Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

a

DENISE WILLIAMS, : HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS

Plaintiff,

Civil Action

v. 1 No. 1:23-cv-01946-KMW-AMD

TOWNSHIP OF CHERRY HILL, et al.,

OPINION

Defendants.

Robert H. Bembry, ITI, Esq. William F. Cook, Esq.

LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT H. BEMBRY, III Brianna M. Morello, Esq.

Counsel for Plaintiff Denise Williams BROWN ee CONNER, Tae

Counsel for Defendants Township of Cherry

Hill, Township Council of the Township of

Cherry Hill, Frederick Kuhn, and Susan Shin

Angulo

Eric J. Riso, Esq.

ZELLER & WIELICZKO, LLP

Counsel for Defendants Charles Cahn and

William Cattel

Brandon Hawkins, Esq.

Howard L. Goldberg, Esq.

OFFICE OF CAMDEN COUNTY COUNSEL

Counsel for Defendant Camden County

Construction Board of Appeals

WILLIAMS, District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Denise Williams (‘Plaintiff’) appeals the decision of the Honorable Ann Marie

Donio, U.S.M.J. (the “Magistrate Judge’’), denying her motion for leave to file a Sixth Amended

Complaint. Plaintiff's appeal is opposed by the Township of Cherry Hill, the Township Council

of the Township of Cherry Hill, Frederick Kuhn, Susan Shin Angulo, Charles Cahn, and William

Cattel (collectively, ““Defendants’”’). For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms.

BACKGROUND

This litigation arises out of a nearly twenty-year dispute between Plaintiff and the

Township of Cherry Hill concerning Plaintiff's efforts to construct a new home, the Township’s

alleged obstruction of that project, and the eventual demolition of the unfinished structure. The

procedural history of this case is as protracted as it is convoluted. Because the Court writes

principally for the parties, it recounts only those portions of the record necessary to resolve

Plaintiff's appeal.

Plaintiff commenced this action in New Jersey state court on February 25, 2019,

challenging local code-enforcement decisions and related actions concerning her unfinished home.

Over the ensuing years, the litigation expanded through related state-court proceedings,

consolidation, and repeated amendments to the pleadings. Plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint on July 28, 2019, a Second Amended Complaint on February 2, 2021, a Third Amended

Complaint on June 3, 2021, and a Fourth Amended Complaint on March 21, 2023. The Fourth

Amended Complaint introduced federal claims into this action, prompting Defendants to remove

it to this Court on April 5, 2023. (ECF No. 1.)

Following removal, Plaintiff again sought to amend her pleading. On July 14, 2023,

Plaintiff moved for leave to file a Fifth Amended Complaint, which proposed, among other things,

removing previously proposed defendants (including attorneys William Cook and Brandon

Hawkins), adding the Township Council of the Township of Cherry Hill, and revising the

corresponding allegations and claims. (ECF No. 40.) That motion was granted, and Plaintiff filed

the Fifth Amended Complaint on July 29, 2023. (ECF Nos. 45, 46.)

On August 7, 2023, the Court entered a case-management order requiring that any further

motions to amend the pleadings be filed by December 29, 2023 (the “Scheduling Order’). (ECF

No. 51 at 2, { 6.) That deadline was later extended by sixty days, making February 27, 2024, the

operative deadline for any further motions to amend. (ECF No. 76.) Plaintiff did not move to

amend by that date. Shortly thereafter, however, Plaintiffs then-counsel moved to withdraw, citing

a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. (ECF No. 103.) Although Plaintiff was afforded

additional time to obtain substitute counsel, new counsel did not enter an appearance until

November 19, 2024. (ECF No. 130.) In light of the delay occasioned by Plaintiff's change in

counsel, the Magistrate Judge directed the parties to meet and confer and to submit a joint status

letter addressing the remaining discovery and a proposed schedule for its completion. (ECF No.

134.)

The parties subsequently agreed to a revised schedule that not only reset certain discovery

deadlines but also afforded Plaintiff an additional opportunity to seek leave to amend. In a January

4, 2025 letter submitted on behalf of all parties, defense counsel explained:

As the Court will see in the proposed schedule, the path forward turns largely on

Plaintiffs forthcoming request to amend the Complaint to state an equal protection

claim. Plaintiff's counsel will be providing a draft of the proposed Amended

Complaint to defense counsel for review. It is anticipated that the Amended

Complaint will streamline the discovery issues in this matter. It is Defendants’

understanding that Plaintiff will be proceeding with this matter as primarily an

equal protection case. This, in turn, will control the relevant discovery.

