (Id. at
PageID 203-04), which the trial court granted the following day. (Id at PageID 206). On May 27,
2020, Mr. Schatzinger again appealed to the Third District. (Id. at PageID 208). His Brief of
Appellant advanced four assignments of error, as follows:
1. Permitting drug abuse in violation of Ohio Revised Code §2925.13(B) is not
supported by the evidence, and that the Defendant-Appellant knowingly
permitted a felony drug abuse offense to take place in his residence and as such
his conviction must be vacated.
2. The Defendant-Appellant’s conviction for corruption of another with drugs in
violation of Ohio Revised Code §2925.02(A)(3), was based on an inference
upon an inference as to the possession and subsequent supplying by the
Defendant-Appellant, controlled substance to the decedent which resulted in
her death and such conviction must be vacated.
3. That neither of the convictions herein for permitting drug abuse or corrupting
another with drugs, are supported by sufficient evidence and that the manifest
weight of the evidence, directs that both convictions are improper and must
be vacated.
4. That the conviction issued herein for corrupting another with drugs, is not
supported by sufficient evidence and the conviction must be vacated.
(Id. at PageID 229). The State filed a Brief of Appellee (Id. at PageID 271-98), and on January 25,
2021, the Third District affirmed Mr. Schatzinger’s convictions and sentence. (Id. at PageID 300-
30).
On March 4, 2021, Mr. Schatzinger filed a Notice of Appeal and Memorandum in Support
of Jurisdiction with the Supreme Court of Ohio. (Id. at PageID 333, 335-83). In his Memorandum
in Support, he advanced two arguments, as follows:
First Argument
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONVICTED THE DEFENDANT IN
VIOLATION OF R.C. §2925.13(b), PERMITTING DRUG ABUSE WHEN
THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF A FELONY DRUG OFFENSE BY THE
OTHER OR THAT THE OFFENSE TOOK PLACE AT THE DEFENDANT’S
RESIDENCE.
Proposition of Law
A conviction of permitting drug abuse under R.C. §2925.13(B), requires proof that
a person occupying a residence knowingly allowed another to permit a felony drug
offense. A conviction for such offense cannot be sustained without evidence of the
felony abuse offense and where it took place.
Second Argument
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONVICTED THE DEFENDANT IN
VIOLATION OF R.C. §2925.02(A)(3), CORRUPTING ANOTHER WITH
DRUGS WITHOUT PROOF OF THE CAUSE ONLY BETWEEN THE
DEFENDANT’S ACTION ARE AT THE ARM TO THE OTHER PERSON.
Proposition of Law
A conviction of corruption of another with drugs in violation of R.C.
§2925.02(A)(3), requires a finding that the defendant either administered, furnished,
induced or caused another to use a controlled substance and thereby caused serious
physical harm to another or to become drug dependent. Such a conviction cannot
be based upon an inference from the evidence taken from another inference from
the evidence.
(Id. at PageID 336-37). The State filed a Memorandum in Response, opposing the grant of
jurisdiction. (Id. at PageID 385-92). On April 27, 2021, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined
jurisdiction. (Id. at PageID 394; see also State v. Schatzinger, 166 N.E.3d 1263 (Ohio 2021) (table)).
FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION
On January 3, 2022, representing himself, Mr. Schatzinger filed his habeas petition in this
Court. (ECF #1). In it, he advanced two grounds for relief, as follows:
Ground One: Insufficient evidence for permitting drug abuse in violation of the 5th
and 14th Amendments.
Supporting Facts: The trial court improperly and unlawfully convicted this
petitioner of violating R.C. 2925.13(B), permitting drug abuse when an essential
element was not proven, either a felony drug offense by another or that the offense
took place at the petitioner’s residence. One of which elements were required to have
been proven but were not as constitutionally required thus violating due process and
a fair trial.
Ground Two: Insufficient evidence to support a conviction for corrupting another
with drugs violating 5th and 14th Amendments.
Supporting Facts: An essential element of a conviction under 2925.02(A)(3) is a
finding that the petitioner either administered, furnished, induced or caused another
to use a controlled substance and thereby caused serious physical harm to another or
to become drug dependent. This essential element cannot be based upon an
inference from evidence taken from another inference from the evidence as such
violates this petitioner’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and the due process of law.
