Albert Anderson v. Board of Trustees, Etc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1054-24

ALBERT ANDERSON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES,

POLICE AND FIREMEN'S

RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF

NEW JERSEY,

Respondent-Respondent.

_________________________

Argued May 13, 2026 – Decided June 29, 2026

Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jablonski.

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and

Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the

Treasury, PFRS No. xx6395.

Samuel M. Gaylord argued the cause for appellant

(Szaferman Lakind Blumstein & Blader PC, attorneys;

Samuel M. Gaylord, on the brief).

Thomas R. Hower, Staff Attorney, argued the cause for

respondent (Nels J. Lauritzen, Legal Affairs Deputy

Director, attorney; Thomas R. Hower, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Albert Anderson appeals from a final agency decision by the Board of

Trustees ("Board"), Police and Fireman's Retirement System of New Jersey

("PFRS") that found he was not entitled to accidental disability retirement

benefits ("ADRB") under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1). In doing so, the Board adopted

the initial decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), finding Anderson's

disability claim was not "undesigned and unexpected." We affirm.

I.

Anderson served as a police officer with the Woodbury City Police

Department for eighteen years, following two years of prior service with the

Wildwood Crest Department. He successfully completed police academy

training, where he learned arrest procedures and use of force, and consistently

met the physical and in-service training requirements. He was, however, noted

to have a history of cardiac issues, especially atrial fibrillation ,1 and his

condition was previously treated with cardiac ablation.

1

Atrial fibrillation, or an irregular heartbeat, is the most common form of heart

arrhythmia and affects more than two-million people a year. See Prystowsky,

E.N., Perspectives and Controversies in Atrial Fibrillation, 82 Amer. Jour. of

Cardiology, (4A), 3I-8I, 3I (1998). This condition is evidenced when one or

both atria, the upper chambers of the heart, quiver at faster-than-normal and/or

erratic rates. Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 26th Edition (1995).

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On April 17, 2018, while working a 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. shift, Anderson

responded to a reported robbery at a local gas station and interviewed the victim.

The victim explained that earlier that day he offered a reward to two males for

the return of his stolen bicycle. When the individuals returned the bicycle, they

demanded additional money. When the victim refused, he was assaulted by the

suspects who fled the scene.

The victim provided Anderson and other responding officers with

descriptions of the suspects and identified one of the perpetrators by name.

Anderson then observed an individual matching that description fleeing through

backyards. Anderson pursued the suspect and apprehended him after a brief foot

chase and following a physical struggle.

During it, Anderson experienced severe pain and a heavy sensation in his

chest. He immediately notified his supervisor of this medical condition and was

transported to the hospital. Since that date, he was unable to return to work

because he could not meet the physical requirements of his position. He

currently remains under medical care.

Anderson filed for ADRB and asserted that as a direct result of the foot

pursuit of the suspect, he suffered atrial fibrillation which prevented him from

performing his regular or assigned duties. The Board denied Anderson's

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application for ADRB and awarded ordinary disability retirement benefits

instead finding Anderson was "totally and permanently disabled from the

performance of his regular and assigned job duties. . . ." It also concluded the

"disability claim is the result of a pre-existing disease alone or a pre-existing

disease that is aggravated or accelerated by the work effort." Therefore, the

Board determined the incident that caused Anderson's disability was "not

undesigned and unexpected" and "[did] not qualify as a traumatic event that

would entitle [him] to [ADRB]."

Anderson appealed and the matter was referred to the Office of

Administrative Law for a hearing where Anderson was the only witness to

testify. The ALJ affirmed the Board's denial. The Board later adopted the ALJ's

decision as a final administrative determination which Anderson now appeals.

He contends his injury occurred during a violent, unplanned confrontation

that was both undesigned and unexpected, and not part of his routine duties. He

asserts that this incident qualifies as a traumatic event, entitling him to receive

ADRB.

II.

"Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of

Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re

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Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)); see also Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police &

Firemen's Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995). "An agency's determination on the

merits 'will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Saccone

v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting

Russo, 206 N.J. at 27).

"Arbitrary and capricious action of administrative bodies means willful

and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of

circumstances. Where there is room for two opinions, action is [valid] when

exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed

that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J.

183, 204-05 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Bayshore Sewerage Co. v.

Dep't Env't Prot., 122 N.J. Super. 184, 199 (Ch. Div. 1973)). When we consider

whether an agency's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable , we

examine: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2)

whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record;

and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the "agency clearly erred in

reaching [its] conclusion." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting

In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)). To determine whether an agency's

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decision is supported by substantial evidence, we may not "engage in an

independent assessment of the evidence as if [we] were the court of first

instance." In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999) (quoting State v. Locurto, 157

N.J. 463, 471 (1999)).

"Like all of the public retirement systems, the PFRS includes provisions

for the grant of ordinary and accidental disability benefits." Mount v. Bd. of

Trs., Police and Fireman's Ret. Sys., 233 N.J. 402, 419 (2018) (quoting Patterson

v. Bd. of Trs., State Police Ret. Sys., 194 N.J. 29, 42 (2008)). "A PFRS member

can qualify for ordinary disability benefits if [the member] is disabled for any

reason; the disability need not have a work connection." Ibid. However, "[t]o

be eligible for greater benefits under the accidental disability provision . . . a

PFRS member must satisfy N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1)'s more rigorous

requirements." Ibid.

