Opinion

Butsko

Court: District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed: Apr 23, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.1%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AIDAN WILLIAM BUTSKO, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-1128

Plaintiff, :

v. :

: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)

FRANK BISIGNANO, :

Commissioner of Social Security,1 :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Aidan William Butsko filed an application under Titles II and XVI

of the Social Security Act for disability and disability insurance benefits

and supplemental security income on December 21, 2022.2 Following a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), the ALJ found that

1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May

7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Bisignano is substituted as the defendant in this

suit.

2 Tr. 17.

Butsko was not disabled from his alleged onset date of January 1, 2022,3

through June 27, 2024 the date of the ALJ’s decision.4

Butsko now appeals this decision, arguing that the ALJ’s decision

is not supported by substantial evidence. After a review of the record,

and mindful of the fact that substantial evidence “means only—‘such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion,’”5 we conclude that substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s findings in this case. Therefore, we will affirm the decision of

the Commissioner denying this claim.

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case

Butsko filed for disability and disability insurance benefits, as well

as supplemental security income, alleging disability due to autism

spectrum disorder, anxiety, and attention deficit hyperactive disorder

3 Butsko initially alleged that he was disabled as of August 16, 2001. (Tr.

17). However, the ALJ determined that the earliest potential eligibility

date was January 1, 2022, when Butsko first met the insured status

requirement ( tr. 248-51), and so considered that the earliest potential

onset date. (Tr. 19).

4 Tr. 17.

5 , 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

(“ADHD”).6 Butsko was 20 years old at the time of his alleged onset of

disability, had at least a high school education, and had no past relevant

work.78

An ALJ held a hearing on Butsko’s disability application on June 5,

2024.9 Butsko and a Vocational Expert both appeared and testified at

this hearing.10 Following this hearing, on June 27, 2024, the ALJ issued

a decision denying Butsko’s application for disability benefits.11 The ALJ

first concluded that Butsko had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since his earliest potential onset date, January 1, 2022.12 At Step

2 of the sequential analysis that governs disability claims, the ALJ found

that the plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of generalized

6 Tr. 277.

7 Tr. 26.

8 Butsko did not outline the pertinent medical/vocational evidence of

record in his brief as required by local rules. ( M.D. Pa. L.R.

83.40.4(a)). We will therefore forego recitation of the administrative

record, except to say that the record contains medical records and medical

opinion evidence, which the ALJ found supported the existence of three

severe impairments.

9 Tr. 34-52.

11 Tr. 14-33.

12 Tr. 20.

anxiety disorder, autism, and ADHD.13 At Step 3, the ALJ reviewed

Butsko’s limitations in the “paragraph B” criteria and found that Butsko

had no limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying

information, a mild limitation to adapting or managing oneself, and

moderate limitations in interacting with others and in concentrating,

persisting, or maintaining pace.14 The ALJ also concluded the evidence

failed to establish the presence of the “paragraph C” criteria.15

Accordingly, the ALJ found none of these impairments met or equaled

the severity of a listed impairment under the Commissioner’s

regulations.16

Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ concluded that Butsko:

[H]a[d] the residual functional capacity to perform a full

range of work at all exertional levels but with the following

nonexertional limitations: The claimant is limited to work

with simple and routine tasks involving only simple, work-

related decisions and with only occasional interaction with

supervisors, coworkers, and the public.17

14 Tr. 20-22.

15 Tr. 21-22.

16 Tr. 22.

17 Tr. 22.

In reaching this RFC determination, the ALJ considered the

objective medical record, the medical opinion evidence, and Butsko’s

reported symptoms. With respect to the medical opinion evidence, the

ALJ first considered the opinion of state agency consultant Dr. Jennifer

Croyle, PsyD.18 Dr. Croyle found that Butsko could:

