The opinion
FILED
Jun 29, 2026
01:12 PM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
Christian Torres Antunez Docket No. 2025-80-2021
v. State File No. 860087-2025
MG Dyess, Inc., et al.
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ Heard June 9, 2026
Compensation Claims in Nashville
Lisa A. Lowe, Judge
Affirmed as Modified and Remanded
In this interlocutory appeal, the employer asserts the trial court erred in concluding the
employee is likely to prevail at trial in establishing entitlement to workers’ compensation
benefits despite having obtained employment using a false identity. The employer argued
it would not have hired the employee had it known he was not authorized to work in the
United States and, therefore, there was no valid contract of hire. The employee responded
that the plain language of the statute entitled him to benefits despite his use of a false
identity. In ordering benefits, the trial court declined to expand the misrepresentation
defense to include identity fraud, and the employer has appealed. Having carefully
reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.
Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge
Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.
Sarah H. Best, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, MG Dyess, Inc.
Michael C. Beehan, Clinton, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Christian Torres
Antunez
Factual and Procedural Background
Christian Torres Antunez (“Employee”) applied for work as a laborer with MG
Dyess, Inc. (“Employer”) using an identity that was not his. Specifically, Employee
completed a written application for employment listing another person’s name, date of
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birth, address, and social security number. 1 Employee was hired under the false identify
and later suffered serious injuries on March 17, 2025, when a trench in which he was
working collapsed, burying him up to his shoulders in mud and pinning his chest against a
section of a pipe beneath the mud. A coworker dug Employee out of the collapsed trench
and a supervisor drove him to Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center. Once there,
Employee again provided his false identity to obtain medical treatment for various
complaints and was diagnosed with four broken ribs. Employee returned to the hospital
on March 19, reporting bilateral knee pain and low back pain, then again on March 25,
with reports of back and jaw pain.
On March 31, Employee filed a petition for benefit determination (“PBD”) seeking
medical benefits, including a panel of physicians, and attorney’s fees. Employer denied
the compensability of Employee’s claim, citing as support his misrepresentation of identity
and fraud. 2 A June 3 dispute certification notice identified the disputed issues as
compensability, medical benefits, and temporary disability benefits.
Employee returned home to Texas and sought unauthorized medical treatment for
his right knee and low back using the same false identity he had used to obtain
employment. 3 He saw Dr. A. Dushi Parameswaran, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed
and surgically repaired a meniscus tear in Employee’s right knee. Employee underwent
physical therapy post-surgery and was released from treatment for his knee on October 31,
2025.
Employee then sought treatment for his low back with Dr. Rubin S. Bashir in July
2025, who diagnosed Employee with a lumbar disc herniation and associated
radiculopathy. He initially provided conservative treatment, including multiple injections
but, due to Employee’s lack of improvement, later recommended surgery.
On October 27, Employee filed a request for an expedited hearing asking the court
to compel Employer to provide temporary disability and/or medical benefits. In a February
10, 2026 expedited hearing order, the court granted Employee’s request for medical
benefits and referred Employer for a potential penalty for its failure to timely provide a
panel of physicians. The trial court concluded that Employee’s misrepresentation of his
identity “does not void” his status as an employee given the statutory definition of
“employee” contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102, which includes the
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Employee used the identity of a real individual with a valid social security number who is legally able to
work in the United States. Employer utilized the E-Verify® process to confirm the individual’s identity and
that he was able to legally work in the United States.
2
Employer asserts it was unaware Employee was using a false identity until the PBD was filed.
3
From our review of the record, there is no indication that Employer provided a panel of physicians prior
to Employee’s return to Texas.
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language “whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.” The court also determined that the
misrepresentation defense is not applicable because Employee’s misrepresentation did not
concern his physical condition. The court noted that Employer “did not establish a causal
connection between [Employee’s] false identity and the trench collapse.” Although the
trial court ordered Employer to authorize additional medical treatment, it did not order the
payment of past medical expenses, temporary disability benefits, or attorney’s fees and did
not address Employer’s request that it be relieved of its obligation to pay medical bills on
behalf of Employee that were not issued in Employee’s real name. Employer has appealed,
and we held oral argument on June 9, 2026.