(ECF #1 at PageID 5, 7) (cleaned up).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs Mr.
Schatzinger’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
AEDPA recognizes that “[s]tate courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights”
and therefore acts as a “formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have
been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013). It “dictates a highly
deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings which demands that state-court decisions be
given the benefit of the doubt.” Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (citation and quotation
omitted). Accordingly, an application for habeas corpus cannot be granted for a person in custody
pursuant to a state conviction unless the adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Habeas courts review the last explained state-court judgment on the federal claim at issue.
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805 (1991). For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), clearly established
federal law “is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the
time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). It includes
“the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of [Supreme Court] decisions.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412 (2000). The state-court decision does not need to refer to relevant Supreme Court cases or
even demonstrate awareness of them; it is sufficient that the result and reasoning are consistent
with Supreme Court precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam).
A state-court decision is contrary to Supreme Court precedent if the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has decided on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.
2005). The word “contrary” means “diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or
mutually opposed.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. A state court does not act contrary to clearly
established law when the precedent of the Supreme Court is ambiguous or nonexistent. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003) (per curiam).
A state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s
precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Supreme Court’s
cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the state prisoner’s case, or if the state court either
unreasonably extends a legal principle from the Supreme Court’s precedent to a new context
where it should not be applied or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle in a new context
where it should apply. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. The appropriate measure of whether a state-court
decision unreasonably applied clearly established federal law is whether that state adjudication was
“objectively unreasonable” and not merely erroneous or incorrect. Id. at 409-11; see also Machacek
v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 953 (6th Cir. 2000). “It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief
does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 102 (2011).
Under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations stand unless they are objectively
unreasonable given the evidence presented in state court. Id. at 100. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized “a state court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the
federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion.” Burt, 571 U.S. at 18.
Under federal law, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be
presumed to be correct. [Petitioner] shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2554(e)(1). Comity principles also
require federal courts to defer to a state’s judgment on issues of state substantive and procedural
law. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-129 (1982).
Federal courts must accept a state court’s interpretation of its statutes and rules of practice. Duffel
v. Dutton, 785 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1986).
The standard is intended to be difficult to meet and reflects the view that habeas corpus is
a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” not a substitute for
ordinary error correction through appeal. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102-03; see also Brown v.
Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 133 (2022) (describing habeas as an “extraordinary remedy, reserved for
only extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system and different in kind from providing
relief on direct appeal”) (cleaned up). To obtain “habeas corpus from a federal court, a state
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was
so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing
law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.
When a properly presented federal constitutional claim was not adjudicated on the merits
in the state courts, the reviewing federal court must apply the pre-AEDPA standard, reviewing de
novo questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 432 (6th
Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION
Both of Mr. Schatzinger’s grounds for relief challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions for permitting drug abuse and corrupting another with drugs. The State
responds that neither of Mr. Schatzinger’s claims warrant habeas relief. (ECF #10 at PageID 50,
58). I agree with the State.
General Principles of Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Review. The due process clause requires
the State prove every fact necessary to constitute the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In
Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Supreme
Court established the standard for reviewing constitutional claims challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence:
[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . This familiar standard gives
full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts.
Id. at 319. Otherwise stated, a petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if, based on the record
evidence at trial and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could
have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 324. The Sixth Circuit has aptly
described this standard as imposing a “nearly insurmountable hurdle.” Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d
525, 534 (6th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Furthermore, the State does not have an “affirmative duty to rule out every hypothesis
except that of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Under this standard, “a
federal habeas court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must
presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any
such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Id. The Supreme
Court teaches that “the Jackson inquiry does not focus on whether the trier of fact made a correct
guilt or innocence determination, but rather whether it made a rational decision to convict or
acquit.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993).
On federal habeas review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, reviewing
courts are bound by two layers of deference. First, in determining whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the federal court
does not reweigh the evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its
opinion for that of the trier of fact. Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 1993)). Thus, even if the federal court might not
agree with the trier of fact’s decision to convict, it must uphold the determination if any rational
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty after resolving all disputes in favor of the
prosecution. Id.