(Id.) Plaintiff did not object to that characterization. Indeed, in a later submission, Plaintiff's

counsel largely confirmed that understanding, while clarifying that Plaintiff also intended to add a

malicious prosecution claim based on a separate criminal proceeding brought against her.

After the parties reaffirmed that understanding during a subsequent telephone conference,

the Magistrate Judge entered a further case-management order adopting those deadlines (the

“Revised Scheduling Order’). Under that order, Plaintiff was to circulate a proposed amended

complaint to Defendants by February 3, 2025, and, if consent could not be obtained, file any

motion for leave to amend by February 20, 2025.

Disagreement quickly arose as to the scope of the amendment permitted by the Revised

Scheduling Order, prompting Plaintiff to move for leave to file a Sixth Amended Complaint. The

proposed amendments were extensive, exceeding the limited additions contemplated by the

parties’ prior agreement. In addition to claims for denial of equal protection and malicious

prosecution, Plaintiff sought to assert three new causes of action for malicious abuse of process,

invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She also sought to restore

attorneys Cook and Hawkins as defendants, notwithstanding her earlier decision to drop them from

this suit. Defendants opposed the motion on multiple grounds, including undue delay, prejudice,

futility, and bad faith.

On July 11, 2025, the Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a Sixth

Amended Complaint, except that she permitted Plaintiff one final opportunity to seek leave to

assert a properly pleaded malicious prosecution claim. The Magistrate Judge first held that the

February 27, 2024 amendment deadline arising out of the original Scheduling Order remained

controlling. Although the amendment deadline was later reopened by the Revised Scheduling

Order, the Magistrate Judge found that it was reopened for the limited purpose of “streamlining

the case and asserting equal protection and malicious prosecution claims only.” (ECF No. 172 at

12.) She therefore analyzed those two proposed claims under Rule 15, while requiring Plaintiff to

satisfy Rule 16(b)(4)’s good-cause standard as to the remaining proposed amendments. Applying

Rule 16, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff did not sufficiently demonstrate good cause for

malicious abuse of process, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress,

reasoning that Plaintiff had long possessed the relevant facts, failed to explain why those claims

were not raised earlier, and could not rely on the appearance of new counsel to obtain a fresh

opportunity to reshape the case. The Magistrate Judge further concluded that, apart from malicious

prosecution, all proposed amendments were independently barred under Rule 15 by undue delay.

She reasoned that Plaintiff had already amended multiple times, including twice after the January

2023 demolition, and that Plaintiff had failed to explain why she did not sought leave to add these

claims and parties sooner. However, as to malicious prosecution, the Magistrate Judge concluded

that the claim did not accrue until May 1, 2024, when the related criminal proceeding allegedly

terminated in Plaintiffs favor, and thus was not barred by delay under Rule 15. Even so, she denied

leave to add that claim without prejudice because the proposed pleading failed to satisfy Rule

8(a)(2), instead relying on impermissible group pleading.

Plaintiff moved for reconsideration on July 28, 2025. (ECF No. 173.) On January 8, 2026,

the Magistrate Judge entered a separate, thoroughly reasoned order denying that motion. (ECF No.

181.) Plaintiff now appeals both decisions.

WI. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review

Federal magistrate judges are authorized “to hear and determine any [non-dispositive]

matter pending before the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also L. Civ. R. 72.1(a)(1). This

Court exercises appellate review over the non-dispositive orders of magistrate judges under 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c).

However, the scope of that review is narrow, and a district court judge will reverse a magistrate

judge on such matters only if it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

Motions to amend or correct pleadings are non-dispositive matters and decisions on them are

consequently subject to this standard of review. See Patel v. Meridian Health Sys., Inc., 666 F.

App’x 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[A] motion for leave to amend is nondispositive.”); Jordan v.

Tapper, 143 F.R.D. 567, 571 (D.N.J. 1992).

The appealing party bears the burden of demonstrating that a magistrate judge’s order was

clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See Allen v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 340 F.R.D. 232, 237 (D.N.J.

2022). A ruling is “clearly erroneous” where, “although there is evidence to support it, the

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.” Champion Painting Specialty Servs. Corp. v. Delaware River Port Auth.,

658 F. Supp. 3d 241, 248 (D.N.J. 2023) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc.,

592 F. Supp. 2d 752, 758-59 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2008)). A ruling is “contrary to law” when the

magistrate judge has “misinterpreted or misapplied applicable law.” Id.; see also Kounelis v.

