Jaara

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

AHMED MOHD EID JAARA,

Petitioner,

v. 26-CV-76-LJV

DECISION AND ORDER

JOSEPH FREDEN et al.,1

Respondents.

The pro se petitioner, Ahmed Mohd Eid Jaara, is a native of Kuwait who was

admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in December 2004.

Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 5; see also Docket Item 1 ¶ 2. In October 2011, Jaara was convicted

of conspiracy and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 6; see also

Docket Item 4-3 at 2-7.2 In light of Jaara’s criminal conviction, the Department of

Homeland Security, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), took

him into custody on March 27, 2012, and issued him a notice to appear in immigration

court. Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 7; see also Docket Item 4-3 at 12-14.

1 The petition named three respondents in their official capacities: then-Attorney

General Pamela Bondi; then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem; and the

Deputy Field Office Director and Administrator of the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility,

Joseph Freden. See Docket Item 1. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d),

Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche and Secretary of Homeland Security Markwayne

Mullin are automatically substituted as respondents for Bondi and Noem. The Clerk of

the Court shall update the case caption accordingly. For ease of reference, the Court

will refer to the respondents as “the government” throughout this decision and order.

2 Page numbers in docket citations refer to ECF pagination.

In June 2012, Jaara was ordered to be removed to Kuwait, Docket Item 1 ¶ 4,

but he was released from custody in the United States about three months later, Docket

Item 4-2 ¶ 9. More than 10 years after that, in April of 2025, he was arrested when he

tried to reenter the United States from Canada. Docket Item 1 ¶ 27. He has remained

in custody ever since and currently is being held at the Buffalo Federal Detention

Facility. Id. ¶¶ 3, 27.

Jaara commenced this action earlier this year by filing a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Docket Item 1. In that petition, he argues that

his prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) violates the United States

Constitution because there is no significant likelihood that he will be removed in the

reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 28-34. After the government moved to

dismiss the petition, Docket Item 4, Jaara responded, Docket Item 8. Jaara later filed a

letter updating the Court on his status. Docket Items 9 and 10.3

For the reasons that follow, Jaara’s petition is GRANTED; the government’s

motion to dismiss, Docket Item 4, is DENIED; and Jaara shall be released immediately.

BACKGROUND4

Jaara is a native of Kuwait who was admitted to the United States as a lawful

permanent resident on December 10, 2004. Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 5; see also Docket Item

3 While the Court received two letters that were docketed separately, the letters

in fact are the same letter dated May 7, 2026. See Docket Items 9 and 10.

4 The following facts are taken from the petition, Docket Item 1, as well as

records submitted by the government, Docket Item 4-3, the declaration of ICE

2

1 ¶ 2. On October 14, 2011, Jaara pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of New York to one count of extortion conspiracy; he was sentenced

to imprisonment for 18 months followed by a term of supervised release of three years.

Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 6; see also Docket Item 4-3 at 2-7 (judgment). Following Jaara’s

sentence of incarceration, see Docket Item 4-3 at 3, ICE took him into custody on March

27, 2012, and issued a notice for him to appear in immigration court, Docket Item 4-2 ¶

7; Docket Item 4-3 at 12-14 (notice to appear).

On June 26, 2012, an immigration judge ordered Jaara removed to Kuwait.

Docket Item 1 ¶ 4; Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 8; see also Docket Item 4-3 at 15-16 (removal

order). Jaara did not appeal the removal order. Docket Item 1 ¶ 5. But Jaara was not

removed; instead, he was released from custody in September 2012 and required to

report to immigration officials at least once annually. Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 9; Docket Item 1

¶ 26.

For more than a decade, Jaara remained on supervision “with no issue[.]”

Docket Item 1 ¶ 27; see Docket 1-1 at 2-12 (copies of W-2s reflecting Jaara’s

subsequent work history). But on April 10, 2025,5 Jaara was driving a 26-foot box truck

to make a delivery in Chicago, Illinois, when he inadvertently drove across the border

into Canada. Docket Item 1 ¶ 27. When Jaara realized that he no longer was in the

Deportation Officer Sean McDonald, Docket Item 4-2, and Jaara’s update to the Court,

Docket Item 9.