The second layer of deference required under AEDPA extends to the state appellate court’s
determination so long as it is not unreasonable. See Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652, 656 (6th Cir.
2008); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The reviewing district court gives deference to the trier of
fact’s verdict and to the state court’s consideration of the trier of fact’s verdict. Davis, 658 F.3d at
531. Additionally, as described above, comity principles require federal courts to defer to a state’s
judgment on issues of state substantive and procedural law, see Murray, 477 U.S. at 491, and
federal courts must accept a state court’s interpretation of state law and its rules of practice, Duffel,
785 F.2d at 133. The state court’s interpretation of state law is binding on a federal court sitting in
habeas review. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
Mr. Schatzinger’s Conviction for Permitting Drug Abuse. Mr. Schatzinger’s direct appeal
to the Third District challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction for
permitting drug abuse. The Third District rejected this challenge, explaining as follows:
First Assignment of Error
{¶17} Schatzinger argues that his conviction for permitting drug abuse is not
supported by sufficient evidence.
Legal Standard
{¶18} A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction “is a
question of law and a ‘test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight of the
evidence.’” “The sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis addresses the question of
whether adequate evidence was produced for the case to be considered by the trier
of fact and, thus, whether the evidence was ‘legally sufficient to support the verdict *
* *.’ ” On appeal, the applicable standard
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶19} To prove the offense of permitting drug abuse in violation of R.C. 2925.13(B),
the State must establish that the defendant “[1] is the owner, lessee, or occupant, or
who has custody, control, or supervision, of premises or real estate, including vacant
land” and “[2] knowingly [3] permit[ted] the premises or real estate, including vacant
land, to be used for the commission of a felony drug abuse offense [4] by another
person.” “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware
that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a
certain nature.”
{¶20} In proving a conviction, “[i]t is a well-settled rule of law that direct evidence is
not necessary for the trier of fact to make a finding; circumstantial evidence has the
same probative value.”
Direct evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or
observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption.” Circumstantial evidence is “evidence based on inference
and not on personal knowledge or observation.”
“A conviction can be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone.”
Legal Analysis
{¶21} Schatzinger does not challenge the first element of this offense on appeal.
Instead, Schatzinger argues that the State failed to establish that Candace was
committing a felony drug offense in the residence. He also argues that “there is not
a reasonable basis” to believe that Schatzinger had “knowledge that the decedent was
committing a felony drug offense in the home.” We will limit our analysis to the
arguments that the appellant has raised on appeal.
{¶22} At trial, the State introduced a number of text messages that were exchanged
between Schatzinger and Candace. On October 24, 2017, the following exchange
occurred:
[Schatzinger]: Does Steff like the white?
[Candace]: I’m not sure if she dose [sic] that any more or not. She’s
supposed to stop by today and pay me for those jeans I’ll ask her if you want
me to?
[Schatzinger]: Yeah ask I guess we have some to get rid
[Candace]: You bringing me any home wink wink wink * * *
During the December 21 interview, Schatzinger explained that “white” referred to
cocaine. On November 2, 2017, the following exchange occurred:
[Candace:] Grab me one please...
[Candace:] Grab me one please...
[Schatzinger:] F**k o [sic] forgot everything
[Candace:] What?
Schatzinger later explained to Sergeant Gottfried that Candace was asking him to get
some Percocet for her in these texts.
{¶23} On November 17, 2017, Candace and Schatzinger were texting about whether
she should submit to a drug test for a job she was about to start:
[Candace:] She said people they’re [sic] have used it and passed [the drug
test]
[Schatzinger:] I would be scared to take one H,coke,pills and pot!! There
[sic] bound to find something it’s up too you though
Sergeant Gottfried asked Schatzinger if this meant that he was advising Candace not
to take the drug test because she would test positive for heroin, cocaine, pills, and
marijuana. Schatzinger replied, “probably.”
{¶24} In another text, Candace stated, “I’ve been talking [sic] stool softner. It’s too
late to take a laxative I’ll be up all night s******g.” At the December 21 interview,
Sergeant Gottfried noted that heroin causes constipation. He stated that this was an
indication that Candace was, by this point, using drugs fairly regularly. Further,
Sergeant Gottfried testified at trial that constipation is a common symptom “for
someone that is taking a lot of medications and/or is on opiates.”
