Sencial

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

STEVEN JAY SENCIAL CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 23-3054

JOSEPH LOPINTO, III, ET AL. SECTION “E” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Joseph

P. Lopinto, III, Sheriff of Jefferson Parish, and Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”)

employees Sergeant Steven Rabb and Officer Kevin Smith. Defendants seek summary

judgment on all claims this pro se Plaintiff asserts against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1

Plaintiff filed an Opposition and a Supplemental Opposition,2 and Defendants filed a

Reply.3 At a status conference, Defendants informed the Court of ongoing discovery issues

and requested leave to file supplemental memoranda. The Court granted leave,4 after

which Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum,5 and Plaintiff filed a Response.6

BACKGROUND

This action arises from Plaintiff’s incarceration as a pretrial detainee at the

Jefferson Parish Correctional Center (“JPCC”).7 Plaintiff asserts Fourteenth Amendment

due process claims against all Defendants in their individual capacities, and against

Sheriff Lopinto in his official capacity, alleging the conditions of his confinement and the

1 R. Doc. 46.

2 R. Doc. 52; R. Doc. 53.

3 R. Doc. 51.

4 R. Doc. 58.

5 R. Doc. 60.

6 R. Doc. 64.

7 R. Doc. 4-2 at pp. 1-3.

episodic acts or omissions of the Defendants amounted to unconstitutional punishment.8

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants deprived him of adequate exercise and outdoor

recreational yard time, and that the deprivation was severe enough to violate his

Fourteenth Amendment rights.9

On December 16, 2025, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary

Judgment, seeking summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.10 Defendants argue

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the first grievance he filed,

and the other conduct of the Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.11

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.”12 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”13

When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the

evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing

the evidence.”14 “All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.”15

There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving

party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.16

8 Id. at pp. 2-3. The Plaintiff mentions Monell liability in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment. R. Doc. 53 at p. 2. This is not sufficient to plead a cause of action under Monell.

9 R. Doc. 4-2 at pp. 6-7.

10 R. Doc. 46.

11 Id.

12 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

13 DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).

14 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008); see also

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).

15 Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075

(5th Cir. 1994).

16 Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).

If the dispositive issue is one for which the moving party will bear the burden of

persuasion at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’”17 If the moving

party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party

successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving

party to direct the Court’s attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the

record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material

fact does indeed exist.18

On the other hand, if the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party

will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of

production by either (1) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element

of the nonmovant’s claim, or (2) demonstrating there is no evidence in the record to

establish an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.19 When proceeding under the

first option, if the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to dispute the

movant’s contention that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be useless, and the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.20 When, however, the

17 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co.

v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)).

18 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24.

19 Id. at 331-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987)

(citing Justice Brennan’s statement of the summary judgment standard in Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, and

requiring the Movers to submit affirmative evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmovant’s

claim or, alternatively, demonstrate the nonmovant’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential

element); Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Celotex,

and requiring the movant to make an affirmative presentation to negate the nonmovant’s claims on

summary judgment); 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 2727.1 (2016) (“Although the Court issued a five-to-four decision, the majority and

dissent both agreed as to how the summary-judgment burden of proof operates; they disagreed as to how

the standard was applied to the facts of the case.” (internal citations omitted)).

20 First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1980); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).

movant is proceeding under the second option and is seeking summary judgment on the

ground that the nonmovant has no evidence to establish an essential element of the claim,

the nonmoving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment by “calling the Court’s

attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by

the moving party.”21 Under either scenario, the burden then shifts back to the movant to

demonstrate the inadequacy of the evidence relied upon by the nonmovant.22 If the

movant meets this burden, “the burden of production shifts [back again] to the

nonmoving party, who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving

party’s papers, (2) produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue

for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further

discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).”23 “Summary judgment should be

granted if the nonmoving party fails to respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after

the nonmoving party responds, the court determines that the moving party has met its

ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact for

trial.”24

Still, “unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence.

The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the

record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports the claim.

‘Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search

of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.’”25

21 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332-33.

22 Id.

23 Id. at 332-33 n.3.

24 Id. at 332 n.3; see also First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 289.

25 Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (first citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;

then Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994); and then quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc.,

953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. The JPSO was put on notice of the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s first

grievance and had an opportunity to address them and, as a result,

Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedy with respect to his first

grievance.

Defendants seek summary judgment that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), with

respect to his first grievance.26 As a result, they argue Plaintiff is barred from recovering

damages for the conduct he alleges occurred from May 25, 2022, the day he entered the

JPCC, through September 15, 2022, when he filed his second grievance.27

The PLRA provides “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 of this title, or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available

are exhausted.”28 “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and

whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”29 The Supreme Court has

described the PLRA exhaustion provision as a “mandatory exhaustion” statute and has

“reject[ed] every attempt to deviate ... from its textual mandate.”30 The Fifth Circuit has

taken a strict approach to the exhaustion requirement.31 The Fifth Circuit has held

26 R. Doc. 46-1 at pp. 12-13.

27 Id. at p. 6.

28 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

29 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (citation omitted).

30 Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632,639-40 (2016); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no

question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in

court.”) (citing Porter, 534 U.S. at 524).

31 Wilson v. Epps, 776 F.3d 296, 299-300 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th

Cir. 2010) (“[P]risoners must not just substantially comply with the prison's grievance procedures, but

instead must ‘exhaust available remedies properly.’”).

exhaustion must have occurred before the lawsuit is filed,32 and that “[w]hen a defendant

asserts the defense of lack of exhaustion, the district court should rule on [the exhaustion]

issue before allowing the case to proceed to the merits.”33

Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has emphasized that a grievance is sufficient, even

if not administratively exhausted, if it puts officials on notice of the alleged conduct that

a plaintiff later relies on in a lawsuit.34 “[A] grievance should be considered sufficient [to

exhaust administrative remedies] to the extent that the grievance gives officials a fair

opportunity to address the problem that will later form the basis of the lawsuit.”35

Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has explained that the purpose of the exhaustion requirement

is not to create a demanding hurdle for plaintiffs to clear before they can bring suit; it is

to provide administrators with an opportunity to address a prisoner’s complaints

internally before the dispute reaches the litigation stage.36 When a pre-trial detainee has

exhausted some, but not all of the claims asserted in the complaint, only the unexhausted

claims are dismissed, not the complaint as a whole.37

The Defendants provided a Supplemental Statement of Uncontested Material

Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.38 The following statements are taken

from Defendants’ supplemental statement of undisputed facts and the first, second, and

third grievances filed by the Plaintiff, and the Defendants’ responses thereto, which are

attached to the supplemental statement.39

32 Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he case must be dismissed if available

administrative remedies were not exhausted.”).