[M]eet the basic mental demands to complete one- to two-step

tasks on a sustained basis despite the limitations resulting

from their mental health impairment; can carry out very short

and simple instructions; can make simple decisions; can

complete tasks within a routine schedule and at a consistent

pace; can maintain regular attendance and be punctual; and

would not require special supervision in order to sustain a

routine.19

The ALJ found this opinion persuasive.20 He explained that Dr. Croyle’s

opinion was consistent with certain objective clinical findings in the

record, and was supported by, , longitudinal medical evidence

that Butsko’s symptoms were stabilized by routine, conservative care.21

18 Tr. 25.

19 Tr. 25, 81-82.

20 Tr. 27-28.

The ALJ was also persuaded by the opinions of Dr. Timothy

Ostrich, PsyD and Dr. Angela Chiodo, PsyD.22 These doctors both opined

that Butsko had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and

pace, but no more than mild limitations in the other areas of mental

functioning, and could “carry out very short and simple instructions; can

make simple decisions; can complete tasks within a routine schedule and

at a consistent pace; can maintain regular attendance and be punctual;

and would not require special supervision in order to sustain a routine.”23

The ALJ found these findings consistent with objective clinical findings

and supported by the longitudinal medical evidence.

With respect to Butsko’s symptoms, the ALJ found that Butsko’s

statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of

his impairments were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence.24

Butsko testified that he was able to work a part time job, but that his

mental health suffered when his hours were increased, that he has

specialists visit him at home once a week to help with his activities of

22 Tr. 25-26.

23 Tr. 26, 64, 561-67.

24 Tr. 23.

daily living, and that he can drive—but only with parental supervision.25

Butsko’s mother also testified and discussed Butsko’s time attending

some college, the community support staff and behavioral specialist

consultants who helped him to practice things like driving and cooking,

and his stimming behaviors, which worsened when his work hours

increased.26

The ALJ ultimately found Butsko’s testimony to be inconsistent

with the objective clinical findings.27 The ALJ recounted the objective

evidence during the alleged disability period, contrasting the extra

support Butsko needed to get through portions of high school with the

fact that Butsko was eventually able to attend normal classes.28 The ALJ

noted that Butsko attended some college courses, and that medications

were effective in managing his symptoms at that time.29 The ALJ also

considered Butsko’s examination with Dr. Chiodo, noting, , that

Butsko generally presented well, had a coherent thought process, and

25 Tr. 39-43.

26 Tr. 43-48.

27 Tr. 23.

showed no memory issues.30 Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Butsko

was not as limited as he alleged.

Having made these findings, the ALJ found at Step 4 that Butsko

had no relevant past work but found at Step 5 that he could perform the

occupations of stock clerk at night, office cleaner off hours, and office

helper.31 Accordingly, the ALJ found that Butsko had not met the

stringent standard prescribed for disability benefits and denied his

claim.32

This appeal followed. On appeal, Butsko argues the ALJ failed to

consider certain impairments severe, failed to implement limitations

from certain impairments, and failed to properly consider if Butsko

qualified for one of the Commissioner’s listings.33 This case is fully

briefed and is therefore ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth

below, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner.

30 Tr. 24.

31 Tr. 26-27.

32 Tr. 27-28.

33 Doc. 9.

III. Discussion

A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court

This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits

is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-

maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record.34 Substantial

evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but

rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.”35 Substantial evidence means less

than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.36

A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ

“ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing

evidence.”37 However, where there has been an adequately developed

factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the

34 42 U.S.C. §405(g); , 529 F.3d 198,

200 (3d Cir. 2008); , 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa.

2012).

35 , 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

36 , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

37 , 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting

, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)) (internal quotations

omitted).

weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from

being supported by substantial evidence.”38 The court must “scrutinize

the record as a whole” to determine if the decision is supported by

substantial evidence.39

The Supreme Court has explained the limited scope of our review,

noting that “[substantial evidence] means—and means only—’such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.’”40 Under this standard, we must look to the

existing administrative record to determine if there is “‘sufficient

evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.”41 Thus, the

question before us is not whether the claimant is disabled, but rather

whether the Commissioner’s finding that he or she is not disabled is

38 , 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).

39 , 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).

40 , 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting ,

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

supported by substantial evidence and was based upon a correct

application of the law.42

When conducting this review, we must remain mindful that “we

must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.”43 Thus,

we cannot re-weigh the evidence. Instead, we must determine whether

there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings. In doing so,

we must also determine whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of

articulation necessary to enable judicial review; that is, the ALJ must

articulate the reasons for his decision.44 This does not require the ALJ

to use “magic” words, but rather the ALJ must discuss the evidence and

explain the reasoning behind his or her decision with more than just

42 , No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D.

Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote

a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations omitted);

, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s

determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application

of the law to the facts”); , 900 F.2d 675, 678

(3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is

plenary); , 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review

of all legal issues . . . .”).

43 , 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing

, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)).

44 , 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).

conclusory statements.45 Ultimately, the ALJ’s decision must be

accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which

it rests.”46

B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the

ALJ

To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a

claimant must show that he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than 12 months.”47 This requires a claimant to show a severe physical or

mental impairment that precludes him or her from engaging in previous

work or “any other substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy.”48 To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act,

45 , 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009)

(citations omitted).

46 , 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).

47 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R.

§§404.1505(a), 416.905(a).

48 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R.

§§404.1505(a), 416.905(a).

a claimant must show that he or she is under retirement age, contributed

to the insurance program, and became disabled prior to the date on which

he or she was last insured.49

In making this determination, the ALJ follows a five-step

evaluation.50 The ALJ must sequentially determine whether the

claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe

impairment; (3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals a listed

impairment; (4) is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) is able

to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work

experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”).51

Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also determine the claimant’s

residual functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an

individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her

impairment(s).”52 In making this assessment, the ALJ must consider all

the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-

49 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).

50 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a), 416.920(a).

5120 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

52 , 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a)(1).

severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her

analysis.53 Our review of the ALJ’s determination of the plaintiff’s RFC

is deferential, and that determination will not be set aside if it is

supported by substantial evidence.54

The claimant bears the burden at Steps 1 through 4 to show a

medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her from

engaging in any past relevant work.55 If met, the burden then shifts to

the Commissioner to show at Step 5 that there are jobs in significant

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform

consistent with the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work

experience.56

With respect to the RFC determination, courts have followed

different paths when considering the impact of medical opinion evidence

on this determination. While some courts emphasize the necessity of

medical opinion evidence to craft a claimant’s RFC, other courts have

53 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).

54 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002).

55 , 994 F.2d at 1064.

56 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(f), 416.912(f); , 994 F.2d at 1064.

taken the approach that “[t]here is no legal requirement that a physician

have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of

determining an RFC.”57 Additionally, in cases that involve no credible

medical opinion evidence, courts have held that “the proposition that an

ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a physician is

misguided.”58

Given these differing approaches, we must evaluate the factual

context underlying an ALJ’s decision. Cases that emphasize the

importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically

arise in the factual setting where well-supported medical sources have

found limitations to support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected

the medical opinion based upon an assessment of other evidence.59 These

cases simply restate the notion that medical opinions are entitled to

careful consideration when making a disability determination. On the

other hand, when no medical opinion supports a disability finding or

57 , 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006);

962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D.

Pa. 2013).

58 , 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015).

59 , 962 F. Supp. 2d at 778–79.

when an ALJ relies upon other evidence to fashion an RFC, courts have

routinely sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based

upon all the facts and evidence.60 Ultimately, it is our task to determine,

considering the entire record, whether the RFC determination is

supported by substantial evidence.61

C. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Our review of the ALJ’s decision denying an application for benefits

is significantly deferential. Our task is simply to determine whether the

ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record; that is

“only— ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.’”62 Judged against this deferential

standard of review, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the

ALJ’s decision in this case.

Butsko’s first argument is that the ALJ erred by “failing to consider

[Butsko’s] medically determinable impairments to be severe

60 , 174 F. App’x 6; 129 F. Supp. 3d at 214–

15.

61 312 F.3d 113.

62 , 139 S. Ct. at 1154.

impairments, including [his] generalized anxiety disorder, autism, and

ADHD.”63 At the outset, the ALJ found all three of these impairments

severe.64 Butsko’s actual contention appears to be that the RFC did not

include “proper limitations” regarding Butsko’s abilities to focus,

concentrate, remember instructions, remain on task, and engage in more

than part time work, nor his needs for special instruction or supervision

and for non-scheduled breaks.65 Butsko lists several pages of record

evidence that he believes demonstrate a need for “more substantial

limitations” in those areas, arguing the evidence should have led to a

different result.66 This is clearly a request for this court to re-weigh the

evidence, which is not our role.67 Our role is to determine if the ALJ’s

decision is supported by substantial evidence.68 Here, the ALJ explained,

relying on myriad references to medical evidence and medical opinion

evidence, why he included the limitations present in Butsko’s RFC.69 We

63 Doc. 9 at 10-11.

64 Tr. 20.

65 Doc. 9 at 14.

66 at 13-18.