5 Jaara and the government both state that he has been detained since April 11,

2025, Docket Item 1 ¶ 3; Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 10. That one-day discrepancy is immaterial

to the Court’s analysis below.

3

United States, he tried to return and was arrested. Id. Jaara has remained in custody

ever since. Id.

About two weeks after Jaara’s arrest, ICE requested a travel document from the

Kuwaiti embassy. Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 11. But on May 14, 2025, the Kuwaiti embassy

notified ICE that it was not able to provide a travel document. Id. ¶ 12.

ICE then tried to remove Jaara to the Palestinian Territories,6 where he has

family and where he lived in the early 1990s. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. To accomplish that, ICE first

needed to obtain approval for Jaara to travel through Israel. Id. ¶ 15. So on September

9, 2025, ICE submitted a transit request to the Israeli government, but at least as of

February 13, 2026, that request had not been answered. Id.

The government says that it usually takes the Israeli government three to six

months to approve or deny such a request, but that it can take longer when the request

does not include identification documents issued by the Palestinian Authority. Id. ICE

does not have such documents for Jaara, id. ¶ 16, so ICE is “awaiting information, if

any, from the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority regarding [Jaara] that

would allow his removal to the Palestinian Territories,” Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 16.

By letter, Jaara informed the Court that in March 2026, an ICE deportation officer

told him that ICE now was trying to deport him to Jordan. Docket Item 9 at 1. In fact,

on March 25, 2026, the officer presented Jaara with an application for a Jordanian

“‘temporary’ travel document.” Id. But Jaara is not “a subject, national, or citizen” of

6 Consistent with the government’s filings, the Court also refers to this region as

the Palestinian Territories.

4

Jordan and has “no ties whatsoever” there. Id. The deportation officer told Jaara that

he would have to “‘remove [himself]’” from Jordan to Palestine but also told him that the

Jordanian border was currently closed and that “there was no determination as [to]

when that would change.” Id. Then, on May 6, 2026, the officer told Jaara that he was

on the list to go to South Africa, that if he refused he would be shackled and put on a

charter flight, and that ICE does not need his consent to remove him. Id. at 2.

In the meantime, Jaara has remained in ICE custody for well over a year.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

I. SECTION 2241 PETITION

28 U.S.C. § 2241 “authorizes a district court to grant a writ of habeas corpus

whenever a petitioner is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.’” Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). “When a petitioner brings a habeas petition [under section] 2241,

the petitioner ‘bears the burden of proving that he is being held contrary to law; and

because the habeas proceeding is civil in nature, the petitioner must satisfy his burden

of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Dzhabrailov v. Decker, 2020 WL

2731966, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2020) (quoting Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d

144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011)). “The equitable principles governing [section] 2241 are

reflected in the plenary discretion vested in habeas courts to ‘hear and determine the

facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.’” Id. (some alterations

omitted) (quoting Pinkney v. Keane, 920 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1990)).

5

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A court “reviews a motion to dismiss a habeas petition according to the same

principles as a motion to dismiss a civil complaint under [Rule] 12(b)(6).” Spiegelmann

v. Erfe, 2018 WL 1582549, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018). “To survive a motion to

dismiss [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556).

III. PRO SE PETITIONS

“When a habeas petitioner proceeds pro se, the court holds the petition to less

rigorous standards than it holds filings by counseled parties.” Nimmons v. Warden,

2025 WL 2782486, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2025) (quoting Mejia v. Elmira Corr.

Facility, 702 F. Supp. 3d 83, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 2023)). Nevertheless, while courts must

“liberally construe” a pro se petition “to raise the strongest arguments it suggests,”

Mejia, 702 F. Supp. 3d at 93, “pro se status ‘does not exempt a pro se party from

compliance with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law,’” Nimmons, 2025

WL 2782486, at *2 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983); see also

6

Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (“It is well

established that the submissions of a [pro se] litigant must be construed liberally[.]”).

DISCUSSION

Jaara argues that his detention violates both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). See Docket Item 1 ¶¶ 19-34; see also id. at 11. Therefore,

he says that he is entitled to immediate release. Id. at 10. The government has moved

to dismiss Jaara’s petition, arguing that despite the length of his detention, Jaara is

lawfully detained under section 1231. See Docket Item 4-1 at 4-5.