{¶25} On November 19, 2017, the following exchange occurred between Candace
and Schatzinger:
[Candace:] I’m still really tired today. * * *
[Schatzinger:] That stuff does that lol
[Candace:] I’ve only done one since you left
[Schatzinger:] Oh what you found
[Candace:] Probably not sure one of the lil pieces I got from you
(Emphasis added.) During the December 21 interview, Sergeant Gottfried noted that
this language seemed to indicate that Candace had done some drugs at home while
Schatzinger was present and before he had left. In response to Gottfried’s statement,
Schatzinger indicated that he could not remember what drug had been on his dresser
on that day.
{¶26} On December 3, 2017, Candace texted Schatzinger about what she had seen
two of her children, J.J. and K.S., do earlier:
[Candace:] Umm so JJ told [K.S.] that we crush pills and snort then [sic] u
our nose and showed her how we do it ... * * *
[Candace:] He showed her with carrots
[Schatzinger:] Omg I hope you had a talk with him and tell him we don’t
do that omg.
[Candace:] Auto-Reply I’m driving right now – I’ll get back to you later.
[Schatzinger:] Make something up idk what tell her medicine for somebody
that can’t swallow
[Schatzinger:] Omg that’s not good what if he does that at school
[Schatzinger:] can’t do nothing anymore
During the December 21 interview, Sergeant Gottfried noted that the children
appear to have seen them use heroin. Schatzinger said, “I don’t think we did it around
the kids. It accidentally happened, you know what I mean.” (Emphasis added.)
Sergeant Gottfried then noted that this text appeared to indicate that their children
were aware of their drug usage.
{¶27} On December 4, 2017, Candace texted Schatzinger this series of requests:
[Candace:] Grab me some smokes please * * *
[Candace:] My back and my feet are killing me wish you could
for tomorrow * * *
[Candace:] Don’t forget my smokes your going to have to get them in town
everything is closed * * *
(Emphasis added.)
{¶28} Sergeant Gottfried also asked about another text where Candace requested a
couple of grams from him. However, Schatzinger told him that Candace was not
talking about heroin and was asking for marijuana. There was another text exchange
from October where Candace reported that she “only had about a half left.” In
response, Schatzinger replied, “Sweet. Let’s do it when I get home and I’ll grab a couple
and do one when I get back.” (Emphasis added.) Schatzinger told Sergeant Gottfried
that this exchange was about Percocet.
{¶29} During the December 21 interview, Schatzinger admitted that he was aware of
Candace’s heroin use, though he stated that her habit was “not that bad.” He stated
that Candace “wasn’t really like hooked on anything, but just every now and then
she would try—try stuff, you know.” Sergeant Gottfried stated that, as he examined
Candace’s text messages, he noticed that she progressed from drugs like marijuana
to harder drugs like heroin. Schatzinger indicated that Candace had started using
heroin “only a couple of months” before she died. He also affirmed that Candace
would do “a point or two at the most” when she used it. Sergeant Gottfried noted
that her text messages confirmed that she started using heroin in late October or
early November of 2017. Schatzinger stated that he could not remember the last time
that he saw her use drugs.
{¶30} Further, Candace was found deceased in her bedroom as the result of a drug
overdose. Dr. Forney testified that, based on the autopsy report, Candace likely died
“within one to two hours max” after she ingested the fatal drug cocktail. He then
added that she “[p]robably [died within] less than an hour.” Sergeant Gottfried also
recovered two straws from the bedroom that were suspected to have traces of fentanyl
on them. However, he testified that the straws were never tested to confirm this
suspicion.
{¶31} In this case, Schatzinger admitted that he knew Candace had been using heroin
for one or two months before her death. The text messages admitted into evidence
indicate that Schatzinger also knew that Candace had been using heroin, cocaine,
and Percocet. Further, the text messages also indicated that Candace was doing illegal
drugs in her home. During the December 21 interview, Sergeant Gottfried read a
text message that indicated Schatzinger had planned to do drugs with Candace
“when [he] got home.” Based on the text messages admitted at trial, their children
also appear to have been aware of Candace and Schatzinger’s use of illegal drugs.