33 Nottingham v. Finsterwald, 582 Fed. Appx. 297, 297-98 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Dillon, 596 F.3d at 272-

73).

34 Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 516-19 (5th Cir. 2004).

35 Id. at 517-19.

36 See id. at 518.

37 Jones v. Brock, 549 U.S. 199, 221 (2007).

38 R. Doc. 60-1.

39 R. Docs. 60-4, 60-5, and 60-6.

The JPCC has a grievance procedure designed to provide speedy and effective

administrative remedies for inmate grievances in compliance with federal and state law.40

The procedure is explained in a policy entitled Inmate Rules, Regulations, & All

Procedures which is provided to inmates incarcerated at the JPCC.41 The policy also

contains written guidelines describing expected inmate behavior and the discipline that

may be imposed for violations.42

The grievance procedure is a two-step process.43 The respondent has 30 days to

respond to a grievance. 44 If no timely response to the grievance is received by the inmate,

the request for review must be made within five days after expiration of the 30-day time

limit for a response.45 If the inmate does receive a timely response to the grievance, an

inmate may request review by the Correctional Administrator.46 The request must be

received by the Correctional Administrator or his designee within five days of the inmate's

receipt of the initial response.47

Plaintiff entered the JPCC on May 25, 2022.48 On July 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed his

first grievance alleging he lacked access to outdoor recreational yard time.49 In the

summary of his grievance, Plaintiff complained that “it has been several weeks since I had

an armband. I still have not received an armband. I have been denied my privileges due

to facility procedure more than three weeks [illegible] yard causing me unjust punishment

40 R. Doc. 60-1 at p. 1, ¶ 1. The Inmate Grievance Procedure is in the record at Doc. 60-2.

41 Id. at pp. 1-2, ¶ 2. The Inmate Handbook is in the record at Doc. 60-3.

42 Id. at pp. 1-2, ¶ 2.

43 Id. at p. 2, ¶ 3 .

44 A respondent has 30 days to respond to the complaint. R. Doc. 60-3 at p. 19.

45 R. Doc. 60-1 at p. 2, ¶ 3.

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 Id. at p. 2, ¶ 4.

49 Id. at p. 2, ¶ 5. The Plaintiff’s initial grievance is in the record at Doc. 46-6 and Doc. 60-4.

to my rights as an inmate.”50 In this grievance, Plaintiff complains of his lack of access to

outdoor recreational yard time for several weeks prior to July 19, 2022. On August 17,

2022, Plaintiff received a response authored by Sergeant Silbernagel, who determined the

grievance was unfounded.51 Sergeant Silbernagel stated that the Plaintiff “rolled into

facility on 05-25-2022 at which time you were issued an armband. You were placed on

suicide watch on 06-24-2022, at which time your armband was probably removed. You

were released from the infirmary on 07-07-2022, back to general population. On 07-25-

2022 you were issued a replacement armband. This Grievance was received on 07-27-

2022. I spoke with the pod officer currently working your pod, they informed me that you

currently have an armband on your person.”52 Plaintiff did not fill out the portion of the

Response to Grievance form requesting administrative review of the response.53

On September 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second grievance alleging a lack of yard

access.54 In this grievance, Plaintiff stated, “I have not received yard privileges since

medical and am constantly refused by Rabb and other officers and even threatened by

Rabb. I am not allowed to use fingernail clippers nor have I seen the sun in 4 months this

is a sedentary life style.”55 The initial response, authored by Sergeant Rabb, determined

the second grievance was unfounded.56 On September 28, 2022, Plaintiff requested

administrative review of that decision.57 On October 18, 2022, the second response,

authored by Captain Bryan Bordelon, determined Plaintiff’s grievance was founded.58

50 R. Doc. 60-4 at p. 1.

51 R. Doc. 60-1 at p. 2, ¶ 6; R. Doc. 60-4 at p. 2.

52 R. Doc. 60-4 at p. 2.

53 R. Doc. 60-1 at p. 2, ¶ 7.

54 Id. at pp. 2-3, ¶ 8. The Plaintiff’s second complaint is in the record at R. Doc. 46-7 and R. Doc. 60-5.

55 R. Doc. 46-7 and R. Doc. 60-5.

56 R. Doc. 60-1 at p. 3, ¶ 9; R. Doc. 46-7 at p. 2 and R. Doc. 60-5 at p. 2.

57 R. Doc. 60-1 at p. 3, ¶ 9; R. Doc. 46-7 at p. 7 and R. Doc. 60-5 at p. 7.

58 R. Doc. 60-1 at p. 3, ¶ 9 .

Captain Bordelon found “There are two extended periods of time after you were removed

from suicide watch where you were not issued a new armband. This prevented you from

attending the recreation yard on numerous occasions due to not having an armband.”59

According to the documents and emails provided by the Defendants, the two extended

periods during which Plaintiff was denied recreation yard privileges are July 5, 2022 until

July 25, 202260 (20 days)61 and August 19, 2022 until September 15, 2022 (27 days).62

Defendants do not seek summary judgment that Plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies as to all grievances filed. Rather, Defendants seek summary

judgment that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies with respect

only to his first grievance. The Defendants argue this failure bars Plaintiff’s recovery of

damages for conduct allegedly occurring from May 25, 2022, when he entered the JPCC,

through September 15, 2022, when Plaintiff filed his second grievance.63

To obtain summary judgment that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies with respect to his first grievance, Defendants must show “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and [they are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”64

Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of

demonstrating that Plaintiff “failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.”65 As a

result, to carry their summary judgment burden, Defendants must submit evidence that,

59 R. Doc. 46-7 at p. 8; 60-5 at p. 8.

59 R. Doc. 46-1 at 3, ¶ 9. R. Doc. 46-7 and R. Doc. 60-5 at p. 8.

60 R. Doc 60-4 at p. 2.

61 R. Doc. 60-5 at p. 3-4.

62 Id.

63 R. Doc. 46-1 at p. 6.

64 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

65 Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010).

if uncontroverted, would entitle them to a directed verdict at trial that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust available administrative remedies as to his first grievance.