Sherrer, 529 F. Supp. 2d 503, 518 (D.N.J. 2008).

B. Amendment Standard

A motion for leave to amend is ordinarily governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(a)(2), which directs courts to “freely give leave when justice so requires.” In applying Rule

15(a)(2), courts consider factors such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of

the movant; repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; prejudice to

the opposing party; and futility.” Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962)). These factors are not exhaustive, and a court is permitted “to

ground its decision, within reason, on consideration of additional equities, such as judicial

economy/burden on the court and the prejudice denying leave to amend would cause to the

plaintiff.” Id. Even so, “prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of an

amendment.” Jd. (quoting Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)).

LC

Where, however, a party seeks leave to amend after the deadline set by a scheduling order

has expired, a movant must first satisfy the “good cause” standard under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 16(b)(4). Premier Comp Sols., LLC v. UPMC, 970 F.3d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 2020). Under

Rule 16, a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Thus, where the amendment deadline has passed, Rule 16 imposes a

threshold burden: the movant must first demonstrate good cause before the Court considers

whether the party also satisfies Rule 15(a)(2)’s more liberal standard. See Premier Comp Sols.,

970 F.3d at 319. Unlike Rule 15(a)(2), which “focus[es] on the prejudice to the non-moving party,

Rule 16(b)(4) focuses on the moving party’s burden to show due diligence.” Race Tires Am., Inc.

v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 84 (3d Cir. 2010). “In assessing diligence, courts ask

whether the movant possessed, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have

possessed, the knowledge necessary to file the motion to amend before the deadline expired.”

Arzadi v. Evanston Ins. Co., No. 17-5470, 2021 WL 1712527, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2021) (quoting

Smith v. Honeywell Intern. Inc., No. 10-3345, 2014 WL 301031, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2014)); see

also Scott v. Cooper Health Sys., No. 22-cv-4123, 2025 WL 2528620, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 3, 2025).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff principally seeks review of the Magistrate Judge’s initial order denying her motion

for leave to amend. In doing so, she largely raises the same arguments advanced on

reconsideration, which she now repackages as five distinct errors. Having thoroughly considered

each of Plaintiff’s contentions, the Court discerns no error.

First, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge misunderstood the procedural history of

the case and therefore based her decision on an incorrect factual premise. Specifically, Plaintiff

contends that the Magistrate Judge treated this action as having begun in 2019, when, in Plaintiff’s

view, the operative case instead began in 2022 with a separate state-court complaint. Although the

2019 and 2022 matters were later consolidated, Plaintiff argues that treating the case as originating

in 2019 overstated both the age of the litigation and the number of prior amendments, thereby

“tainting” the Magistrate Judge’s analysis under Rules 15 and 16.

The Magistrate Judge did not misunderstand the procedural history of this litigation. The

record plainly demonstrates that the present federal action traces back to the 2019 state-court

matter, as reflected in the notice of removal, the numbering of the successive amended pleadings,

and Plaintiff’s own treatment of the later state-court filings as related to and incorporated into the

earlier case. Regardless, the Magistrate Judge’s undue-delay analysis did not turn on the mere fact

that related proceedings dated back to 2019. Rather, as she explained, the critical point was that,

with the exception of the malicious prosecution claim, the claims Plaintiff sought to add could

have been asserted in the Fourth or Fifth Amended Complaint after the January 2023 demolition

of the property. Yet, for reasons Plaintiff did not adequately explain, she did not. That reasoning

was not clearly erroneous.

Second, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in construing the amendment

deadline established by the Revised Scheduling Order as limited to the assertion of equal

protection and malicious prosecution claims. Although Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that

those were the only claims specifically identified during the parties’ prior meet-and-confer, she

maintains that her counsel never explicitly agreed that amendment would be confined to those two

theories alone. Thus, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge improperly treated the parties’ prior

discussions as narrowing the scope of permissible amendment and, on that basis, erroneously

subjected the three additional claims to Rule 16’s good-cause requirement.

°

That challenge is unpersuasive. The Magistrate Judge did not invent that limitation out of

whole cloth; rather, she derived it from the parties’ own correspondence and representations to the

Court, which reasonably reflected that the reopening of the amendment deadline was tied to an

effort to streamline the case and to permit Plaintiff to assert equal protection and malicious

prosecution claims. The proposed amendments far exceeded that expectation. And even if counsel

never explicitly stated those were the only claims she might later seek to add, that does not render

the Magistrate Judge’s reading of the record clearly erroneous. But more importantly, Plaintiff

cannot show that this interpretation affected the outcome. The Magistrate Judge did not stop at

Rule 16. She separately analyzed the proposed additional claims under Rule 15 and concluded

that, except for malicious prosecution, amendment was barred by undue delay because those

theories could have been asserted earlier. Plaintiff's second argument therefore fails on its own

terms.