Finally, Candace also passed away in their bedroom from a heroin and fentanyl
induced overdose. We conclude that, from the facts presented at trial, a jury could
infer that Schatzinger knew that Candace was committing a felony drug offense in
his residence.
{¶32} After reviewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the State had produced
some evidence to substantiate the essential elements that Schatzinger has challenged
on appeal. For this reason, his conviction for the crime of permitting drug abuse is
not unsupported by sufficient evidence as alleged. Thus, Schatzinger’s first
assignment of error is overruled.
State v. Schatzinger, 2021 WL 237217, at *4-7 (citations omitted).
In his petition, Mr. Schatzinger asserts his conviction for permitting drug abuse was not
supported by sufficient evidence because “an essential element was not proven, either a felony drug
offense by another or that the offense took place at the petitioner’s residence.” (ECF #1 at PageID
5). In his Traverse, he argues he and the victim “had a ‘split/duel [sic] lease with an equal share of
the residence, meaning, no party had control over the other resident outside of an eviction
enforced by the landlord or the court of common pleas,” citing Revised Code § 5321.05. (ECF
#13 at PageID 737). Mr. Schatzinger did not advance this specific argument before the Third
District; as such, the argument is procedurally defaulted before this Court.2 The remainder of his
argument for Ground One is cognizable but after applying the two layers of deference described
above, I conclude the Third District’s application of state law and its review of the evidence
admitted at trial withstands scrutiny. Mr. Schatzinger does not direct the Court to any clearly
established federal law that is violated by his conviction for permitting drug abuse.
The role of a habeas court is neither to re-try a case nor “to upset state court judgments by
substituting [its own] judgments or opinions.” Neace v. Edwards, No. 02-4079, 2005 WL 1059274,
2 In Ohio, claims must be raised on direct appeal, if possible, or res judicata bars
their litigation in subsequent proceedings. McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 738 F.3d 741,
751 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing State v. Perry, 226 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ohio 1967)). Therefore, a
petitioner is not entitled to raise claims in post-conviction proceedings that could have been raised
on direct appeal. Engle, 456 U.S. at 125 n.28. Consequently, if an Ohio petitioner fails to raise a
claim on direct appeal that could have been raised at that time, the claim is procedurally defaulted.
Id.
To overcome this procedural bar, a petitioner must show cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law or demonstrate that failure to consider
the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
749 (1991). Mr. Schatzinger makes no argument or showing as to either; therefore, procedural
default still applies.
at *6 (6th Cir. May 6, 2005) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)). Additionally, a
federal habeas court is not “an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made
insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Group v. Robinson, 132 F. Supp. 3d 954, 959
(N.D. Ohio 2015) (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011)). Federal district courts do
not operate as another level of “appellate tribunals to review alleged errors in state court judgments
of conviction.” Baker v. Reid, 482 F. Supp. 470, 471 (S.D. N.Y. 1979). Rather, the only question
this federal habeas court may decide is whether the state-court decision was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
Mr. Schatzinger has not met this high standard as concerns his conviction for permitting
drug abuse. Therefore, I recommend that the District Court DENY any relief as to Ground One
of his habeas petition.
Mr. Schatzinger’s Conviction for Corrupting Another with Drugs. Mr. Schatzinger’s
direct appeal to the Third District also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
conviction for corrupting another with drugs. The Third District similarly rejected this challenge,
explaining as follows:
Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶33} Schatzinger argues that his conviction for corrupting another with drugs is not
supported by sufficient evidence.
Legal Standard
{¶34} We herein reincorporate the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard set forth
under the first assignment of error. To prove the offense of corrupting another with
drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), the State must establish that the defendant
“[1] knowingly * * * [2] [b]y any means, administer[ed] or furnish[ed] to another * * *
[3] a controlled substance, and [4] thereby cause[d] serious physical harm to the other
person, or cause[d] the other person to become drug dependent.” “A person acts
knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct
will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
Legal Analysis
{¶35} While Schatzinger concedes that death would constitute serious physical harm,
he argues that the State did not present any direct evidence that he “furnished”
Candace with the fatal dosage of heroin and fentanyl that caused her death.