In support of their Motion, Defendants submitted Plaintiff’s first grievance and the

administrator’s response.66 Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to seek administrative

review of the first grievance, and that fact is confirmed by copy of the grievance and initial

response submitted by Defendants.67 The Response to Grievance reflects that Plaintiff did

not request administrative review.68

Plaintiff’s second grievance filed on September 15, 2022 informed the Defendants

of the conduct Plaintiff objected to and that Plaintiff claimed he had not seen the sun for

four months, a period that covers conduct back to when Plaintiff entered the JPCC on

May 25, 2022. On October 18, 2022, the JPSO’s second response to the second grievance,

authored by Captain Bryan Bordelon, found the second grievance founded and recognized

that there had been two extended periods of time after Plaintiff was removed from suicide

watch when he was not issued a new armband and that this prevented him from attending

the recreation yard on numerous occasions--July 5, 2022 until July 25, 2022 (20 days) 69

and August 19, 2022 until September 15, 2022 (27 days).70

The Defendants were aware of and took the opportunity, when reviewing Plaintiff’s

second grievance, to address the allegations in his first grievance concerning Plaintiff’s

lack of access to the outside recreational yard after his removal from his first suicide

watch. The administrators did not treat Plaintiff’s second grievance as being only about

conduct beginning on August 19, 2022, when he was removed from his second suicide

66 R. Doc. 60-4.

67 Id.

68 R. Doc. 46-6 at p. 2.

69 R. Doc 60-4 at p. 2; 60-5 at p. 3.

70 R. Doc. 60-5 at p. 3.

watch, but rather acknowledged that they were aware his second grievance complained

about two separate denials of access to outdoor recreation time: one beginning July 5,

2022 when Plaintiff came off his first suicide watch and a second beginning August 19,

2022 when he came off his second suicide watch. The JPSO investigated and responded

to the second grievance accordingly looking past the technical defect of failure to exhaust

the first grievance and, in effect, determining the first grievance was founded as to all

conduct beginning on July 5, 2022 and ending on July 25, 2022 and the second grievance

was founded as to all conduct beginning on August 19, 2022 and ending on September 15,

2022. In his response to the second grievance, Captain Bordelon recognized there had

been two extended periods of time after Plaintiff was removed from suicide watch when

he was not issued a new armband which prevented him from attending the recreation

yard on numerous occasions71—the period covered by the first grievance and the period

covered by the second grievance.

Prison administrators cannot argue that a “prisoner’s grievance failed to comply

with procedural rules when the officials had looked past the purported technical defect

and rejected the grievance for substantive reasons.”72 In this case, the JPSO prison

administrators were aware that Plaintiff’s first and second grievances concerned two

extended periods when he was denied access to the outside recreation yard and they

addressed both periods of time in response to the second grievance. Accordingly, the

review of and response to Plaintiff’s second grievance satisfies the purpose of the

administrative exhaustion requirement—to ensure officers have notice of Plaintiff’s

claims and an opportunity to address them before litigation commences—with respect to

71 R. Doc. 60-5 at p. 8.

72 See Johnson, 385 F.3d at 520 (citing Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 331 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2004).

both his first and second grievances.73 Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense,

Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff “failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies.”74 As a result, to carry their summary judgment burden,

Defendants must submit evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle them to a

directed verdict at trial that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies

as to his first grievance. The Defendants have failed to meet this burden because the

evidence shows that JPSO had notice of, and an opportunity to address, Plaintiff’s first

grievance. The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies as to his first grievance will be denied.75

II. Disputed issues of fact exist with respect to the conditions of

confinement claims against Sheriff Lopinto in his official capacity and

against Sergeant Rabb and Officer Smith in their individual capacities.

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, brings conditions of confinement claims under § 1983

against Sheriff Lopinto in his official capacity and against Sergeant Rabb and Officer

Smith in their individual capacities. Plaintiff does not bring a conditions of confinement

claim against Sheriff Lopinto in his individual capacity. In the Fifth Circuit, conditions of

confinement claims are cognizable against officials in their individual capacities only if

the defendant is personally involved in the challenged conditions. 76 Plaintiff did not allege

or ague Sheriff Lopinto was personally involved in denying him outdoor recreation.

73 See Johnson, 385 F.3d at 516-19.

74 Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010).

75 Even if the Defendants had not been aware of and addressed Plaintiff’s first grievance when responding

to the second grievance, Defendants would not be entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff has established

there are genuine issues of disputed fact with respect to whether an exception excuses Plaintiff’s failure to

exhaust his first grievance because the remedy was not available. The Plaintiff argues in his Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment that the denial of his access to recreational yard time was

“punitive and retaliatory for grievances” and attaches his own declaration which includes a statement that

there was “Retaliation by Deputy Rabb (self-review of grievances about himself).”

76 See Borchgrevink v. Harris Cnty., Texas, No. 4:23-CV-03198, 2025 WL 2774777, at *2 n.4 (S.D. Tex.

Sept. 30, 2025) (citing Brown v. McLane, 807 F. App'x 410, 411 (5th Cir. 2020)).

“[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an

individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time

fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and

reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth

Amendment and the Due Process Clause.”77 While the state may punish those convicted

of crimes—so long as such punishment is neither cruel nor unusual—the state cannot

punish pretrial detainees because they have not yet been convicted of a crime.78 For this

reason, “[t]he constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee flow from both the procedural

and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment[,]” and not the

Eighth Amendment.79 Pretrial detainees may assert Fourteenth Amendment due process

claims under two alternative theories: (1) challenging the legality of a condition of

confinement or, (2) challenging episodic acts or omissions of prison officials.80 The Court

first examines Plaintiff’s claims challenging conditions of his confinement that denied

him the right to regular outdoor recreation.