I. DETENTION UNDER SECTION 1231

A. The Statute

Because Jaara is a noncitizen with a final order of removal, his detention is

governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 542-45

(2021). “Section 1231 provides that during a specified ninety-day removal period, ‘the

Attorney General shall detain the [noncitizen].’” Diallo v. Joyce, 817 F. Supp. 3d 202,

204 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A)); see also Guzman

Chavez, 594 U.S. at 528 (“During the removal period, detention is mandatory.”). Under

section 1231’s explicit terms, that period begins “on the latest” of three possible dates:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay

of the removal of the [noncitizen], the date of the court's final order.

7

(iii) If the [noncitizen] is detained or confined (except under an

immigration process), the date the [noncitizen] is released from

detention or confinement.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B); see also Hechavarria v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 49, 54-55 (2d Cir.

2018), as amended (May 22, 2018).

“If the [noncitizen] does not leave or is not removed within the removal period,

the [noncitizen], pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations

prescribed by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). In “normal circumstances,

after the ninety-day removal period ends, a person is required to be released from

detention under supervision.” Diallo, 817 F. Supp. 3d at 204. Under the relevant

federal regulations, “that person would be released with an order of supervision, with

regulations specifying conditions under which they can be re-detained.” Id. (citing 8

C.F.R. § 241.4).

But the government is not required to release all noncitizens after the removal

period ends. More specifically, “[a]fter the 90-day removal period expires, section

1231(a)(6) authorizes the detention of three classes of persons ‘beyond the removal

period’: noncitizens who are (1) inadmissible, (2) removable as the result of violations of

certain status requirements or entry conditions, violations of criminal law, or reasons of

security or foreign policy, or (3) determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the

community, or to be unlikely to comply with the order of removal.” Zhu v. Genalo, 798

F. Supp. 3d 400, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)).

As is immediately clear, that statute “fails to specify how long the Attorney

General can continue detention beyond the removal period.” Lin v. United States, 2007

8

WL 951618, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2007); see also Qasemi v. Kurzdorfer, 2025 WL

2938607, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2025) (“By its plain language, [section 1231(a)(6)]

does not appear to impose any limitation on the length of a[ noncitizen]’s detention.”).

And because a “statute permitting indefinite detention of a[ noncitizen] would raise a

serious constitutional problem,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, the Supreme Court has

provided guidance for courts addressing cases that involve detention under section

1231(a)(6). The Court turns now to that guidance.

B. Zadvydas v. Davis

In Zadvydas, “the Supreme Court interpreted [section] 1231(a)(6) narrowly to

avoid the possible constitutional problems with indefinite detention.” Qasemi, 2025 WL

2938607, at *3. More specifically, the Court held that section 1231(a)(6), “read in light

of the Constitution’s demands, limits a[ noncitizen]’s post-removal-period detention to a

period reasonably necessary to bring about that [noncitizen]’s removal from the United

States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689; see also Lema v. Rhoney, 2026 WL 380402, at *2

(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2026) (Wolford, C.J.) (“In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court read an

implicit limitation into [section] 1231(a)(6).” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)). “This limitation is linked to the statute’s ‘basic purpose,’ which is to ‘assure

the [noncitizen]’s presence at the moment of removal.’” Qasemi, 2025 WL 2938607, at

*3 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (alteration omitted)).

“The Zadvydas court also provided a framework under which habeas courts are

to review claims challenging continued detention under [section] 1231(a)(6).” Id. In

doing so, “[t]he Zadvydas Court . . . adopted a 6-month ‘presumptively reasonable

9

period of detention,’ and instructed that ‘after this 6-month period, once the [noncitizen]

provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future, the [g]overnment must respond with evidence sufficient

to rebut that showing.’” Lema, 2026 WL 380402, at *2 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

701) (alteration omitted)).

“In analyzing the likelihood of removal, courts consider a variety of factors,

including the existence of a repatriation agreement with the target country, the target

country’s prior record of accepting removed [noncitizens], and specific assurances from

the target country regarding its willingness to accept a[ noncitizen].” Hassoun v.