However, the State could also establish this offense by proving that Schatzinger
“knowingly * * * furnish[ed] a controlled substance and * * * caused [Candace] * * *
to become drug dependent.”
{¶36} At trial, the State introduced an abundance of evidence that established that
Schatzinger supplied Candace with illegal drugs. During the December 21 interview,
the following exchange occurred:
[Sergeant Gottfried:] Did she have a drug dealer or did she pretty much get
the stuff that you brought home?
[Schatzinger:] I’m not sure if she got anything else from anybody else or
not.
[Sergeant Gottfried:] She doesn’t act like she did. I looked through her
phone. Um, did not see anytime she needed something as simple as
marijuana she was looking to you. Does that sound pretty accurate?
[Schatzinger:] I don’t know for sure. I can’t say one hundred percent.
Schatzinger further admitted that he supplied Candace with illegal drugs, ranging
from marijuana to Percocet. He also admitted to obtaining Xanax from Powers at
Candace’s request.
{¶37} However, Sergeant Gottfried testified that he had reviewed Candace’s text
messages and that Schatzinger was the only person from whom she requested illegal
drugs. At trial, he stated the following:
[I]nitially we looked at different avenues. We had heard one individual was
possibly supplying Aaron Schatzinger and Candace, which was a Travis
Danner, who we are familiar with. So I looked in [Candace’s] phone for
conversations with Travis Danner, along with numerous other
conversation threads she had still currently on her cell phone. And I did
not observe any real drug content that would suggest getting drugs from
any of those individuals, until I came to the thread with Aaron Schatzinger.
He further testified that the police investigation did not uncover any other people
who supplied Candace with drugs. At various points, the texts between Candace and
Schatzinger mention heroin, cocaine, Percocet, and marijuana. She specifically asked
Schatzinger for Percocet and marijuana in these text messages.
{¶38} Further, the text messages at trial indicate that Schatzinger was trafficking in
heroin. He had multiple pictures on his phone of heroin on scales. Schatzinger told
Sergeant Gottfried that he was trafficking in drugs primarily to support his heroin
addiction. He further admitted that he was using one to one and a half grams of
heroin every couple of days. He indicated that each gram of heroin cost him $100.00
to $120.00. For this reason, he stated that he was not making much money from
selling heroin to others.
{¶39} During the December 21 interview, Schatzinger admitted that he was a “little”
concerned about getting some bad heroin in the process of trafficking these drugs.
The prosecution also introduced several text messages from several people who had
purchased heroin from Schatzinger. One of these contacts informed Schatzinger the
product he sold caused him to “fade out bad.” Another contact reported that the
product was “burning [his] nose bad.” Schatzinger told Sergeant Gottfried that, if he
could go back, he would not have sold these drugs to people.
{¶40} However, after receiving texts indicating that the drugs he was selling were too
strong, he received texts from his contacts with reports the drugs he was trafficking
were not strong enough. Schatzinger was, at this time, obtaining drugs from Powers.
He texted Powers about this issue. Powers replied the drugs were not as strong
because he was cutting them “because all the ods.” During the December 17
interview, Schatzinger stated that this concerned him and that he began to get drugs
from other sources. However, Schatzinger still obtained the Xanax for Candace from
Powers even though he was aware that Powers was selling dangerous substances that
had caused overdoses.
{¶41} During the December 21 interview, Schatzinger stated that he did not think
that Candace was becoming an addict and that he believed that he was helping her
out by providing her with these drugs. At trial, Sergeant Gottfried testified about the
progression of Candace’s drug usage based on the text messages on her phone.