Inmates have no protected liberty interest in specific recreational opportunities

and the “[d]eprivation of exercise is not a per se constitutional violation.”81 “[W]hat is

constitutionally required, however, is that [the pretrial detainee] not be confined for long

periods without the opportunity for regular physical exercise.”82 Accordingly, to succeed

77 Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996).

78 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).

79 Cleveland v. Gautreaux, 198 F.Supp.3d 717, 733 (M.D. La. 2016) (citing Olabisiomotosho v. City of

Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999)).

80 Id. (quoting Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009)).

81 Lewis v. Smith, 277 F.3d 1373, 2001 WL 1485821, at *1 (5th Cir. 2001).

82 Id.

on this claim at trial, Plaintiff must establish he was deprived of outdoor recreational yard

time for a sufficiently long period of time and the deprivation caused him actual injury.83

In the “Declaration of Steven Jay Sencial,” which Plaintiff submitted as an

attachment to his supplemental memorandum in opposition to Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiff declares he was repeatedly denied requests for recreation,

and he suffered emotional and physical injury.84 In terms of his physical harm, Plaintiff

alleges he suffered “extreme pain” and injuries from remaining sedentary.85

The Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish established the analysis for pretrial detainee

conditions of confinement claims.86 In that case, the Supreme Court held the government

may “detain [an individual] to ensure his presence at trial and may subject him to the

restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and

restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.”87 “[I]f a

restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or

purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action

is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.”88

In Hare v. City of Corinth, the Fifth Circuit clarified that the Bell “reasonably

related” test applies to conditions of confinement claims.89 The Fifth Circuit has gone on

to specify that, to successfully bring a conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must

prove: (1) “a rule or restriction or. . . the existence of an identifiable intended condition or

practice. . . [or] that the jail official's acts or omissions were sufficiently extended or

83 Laue v. Gusman, 2014 WL 3733002, at *10 (E.D. La. 2014).

84 R. Doc. 53-1.

85 R. Doc. 4-2 at p. 4.

86 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).

87 Id. at pp. 536–37.

88 Id. at pp. 539.

89 Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 644 (5th Cir. 1996).

pervasive; (2) which was not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective;

and (3) which caused the violation of [plaintiff's] constitutional rights.”90 When evaluating

a conditions of confinement claim, the state's or municipality's intent to punish is

presumed because a “State’s imposition of a rule or restriction during pretrial

confinement manifests an avowed intent to subject a pretrial detainee to that rule or

restriction.”91 As a result, “even where a State may not want to subject a detainee to

inhumane conditions of confinement or abusive jail practices, its intent to do so is

nevertheless presumed when it incarcerates the detainee in the face of such known

conditions and practices.92 Accordingly, Plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that the

state actor or municipality had the intent to punish him.93

When a plaintiff asserts a claim challenging conditions of confinement, the inmate

challenges the “general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial

confinement.”94 Plaintiff alleges he was denied his constitutional right “to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment, as protected by the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.”95 “These conditions, practices, rules, and restrictions can be explicit, such

as ‘the number of bunks per cell, mail privileges, disciplinary segregation, etc.’”96

However, “[a] formal, written policy is not required to establish a ‘condition or practice.’”97

A condition also may “reflect an unstated or de facto policy, as evidenced by a pattern of

acts or omissions ‘sufficiently extended or pervasive, or otherwise typical of extended or

90 Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., 631 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2011).

91 Hare, 74 F.3d at 644.

92 Id.

93 Id.

94 Id.

95 R. Doc. 4-2 at p. 6.

96 Reed v. Wichita Cnty., 795 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445,

452 (5th Cir. 2009)).

97 Montano v. Orange Cnty., Texas, 842 F.3d 865, 875 (5th Cir. 2016).

pervasive misconduct by [jail] officials, to prove an intended condition or practice.’”98 A

pervasive pattern of acts or omissions claim may be established with “consistent

testimony of jail employees’ or with reports, affidavits, and other documentary

evidence.”99 In Montano v. Orange County, the Fifth Circuit found that jail employees

holding detoxifying detainees in a special cell for as long as necessary until they detoxed

constituted a de facto policy, even though the formal written policy limited the

detoxification period to between four and eight hours.100

“[C]onfinement conditions may be constitutionally inadequate if, when viewed in

combination, they have a ‘mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a

single, identifiable human need.”101 In Miller v. Carson, the Fifth Circuit recognized that

exercise is one such identifiable human need, stating that “presumably innocent pretrial

detainees who are not classified as security risks and who have not been shown to have

violated the disciplinary rules of the jail have a [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and 1983 right

to regular access” to outdoor exercise.102 However, the Fifth Circuit has since held that

prisons are not necessarily required to allow pretrial detainees to exercise outdoors.103

Instead, the Fifth Circuit has stated that courts should evaluate deprivation of exercise

claims “on a case-by-case basis using, inter alia, the following criteria: (1) the size of the

inmate's cell; (2) the amount of time the inmate spends locked in his cell each day; and

98 Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74

F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1996)).

99 Baqer v. St. Tammany Par. Gov't, No. CV 20-980, 2025 WL 948167, at *7 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2025).

100 842 F.3d 865, 875 (5th Cir. 2016).

101 Sanchez v. Young Cnty., 956 F.3d 785, 795 (5th Cir. 2020)(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304

(1991)).

102 563 F.2d 741, 750 (5th Cir. 1977).

103 Mayfield v. Ellett, 102 F.3d 549 (5th Cir. 1996) (“we are quite certain that [Miller] does not confer a

constitutional right to exercise in unfiltered sunlight in an otherwise acceptable custodial facility regardless

of the facility's physical constraints.”).