During oral argument, Employer reiterated its assertion that no valid contract of hire
existed because the “purported ‘hire’ was procured through identity fraud and was
therefore void ab initio; without a valid contract, the workers’ compensation system is not
implicated.” Employer asserted that fraud rendered the contract void and that the trial court
did not properly analyze the elements of contract formation. Employer also contends that
the misrepresentation defense, which it described as a judicially-created doctrine, should
be expanded to include circumstances in which an injured worker is shown to have
fraudulently obtained the employment at which he was injured. Finally, Employer asked
that we clarify that, under any circumstances, Employer will only be responsible for paying
medical bills issued in Employee’s real name to prevent it from being compelled to
participate in Employee’s identity fraud. Employee responded that the plain language of
the statute encompasses employees who are not legally employed. Thus, Employee argued,
the trial court was correct in concluding Employee is entitled to workers’ compensation
benefits for his work-related injuries regardless of whether he was authorized to work in
the United States or provided false identification. Employee further asserts that any
expansion of the misrepresentation defense must come from the Tennessee Supreme Court
or the General Assembly. Finally, Employee asserted that the trial court’s order clearly
awarded medical benefits only in Employee’s legal name, and not in the name of his false
identity, and thus payment of those medical benefits is not at issue.
Standard of Review
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the court’s
factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2025). When the trial judge has had the opportunity
to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give considerable
deference to credibility determinations made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp.
of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “when it comes to deposition
testimony, an appellate panel is in the same position as the trial court to make credibility
determinations.” Edwards v. Peoplease, LLC, No. W2024-01034-SC-R3-WC, 2025 Tenn.
LEXIS 514, at *18 (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2025). Thus, when medical proof is presented by
deposition, “the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and
credibility of the expert testimony.” Id. Moreover, the interpretation and application of
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statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption
of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone
N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our
obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in
accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor
either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2025).
Analysis
On appeal, Employer asserts the trial court erred in concluding Employee is likely
to prevail at trial in establishing his entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits because
there was no valid contract of hire between the parties and, thus, no existing employer-
employee relationship. Employer maintains that it detrimentally relied on Employee’s
knowing and willful misrepresentation regarding his identity, ultimately leading to the
work-related injuries.
Contract of Hire
Employer first argues that Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law requires a
“contract of hire . . . written or implied” as a prerequisite to workers’ compensation
liability. 4 Under Employer’s theory, because it never would have hired Employee “but
for” the misrepresentation regarding his identity, no valid contract of hire exists and, thus,
no workers’ compensation benefits are owed. Employer contends that the trial court erred
when it “conflated unlawful employment status with identity-based fraud that negates
contract formation.” According to Employer, the workers’ compensation statute addresses
“unauthorized or unlawful employment, not situations where no employment contract
exists due to fraud. Identity fraud prevents contract formation and thus should bar workers’
compensation coverage.”
Employee responds that “Tennessee courts have long recognized that employment
obtained through false or even criminal misrepresentations does not, by itself, defeat
coverage under the Act,” citing Tennessee Supreme Court precedent establishing that
“employment which has been obtained by the making of false statements – even criminally
false statements – is still employment; that is, the technical illegality will not of itself
destroy compensation coverage.” Fed. Copper & Aluminum Co. v. Dickey, 493 S.W.2d
463, 465 (Tenn. 1973). Employee maintains that the nexus on which the analysis should
focus is that between an employee’s misrepresentation of his or her physical condition and
the injury. In Employee’s view, misrepresentations regarding identity are not the type of
4
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102 defines “Employee” to include “every person, including a
minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed . . . under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written
or implied.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(10)(A) (2025) (emphasis added).
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employee misconduct contemplated by the statute as defeating an injured worker’s
entitlement to benefits.
We conclude Employer has taken the statutory phrase “under any contract of hire”
as used in subsection 102(10)(A) out of context. That phrase is part of a single sentence
that also includes the phrase “every person . . . whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.”
Moreover, the phrase “under any contract of hire” is modified by the phrase “written or
implied,” indicating that a written agreement is not a critical element of the formation of
an employment contract. Id. Our review of binding precedent from the Tennessee
Supreme Court and Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel convinces us that the
scope of the Workers’ Compensation Law was intended to encompass all persons who
provide services to an employer for pay, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed. This
interpretation is further supported by the statutory definition of “Employer,” which
includes any entity “using the services of not less than five (5) persons for pay.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11) (2025). Here, there can be no doubt that Employer was using
the services of Employee for pay. The fact that he was not lawfully employed due to his
use of a false identity does not change that fact.