[Sergeant Gottfried:] It was a long history of text messages dating back
several months of conversations between Aaron Schatzinger and Candace
Schatzinger. And through those conversations, it was very evident to me,
whose dealt with the epidemic, and dealt with numerous drug
investigations, that there was a process where an individual who was drug
dependent. It’s not an immediate thing. It’s almost a gradual process,
where someone may start with pills, and then get deeper into pills, maybe
stronger pills, and then moving to heroin, and then stronger heroin. It was
almost a process that we could see of a telling tale of the last few months of
Candace Schatzinger’s life, which started out with getting marijuana,
getting pills, moving towards heroin, stronger heroin, doing more, needing
it, becoming constipated * * * which is also commonly—for someone that is
taking a lot of medications and/or is on opiates. So once we saw this, I
started to see where the only person that she was having conversations with
relevant to drugs or supplying her with pills, marijuana, and other stronger
stuff, heroin, was Aaron Schatzinger. If she needed something, her
conversation thread indicated that she was contacting him, Aaron
Schatzinger, to get her this.
Sergeant Gottfried had also explained to Schatzinger that the constipation referred
to in the text messages would indicate that Candace was engaging in more regular
heroin use by the middle of November.
{¶42} At trial, Bricely testified that Candace lost weight in the months before she
died. She also testified that Candace had become more withdrawn over time and less
social. Bricely stated that she was unaware that Candace had been using illegal drugs.
However, she testified that the family had planned to have an intervention after
Christmas in 2017 because they were concerned about Candace and wanted to find
out what was happening with her.
{¶43} During the December 21 interview, Schatzinger indicated that Candace had
progressed to heroin one or two months before her death. Sergeant Gottfried noted
that this statement was consistent with the text messages. Schatzinger affirmed that
Candace was using about “a point or two” but that her habit was not as bad as his
had been. He stated that he could not remember the last time that he saw her using
heroin. Schatzinger also indicated that Candace began losing weight before she
started using the harder drugs.
{¶44} In this case, the State provided evidence that Schatzinger furnished Candace
with a variety of controlled substances over an extended period of time. Further, the
prosecution provided evidence that Candace became progressively more dependent
on stronger and stronger drugs, moving from marijuana to pills to heroin over the
course of several months. After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could conclude that
Schatzinger committed the offense of corrupting another with drugs. Since the State
provided some evidence for each of the essential elements of this crime, this
conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. Thus, Schatzinger’s fourth assignment
of error is overruled.
State v. Schatzinger, 2021 WL 237217, at *7-9 (citations omitted).
Before this Court, Mr. Schatzinger advances the same argument he did before the Third
District – that his conviction for corrupting another with drugs was not supported by sufficient
evidence because there was no proof that he “administered, furnished, induced or caused another
to use a controlled substance and therefore caused serious physical harm to another or to become
drug dependent.” (ECF #1 at PageID 7; see also ECF #10-1 at PageID 246-47). He expands the
argument before this Court, arguing that the State improperly received the benefit of an inference
based on an inference, which he says runs afoul of state law including State v. Nevius, 71 N.E.2d
258 (Ohio 1947), and State v. Maynard, No. 11AP-697, 2012 WL 2463966 (Ohio Ct. App. June
28, 2013). (ECF #13 at PageID 738-40). He also cites the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States
v. Valadez-Gallegos, 162 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 1998), which stated in part: “[W]e may not uphold a
conviction obtained by piling inference on inference.” Id. at 1262 (citing United States v. Jones, 44
F.3d 860, 865 (10th Cir. 1995)).
Even if Mr. Schatzinger were correct that federal law prohibited a conviction based on an
inference drawn from another inference – an issue as to which I express no opinion – any such
rule was not broken here. The Third District’s decision upholding Mr. Schatzinger’s conviction for
corrupting another with drugs provided a detailed analysis of the evidence adduced at trial from
which it found the State proved both that Mr. Schatzinger “furnished [the victim] with a variety of
controlled substances over an extended period of time” and that as a result, the victim “became
progressively more dependent on stronger and stronger drugs, moving from marijuana to pills to
heroin over the course of several months.” State v. Schatzinger, 2021 WL 237217, at *9. These
conclusions from the evidence, reached without having to draw an inference based on another
inference, establish each of the essential elements of the offense of corrupting another with drugs
under Ohio law, and Mr. Schatzinger has not cited any federal authority to the contrary.
In point of fact, the Third District addressed this same argument in rejecting Mr.
Schatzinger’s second assignment of error, writing as follows:
Second Assignment of Error
{¶45} Schatzinger argues that his conviction for corrupting another with drugs is
based upon an inference upon an inference.