Third, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in treating several of her proposed

claims as unduly delayed, notwithstanding allegations of post-complaint conduct. More

specifically, Plaintiff contends that her proposed equal protection, abuse of process, invasion of

privacy, and emotional distress claims were viable as “stand-alone” claims because they were

based, at least in part, on distinct conduct occurring after the filing of the Fifth Amended Complaint

in July 2023. Plaintiff therefore maintains that those claims should not have been construed as

latent attempts to repackage earlier allegations, but rather as claims arising from new events that

could properly be asserted at that stage of the litigation.

The Court is unpersuaded. To the extent Plaintiff truly sought to assert new claims based

on events occurring after the filing of the Fifth Amended Complaint, the proper procedural

mechanism was, as the Magistrate Judge correctly observed, a supplemental pleading under Rule

15(d)—not an amended pleading under Rule 15(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (permitting post-

pleading supplementation based on “any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the

date of the pleading to be supplemented”); see also T Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of Wilmington, 913

F.3d 311, 326 (3d Cir. 2019). And insofar as the proposed claims were predicated on conduct that

began in 2018, Plaintiff conceded that she had knowledge of those facts for years, yet failed to

explain why they were omitted from her prior pleadings. The Magistrate Judge therefore did not

err in concluding that Plaintiff's partial reliance on post-complaint conduct did not justify

amendment at that stage of the litigation.

Pourth, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge “ignored completely” the applicability

of the continuing violation doctrine—an equitable principle under which repeated wrongful

conduct may be treated as one continuing wrong, such that the applicable statute of limitations

runs from the last wrongful act rather than the first. See Brenner v. Local 514 United Bros. of

Carpenters of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991); Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental

Ctr., 803 A.2d 611 (N.J. 2002). In Plaintiff's view, her proposed equal protection, abuse of process,

invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims formed part of an

ongoing continuum of misconduct. She therefore argues that, because the alleged wrongful

conduct continued, those claims remained timely and that she was not required to explain why

they had not been asserted earlier.

Setting aside for a moment that Plaintiff herself made no mention of this argument until

she sought reconsideration, it fails on its merits. As the Magistrate Judge correctly explained on

reconsideration, Plaintiff's position rests on a fundamental conflation of distinct issues. The

continuing violation doctrine concerns itself with the timeliness of a claim for statute-of-

limitations purposes; it does not answer, much less eliminate, the distinct question of whether a

party who has long known relevant facts has unduly delayed seeking leave to amend under Rule

15. See Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 205 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Boileau v.

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 730 F.2d 929, 939 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he delay exception in amending the

complaint refers to delay in the actual proceeding in which the complaint occurs, not delay in

bringing suit.”); see also Blake v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 259 F. Supp. 3d 249, 261 (E.D.

Pa. 2017) (addressing limitations timeliness and Rule 15 delay under two separate inquiries).

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge placed undue weight on her delay while

overlooking that Defendants had long been on notice of the facts underlying the new claims she

proposed. In Plaintiff's view, granting leave to amend would not have caused Defendants any

meaningful prejudice, particularly because discovery remained ongoing and Defendants would

still have had a full opportunity to respond to the amended pleading and develop any additional

evidence.

That argument is unpersuasive because it does not confront the actual basis of the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling. The Magistrate Judge expressly considered Plaintiffs assertion that

Defendants would suffer little prejudice, but explained that discovery-related prejudice is not the

only relevant form of prejudice at issue. Undue delay can itself “constitute prejudice sufficient to

justify denial of a motion for leave to amend.” CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d

612, 629 (3d Cir. 2013). Consistent with that principle, the Third Circuit has “refused to overturn

denials of motions for leave to amend where the moving party offered no cogent reason for the

delay in seeking the amendment.” Jd. Here, that is precisely the problem the Magistrate Judge

identified. She found that, except for the malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff's proposed claims

and parties rested on facts long known to her and could have been asserted earlier. Yet, Plaintiff

failed to offer any explanation, much less a cogent one, for why they were omitted. This was not

clear error.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s July 11, 2025 order

denying Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a Sixth Amended Complaint, as well as the January 8,

2026 order denying Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.

Date: March 31, 2026 | J

K M. WILLIAMS

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE