Huynh

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TAI TAN HUYNH,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-1536-WWB-MCR

WARDEN, BAKER CORRECTIONAL

INSTITUTION, et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________

ORDER

Petitioner Tai Tan Huynh, an immigration detainee at Baker Correctional Institute,

initiated this action through counsel by filing a Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) with exhibits (Doc. Nos. 1-1 to 1-9). Respondents

filed a Response (Doc. 11) with exhibits (Doc. Nos.11-1 to 11-8). Petitioner filed a

counseled Reply (Doc. 17) with exhibits (Doc. Nos. 17-1 to 17-4). The case is ripe for

review.

I. PETITION

Petitioner, a native of Vietnam, entered the United States as a refugee in 1992 as

part of the Orderly Departure Program established by the United States following the

Vietnam War. (Doc. 1 at 1, 13). At that time, Petitioner was 15 years old, and as part of

that program, Petitioner obtained lawful permanent resident status. (Id. at 13, 14). In

1999, Petitioner was convicted in South Dakota of reckless discharge of a firearm and

was sentenced to six-months of work release. (Id. at 15). Subsequently, Petitioner was

placed in removal proceedings, detained for one day, and then released. (Id.). On

February 11, 2003, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed to Vietnam based

on his criminal conviction. (Id.). Petitioner was placed on an Order of Supervision

(“OSUP”) on March 3, 2008. (Id.).

More than seventeen years later, on May 23, 2025, at a routine check-in, Petitioner

“was enrolled into the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program . . . without

explanation,” and for the first time, required to wear an ankle monitor. (Id. at 16). United

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) also “provided him with a letter

entitled Plan of Action for Self-departure” requiring Petitioner to “provide a travel itinerary

to ICE officials by July 23, 2025, for departure to Vietnam by no later than August 25,

2025.” (Id.). In compliance with the letter, Petitioner attempted to obtain a passport from

Vietnam, but the consulate “returned the passport application to Petitioner and declined

to process it, citing his order of removal.” (Id.). On June 3, 2025, Petitioner applied to

the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services “for parole-in-place,” and the

application remains pending. (Id. at 16–17). Further, Petitioner’s wife submitted a petition

for alien relative, which likewise remains pending. (Id. at 17). Petitioner also submitted

to ICE an application for stay of removal, but ICE denied his request. (Id.). Despite

Petitioner’s efforts and compliance with his OSUP, at his scheduled check-in on June 14,

2025, ICE detained him. (Id. at 17–18). A few days after his detention, on June 18, 2025,

an airline ticket to Vietnam was purchased for Petitioner for July 28, 2025. (Id. at 16).

Petitioner raises the following claims: Violation of Fifth Amendment Substantive

Due Process and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), based on Petitioner’s

prolonged detention (“Count One”); Violation of Fifth Amendment Substantive (Count

Two) and Procedural (Count Three) Due Process based on the improper revocation of

his OSUP; Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (Count Four); and Violation of

the Doctrine set forth in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260

(1954) (Count Five). (Doc. 1 at 18–29). As relief, he seeks, inter alia, immediate release

from immigration detention. (Id. at 30).

II. ANALYSIS

The Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to relief on Count One; thus, the Court

need not address his other claims. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689 n.10 (2004)

(declining to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after granting relief on

another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that claim would be

cumulative”); see, e.g., Pena-Gil v. Lyons, No. 25-CV-03268, 2025 WL 3268333, at *4 (D.

Colo. Nov. 24, 2025)1 (“Because the Court will grant petitioner’s petition on the basis of

his Zadvydas claims, . . . it need not reach petitioner’s remaining claims that contest

petitioner’s detention.”). Therefore, the following analysis focuses solely on Count One.2

Once an alien is ordered removed, immigration detention is governed by 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231. See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 544 (2021) (“§ 1231 explains

what to do if the alien is ordered removed.”); see also Deshati v. Noem, No. 25-cv-15940,

2025 WL 3204227, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2025) (“The statute governing post-final order

of removal immigration detention is 8 U.S.C. § 1231.”). Pursuant to § 1231(a)(1)(A),

“when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the

1 Although district court orders are not binding, they may be cited as persuasive

authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting

that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any other district court’s

determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects”).

2 Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments appear to focus on Petitioner’s claims

relating to the revocation of his OSUP. (Doc. 11 at 3–6). Any argument that the Court

lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Petitioner’s ripe Zadvydas claim is without merit.

United States within a period of 90 days.” During the removal period, detention is

mandatory. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A).

The Supreme Court has held that indefinite detention of aliens raises serious

constitutional concerns. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–99. Once an order of removal is

final, the government may continue to detain an alien only for a reasonable amount of

time. See id. at 699–701. The reasonableness of the detention is to be measured

“primarily in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence

at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held that

six months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien awaiting

deportation. Id. at 700–01. “Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears

to view the six-month period to include the 90-day removal period [from section

1231(a)(1)(A)] plus 90 days thereafter.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th

Cir. 2002).