67 , 777 F.3d at 611.

68 , 139 S. Ct. at 1154.

69 Tr. 22-26.

therefore conclude the RFC is supported by substantial evidence, and

that this argument is unavailing.

Next, Butsko argues the ALJ erred by failing to consider Butsko’s

learning disorder and “obvious cognitive issues” to be medically

determinable impairments.70 He claims that these impairments “clearly

limit [him] functionally, per the record in this matter.”71 To establish a

medically determinable impairment, the impairment must be “shown by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and

be “established by objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical

source.”72 Butsko does not cite to any such evidence, instead stating “the

record” broadly supports limitations pursuant to these impairments, and

referring generally to his high school IEP and weekly specialist visits.73

Those vague references are insufficient to establish medically

determinable impairments, and so we cannot say the ALJ erred in not

considering them. Additionally, Butsko fails to explain how further

70 Doc. 9 at 18-21.

71 Doc. 9 at 20.

72 20 C.F.R. § 416.921

73 Doc. 9 at 20.

consideration of these issues would have changed the outcome, which is

a requirement for a successful appeal.74 Thus, this argument is

unavailing.

Butsko’s last argument is that the ALJ erred in various ways at

Step 3. At Step 3, the ALJ is required to determine whether a claimant’s

impairments or combination of impairments are so severe that they are

disabling, entitling the claimant to benefits. As part of this

analysis, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant’s alleged

impairment is equivalent to one or more listed impairments, commonly

referred to as listings, that are acknowledged to be so severe as to

preclude the claimant from working.75

Thus, if a claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed

impairments, the claimant is considered disabled and is awarded

benefits.76 The claimant bears the burden of presenting “medical

findings equivalent in severity to the criteria for the one most similar

74 , 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016)

(citing , 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)).

75 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1;

, 220 F.3d 112, 119.

76 20 C.F.R. §416.920(d); , 220 F.3d at 119.

impairment.”77 An impairment that meets or equals only some of the

criteria for a listed impairment will not be sufficient.78

This Step 3 determination is a medical determination. Accordingly,

the claimant must present medical evidence or a medical opinion showing

that his or her impairment meets or equals a listing. However, the ALJ

is not required to accept a physician’s opinion if the opinion is not

supported by objective medical evidence.79 The ALJ is responsible for

identifying the relevant listed impairments, given that it is it is “the

ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for

and against granting benefits.”80

Butsko argues that the ALJ did not refer to the “part A criteria”

when considering Listing 12.10, that Butsko met that criteria as well as

the “part A” and “part C” criteria for Listing 12.11, and that the ALJ did

not reference Listing 12.05 despite “clear evidence” of relevant

77 , 493 U.S. 521, 531 (1990) (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(d); SSR 83-19 at 91).

79 , 134 F. Supp. 2d 640, 659 (E.D. Pa. 2001).

80 , 220 F.3d at 120 n.2.

symptoms.81 Butsko does explain why the alleged shortcomings are

errors, nor what evidence allegedly supports different outcomes, nor does

he cite the record at all.82 He also fails to meet his burden to present

“medical findings equivalent in severity to the criteria for the one most

similar impairment.”83 Further, Butsko fails to explain what would have

been different about the result but for the alleged error which, as

discussed, is necessary for a successful appeal.84 Put simply, this

argument is underdeveloped and unavailing.

Given that the ALJ considered all the evidence and adequately

explained the decision for including or discounting certain limitations as

established by the evidence, we find no error with the decision.

Therefore, under the deferential standard of review that applies to

appeals of Social Security disability determinations, we conclude that

82 Doc. 9 at 21-23.

83 493 U.S. at 531 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d); SSR 83-19 at

91).

84 , 639 F. App’x at 814 (citing , 556 U.S.

396, 409 (2009)).

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s evaluation of this case, and this

decision will be affirmed.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner in this

case will be affirmed, and the plaintiff’s appeal denied.

An appropriate order follows.

Daryl F. Bloom

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: April 23, 2026.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.