Misrepresentation Defense
The Tennessee Supreme Court has long recognized a misrepresentation defense in
workers’ compensation law. In Anderson v. Chattanooga Gen. Servs. Co., 631 S.W.2d
380 (Tenn. 1981), for example, the Court set out a three-part analysis to evaluate
misrepresentation claims. To prevail on such a defense, the employer has the burden of
showing:
(1) [T]he employee . . . knowingly and willfully made a false representation as
to his physical condition;
(2) [T]he employer . . . relied thereon and such reliance [was] a substantial
factor in the hiring; and
(3) [T]here [is] a causal connection between the false representation and the
injury.
Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
In Silva v. Martin Lumber Co., No. M2003-00490-WC-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS
1047 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp Panel Nov. 5, 2003), the Tennessee Supreme Court’s Special
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel addressed a factual scenario strikingly similar to
the one before us. In Silva, the employee presented falsified documentation in order to
gain employment and was subsequently injured while at work. Id. at *2-3. The employer
denied the claim and questioned on appeal whether an undocumented worker who obtains
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employment by presenting fraudulent documents may recover workers’ compensation
benefits. Id. at *2-5. The Panel affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the injured worker
was an employee within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law regardless of his
use of falsified documentation when there was no evidence that the misrepresentation
increased his risk of a work-related injury. Id. at *6. The Panel observed that the employee
did not make a false representation as to his physical condition and, because there was no
causal connection between his false representation and the injury, he was not barred from
obtaining workers’ compensation benefits. Id. at *6-7.
We also note that the General Assembly has specifically addressed undocumented
workers’ entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits. Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-207(3)(F) provides that employees who are “not eligible or authorized to work
in the United States” can receive medical benefits, temporary disability benefits, and
certain permanent disability benefits but are not entitled to seek increased benefits pursuant
to subsection 207(3)(B). Thus, the General Assembly has considered situations in which
workers not eligible to work in the United States are injured. Yet, it did not disqualify such
workers from receiving any workers’ compensation benefits but instead limited the amount
of permanent disability such workers could receive. Had the legislature intended to
exclude undocumented workers who obtained employment by misrepresenting their
identities from the class of undocumented workers entitled to certain benefits, it could have
so stated.
In sum, we conclude that the misrepresentation defense is limited to false statements
about the worker’s physical condition. Here, the misrepresentations Employee made are
unrelated to his physical condition or his ability to perform his job duties. As in Silva,
Employee’s misrepresentations were aimed at obtaining employment and did not seek to
conceal a physical condition that increased his risk of injury. Our review of the record
supports the trial court’s determination that Employee sustained a compensable injury in
the course and scope of his employment, the risk of which was not impacted by his identity
fraud. In short, there is not a sufficient nexus between the misrepresentation and
Employee’s injuries to bar Employee’s recovery of workers’ compensation benefits. If the
misrepresentation defense is to be expanded to identity fraud, that task must be left to the
Tennessee Supreme Court or the General Assembly.
Payment of Medical Bills
Turning to Employer’s request that we modify the trial court’s order to make clear
that Employer will only be responsible for the payment of medical bills reflecting
Employee’s real name, we agree that such a limitation is necessary to prevent Employer
from potentially being complicit in any fraudulent activity. Given that Employee has
admitted to using the identity of another person to fraudulently obtain employment and
certain medical treatment, the processing of past medical bills in two different names could
create confusion and the possibility of Employer being held liable for medical bills wholly
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unrelated to the current claim, and require it to process and pay bills that contain the name
and identifying information of that other person. Accordingly, the trial court’s order is
modified to show that Employer will be responsible for the payment of medical bills
reflecting reasonable and necessary medical treatment causally related to the work injury
under Employee’s real name. 5
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order as modified, and we
remand the case for further proceedings. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.
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We further note that nothing in this opinion prevents Employee’s medical providers from reissuing
medical bills incurred by Employee for reasonable and necessary medical treatment causally related to
Employee’s compensable injuries with Employee’s real name.
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