After that six-month period has passed, if the alien “provides good reason to

believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.

at 1052 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). Thus, “in order to state a claim under

Zadvydas the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six

months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If an alien

makes these showings, then the burden shifts to the government to rebut the presumption

with sufficient evidence establishing that there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.

Here, ICE took Petitioner into custody on June 14, 2025, and he filed this case 184

days later on December 15, 2025. It is undisputed that Petitioner was in ICE custody

over six months at the time he filed this case. Thus, the Court must consider whether

Petitioner has “provide[d] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. In the

Petition, Petitioner explains that in 2008, the United States and Vietnam entered into a

memorandum of understanding in which Vietnam agreed to accept deportees only if they

entered the United States after July 12, 1995. (Doc. 1 at 13). But for individuals like

Petitioner, who entered prior to that date, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)

“cannot secure travel documents and cannot effectuate removal within a reasonably

foreseeable period.” (Id. at 14). He further explains that notwithstanding being ordered

removed in 2003, he has remained in the United States on an OSUP for more than twenty

years. (See id. at 15–16, 22). And despite Petitioner’s recent efforts in attempting to

obtain a passport to self-depart at ICE’s request, the consulate declined to issue him a

passport “citing his order of removal,” and he has now remained in ICE custody for over

six months with no progress on his removal. (Id. at 16).

Given the record, the Court finds that Petitioner has provided good reason to

believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future. Thus, the burden shifts to Respondents to “respond with evidence sufficient to

rebut that showing.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052.

Respondents contend that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future “based on the facts set forth in the” Declaration of

Deportation Officer Milciades Amparo Jr. (Doc. 11 at 7 (citing Doc. 11-2)). Officer Amparo

declares in pertinent part as follows. Petitioner entered the United States on February

16, 1992. In 1997, he was convicted in state court “for three counts of Burglary in the

third degree . . . and sentenced to three to eight years of imprisonment.” On February

11, 2003, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed from the United States to

Vietnam. On August 24, 2004, Petitioner was placed on an OSUP. During the more than

twenty years that followed, Petitioner missed two scheduled OSUP appointments on

December 3, 2019, and May 22, 2025. On May 23, 2025, DHS issued Petitioner a plan

for self-departure but then took him into custody on June 14, 2025. “On July 9, 2025,

Petitioner refused to complete an application for a travel document. At the time Petitioner

claimed he could not read or write and requested the assistance of his wife.”

Subsequently, on August 18, 2025, Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”)

determined that Petitioner’s continued detention was warranted based on his “criminal

history and the existence of a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future.” On August 25, 2025, ERO submitted an electronic travel document

request “for evaluation by the Detention and Deportation Officer . . . responsible for

Vietnam.” On September 11, 2025, an update was received indicating only that the

request was still pending. On October 12, 2025, and January 7, 2026,3 “ERO requested

a status update on” the travel document request, but apparently no update was provided.

Based on these facts, Officer Amparo concludes that “there is a significant likelihood that

Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (Doc. 11-2 at 2–4).

3 The Declaration includes a scrivener’s error with respect to the year. (See Doc.

11-2 at 3 (“On January 7, 2025 . . .”)).

Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner’s detention remains “reasonable under

Zadvydas given the [significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future]

to Vietnam,” (Doc. 11 at 7), is speculative and unsupported. Officer Amparo’s Declaration

merely explains that a travel document request was submitted on August 25, 2025, “for

evaluation by the Detention and Deportation Officer . . . responsible for Vietnam.” (Doc.

11-2 at 3). Although the travel document request was submitted approximately six months

ago, there has been no status update or indication that Vietnam has agreed to accept

Petitioner. Respondents have not provided any details about why a travel document has

not been obtained in the past twenty-plus years4 or whether there are changed

circumstances such that a travel document is likely to be obtained now. The approximate

six months that have passed since the submission of the request for a travel document—

with no substantive status update—weighs against Respondents’ position, and

Respondents otherwise fail to present any evidence showing that Petitioner’s removal is

any more likely now than it was when he was detained on June 14, 2025.

Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds Respondents have failed to

show a significant likelihood that Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable

future. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to release from detention under Zadvydas.

Therefore, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED as to Count One and otherwise DENIED

without prejudice as moot. Respondents shall release Petitioner within

24 hours of this Order, and they shall facilitate his transportation from the

4 Petitioner was ordered removed on February 11, 2003, and the Board of

Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal on July 21, 2004. (Doc. 11-2 at 3).

detention facility by notifying his counsel when and where he can be

collected.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment granting the Petition as to Count One and

otherwise denying the Petition without prejudice as moot, terminate any

pending motions, and close the file.°

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on February 25, 2026.

WENDY W. B

UNITED STATES T JUDG

C:

Counsel of Record

© Insofar as Petitioner requests attorney’s fees, he may make such a request in a

separate motion, if appropriate. See M.D. Fla. R. 7.01. Any such motion must be

supported by a memorandum of law.