Sessions, 2019 WL 78984, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019). And when conducting that

analysis, courts “must take appropriate account of the greater immigration-related

expertise of the Executive Branch, of the serious administrative needs and concerns

inherent in the necessarily extensive . . . efforts to enforce this complex statute, and [of]

the Nation’s need to speak with one voice in immigration matters.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.

at 700 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“The mere passage of time beyond the six-month presumptively reasonable

period does not satisfy [the petitioner’s] burden under Zadvydas.” Lorenzo v. Barr, 2021

WL 84283, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2021). But at the same time, as the length of

detention grows, “what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely”

shrinks. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. “In effect, the parties’ respective burdens shift as

the length of detention increases.” Hassoun, 2019 WL 78984, at *4. “Thus, as time

passes, the mere existence of possible avenues for removal becomes insufficient to

justify further detention; some evidence of progress is required.” Id. (collecting cases).

10

II. APPLYING ZADVYDAS

With those principles in mind, the Court now turns to the facts of Jaara’s

detention and the government’s efforts to remove him. Because Jaara now has been

detained for more than twice six months,7 see Docket Item 1 ¶¶ 3, 27, he most certainly

“has surmounted the first of Zadvydas’s hurdles,” Hassoun, 2019 WL 78984, at *4, and

then some. The question thus becomes whether he has provided “good reason to

believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. And he has.

Jaara says that the “persistent inability” of the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”) “to effectuate [his] removal provides threshold evidence that there is not a

significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future.” Docket Item 1 ¶ 28. He

7 Jaara does not claim to have sought judicial review of the removal order or

obtained a stay, and he is detained under an immigration process; therefore, only the

first criterion of section 1231(a)(1)(B)—when the removal order became administratively

final—marks the beginning of his removal period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).

Because Jaara did not appeal his removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals,

that removal order became administratively final on June 26, 2012, the date it was

issued. See, e.g., Villa as Next Friend of Villa v. Warden, Broome Cnty. Corr. Facility,

2026 WL 925828, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2026) (because the petitioner waived appeal

of the removal order, the order of removal became “administratively final” under section

1231(a)(1)(B)(i) on the date it was issued). His detention was mandatory for the ninety-

day period following June 26, 2012. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). And Jaara was released

from custody on September 19, 2012, just before the ninety-day mandatory detention

period expired. Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 9. But determining the exact beginning and ending

of Jaara’s removal period is not material to the Court’s analysis because it is undisputed

that Jaara’s current detention has exceeded six months: indeed, Jaara was re-detained

in early April of 2025, id. ¶ 10; he had been detained more than eight months when he

filed this petition; and he now has been detained well over a year.

11

argues that continuing to detain him when there is no significant likelihood of his

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future deprives him of his “strong interest in

liberty” and imposes “actual and substantial hardships and irreparable injuries.” Id. ¶ 33

(internal quotation marks omitted). And he asks this Court to order his release in light of

his strong family ties in the United States, the fact that he is not a danger to the

community or a flight risk, and the availability of supervision programs that would cost

significantly less than his detention while still ensuring his appearance. See id. ¶¶ 30,

35-38; see also Docket 1-2 at 2-21 (letters of support submitted by Jaara).

As noted above, merely noting “that the government has been unable to obtain a

travel document to date” or relying on the length of time in detention does not satisfy a

petitioner’s burden under Zadvydas. See Callender v. Shanahan, 281 F. Supp. 3d 428,

434-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Lorenzo, 2021 WL 84283, at *6. But Jaara has done far more

than that, particularly in light of the government’s several failed efforts to deport him

since he was detained in April 2025.

First, the government tried to deport Jaara to Kuwait—as his removal order

provided—but the government was unable to obtain the necessary travel documents.

Docket Item 4-2 ¶¶ 8, 11-12. So ICE tried to remove him to the Palestinian Territories,

id. ¶ 13, but that required permission from Israel, id. ¶ 15. And while the government

requested such permission 10 months ago, id., it has yet to be granted. What is more,

the government concedes that it still “is awaiting information, if any, from the

Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority regarding [Jaara] that would allow

his removal to the Palestinian Territories.” Id. ¶ 16 (emphasis added). In other words,

the government apparently does not know whether it will ever get an answer.