(3) the overall duration of the inmate's confinement.”104 In Mayfield v. Ellett, the Fifth

Circuit held that, because a prison allowed a detainee to exercise regularly in a “dayroom”

and a gymnasium, the prison did not violate the plaintiff’s right to exercise even though

it did not allow Plaintiff outdoor recreation.105

To avoid violating a pretrial detainee’s constitutional rights, a policy, or pervasive

acts reflecting a de facto policy, must be (1) rationally related to a legitimate governmental

purpose, and (2) not be excessive in relation to that purpose.106 If policies or pervasive acts

are arbitrary or purposeless, they are not rationally related to a legitimate purpose.107

“[T]his test is deferential to jail rulemaking; it is in essence a rational basis test of the

validity of jail rules.”108 Courts should consider “the totality of the circumstances” of a

detainee’s confinement, such as the size of the inmate’s cell and the inmate’s ability to

exercise indoors, in determining whether a prison policy is reasonably related to a

legitimate purpose or is excessive.109 A “lack of funds is not a sufficient justification for

neglect of a citizen's constitutional rights.”110 While this is a deferential standard, courts

in this circuit have declined to dismiss conditions of confinement claims when disputed

issues of fact existed with respect to a policy’s legitimacy. In Martinez v. Harris County

Jail, the Fifth Circuit found a prison failed to state a legitimate government interest for

imposing restrictions on an inmate when it provided no evidence to justify the necessity

of the restrictions.111 In addition, in Burns v. Smith, the United States District Court for

104 Hewitt v. Henderson, 271 F. App'x 426, 428 (5th Cir. 2008).

105 Mayfield, 102 F.3d 549.

106 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979); Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009).

107 Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.

108 Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 646 (5th Cir.1996).

109 Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau Cnty., 88 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1996).

110 Baqer v. St. Tammany Par. Gov't, No. CV 20-980, 2025 WL 948167, at *9 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2025).

111 Martinez v. Harris Cnty. Jail, 71 F.3d 876 (5th Cir. 1995).

the Western District of Louisiana denied prison officials’ motion for summary judgment

on a pretrial detainee’s conditions of confinement claim when the court could not discern

a legitimate rationale for depriving a pretrial detainee of outside recreation opportunities.

The court reasoned that the officials had not demonstrated that denying the pretrial

detainee outdoor recreation was related to a legitimate government purpose, as the

detainee had committed no disciplinary infractions and did not otherwise present a

security risk.112

In this matter, Plaintiff claims that both JPSO formal policies and its de facto

policies evidenced by the deputies’ pervasive acts unreasonably denied him outdoor

recreation time. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

conditions of confinement claims. As Defendants are moving for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims, Defendants must demonstrate there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.113 Defendants as movants can satisfy this burden by either (1) submitting affirmative

evidence that negates an essential element of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims,

or (2) demonstrating there is no evidence in the record to establish an essential element

of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims.114 Defendants in this case chose to meet

their summary judgment burden by pointing to evidence in the record negating an

essential element of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim. To support this

argument, Defendants provided a statement of undisputed material facts and attached

the Plaintiff’s grievances and JPSO’s responses thereto.115 In response to Defendants’

112 Burns v. Smith, No. CIV.A.08-0428, 2009 WL 2825322, at *9 (W.D. La. Sept. 2, 2009).

113 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

114 Id. at 331-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987).

115 R. Docs. 46-6, 46-7, 46-8, 60-4, 60-5, 60-6, 60-7, 60-8, 60-9, 60-10, 60-11, 60-12, 60-13.

motion, Plaintiff did not specifically admit or deny any of Defendants’ statements of fact

but did provide a “Declaration of Steven Jay Sencial.”116 As a result, the court will assume

the facts as stated by the Defendants are true for the purposes of this motion and rely on

the grievances, responses, and Plaintiff’s declaration to determine whether Defendants

have met their burden of demonstrating that evidence in the record negates an essential

element of Plaintiffs conditions of confinement claims.

Not only must Defendants show that no genuine disputes of material fact exist, but

they also must demonstrate they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants

argue they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s conditions of

confinement claims, but they have cited an incorrect analysis for evaluating these claims.

Defendants incorrectly cite the standard for episodic acts or omissions claims as whether

the official “acted with subjective deliberate indifference” to a violation of the pretrial

detainee’s constitutional rights.117 The correct analysis is whether the Plaintiff has shown:

(1) “a rule or restriction or. . . the existence of an identifiable intended condition or

practice. . . [or] that the jail official's acts or omissions were sufficiently extended or

pervasive; (2) which was not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective;

and (3) which caused the violation of [plaintiff's] constitutional rights.”118

The Court will now examine the evidence in the record to determine whether the

Defendants have shown it is an undisputed fact that the Plaintiff cannot establish an

element of his cause of action. In his grievances, Plaintiff states he was denied outdoor

recreation for numerous periods of time; Defendants’ responses include JPSO’s stated

116 R. Doc. 53-1.

117 R. Doc. 60 at pp. 14-15.

118 Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., 631 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2011).

reasons for Plaintiff’s outdoor recreation time being denied. The attached grievances and

responses reflect the following:

 Plaintiff’s First and Second grievances: Plaintiff was denied outdoor

recreation for 20 days from July 5, 2022 to July 25, 2025119 and for 27 days

from August 19, 2022 to September 15, 2022.120 Captain Bordelon marked

these grievances as founded, clearly revealing he saw no legitimate reason

for the denials.121 Captain Bordelon acknowledged in his step two response

to Plaintiff’s second grievance that on two occasions Plaintiff was not issued

an armband that would allow him to exercise outdoors after he was removed

from suicide watch and that he had been denied outdoor yard time during

the periods covered by Plaintiff’s first and second grievances.122 No policy

regarding providing armbands after removal from suicide watch appears in

the Inmate Rules, Regulations, and All Procedures attached to the motion

for summary judgment.123 Plaintiff’s first two grievances and the

accompanying responses demonstrate that he was subject to a consistent

and pervasive pattern of prison officials denying him outdoor recreation

time due to the prison’s failure to provide him an armband after he was

removed from suicide watch. Sgt. Rabb stated in response to Plaintiff’s third

grievance that JPSO policy requires inmates to fill out an “Inmate Request

Form” in order to obtain a new armband after removal from suicide

119 R. Doc. 46-6 at p. 1.

120 R. Doc. 46-7.

121 Id.

122 Id. at p. 8.

123 R. Doc. 60-3.

watch,124 but no such policy appears in the Inmate Rules, Regulations, and

All Procedures attached to the motion for summary judgment.125 As a result,

Plaintiff also was subject to a pervasive pattern of prison officials requiring

that he request a new armband after he was removed from suicide watch—

rather than the armband being returned to him without request—that

denied him outdoor recreation.

 Plaintiff’s Third grievance: 41 days from September 15, 2022 to October 26,

2022.126 Captain Bordelon found this grievance founded, again clearly

revealing he saw no legitimate reason for the denial. He stated in his step

two response to this grievance that the inmates in Plaintiff’s living areas had

received outdoor recreation time on multiple occasions,127 but he

acknowledged that during this period inmates were denied outside

recreation time because of personnel shortages and construction on the

prison’s security door system.128 While the number of days Plaintiff was

denied outdoor recreation during this period is unclear, Plaintiff’s grievance

and the accompanying responses demonstrate a consistent and pervasive

pattern of prison officials denying Plaintiff outdoor recreation time due to

personnel shortages. No such policy appears in the Inmate Rules,

Regulations, and All Procedures attached to the motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiff also was denied outdoor recreation because of

124 R. Doc. 60-6 at p. 3.

125 There is a section in the policy entitled “Request Forms” but it includes no reference to inmates

requesting a new armband after removal from suicide watch. R. Doc. 60-3 at p. 16.

126 R. Doc. 46-8 at p. 1.

127 Id. at p. 10.

128 Id.

construction on the prison’s security door system. There is a policy in the

Inmate Rules, Regulations, and All Procedures that inmates will be on

lockdown during “Maintenance Repairs.”129

 Plaintiff’s Fourth grievance: 1 day on February 17, 2023.130 Sgt. Rabb

acknowledged in the first step response to this grievance that the prison

cancelled outdoor recreation time on this day due to the presence of private

contractors on the premises.131 There is no policy in the Inmate Rules,

Regulations, and All Procedures regarding inmates not being provided

outdoor recreation due to contractors being on the premises.132 This

grievance and Sgt. Rabb’s response demonstrate a consistent and pervasive

practice denying Plaintiff outdoor recreation time due to the presence of

contractors on prison grounds.

 Plaintiff’s Fifth grievance: 21 days from February 22, 2023 to March 15,

2023.133 Sgt. Rabb disputes the grievance only to the extent he states that on

March 10, 2023, Plaintiff was given 30 minutes of outdoor recreation

time.134 Sgt. Rabb acknowledged in the first step response to this grievance

that the prison cancelled outdoor recreation time during this period due to

the presence of contractors on the premises.135 There is no policy in the

Inmate Rules, Regulations, and All Procedures regarding inmates not being

129 R. Doc. 60-3 at p. 24.

130 R. Doc. 60-7 at p. 1.

131 Id. at p. 2.

132 R. Doc. 60-3.

133 R. Doc. 60-8 at p. 1.

134 Id. at p. 2.

135 Id. at p. 2.

provided outdoor recreation due to contractors on the premises.136 Sgt.

Rabb’s response once again demonstrates a consistent and pervasive

pattern of denying Plaintiff outdoor recreation time due to the presence of

contractors on prison grounds.

 Plaintiff’s Sixth grievance: 1 day on March 24, 2023.137 Sgt. Rabb

acknowledged in the first step response to this grievance that Plaintiff was

denied recreation yard access on this date because his armband had been

tampered with and was being held together by a rubber band; Sergeant

Rabb cited the prison policy providing that inmates who remove their

armbands will be subject to discipline and not eligible for outdoor activity.138

Plaintiff denies that he tampered with his armband.139 The Rule Book

provides that “[a]ny inmate who removes their armband for any reason

shall have disciplinary action instituted against him/her” and “any inmate

without an armband will not be allowed . . . recreational privileges.”140

Officer Smith also provided a response saying Plaintiff was denied outdoor

exercise time because of his mohawk haircut.141 The JPSO Inmate Rule Book

requires inmates to have “no longer than shoulder hair length. . . or any hair

style[s] that are not standard or the norm.”142 Plaintiff denies that his hair

style violates this policy. Accordingly, Plaintiff was subject to formal prison

136 R. Doc. 60-3.

137 R. Doc. 60-9 at p. 1.

138 Id. at p. 2.

139 Id. at p. 1.

140 R. Doc. 60-3 at p. 4.

141 R. Doc. 60-9 at p. 7.

142 R. Doc. 60-3 at p. 6.

policies regarding his armband and his hair style that denied him outdoor

recreation.

 Plaintiff’s Seventh grievance: For “over a month” from “March [2023] to

April [2023].”143 Sgt. Rabb acknowledged in the first step response to

Plaintiff’s grievance that the prison had been unable to follow the ordinary

recreation schedule during this period due to the presence of contractors on

the premises and adverse weather conditions.144 There is a policy in the

Inmate Rules, Regulations, and All Procedures providing there shall be no

outdoor exercise based on “weather conditions.”145 Sgt. Rabb further stated

that Plaintiff could have participated in outdoor recreation on March 24,

2023 had he not tampered with his armband.146 Sgt. Rabb’s response once

again demonstrates a pattern of pervasive acts denying Plaintiff outdoor

recreation, on these occasions due to the presence of contractors on prison

grounds, as well as the policies prohibiting tampering with an armband and

outdoor exercise during inclement weather.

 Plaintiff’s Eighth Grievance: 1 day on June 30, 2023.147 Sgt. Rabb stated in

the first step response to Plaintiff’s grievance that he asked the inmates in

Plaintiff’s living area if any of them wanted to participate in outdoor

recreation, but only the inmates of one cell, which did not include Plaintiff,

expressed a desire for recreation time.148 Plaintiff claims Sgt. Rabb did not

143 R. Doc. 60-10 at p. 1.

144 Id. at p. 2.

145 R. Doc. 60-3 at p. 7.

146 R. Doc. 60-1o at p. 2.

147 R. Doc. 60-11 at p. 1.

148 Id. at p. 2.

ask him whether he wanted recreation time and that Sgt. Rabb ignored his

request to participate.149

 Plaintiff’s Ninth Grievance: 1 day on July 14, 2023.150 Lt. Morris stated in his

first step response to Plaintiff’s grievance that Plaintiff lost recreation

privileges for his violation of the prison’s haircut policy.151 The Inmate Rules,

Regulations, and All Procedures policy requires inmates to have “no longer

than shoulder hair length . . . or any hair style[s] that are not standard or

the norm.”152 Lt. Morris does not specify how Plaintiff violated the haircut

policy and Plaintiff denies that he did. Plaintiff claims he should not have

been denied recreation time for this violation.153 Accordingly, Plaintiff was

subject to a formal prison policy that denied him outdoor recreation time

because of his hair style.