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7 specifically sets forth the requirements for a PFRS

member to receive ADRB:

Any member may be retired on an accidental disability

retirement allowance, provided that the medical board,

after a medical examination of such member, shall

certify that the member is permanently and totally

disabled as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring

during and as a result of the performance of his regular

or assigned duties.

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[N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1).]

To establish entitlement to ADRB, an applicant must prove:

1. That [they are] permanently and totally disabled;

2. As a direct result of a traumatic event that is

a. Identifiable as to time and place,

b. Undesigned and unexpected, and

c. Caused by a circumstance external to the

member (not the result of pre-existing disease

that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);

3. That the traumatic event occurred during and as a

result of the member's regular or assigned duties;

4. That the disability was not the result of the member's

willful negligence; an[d]

5. That the member is mentally or physically

incapacitated from performing his usual or any other

duty.

[Richardson v. Board of Trs., Police and Firemen's Ret.

Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 212-213 (2007).]2

2

The Court also discussed other factual scenarios to provide guidance. For

example, "a police officer who has a heart attack while chasing a suspect has not

experienced a traumatic event," because there, "work effort, alone or in

combination with pre-existing disease, was the cause of the injury." Richardson,

192 N.J. at 213. Conversely, "the same police officer, permanently and totally

disabled during the chase because of a fall, has suffered a traumatic event." Ibid.

Additionally, "the gym teacher who develops arthritis from the repetitive effect

of his [or her] work over the years has not suffered a traumatic event," as "[his

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The Court held the "undesigned and unexpected" prong requires either "an

unintended external event" or "an unanticipated consequence" of an intended

event that "is extraordinary or unusual in common experience." Id. at 201

(quoting Russo, 62 N.J. at 154). "Injury by ordinary work effort," when "the

employee was doing [their] usual work in the usual way" does not qualify. Ibid.

(quoting Russo, 62 N.J. at 154). In short, "work effort itself . . . cannot be the

traumatic event." Id. at 211.

The Court emphasized the "polestar" of the inquiry was "whether, during

the regular performance of [the petitioner's] job an unexpected happening, not

the result of pre-existing disease along or in combination with the work, has

occurred and directly resulted in the permanent and total disability of the

member." Id. at 214.

The determination of whether an incident is undesigned and unexpected

cannot "[be] resolved merely be reviewing the member's job description and the

scope of his or her training." Mount, 233 N.J. at 427. While "those

considerations may weigh strongly for or against an award of accidental

or her]disability is the result of a degenerative disease and is not related to an

event that is identifiable as to time and place." Ibid. "On the contrary, the same

gym teacher who trips over a riser and is injured has satisfied the standard."

Ibid.

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disability benefits," a reviewing court "must carefully consider not only the

member's job responsibility and training, but all aspects of the event itself."

Ibid.

The ALJ found, and the Board agreed, that Anderson experienced cardiac

issues while attempting to detain, restrain, and handcuff the suspect on his own,

which he successfully accomplished. Although Anderson claims that the

incident was undesigned and unexpected because of the suspect's refusal to

comply and his combative behavior, given Anderson's training, years of

experience, and the demands of his position, the incident cannot, under our

jurisprudence, be considered undesigned and unexpected.

Richardson and subsequent cases clarify that ordinary work effort, even if

strenuous, does not constitute a traumatic event unless it is accompanied by an

unintended external event or an extraordinary consequence. 192 N.J. at 202.

See Moran v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 438 N.J. Super. 346,

351 (App. Div. 2014) (A firefighter's injury caused by unusual circumstances

including trapped victims and a lack of assistance and equipment represented an

undesigned and unexpected event to support the award of ADRB.); Brooks v.

Bd. of Trs., Dep't of Treasury, 425 N.J. Super. 277, 283 (App. Div. 2012) (A

custodian experienced an undesigned and unexpected accident when a weight

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bench dropped on its side and caused the full weight of the equipment to fall on

him.).

In contrast, Anderson's injury stemmed from a pre-existing condition for

which he had previously received medical intervention that may have been

exacerbated by his routine job activity, consistent with his responsibilities as a

police officer. Pursuit and restraint of fleeing and combative suspects were

routine parts of Anderson's duties despite each incident presenting unique and

unpredictable challenges. Nevertheless, Anderson was fully trained and

prepared for these contingencies. There was nothing out of the norm,

extraordinary, or unusual about the activity that ultimately led to Anderson's

disability. In sum, the facts neither demonstrate an intended external event nor

an extraordinary circumstance that might be considered unusual and that would

otherwise permit an ADRB award.

We are satisfied the Board's final determination relied on credible

evidence in the record and was not arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. The

ALJ's findings, adopted by the Board, were fully supported by substantial

credible evidence in the record and according to the pertinent jurisprudence. We

decline to disturb the Board's decision.

Affirmed.

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