12

Since February 13, 2026, the date that the government moved to dismiss the

petition, more than four months have passed with no apparent progress. And to date,

the government has not provided an update on the status of its request to Israel or any

attempt to secure the identification documents necessary for Jaara’s removal to the

Palestinian Territories.

Jaara has since been told that he is destined for Jordan or South Africa. Docket

Item 9 at 1-2. But there is no evidence that the government is anywhere near effecting

his removal to either of those places—or anywhere else in the world, for that matter.

And because the government has not given this Court any reason to believe that the

government has obtained any of the materials necessary for Jaara’s removal—such as

a scheduled removal, a travel document, or an identity document issued by the

Palestinian Authority or Israel—the Court is “left to guess whether [Jaara’s] deportation

might occur in ten days, ten months, or ten years.” See Singh v. Whitaker, 362 F. Supp.

3d 93, 102 (W.D.N.Y. 2019).

Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Jaara has cleared the low bar

needed to shift the burden back to the government. See Yuan v. Anda-Ybarra, 2026

WL 837021, at *1-2 (D.N.M. Mar. 26, 2026) (petitioner had “met his burden of showing

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future”

when the government had not submitted “proof of a travel document, . . . proof of

acceptance by China, [or] proof of a scheduled removal” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also Sahin v. Casey, 2026 WL 800558, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2026)

(“The ‘good reason to believe’ standard is not a very high bar.” (quoting Freeman v.

13

Watkins, 2009 WL 10714999, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009))). But the government

has pointed to little to rebut Jaara’s showing.

In fact, the government has given this Court nothing other than the transit request

that has been pending with Israel for more than five months. Docket Item 4-1 at 3;

Docket Item 4-2 ¶ 16. The government has not provided evidence that ICE has

successfully removed others to the Palestinian Territories; or updated its progress on

removing Jaara to the Palestinian Territories or Kuwait or Jordan or South Africa; or

given this Court any reason to believe that Jaara’s removal will ever happen. And for

that reason, the government has not come close to rebutting Jaara’s showing. Cf.

Salem v. Core Civic Warden, 2026 WL 194156, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2026)

(denying habeas petition where “[r]espondents have submitted unrebutted evidence that

ICE has successfully removed individuals to the Palestinian [T]erritories.”); Hammouda

v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2026 WL 91465, at *2, *5-6 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2026)

(denying habeas relief where respondents declared that the petitioner was slated for

one of two specifically scheduled missions to the Palestinian Territories and the

government was “nearing final approval” of travel documents and “pledged that

[p]etitioner’s removal [wa]s likely to occur within days”).

Nor has the government suggested that it “anticipate[s] receiving special transit

permission necessary to enter the occupied Palestinian [T]erritories[,]” see Hammouda,

2026 WL 91465, at *5, let alone that it has made progress toward Jaara’s removal by

actually receiving that permission, cf. Zakarneh v. United States Immigr. & Customs

Enf’t, 2026 WL 73825, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2026) (denying relief under Zadvydas

based on evidence that “the government of Israel has approved [p]etitioner’s removal

14

through Israel to the West Bank so long as a flight can be arranged” and at least two

removal flights had been arranged for petitioner (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)). Indeed, as Jaara argues in his response, ICE is apparently waiting for any

information from Israel or the Palestinian Authority about Jaara—which implies that ICE

“ha[s] acknowledged the possibility of receiving no information at all” and that such

information may not even exist. See Docket Item 8 at 2.

In light of the lack of progress since Jaara’s arrest more than a year ago, the

government’s proffered evidence and explanation concerning its efforts to remove Jaara

to the Palestinian Territories falls far short. See Fadwa v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3525026, at

*5-6 (D. Colo. Dec. 9, 2025) (granting habeas relief where petitioner had been detained

for almost four months after presumptively reasonable timeframe ended, ICE’s

application for transit documents from Israel had been pending for 195 days, and ICE

did not provide any details about how removal plan would be effected or whether

Palestinian Authority would accept petitioner); Shamma v. Raycraft, 2026 WL 598451,

at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026) (granting petition where government repeatedly was

unable to acquire travel documents for petitioner and provided only a “general,

speculative statement” that “Israel will take stateless subjects and transfer [them] to

Palestine via the West Bank” to show significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Barghouthi v. Field