To prevail at the summary judgment stage, Defendants must “show[] that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.”154 To successfully bring a conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must

prove: (1) “a rule or restriction or. . .the existence of an identifiable intended condition or

practice. . . [or] that the jail official's acts or omissions were sufficiently extended or

pervasive; (2) which was not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective;

and (3) which caused the violation of [plaintiff's] constitutional rights.”155

149 Id. at p. 1.

150 Id.

151 R. Doc. 60-13 at p. 2.

152 R. Doc. 60-3 at p. 6.

153 R. Doc. 60-13 at p. 1.

154 FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

155 Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., 631 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2011).

To determine whether conditions are excessive to a legitimate government

interest, the Court must consider the totality of the circumstances, such as “the size of the

detainee's living space, the length of the confinement, the amount of time spent in the

confined area each day, and the opportunity for exercise.”156 The Fifth Circuit in Ruiz v.

Estelle added that these factors “together with the inmate’s physical and other needs must

be determined on the facts of each case and the evidence in each case should support the

existence of any health hazard under the specific circumstances involved.” 157 For example,

in order to determine whether the denial of outside yard exercise is a constitutional

violation, the Court must consider whether it is an undisputed fact that Plaintiff had

ample opportunity to enjoy indoor activity, such as having a cell large enough for him to

exercise indoors.158

Some of the formal policies cited by Plaintiff or Defendants are reasonably related

to a legitimate governmental objective, including the requirement that the prisoner have

an intact armband,159 that there be no outdoor exercise during adverse weather

conditions,160 and that there be no outside exercise during Maintenance Repairs.161

However, there are disputed issues of fact with respect to the totality of circumstances of

Plaintiff’s confinement that must be considered to determine whether other policies or

pervasive acts are legitimate or excessive, such as failing to issue Plaintiff a new armband

after he was removed from suicide watch, denying him outdoor recreation time due to the

presence of contractors on the premises, denying Plaintiff outdoor recreation because he

156 Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau Cnty., 88 F.3d 647, 650 (8th Cir. 1996).

157 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982).

158 See Lewis v. Smith, 277 F.3d 1373, 2001 WL 1485821, at *1 (5th Cir. 2001).

159 R. Doc. 60-3 at p. 4.

160 Id. at p. 7.

161 R. Doc. 60-3 at p. 24.

violated the hair style policy, and denying him outdoor recreation based on personnel

shortages. Defendants correctly argue that “[n]either the Supreme Court nor the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals has held that pretrial detainees have a per se constitutional right

to out-of-cell exercise or recreation,” but Defendants must address the totality of the

circumstances of Plaintiff’s confinement that show the prison policies or pervasive acts

that denied Plaintiff outdoor recreation were reasonably related to a legitimate

governmental purpose and were not excessive to that purpose.162 Neither Defendants’

statement of undisputed material facts nor the grievances and responses include any

evidence with respect to the totality of Plaintiff’s ability or opportunities to exercise

indoors, the size of plaintiff’s cell, the duration of his confinement, the amount of time

Plaintiff spent locked in his cell each day, or any of the other circumstances surrounding

Plaintiff’s pretrial detention.

In addition, Defendants have failed to provide legitimate rationales for failing to

issue Plaintiff a new armband after removing him from suicide watch, denying him

outdoor recreation based on the presence of contractors on the premises, denying the

Plaintiff outdoor recreation based on his violation of the hair style policy, or denying him

outdoor recreation based on personnel shortages. The Fifth Circuit has declined to

dismiss a plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim when the defendants failed to

explain the rationale for imposing certain restrictions.163 In response to Plaintiff’s

grievances in which Plaintiff complained of this armband policy, Captain Bordelon

acknowledged that the prison erred in neglecting to replace Plaintiff’s armband and that

162 R. Doc. 46-1 at p. 16.

163 Martinez v. Harris Cnty. Jail, 71 F.3d 876 (5th Cir. 1995).

this failure resulted in improperly restricting Plaintiff’s outdoor recreation time.164

Captain Bordelon also acknowledged the presence of contractors on the premises and

personnel shortages were not rationally related reasons for denying outdoor recreation.

Furthermore, Defendants have not offered evidence showing that Plaintiff presented a

security threat. Defendants fail to explain these circumstances reasonably required the

denial of Plaintiff’s outdoor recreation. Accordingly, the Defendants have not shown

evidence in the record negating Plaintiff’s ability to establish that the policies and

pervasive acts denying Plaintiff outdoor recreation were not reasonably related to a

legitimate governmental objective.

Even if Defendants had demonstrated that no disputed issues of material fact exist,

they still would not have demonstrated that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. As noted above, to successfully bring a conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff

must prove: (1) “a rule or restriction or. . . the existence of an identifiable intended

condition or practice. . . [or] that the jail official's acts or omissions were sufficiently

extended or pervasive; (2) which was not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental

objective; and (3) which caused the violation of [plaintiff's] constitutional rights.”165

Defendants must either submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of

the nonmovant’s claim, or demonstrate there is no evidence in the record to establish an

essential element of the nonmovant’s claim. However, Defendants argue they are entitled

to judgment as a matter of law under the analysis used for episodic acts or omissions

claims, which differs significantly from the analysis for conditions of confinement claims

in that it requires plaintiffs to establish that prison officials “acted with subjective

164 R. Doc. 46-7 at p. 8.

165 Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., 631 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2011).

deliberate indifference” to a violation of constitutional rights.166 Defendants have not

established they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law when they have not cited the

correct legal elements of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim. Accordingly, even if

issues of material fact did not exist, Defendants still would have failed to establish that

they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Disputed issues of material fact exist as to whether the polices and pervasive acts

that denied Plaintiff outdoor recreation time were reasonably related to a legitimate

governmental rationale or instead were excessive to that purpose. In addition, Defendants

have failed to demonstrate they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the

applicable legal standard. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim against

Sheriff Lopinto in his official capacity and Sergeant Rabb and Officer Smith in their

individual capacities.