Legal Standard
{¶46} “An inference based solely and entirely upon another inference, unsupported
by any additional fact or another inference from other facts, is an inference on an
inference and may not be indulged in by a jury.” However, “a given state of facts may
give rise to two or more inferences, and in such case one inference is not built upon
another but each is drawn separately from the same facts.” Thus, “a trier of fact may
draw multiple inferences from the same set of facts.”
Legal Analysis
{¶47} Schatzinger argues that his conviction for corrupting another with drugs is
based on an impermissible inference on an inference. Specifically, he asserts that the
jury inferred that he had possession of the fatal heroin compound and that he
furnished this compound to Candace. However, the State did not have to establish
that Schatzinger furnished Candace with the fatal dosage of heroin in order to prove
that he committed the offense of corrupting another with drugs. The State could also
establish a conviction for this offense by proving that he caused Candace to become
drug dependent.
{¶48} At trial, the State introduced evidence that established that Schatzinger was an
addict who regularly used heroin; that Schatzinger was trafficking in heroin to
support his habit; that Schatzinger had seen Candace use heroin, though he could
not recall the last occasion that he saw her ingest this drug; that Schatzinger had
supplied Candace with the controlled substances she had requested from him over
an extended period of time; and that Schatzinger had procured marijuana, Percocet,
and Xanax for her. From these facts, a jury could infer that Schatzinger had also
furnished Candace with heroin. This conclusion did not require the jury to make an
inference on an inference.
{¶49} Further, the State also introduced evidence that established that Schatzinger
supplied Candace with various types of drugs over an extended period of time; that
Candace progressed from marijuana to pills to harder drugs, such as heroin, during
this timeframe; that Candace had only progressed to heroin a few months before she
died; and that Candace had a heroin “habit,” though her habit was not as bad as
Schatzinger's habit. From these facts a jury could infer that Schatzinger had, by
furnishing her these various kinds of controlled substances, caused her to form a
drug dependency that progressed over time from marijuana to pills to heroin.
{¶50} These conclusions do require inferences. However, these conclusions do not
require inferences upon inferences. From the evidence introduced at trial, a jury
could make permissible inferences that support a conviction for corrupting another
with drugs. For this reason, Schatzinger's second assignment of error is overruled.
State v. Schatzinger, 2021 WL 237217, at *9-10 (citations omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend the District Court DENY relief as to Ground Two
of Mr. Schatzinger’s habeas petition.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A habeas petitioner may not appeal the denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus
unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability (COA) and specifies the issues that can be raised
on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). “A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Where a district court has determined a petitioner’s constitutional claim to be without merit, the
petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of
the constitutional claim debatable or wrong” before receiving a COA. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000). When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without
reaching the petitioner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner
shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id. A showing that the appeal would
succeed on the claim is not required to grant a COA. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337
(2003).
Mr. Schatzinger has not made a substantial showing that he was denied any constitutional
right. Jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the grounds for relief are valid claims
of the denial of constitutional rights. Similarly, no procedural ruling appears to be in error.
Therefore, I recommend the District Court DENY Mr. Schatzinger a COA as to either ground of
his petition.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend the District Court DENY any relief based on Mr.
Schatzinger’s petition. I also recommend the District Court DENY a certificate of appealability as
to all grounds for relief.
Dated: May 29, 2024
} | ]
DARRELL A. CLAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Objections, Review, and Appeal
Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and
Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Civ. R. 72.3(b). Properly asserted
objections shall be reviewed de novo by the assigned district judge.
Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or
waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal, either to the district judge or in a
subsequent appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or
whether the party responds to the Report and Recommendation. Berkshire v.
Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be specific and not
merely indicate a general objection to the entirety of the Report and
Recommendation; “a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to
object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.
1991). Objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate the
arguments in briefs submitted to the Magistrate Judge. “A reexamination of the
exact same argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific
objections ‘wastes judicial resources rather than saving them and runs contrary to
the purpose of the Magistrates Act.’”” Overholt v. Green, No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018
27
WL 3018175, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018) (quoting , 932 F.2d at 509).
The failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be excused in the interest
of justice. , 924 F.3d 868, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2019).