Off. Dir., 2026 WL 1040943, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2026) (ordering bond hearing

where DHS was unable to effect removal for years, circumstances remained “materially

unchanged from those that previously rendered [p]etitioner’s removal impracticable,”

and government presented only a “speculative” attempt “to pursue removal through

15

Palestinian-issued travel documents”); Thabata v. Blanche, 2026 WL 1495209, at *2

(W.D. Okla. May 28, 2026) (“Over four years later, [p]etitioner still lacks a passport to

enter Palestine, [r]espondents have not obtained any travel documents for [p]etitioner,

and Isr[ae]l has not approved his removal though the request was submitted . . . almost

six months ago. Such prolonged silence reinforces that removal is not significantly

likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.”); Al Ellary v. Bondi, 2026 WL 787663, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2026) (granting petition of Palestinian native where multiple

countries declined to accept him and ICE had not identified any other country that might

accept him or provided any plan or timeline for removal).

Finally, the government has not attempted to rebut Jaara’s initial showing by

providing evidence that it is trying to remove him to some other country such as Jordan

or South Africa. Indeed, aside from Jaara’s letter dated May 7, 2026, Docket Items 9

and 10, the Court has no reason to believe that the government has even explored

those avenues. So to the extent that the government may be trying to remove Jaara

somewhere else, the Court has not received any information—let alone a declaration or

official documentation—from the government itself. And at this stage, it is the

government’s burden to present “evidence sufficient to rebut [Jaara’s] showing.” See

Lema, 2026 WL 380402, at *2 (declaration from ICE deportation officer that “cryptically

state[d]” that DHS is “actively working . . . to remove [p]etitioner to a third country” with

no further details was “inadequate to rebut [petitioner’s] showing under Zadvydas”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

In sum, Jaara has demonstrated that he is entitled to relief under Zadvydas

because he has been detained for more than twice six months and there still is no

16

significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. For that

reason, he is entitled to immediate release.8 See Trejo v. Warden of ERO El Paso East

Montana, 807 F. Supp. 3d 697, 712 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (“The remedy for a Zadvydas

claim is generally release of the habeas petitioner under conditions of supervision.”);

see also Diallo, 817 F. Supp. 3d at 210 (“[T]he ‘typical remedy’ for ‘unlawful executive

detention is, of course, release.’” (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)

(alteration omitted)); Lema, 2026 WL 380402, at *2 (ordering immediate release of

petitioner who brought successful Zadvydas claim). The government’s motion to

dismiss therefore is denied,9 and Jaara’s petition is granted.

8 Because Jaara is entitled to his release under Zadvydas, the Court need not

address the other arguments raised in his petition.

9 In the motion to dismiss, the government also says that this Court “lacks

jurisdiction over this matter [under] 8 U.S.C. § 1252,” Docket Item 4-1 at 5, but it does

not expand on this argument. The Court assumes that the government is arguing that

its review of Jaara’s petition is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which provides that “no

court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any

[noncitizen] arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to . . . execute

removal orders.” Such an argument misses the point of Jaara’s petition, which

challenges his detention—not his removal order. See Docket Item 1 ¶¶ 31-34. And

“[d]istrict courts retain jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from noncitizens challenging

their detention during or following immigration proceedings.” Al Nassar v. Rhoney, 2026

WL 1800891, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 23, 2026) (citing Delgado v. Quarantillo, 643 F.3d

52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011)). This Court therefore “has little difficulty in concluding that it may

exercise jurisdiction over [Jaara]’s habeas claims,” which argue that his detention

violates the Constitution and federal law. See id. at *3 (concluding that court had

jurisdiction to hear habeas claims raised by petitioner who argued, among other things,

that his detention was indefinite and violated “the Constitution and 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(6)”).

17

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Jaara’s petition, Docket Item 1, is GRANTED, and

the government’s motion to dismiss, Docket Item 4, is DENIED. Within 24 hours of the

issuance of this order, Jaara shall be released from custody. The respondents may, in

their discretion, impose conditions of release. On or before June 29, 2026, the

government shall file an affidavit attesting to Jaara’s release.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 26, 2026

Buffalo, New York

/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo

LAWRENCE J. VILARDO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18