III. All defendants individually, and Sheriff Lopinto in his official capacity,

are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s

episodic acts claims.

Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s episodic act or omission claims

asserted against Sergeant Rabb, Officer Smith, and Sheriff Lopinto in their individual

capacities and against Sheriff Lopinto in his official capacity. Defendants argue Plaintiff

failed to submit any evidence showing that Defendants were aware Plaintiff faced a

substantial risk of harm.167

An episodic acts or omissions claim may be brought against defendants in their

individual or official capacities. An episodic act or omissions claim “faults specific jail

166 Flores v. Cnty. of Hardeman, Tex., 124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997).

167 R. Doc. 60 at pp. 17-20.

officials for their acts or omissions.”168 In these claims, an actor is “interposed between

the detainee and the municipality, such that the detainee complains first of a particular

act of, or omission by, the actor and then points derivatively to a policy, custom, or rule

(or lack thereof) of the municipality that permitted or caused the act or omission.”169 The

relevant question becomes “whether that official breached his constitutional duty to tend

to the basic human needs of persons in his charge,” and intentionality is no longer

presumed.170

Plaintiff brings episodic acts/omissions claims against all Defendants. As noted

above, Plaintiff submitted multiple grievances arguing that various prison officials acted

to deny him outdoor recreation time and that Sheriff Lopinto was “responsible for all

aspects of [the] operations at the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center. . .[as] a final policy

maker[.]”171 As Plaintiff challenges the particular acts of individual officers and “then

points derivatively” to prison policies that caused the acts, Plaintiff brings episodic acts

or omissions claims against all Defendants in their individual capacities and against

Sheriff Lopinto in his official capacity.

Courts employ different standards for episodic acts or omissions claims depending

on whether the plaintiff brings claims against an official in his or her individual capacity

or official capacity.172 To find an official liable in his or her individual capacity, a pretrial

detainee must establish that the official “acted with subjective deliberate indifference” to

a violation of his constitutional rights.173 Generally, subjective deliberate indifference is

168 Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir. 2009).

169 Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1997).

170 Estate of Henson v. Wichita Cnty., 795 F.3d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 2015).

171 R. Doc. 4-2 at p. 2.

172 Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999).

173 Flores v. Cnty. of Hardeman, Tex., 124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997).

shown only when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

or safety,” and “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.”174

To find an official liable in his or her official capacity, “a pre-trial detainee must

establish that an official acted with subjective deliberate indifference” and that the “act

resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted or maintained with objective

deliberate indifference to the detainee's constitutional rights.”175 The objective deliberate

indifference standard “considers not only what the policy maker actually knew, but what

he should have known, given the facts and circumstances surrounding the official policy

and its impact on the plaintiff's rights.”176

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on this issue because

Plaintiff failed to submit evidence establishing that any of the Defendants had subjective

knowledge of any risk of serious harm to him.177 Defendants further argue the grievances

and responses establish that the Defendants did not evidence a deliberate disregard for a

substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, or that any Defendant disregarded that risk

by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent it.178 Defendants further argue they are

entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence establishing

174 Estate of Henson v. Krajca, 440 Fed.Appx. 341, 343 (5th Cir. 2011).

175 Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 54 (5th Cir. 1997); Corley v. Prator, 290 F. App'x 749, 753 (5th Cir.

2008)(affirming a district court’s granting of summary judgment on a Plaintiff’s episodic act claim against

a defendant in his official capacity because the plaintiff failed to raise a fact issue as to the subjective

deliberate indifference of any individual.).

176 Corley v. Prator, 290 Fed.Appx. 749, 750 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lawson v. Dallas Cnty., 286 F.3d 257,

264 (5th Cir. 2002)).

177 R. Doc. 60 at pp. 19-20.

178 Id. at p. 20.

that any policy of the Sheriff was the moving force behind any alleged constitutional

violations.179

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts or offered any evidence to show that Defendants

acted with subjective deliberate indifference. For Plaintiff to succeed on his episodic acts

or omissions claims, against all Defendants individually and against Sheriff Lopinto in his

official capacity, Plaintiff must be able to establish that prison officials acted with

subjective deliberate indifference.180 To establish this element, Plaintiff must show the

Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety and that the

officers were aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm existed, and must also draw the inference.181 Plaintiff offers not a

scintilla of evidence that prison officials were aware that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk

of serious physical or psychological harm due to his lack of outdoor recreation time. The

record does not reflect that the Defendants were aware Plaintiff suffered any type of

physical or psychological harm, let alone a “serious harm,”182 or that they were aware of

facts from which such an inference could be drawn and they actually drew the inference.

Accordingly, the Defendants have established that Plaintiff will be unable to establish an

essential element of his episodic acts claim because he cannot show that prison officials

acted with deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm to him. Accordingly,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these claims.

179 Id. at pp. 23-24.

180 Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999).

181 Estate of Henson v. Krajca, 440 Fed.Appx. 341, 343 (5th Cir. 2011).

182 Corley v. Prator, 290 F. App'x 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2008)(affirming a district court’s granting of summary

judgment on a Plaintiff’s episodic act claim against a defendant in his official capacity because the plaintiff

failed to raise a fact issue as to the subjective deliberate indifference of any individual.); Morel v. Lopinto,

No. CV 19-12422, 2022 WL 110496, at *9 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2022)(granting summary judgment for

defendant on a plaintiff’s episodic acts claim when the plaintiff did not offer “a scintilla of evidence that

[defendants] knew of a substantial risk of harm to [plaintiff].”).

CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment that Plaintiff

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his first grievance is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

on Plaintiffs conditions of confinement claims against Sheriff Lopinto in his official

capacity and Sergeant Rabb and Officer Smith in their individual capacities is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

on Plaintiffs episodic acts claims against Sergeant Rabb, Officer Smith, and Sheriff

Lopinto in their individual capacities and against Sheriff Lopinto in his official capacity is

GRANTED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 22nd day of June, 2026.13

SUSIE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

183 On May 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion to issue subpoenas for trial. R. Doc. 67. The trial in this matter

not been set. The motion is denied without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling the motion closer to the trial

323